

SCALES

MPC with Small Clients and Larger Ephemeral Servers

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MPC with Specialized Communication Patterns

[BGG+20,GHK+21,CGG+21,GMPS21,GHM+21,KRY22]

- Large pool of parties
- Short term workers
- Motivated by blockchain platforms

The YOSO Model [GHK+21]

- You Only Speak Once
 - Parties compute a message, erase state, send message to a receiver with unknown ID
- Avoid adaptive corruption
 - by not revealing identity until server sends a message

Existing YOSO protocols require

- **Target anonymous channels** [BGG+20, GHM+21]
- n-party **committees**, each with **honest majority**
- **Number of committees** proportional to **size of computation**

Our Contributions


- Define **SCALES**: an Ephemeral Servers model (clients speak twice)
- Construct a **SCALES protocol** in the **semi-honest model** using
 - Constant number of servers
 - All-but-one corruption (dishonest majority)
 - Without target anonymous channels (no PKI)
- Define and construct its **building-blocks**
 - Strong Key-and-Message Homomorphic Encryption
 - Rerandomizable Garbling Schemes
 - Incremental Decomposable Randomized Encodings

Also used to fix a gap in the proof of multi-hop FHE [GHV10]

Outline


- **SCALES**
- Rerandomizable Garbling Schemes
- Construction - RGCs
- A SCALES protocol

Server Pool




SCALES - the model

Server Pool



SCALES - the model

Server Pool




Clients




SCALES - the model

Server Pool




Clients




SCALES - the model

Server Pool




Clients




Append-only Bulletin Board

SCALES - the model

Server Pool




Clients




SCALES - the model

Server Pool




Clients



SCALES - the model

Server Pool


Clients



SCALES - the model


Server Pool

Clients





SCALES - the model

Server Pool




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


SCALES - the model

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


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


SCALES - the model

Server Pool



Clients



public decoding: $f(x)$



SCALES - the model

Semi-Honest Security

Servers	Clients
YOSO-style Adaptive Corruption	Adaptive Corruption
All-but-one Corruption (dishonest majority)	No restrictions (can collude with the servers)


Features of a SCALES Protocol

Ephemeral Servers	Small Clients
<p>One honest server overall</p> <p>Constant number of servers</p> <p>One message per server</p> <p>Compatible with just-in-time random self-selection</p>	<p>Computation proportional to its own input size and number of servers – independent of the full circuit or number of clients</p> <p>Can dynamically control when the protocol ends (by choosing when to post the second message)</p>
Public Output Decoding	

Outline


- SCALES
- **Rerandomizable Garbling Schemes**
- Construction - RGCs
- A SCALES protocol

Rerandomizable Garbling Schemes [BHR12]





Rerandomizable Garbling Schemes

What we want:



Rerandomizable Garbling Schemes



What we want:



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- **Construction - RGCs**
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
Rerandomizing a GC [GHV10]




Rerandomizing a GC [GHV10]

Recall: Each ciphertext in a garbled gate encrypts an output wire label under two input wire labels


To randomize: use Homomorphic Encryption




Rerandomizing a GC [GHV10]



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
Rerandomizing a GC [GHV10]



To randomize: use Homomorphic Encryption

Transform key and message:
Key & Message Homom. Enc.

Rerandomizing a GC [GHV10]





To randomize: use Homomorphic Encryption


Transform key and message:
Key & Message Homom. Enc.

Rerandomizable Garbling Schemes

Also need to specify how input labels are transformed (π)



Input Label Transformation



$$\begin{array}{ccc}
 \begin{array}{l} \text{Enc}(K_A^0, L_A^0) \\ \text{Enc}(K_A^1, L_A^1) \end{array} & \begin{array}{l} \text{Enc}(K_B^0, L_B^0) \\ \text{Enc}(K_B^1, L_B^1) \end{array} & \begin{array}{l} \text{Enc}(K_D^0, L_D^0) \\ \text{Enc}(K_D^1, L_D^1) \end{array}
 \end{array}$$

Used as the actual input labels

Input Label Transformation

$$\begin{array}{ccc} & A & \\ \text{Enc}(K_A^0, L_A^0 \cdot F_A) & & \text{Enc}(K_B^0, L_B^0 \cdot F_B) \\ \text{Enc}(K_A^1, L_A^1 \cdot F_A) & & \text{Enc}(K_B^1, L_B^1 \cdot F_B) \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{ccc} & B & \\ \text{Enc}(K_D^0, L_D^0 \cdot F_D) & & \\ \text{Enc}(K_D^1, L_D^1 \cdot F_D) & & \end{array}$$

Input Label Transformation

A		B		D
$\text{Enc}(K_A^0, L_A^0 \cdot F_A)$	$\text{Enc}(K_B^0, L_B^0 \cdot F_B)$	$\text{Enc}(K_D^0, L_D^0 \cdot F_D)$		
$\text{Enc}(K_A^1, L_A^1 \cdot F_A)$	$\text{Enc}(K_B^1, L_B^1 \cdot F_B)$	$\text{Enc}(K_D^1, L_D^1 \cdot F_D)$		


A		B		D
$\text{Enc}(K_A^0 + \sigma_A^0, L_A^0 \cdot F_A)$	$\text{Enc}(K_B^0 + \sigma_B^0, L_B^0 \cdot F_B)$	$\text{Enc}(K_D^0 + \sigma_D^0, L_D^0 \cdot F_D)$		
$\text{Enc}(K_A^1 + \sigma_A^1, L_A^1 \cdot F_A)$	$\text{Enc}(K_B^1 + \sigma_B^1, L_B^1 \cdot F_B)$	$\text{Enc}(K_D^1 + \sigma_D^1, L_D^1 \cdot F_D)$		

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
From RGS to SCALES

Building block 1: 2-round OT



From RGS to SCALES


Building block 1: 2-round OT




Building block 2: KMHE

From RGS to SCALES


Server Pool




Clients




From RGS to SCALES




From RGS to SCALES



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


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

Server Pool



Clients

public decoding:

using $X' = \{ L' \}$ and final F' ,
 $Ev(X', F') = f(x)$



Performance Comparison

	SCALES	YOSO
Setup	Bulletin-Board	Target-Anonymous Channels, PKI
Communication: clients servers number of rounds	2 1 constant	1 1 computation size
Computation: Clients servers	number of servers computation size	committee size committee size
Corruption (adaptive): servers clients	all-but-one arbitrary	honest majority in each committee arbitrary

Open Problems

Better KMHE schemes

Stronger security (malicious, GOD)

Sublinear RCS

Information theoretic iDRE