

Solving the Hidden Number Problem for CSIDH and CSURF via Automated Coppersmith



Jonas Meers



Julian Nowakowski

Ruhr University Bochum

December 7, 2023

Definition

A **group action** is a map

$$\star : \mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}, \quad (g, x) \mapsto g \star x$$

for group \mathcal{G} and set \mathcal{X} .

Definition

A **group action** is a map

$$\star : \mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}, \quad (g, x) \mapsto g \star x$$

for group \mathcal{G} and set \mathcal{X} .

Example

Exponentiation: $(a, h) \mapsto h^a$

Scalar multiplication: $(m, P) \mapsto [m]P$

Isogenies: $([\mathfrak{a}], E) \mapsto E/E[\mathfrak{a}]$

Motivation

Definition

A **group action** is a map

$$\star : \mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}, \quad (g, x) \mapsto g \star x$$

for group \mathcal{G} and set \mathcal{X} .

Example

Exponentiation: $(a, h) \mapsto h^a$

Scalar multiplication: $(m, P) \mapsto [m]P$

Isogenies: $([a], E) \mapsto E/E[a]$

Alice

$$a \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{G}$$

$$x_A = a \star x$$

Public:

$$\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{X}, x \in \mathcal{X}$$

Bob

$$b \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{G}$$

$$x_B = b \star x$$

Motivation

Definition

A **group action** is a map

$$\star : \mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}, \quad (g, x) \mapsto g \star x$$


for group \mathcal{G} and set \mathcal{X} .

Example

Exponentiation: $(a, h) \mapsto h^a$

Scalar multiplication: $(m, P) \mapsto [m]P$

Isogenies: $([a], E) \mapsto E/E[a]$



Motivation

Definition

A **group action** is a map

$$\star : \mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}, \quad (g, x) \mapsto g \star x$$


for group \mathcal{G} and set \mathcal{X} .

Example

Exponentiation: $(a, h) \mapsto h^a$

Scalar multiplication: $(m, P) \mapsto [m]P$

Isogenies: $([a], E) \mapsto E/E[a]$



Motivation

Definition

A **group action** is a map

$$\star : \mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}, \quad (g, x) \mapsto g \star x$$


for group \mathcal{G} and set \mathcal{X} .

Example

Exponentiation: $(a, h) \mapsto h^a$

Scalar multiplication: $(m, P) \mapsto [m]P$

Isogenies: $([a], E) \mapsto E/E[a]$



Definition

A **group action** is a map

$$\star : \mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}, \quad (g, x) \mapsto g \star x$$

for group \mathcal{G} and set \mathcal{X} .

Example

Exponentiation: $(a, h) \mapsto h^a$

Scalar multiplication: $(m, P) \mapsto [m]P$

Isogenies: $([a], E) \mapsto E/E[a]$

Hidden Number Problem

Given: Public elements x_A, x_B and access to a CDH-like oracle with fixed input x_A

$$\mathcal{O}_k(y) := \text{MSB}_k(a \star y)$$

Task: Recover $x_{AB} = \text{CDH}(x_A, x_B)$

Definition

A **group action** is a map

$$\star : \mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}, \quad (g, x) \mapsto g \star x$$

for group \mathcal{G} and set \mathcal{X} .

Example

Exponentiation: $(a, h) \mapsto h^a$

Scalar multiplication: $(m, P) \mapsto [m]P$

Isogenies: $([a], E) \mapsto E/E[a]$

Hidden Number Problem

Given: Public elements x_A, x_B and access to a CDH-like oracle with fixed input x_A

$$\mathcal{O}_k(y) := \text{MSB}_k(a \star y)$$

Task: Recover $x_{AB} = \text{CDH}(x_A, x_B)$

- Solutions for DH [BV96], EC-DH [BHH01] and SIDH [GPST16]
- CSIDH [CLM⁺18] and CSURF [CD20] are popular post-quantum secure group actions, but **no results** on HNP

1 Efficient heuristic PPT algorithm solving HNP for

- CSIDH: $k \approx 0.54 \log p$
- CSURF: $k \approx 0.76 \log p$
- Recovery works on any continuous block of missing bits
- Only 3 queries to the oracle



1 Efficient heuristic PPT algorithm solving HNP for

- CSIDH: $k \approx 0.54 \log p$
- CSURF: $k \approx 0.76 \log p$
- Recovery works on any continuous block of missing bits
- Only 3 queries to the oracle



2 Complete automation of Coppersmith's method

- Prior results required a lot of manual work
- Lattice optimization can be seen as a combinatorial problem that can be solved efficiently
- Implementation in Sage

Group Action

$$\star : \mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$$

- Set elements are elliptic curves in **Montgomery form**

$$E_M : y^2 = x^3 + Mx^2 + x, \quad M \in \mathbb{F}_p^* \setminus \{\pm 2\}$$

Group Action

$$\star : \mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$$

- Set elements are elliptic curves in **Montgomery form**

$$E_M : y^2 = x^3 + Mx^2 + x, \quad M \in \mathbb{F}_p^* \setminus \{\pm 2\}$$

- There is a group $\mathcal{G} = \langle g_1, \dots, g_n \rangle$ that acts on these curves via **isogenies**

Group Action

$$\star : \mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$$

Group Action

$$\star : \mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$$

- Set elements are elliptic curves in **Montgomery form**

$$E_M : y^2 = x^3 + Mx^2 + x, \quad M \in \mathbb{F}_p^* \setminus \{\pm 2\}$$

- There is a group $\mathcal{G} = \langle g_1, \dots, g_n \rangle$ that acts on these curves via **isogenies**
- For the generators g_i there exist efficient formulas that compute the group action

	CSIDH	CSURF
g_1	not available	$M' = (M + 6)/(2\sqrt{M + 2})$
g_2	$M' = -6x_P^3 + Mx_P^2 + 6x_P$	
g_3	$M' = x_P^2 x_{2P}^2 (M - 6(x_P + x_{2P} - x_P^{-1} - x_{2P}^{-1}))$	
\vdots	\vdots	

Group Action

$$\star : \mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$$

- Set elements are elliptic curves in **Montgomery form**

$$E_M : y^2 = x^3 + Mx^2 + x, \quad M \in \mathbb{F}_p^* \setminus \{\pm 2\}$$

- There is a group $\mathcal{G} = \langle g_1, \dots, g_n \rangle$ that acts on these curves via **isogenies**
- For the generators g_i there exist efficient formulas that compute the group action

	CSIDH	CSURF
g_1	not available	$M' = (M + 6)/(2\sqrt{M + 2})$
g_2	$M' = -6x_P^3 + Mx_P^2 + 6x_P$	
g_3	$M' = x_P^2 x_{2P}^2 (M - 6(x_P + x_{2P} - x_P^{-1} - x_{2P}^{-1}))$	
\vdots	\vdots	

- In practice: iteratively apply the action of the generators to get $E_{M'} = \left(\prod_{i=1}^n g_i^{e_i}\right) \star E_M$

Hidden Number Problem

Given: Public curves E_A , E_B and oracle

$$\mathcal{O}_k(E) := \text{MSB}_k(a \star E)$$

Task: Recover E_{AB}

Hidden Number Problem

Given: Public curves E_A , E_B and oracle

$$\mathcal{O}_k(E) := \text{MSB}_k(a \star E)$$


Task: Recover E_{AB}

Observation

For a fixed generator g_i the repeated action

$$g_i \star E, \quad g_i^2 \star E, \quad g_i^3 \star E, \quad \dots$$

forms a **cycle**¹.



¹More precisely, there could be *multiple* disjoint cycles.

Hidden Number Problem

Given: Public curves E_A , E_B and oracle

$$\mathcal{O}_k(E) := \text{MSB}_k(a \star E)$$


Task: Recover E_{AB}

Observation

For a fixed generator g_i the repeated action

$$g_i \star E, \quad g_i^2 \star E, \quad g_i^3 \star E, \quad \dots$$

forms a **cycle**¹.



¹More precisely, there could be *multiple* disjoint cycles.

Hidden Number Problem

Given: Public curves E_A , E_B and oracle

$$\mathcal{O}_k(E) := \text{MSB}_k(a \star E)$$


Task: Recover E_{AB}

Observation

For a fixed generator g_i the repeated action

$$g_i \star E, \quad g_i^2 \star E, \quad g_i^3 \star E, \quad \dots$$

forms a **cycle**¹.



¹More precisely, there could be *multiple* disjoint cycles.

Hidden Number Problem

Given: Public curves E_A , E_B and oracle

$$\mathcal{O}_k(E) := \text{MSB}_k(a \star E)$$


Task: Recover E_{AB}

Observation

For a fixed generator g_i the repeated action

$$g_i \star E, \quad g_i^2 \star E, \quad g_i^3 \star E, \quad \dots$$

forms a **cycle**¹.



¹More precisely, there could be *multiple* disjoint cycles.

Hidden Number Problem

Given: Public curves E_A , E_B and oracle

$$\mathcal{O}_k(E) := \text{MSB}_k(a \star E)$$


Task: Recover E_{AB}

Observation

For a fixed generator g_i the repeated action

$$g_i \star E, \quad g_i^2 \star E, \quad g_i^3 \star E, \quad \dots$$

forms a **cycle**¹.



¹More precisely, there could be *multiple* disjoint cycles.

Hidden Number Problem

Given: Public curves E_A , E_B and oracle

$$\mathcal{O}_k(E) := \text{MSB}_k(a \star E)$$


Task: Recover E_{AB}

Observation

For a fixed generator g_i the repeated action

$$g_i \star E, \quad g_i^2 \star E, \quad g_i^3 \star E, \quad \dots$$

forms a **cycle**¹.



¹More precisely, there could be *multiple* disjoint cycles.

Hidden Number Problem

Given: Public curves E_A, E_B and oracle

$$\mathcal{O}_k(E) := \text{MSB}_k(a \star E)$$


Task: Recover E_{AB}

Observation

For a fixed generator g_i the repeated action

$$g_i \star E, \quad g_i^2 \star E, \quad g_i^3 \star E, \quad \dots$$

forms a **cycle**¹.



¹More precisely, there could be *multiple* disjoint cycles.

Hidden Number Problem

Given: Public curves E_A , E_B and oracle

$$\mathcal{O}_k(E) := \text{MSB}_k(a \star E)$$

Task: Recover E_{AB}


Observation

For a fixed generator g_i the repeated action

$$g_i \star E, \quad g_i^2 \star E, \quad g_i^3 \star E, \quad \dots$$


forms a **cycle**¹.

🔍 By abusing **commutativity** we can explore the neighborhood of E_{AB}




¹More precisely, there could be *multiple* disjoint cycles.

CSURF




CSURF



	CSIDH	CSURF
g_1	not available	$M' = (M + 6)/(2\sqrt{M + 2})$
g_2	$M' = -6x_P^3 + Mx_P^2 + 6x_P$	
g_3	$M' = x_P^2 x_{2P}^2 (M - 6(x_P + x_{2P} - x_P^{-1} - x_{2P}^{-1}))$	
\vdots	\vdots	\vdots

CSURF




From the group element g_1 we get a **system of equations**:

$$M_L^2 + 12M_L - 4M^2M_L - 8M^2 + 36 \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$$

$$M^2 + 12M - 4M_R^2M - 8M_R^2 + 36 \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$$

CSURF



From the group element g_1 we get a **system of equations**:

$$M_L^2 + 12M_L - 4M^2M_L - 8M^2 + 36 \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$$


$$M^2 + 12M - 4M_R^2M - 8M_R^2 + 36 \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$$

Observation

$$M = \underbrace{M_{\text{TOP}} \cdot 2^{n-k}}_{\text{MSBs, shifted}} + \underbrace{M_{\text{BOT}}}_{\text{Unknown LSBs}} \text{ over } \mathbb{F}_p$$

Neighborhood Relation


CSURF



From the group element g_1 we get a **system of equations**:

$$M_L^2 + 12M_L - 4M^2 M_L - 8M^2 + 36 \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$$

$$M^2 + 12M - 4M_R^2 M - 8M_R^2 + 36 \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$$


 The system has a **small** solution in the missing bits of E_L , E , E_R

Observation


$$M = \underbrace{M_{\text{TOP}} \cdot 2^{n-k}}_{\text{MSBs, shifted}} + \underbrace{M_{\text{BOT}}}_{\text{Unknown LSBs}} \text{ over } \mathbb{F}_p$$

Neighborhood Relation

CSURF




CSIDH



From the group element g_1 we get a **system of equations**:


$$M_L^2 + 12M_L - 4M^2 M_L - 8M^2 + 36 \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$$

$$M^2 + 12M - 4M_R^2 M - 8M_R^2 + 36 \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$$

 The system has a **small** solution in the missing bits of E_L , E , E_R

Neighborhood Relation


CSURF



From the group element g_1 we get a **system of equations**:

$$M_L^2 + 12M_L - 4M^2M_L - 8M^2 + 36 \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$$

$$M^2 + 12M - 4M_R^2M - 8M_R^2 + 36 \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$$

 The system has a **small** solution in the missing bits of E_L , E , E_R


CSIDH



There exists a group element g' of **order 3**

$$g' = \prod g_i$$


CSURF




From the group element g_1 we get a **system of equations**:

$$M_L^2 + 12M_L - 4M^2 M_L - 8M^2 + 36 \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$$

$$M^2 + 12M - 4M_R^2 M - 8M_R^2 + 36 \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$$

 The system has a **small** solution in the missing bits of E_L , E , E_R

CSIDH




There exists a group element g' of **order 3**

$$g' = \prod g_i$$

Neighborhood Relation


CSURF




From the group element g_1 we get a **system of equations**:

$$M_L^2 + 12M_L - 4M^2M_L - 8M^2 + 36 \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$$

$$M^2 + 12M - 4M_R^2M - 8M_R^2 + 36 \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$$

 The system has a **small** solution in the missing bits of E_L , E , E_R

CSIDH




There exists a group element g' of **order 3**

$$g' = \prod g_i$$

Action of g' [OT20]

$$M' = 2 \frac{M - 6}{M + 2}$$


CSURF




From the group element g_1 we get a **system of equations**:

$$M_L^2 + 12M_L - 4M^2M_L - 8M^2 + 36 \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$$

$$M^2 + 12M - 4M_R^2M - 8M_R^2 + 36 \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$$

 The system has a **small** solution in the missing bits of E_L , E , E_R

CSIDH



There exists a group element g' of **order 3**

$$g' = \prod g_i$$

We get the following **system of equations**:


$$2M - MM_L - 2M_L - 12 \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$$

$$2M_R - MM_R - 2M - 12 \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$$

$$2M_L - M_LM_R - 2M_R - 12 \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$$

Neighborhood Relation


CSURF




From the group element g_1 we get a **system of equations**:


$$M_L^2 + 12M_L - 4M^2M_L - 8M^2 + 36 \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$$

$$M^2 + 12M - 4M_R^2M - 8M_R^2 + 36 \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$$

 The system has a **small** solution in the missing bits of E_L , E , E_R

 Apply the same trick to get a system with a small solution

CSIDH



There exists a group element g' of **order 3**

$$g' = \prod g_i$$

We get the following **system of equations**:

$$2M - MM_L - 2M_L - 12 \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$$

$$2M_R - MM_R - 2M - 12 \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$$

$$2M_L - M_LM_R - 2M_R - 12 \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$$

Coppersmith-type Problem

Given:

- Polynomials $f_1, \dots, f_n \in \mathbb{Z}[x_1, \dots, x_k]$,
- bounds $X_1, \dots, X_k \in \mathbb{N}$,
- modulus $p \in \mathbb{N}$.

Find:

- All **small roots** $r = (r_1, \dots, r_k) \in \mathbb{Z}^k$ with
 - $f_i(r_1, \dots, r_k) \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$, and
 - $|r_i| \leq X_i$.

Coppersmith-type Problem

Given:

- Polynomials $f_1, \dots, f_n \in \mathbb{Z}[x_1, \dots, x_k]$,
- bounds $X_1, \dots, X_k \in \mathbb{N}$,
- modulus $p \in \mathbb{N}$.

Find:

- All **small roots** $r = (r_1, \dots, r_k) \in \mathbb{Z}^k$ with
 - $f_i(r_1, \dots, r_k) \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$, and
 - $|r_i| \leq X_i$.

Strategy:

- Fix $m \in \mathbb{N}$ and define **shift-polynomials**

$$f_1^{i_1} \cdot \dots \cdot f_n^{i_n} \cdot x_1^{j_1} \cdot \dots \cdot x_k^{j_k} \cdot p^{m \cdot n - (i_1 + \dots + i_n)}$$

- Select **suitable** subset \mathcal{F} of shift-polynomials and use it to construct a lattice
- Use **lattice reduction** (LLL) to find (r_1, \dots, r_k)

📖 The performance **strongly** depends on the choice for \mathcal{F}

Coppersmith-type Problem

Given:

- Polynomials $f_1, \dots, f_n \in \mathbb{Z}[x_1, \dots, x_k]$,
- bounds $X_1, \dots, X_k \in \mathbb{N}$,
- modulus $p \in \mathbb{N}$.

Find:

- All **small roots** $r = (r_1, \dots, r_k) \in \mathbb{Z}^k$ with
 - $f_i(r_1, \dots, r_k) \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$, and
 - $|r_i| \leq X_i$.

Problem

How to select the shift-polynomials in \mathcal{F} ?

Strategy:

- Fix $m \in \mathbb{N}$ and define **shift-polynomials**

$$f_1^{i_1} \cdot \dots \cdot f_n^{i_n} \cdot x_1^{j_1} \cdot \dots \cdot x_k^{j_k} \cdot p^{m \cdot n - (i_1 + \dots + i_n)}$$

- Select **suitable** subset \mathcal{F} of shift-polynomials and use it to construct a lattice
- Use **lattice reduction** (LLL) to find (r_1, \dots, r_k)

📖 The performance **strongly** depends on the choice for \mathcal{F}

Problem

How large can the bounds X_1, \dots, X_k be?

Coppersmith-type Problem

Given:


- Polynomials $f_1, \dots, f_n \in \mathbb{Z}[x_1, \dots, x_k]$,
- bounds $X_1, \dots, X_k \in \mathbb{N}$,
- modulus $p \in \mathbb{N}$.

Find:

- All **small roots** $r = (r_1, \dots, r_k) \in \mathbb{Z}^k$ with
 - $f_i(r_1, \dots, r_k) \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$, and
 - $|r_i| \leq X_i$.

Observation 1

\mathcal{F} only depends on a **single** shift-polynomial (for which there even exists a canonical candidate).


 Given a single shift-polynomial, a locally optimal \mathcal{F} can be constructed **automatically**

Strategy:

- Fix $m \in \mathbb{N}$ and define **shift-polynomials**

$$f_1^{i_1} \cdot \dots \cdot f_n^{i_n} \cdot x_1^{j_1} \cdot \dots \cdot x_k^{j_k} \cdot p^{m \cdot n - (i_1 + \dots + i_n)}$$

- Select **suitable** subset \mathcal{F} of shift-polynomials and use it to construct a lattice
- Use **lattice reduction** (LLL) to find (r_1, \dots, r_k)

 The performance **strongly** depends on the choice for \mathcal{F}

Problem

How large can the bounds X_1, \dots, X_k be?

Coppersmith-type Problem

Given:


- Polynomials $f_1, \dots, f_n \in \mathbb{Z}[x_1, \dots, x_k]$,
- bounds $X_1, \dots, X_k \in \mathbb{N}$,
- modulus $p \in \mathbb{N}$.

Find:

- All **small roots** $r = (r_1, \dots, r_k) \in \mathbb{Z}^k$ with
 - $f_i(r_1, \dots, r_k) \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$, and
 - $|r_i| \leq X_i$.

Observation 1

\mathcal{F} only depends on a **single** shift-polynomial (for which there even exists a canonical candidate).


 Given a single shift-polynomial, a locally optimal \mathcal{F} can be constructed **automatically**

Strategy:

- Fix $m \in \mathbb{N}$ and define **shift-polynomials**



$$f_1^{i_1} \cdot \dots \cdot f_n^{i_n} \cdot x_1^{j_1} \cdot \dots \cdot x_k^{j_k} \cdot p^{m \cdot n - (i_1 + \dots + i_n)}$$

- Select **suitable** subset \mathcal{F} of shift-polynomials and use it to construct a lattice
- Use **lattice reduction** (LLL) to find (r_1, \dots, r_k)

 The performance **strongly** depends on the choice for \mathcal{F}

Observation 2

We can use **polynomial interpolation** to derive bounds X_1, \dots, X_k automatically.

- We solved the **Hidden Number Problem** for CSIDH and CSURF
 - CSIDH: Given 54%, recover remaining 46% 
 - CSURF: Given 76%, recover remaining 24% 
- Recovery strongly benefits from a **small order subgroup** in the CSIDH setting
- **Combinatorial reformulation** of Coppersmith that allows for complete automation
- Open source **Sage implementation** available at github.com/juliannowakowski/automated-coppersmith



<https://ia.cr/2023/1409>

- [BHH01] Dan Boneh, Shai Halevi, and Nick Howgrave-Graham. The modular inversion hidden number problem. In Colin Boyd, editor, *ASIACRYPT 2001*, volume 2248 of *LNCS*, pages 36–51. Springer, Heidelberg, December 2001.
- [BV96] Dan Boneh and Ramarathnam Venkatesan. Hardness of computing the most significant bits of secret keys in Diffie-Hellman and related schemes. In Neal Koblitz, editor, *CRYPTO'96*, volume 1109 of *LNCS*, pages 129–142. Springer, Heidelberg, August 1996.
- [CD20] Wouter Castryck and Thomas Decru. CSIDH on the surface. In Jintai Ding and Jean-Pierre Tillich, editors, *Post-Quantum Cryptography - 11th International Conference, PQCrypto 2020*, pages 111–129. Springer, Heidelberg, 2020.
- [CLM⁺18] Wouter Castryck, Tanja Lange, Chloe Martindale, Lorenz Panny, and Joost Renes. CSIDH: An efficient post-quantum commutative group action. In Thomas Peyrin and Steven Galbraith, editors, *ASIACRYPT 2018, Part III*, volume 11274 of *LNCS*, pages 395–427. Springer, Heidelberg, December 2018.
- [GPST16] Steven D. Galbraith, Christophe Petit, Barak Shani, and Yan Bo Ti. On the security of supersingular isogeny cryptosystems. In Jung Hee Cheon and Tsuyoshi Takagi, editors, *ASIACRYPT 2016, Part I*, volume 10031 of *LNCS*, pages 63–91. Springer, Heidelberg, December 2016.

- [OT20] Hiroshi Onuki and Tsuyoshi Takagi. On collisions related to an ideal class of order 3 in CSIDH. In Kazumaro Aoki and Akira Kanaoka, editors, *IWSEC 20*, volume 12231 of *LNCS*, pages 131–148. Springer, Heidelberg, September 2020.