

The Pre-Shared Key Modes of HPKE

Joël Alwen¹, Jonas Janneck², Eike Kiltz², Benjamin Lipp³


¹AWS-Wickr, ²Ruhr-Universität Bochum, ³Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy

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- 1 Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE)
- 2 Modeling Pre-Shared Key (PSK) Modes of HPKE
- 3 Security
- 4 Post-Quantum Security


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Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE)




- Follows KEM/DEM paradigm

Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE)




- Follows KEM/DEM paradigm
- Published as RFC 9180 by the Internet Research Task Force [BBLW22]
- Used in TLS 1.3 Encrypted Client Hello Extension, Message Layer Security (MLS), Oblivious DNS over HTTPS, ...

HPKE – Base Mode




HPKE – Base Mode




Mode	Sender Key	PSK	Primitive	Security	Source
HPKE _{Base}	–	–	PKE	CCA	folklore

HPKE – Auth Mode



Mode	Sender Key	PSK	Primitive	Security	Source
HPKE _{Base}	–	–	PKE	CCA	folklore
HPKE _{Auth}	✓	–	APKE	Insider-CCA & Outsider-Auth	[ABH ⁺ 21]

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HPKE _{PSK}	–	✓	?	?	

HPKE – AuthPSK Mode

Sender
 sk_S, pk_S, psk

Receiver
 sk_R, pk_R, psk

$$c \leftarrow \text{pskAEnc}(sk_S, pk_R, psk, m)$$

c

$$m \leftarrow \text{pskADec}(pk_S, sk_R, psk, c)$$

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HPKE _{PSK}	–	✓	?	?	
HPKE _{AuthPSK}	✓	✓	?	?	

Filling the Gaps

- 1 Modeling syntax and security of PSK modes
- 2 Proving security (confidentiality and authenticity)

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HPKE _{AuthPSK}	✓	✓	pskAPKE	Insider-CCA & Outsider-Auth	This work

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pskPKE := (GenSK, GenPSK, pskEnc, pskDec)

- $(sk, pk) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{GenSK}$
- $psk \xleftarrow{\$} \text{GenPSK}$
- $c \xleftarrow{\$} \text{pskEnc}(pk_R, psk, m)$
- $m \leftarrow \text{pskDec}(sk_R, psk, c)$


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pskAPKE := (GenSK, GenPSK, pskAEnc, pskADec)


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Outsider-Auth for APKE [ABH⁺21]

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
Outsider-Auth for APKE [ABH⁺21]



Winning condition:

- Fresh and valid ciphertext
- Sender secret key corresponding to c^* is not corrupted

Outsider-Auth for pskAPKE



Winning condition:

- Fresh and valid ciphertext
- Sender secret key **and pre-shared key** corresponding to c^* are **not both** corrupted

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Four generic composition theorems for hybrid constructions

Primitive	Confidentiality	Authenticity
pskPKE		
pskAPKE		


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
Primitive	Confidentiality	Authenticity
pskPKE	Thm. 1 CCA	Thm. 2 Auth
pskAPKE	Thm. 3 Insider – CCA <small>(implies Outsider-CCA)</small>	Thm. 4 Outsider – Auth

Mode HPKE_{PSK} :



Security – pskPKE

Mode HPKE_{PSK} :




Theorem 1 (CCA security)

KEM CCA + KS dual-PRF + AEAD CCA \Rightarrow pskPKE CCA

Security – pskPKE

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
KEM CCA + KS dual-PRF + AEAD CCA \Rightarrow pskPKE CCA

Theorem 2 (Auth security)

KEM CCA + KS dual-PRF + AEAD INT-CTXT \Rightarrow pskPKE Auth


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Mode $\text{HPKE}_{\text{AuthPSK}}$:



Security – pskAPKE

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


Theorem 3 (Insider-CCA security)

AKEM Insider-CCA + **KS dual-PRF** + **AEAD CCA** \Rightarrow **pskAPKE Insider-CCA**

Security – pskAPKE

Mode $\text{HPKE}_{\text{AuthPSK}}$:




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
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Theorem 4 (Outsider-Auth security)


AKEM Outsider-CCA + **AKEM Outsider-Auth** + **KS dual-PRF** + **AEAD INT-CTXT** \Rightarrow **pskAPKE Outsider-Auth**

RFC Specification: HPKE_{PSK}







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
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- (3) AEAD: AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305 fulfilling IND-CPA and INT-CTXT security [BT16, DGGP21]




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
(1) + (2) + (3) $\stackrel{\text{Thm.1+2}}{\Rightarrow}$ **CCA and Auth**

RFC Specification: $\text{HPKE}_{\text{AuthPSK}}$






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(1) + (2) + (3) $\stackrel{\text{Thm. 3+4}}{\Rightarrow}$ **Insider-CCA and Outsider-Auth**

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- We need the underlying primitives to be post-quantum secure
 - KEM ✓
 - AKEM ?

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 - KEM ✓
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- We introduce two AKEM constructions:
 - KEM + Signature + Hash (PRF)
 - NIKE + Hash (PRF)

Classical/Post-Quantum Hybrid


- Goal: Build a classical/post-quantum hybrid (A)PKE
- Relies on classical (C) and post-quantum (PQ) assumptions

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- Relies on classical (C) and post-quantum (PQ) assumptions
- Direct plug-in construction from HPKE PSK modes::


PQ KEM + pskPKE \Rightarrow C/PQ PKE

PQ AKEM + pskAPKE \Rightarrow C/PQ APKE


Hybrid From HPKE PSK Modes



Hybrid From HPKE PSK Modes



Hybrid From HPKE PSK Modes



Theorem 5

If KS, AEAD, and (AKEM or AKEM') are secure, then APKE is secure.

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- Security model for pskPKE and pskAPKE

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Credit: [Mas09]

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- Security proofs of pre-shared key modes of HPKE
- Two post-quantum AKEM constructions
- Post-quantum security and plug-in hybrid construction



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Credit: [Mas09]

-  Joël Alwen, Bruno Blanchet, Eduard Hauck, Eike Kiltz, Benjamin Lipp, and Doreen Riepel. **Analysing the HPKE standard.**
In Anne Canteaut and François-Xavier Standaert, editors, *EUROCRYPT 2021, Part I*, volume 12696 of *LNCS*, pages 87–116. Springer, Heidelberg, October 2021.
-  Richard L. Barnes, Karthik Bhargavan, Benjamin Lipp, and Christopher A. Wood. **Hybrid public key encryption.**
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Jean Paul Degabriele, Jérôme Govinden, Felix Günther, and Kenneth G Paterson.

The security of chacha20-poly1305 in the multi-user setting.

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Luca Mascarò.

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[Online; accessed 28-November-2023].