The Indifferentiability of the Duplex and its Practical Applications

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Outline

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1 Background

2 Indifferentiability of the Duplex from the Online Random Oracle

3 Applications of the Indifferentiability of the Duplex

Background

Indistinguishability vs. Indifferentiability

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Indistinguishability



Indistinguishability vs. Indifferentiability

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

- Focused on a specific property

Indistinguishability vs. Indifferentiability

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

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

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Indifferentiability [MRH04]



Indistinguishability vs. Indifferentiability

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

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

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

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

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

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

- Used to build an ideal primitive *R*
- For (un)keyed constructions
- Covers multiple security properties

Composability [MRH04]

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If *C* **is indifferentiable from** *R*,
then, in the p-model, it **has the same security properties** as *R*.

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

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

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

Composability [MRH04]
Full Domain Hash (FDH) Example

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

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

→ C and R need to share the **same interface**

Indifferentiability from Idealized Model

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Primitive *C*	**Idealized Model** *R*
Hash Function	Random Oracle [Bellare and Rogaway, *ACM CCS 93*]
Block Cipher	Ideal Cipher [Holenstein, Künzler, and Tessaro, *43rd ACM STOC*] [Andreeva et al., *CRYPTO 2013, Part I*]
Authenticated Encryption	Random Injection [Barbosa and Farshim, *CRYPTO 2018, Part I*]

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Duplex	??

The Sponge Construction [Ber+08]

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

- Basis of multiple NIST standards:
  - SHA-3, cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash, ParallelHash

The Sponge Construction [Ber+08]



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

- Basis of multiple NIST standards:
  - SHA-3, cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash, ParallelHash
- Based on a public random permutation p
- Indifferentiable from a Random Oracle with bound $\mathcal{O}\left(\frac{q^2}{2^c}\right)$ [Ber+08]

The Duplex Construction [Ber+12]



- Allows the construction of one-pass AEAD schemes

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

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- Basis of multiple AEAD candidates of the CAESAR & NIST competitions

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

- Allows the construction of one-pass AEAD schemes
- Basis of multiple AEAD candidates of the CAESAR & NIST competitions
- Stateful construction that supersedes the Sponge

[Ber+12] Security Analysis

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→ Reduces an instance of the Duplex to a sequence of Sponge calls



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



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



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







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





The Full-State Keyed Duplex [MRV15]

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

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

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

- Newer work focuses on the indistinguishability of the keyed Duplex
- Better bounds
- Improved absorption performance

The Duplex as a General-Purpose Primitive

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Used for:

- **Authenticated Encryption/AEAD**

The Duplex as a General-Purpose Primitive

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$\rightarrow$ Need an idealized model for the Duplex

Indifferentiability of the Duplex from the Online Random Oracle

Limitations of [Ber+12] Security Analysis







- Mismatching interface → cannot directly apply composition thm

Limitations of [Ber+12] Security Analysis







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





- Mismatching interface → cannot directly apply composition thm
- Needs an extra step
- Needs sponge-compliant padding in every call to p within the Duplex

Indifferentiability from Idealized Model

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Primitive *C*	**Idealized Model** *R*
Hash Function	Random Oracle [Bellare and Rogaway, *ACM CCS 93*]
Block Cipher	Ideal Cipher [Holenstein, Künzler, and Tessaro, *43rd ACM STOC*] [Andreeva et al., *CRYPTO 2013, Part I*]
Authenticated Encryption	Random Injection [Barbosa and Farshim, *CRYPTO 2018, Part I*]
Duplex	Online Random Oracle (ORO) [This work]

The Online Random Oracle (ORO)



- Stateful & Online primitive

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

- Stateful & Online primitive
- To each query, we associate a path and we keep a table for mapping paths to answers
- The path corresponding to init is X_0
- The path corresponding to next is $X_0 \| X_1 \| \cdots \| X_i$
- The answer associated with a path is sampled at random once

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

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- We updated the syntax to supports multiple concurrent sessions

The Duplex is Indifferentiable from the ORO

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The Duplex



The ORO



- We show that **the Duplex is indifferentiable from the ORO** with bound $\mathcal{O}\left(\frac{q^2}{2^c}\right)$

The Duplex is Indifferentiable from the ORO

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The Duplex



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

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- We give a **proof using the code-based framework** from Bellare–Rogaway

The Duplex is Indifferentiable from the ORO

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

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

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The Duplex is Indifferentiable from the ORO

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

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

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- We obtain an **efficient simulator**
- No padding required

Full-State Duplex is Differentiable from the ORO

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The Full-State Duplex



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

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

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

- The full string Y is recoverable in the real world through the access to p

Full-State Duplex is Differentiable from the ORO

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

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

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

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

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- In the ideal world, the input path to the ORO will be different

Applications of the Indifferentiability of the Duplex

A Nonce-Based Variant of SpongeWrap



- Classical AEAD template

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

- Classical AEAD template
- Satisfied plain AEAD security

KDM-AEAD, RKA-AEAD and CMT-AEAD Security

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We prove the following **stronger security** for SpongeWrap in the **ORO model**:

KDM-AEAD, RKA-AEAD and CMT-AEAD Security

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We prove the following **stronger security** for SpongeWrap in the **ORO model**:

- KDM-AEAD: **key-dependent message** security, i.e., when $M = \Phi(K)$
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- RKA-AEAD: **related-key attacks** security, i.e., when $K' = \Phi(K)$
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- CMT-AEAD: **commitment** security
  $\rightarrow$ useful for message franking, key rotation

Benefits of the ORO Model

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- The ORO model makes the proof **simpler** and **more intuitive**

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- Allow us to **bypass a complex analysis** in the random-permutation model
- We obtain the **first one-pass** AEAD scheme to **achieve KDM-AEAD, RKA-AEAD and CMT-AEAD** security

Future Work

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- Prove **KDM**, **RKA** and **CMT** security **for other primitives** based on the Duplex such as PRF and MAC

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Full version available soon on IACR ePrint

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