Microsoft 🛛 NTNU | Norweg

Norwegian University of Science and Technology



# **Cryptographic Smooth Neighbors**

≜UCI

Giacomo Bruno <sup>1</sup> Maria Corte-Real Santos <sup>2</sup> Craig Costello <sup>3</sup> Jonathan Komada Eriksen <sup>4</sup> Michael Meyer <sup>5</sup> Michael Naehrig <sup>3</sup> Bruno Sterner <sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup>IKARUS Security Software, <sup>2</sup>University College London, <sup>3</sup>Microsoft Research, <sup>4</sup>Norwegian University of Science and Technology, <sup>5</sup>University of Regensburg, <sup>6</sup>University of Surrey

Talk at Asiacrypt 2023

ÓIKARUS

we provide security



### **Consecutive Integers**

1

1524094380979073513389817855 1524094380979073513389817856

÷

 $1524094380979073513389817850 = 2 \cdot 3 \cdot 5^2 \cdot 21490061513 \cdot 472805961973663$  $1524094380979073513389817851 = 11^2 \cdot 5009 \cdot 131009 \cdot 42319423 \cdot 453559837$  $1524094380979073513389817852 = 2^2 \cdot 433 \cdot 879962113729257224820911$  $1524094380979073513389817855 = 5 \cdot 17 \cdot 19^2 \cdot 31^2 \cdot 37^2 \cdot 53 \cdot 79^2 \cdot 139^2 \cdot 157 \cdot 191 \cdot 197$  $1524094380979073513389817856 = 2^{19} \cdot 3^2 \cdot 7 \cdot 13^2 \cdot 23 \cdot 41 \cdot 43 \cdot 103 \cdot 109 \cdot 113 \cdot 149 \cdot 179 \cdot 199$  $1524094380979073513389817860 = 2^2 \cdot 5 \cdot 181 \cdot 421020547231788263367353$  $1524004380070073513380817861 - 101 \cdot 1087 \cdot 42437 \cdot 1007461 \cdot 163064284070$ 

For an integer B, we say that a pair of consecutive integers, (r, r + 1), are B-smooth twins if their product r(r + 1) is B-smooth, i.e. q prime and  $q | r(r + 1) \implies q \leq B$ .

For an integer B, we say that a pair of consecutive integers, (r, r + 1), are B-smooth twins if their product r(r + 1) is B-smooth, i.e. q prime and  $q | r(r + 1) \implies q \le B$ .

For instance, the following are 7-smooth twins:

 $r = 4374 = 2 \cdot 3^7$ , and  $r + 1 = 4375 = 5^4 \cdot 7$ 

For an integer B, we say that a pair of consecutive integers, (r, r + 1), are B-smooth twins if their product r(r + 1) is B-smooth, i.e. q prime and  $q | r(r + 1) \implies q \le B$ .

For instance, the following are 7-smooth twins:

$$r = 4374 = 2 \cdot 3^7$$
, and  $r + 1 = 4375 = 5^4 \cdot 7$ 

For a fixed B, Størmer (1897) proved the set of B-smooth twins is finite!

For an integer B, we say that a pair of consecutive integers, (r, r + 1), are B-smooth twins if their product r(r + 1) is B-smooth, i.e. q prime and  $q | r(r + 1) \implies q \le B$ .

For instance, the following are 7-smooth twins:

$$r = 4374 = 2 \cdot 3^7$$
, and  $r + 1 = 4375 = 5^4 \cdot 7$ 

For a fixed B, Størmer (1897) proved the set of B-smooth twins is finite!

For an integer B, we say that a pair of consecutive integers, (r, r + 1), are B-smooth twins if their product r(r + 1) is B-smooth, i.e. q prime and  $q | r(r + 1) \implies q \le B$ .

For instance, the following are 7-smooth twins:

 $r = 4374 = 2 \cdot 3^7$ , and  $r + 1 = 4375 = 5^4 \cdot 7$ 

For a fixed B, Størmer (1897) proved the set of B-smooth twins is finite!

Many applications: isogeny-based cryptography (e.g. SQISign)

### Twin smooth integers





➤ Pell equations

≻ CHM algorithm

➤ PTE sieve



➤ Pell equations

➤ CHM algorithm

➤ PTE sieve





We revisit the CHM algorithm to find record size twin smooth integers and use these twins to find new parameters for the isogeny-based cryptosystem SQISign

Isogeny-based protocols

New SQISign parameters



An algorithm devised by Conrey, Holmstrom and McLaughlin (2012) that finds *almost all B*-smooth twins

An algorithm devised by Conrey, Holmstrom and McLaughlin (2012) that finds *almost all B*-smooth twins

≻  $S^{(0)} = \{1, 2, \cdots, B-1\}$  - representing *B*-smooth twins  $(1, 2), (2, 3), \cdots, (B-1, B)$ 

An algorithm devised by Conrey, Holmstrom and McLaughlin (2012) that finds *almost all B*-smooth twins

≻  $S^{(0)} = \{1, 2, \cdots, B-1\}$  - representing *B*-smooth twins  $(1, 2), (2, 3), \cdots, (B-1, B)$ 

➤ For each  $r, s \in S^{(0)}$  with r < s compute

$$rac{t}{t'} = rac{r}{r+1} \cdot rac{s+1}{s}$$
 with  $\gcd(t,t') = 1$ 

An algorithm devised by Conrey, Holmstrom and McLaughlin (2012) that finds almost all *B*-smooth twins

>  $S^{(0)} = \{1, 2, \cdots, B-1\}$  - representing *B*-smooth twins  $(1, 2), (2, 3), \cdots, (B-1, B)$ 

▶ For each  $r, s \in S^{(0)}$  with r < s compute

$$rac{t}{r'} = rac{r}{r+1} \cdot rac{s+1}{s}$$
 with  $\gcd(t,t') = 1$ 

 $\succ$   $S^{(1)} := S^{(0)} \cup \{$ new solutions  $t : t' = t + 1 \}$ 

An algorithm devised by Conrey, Holmstrom and McLaughlin (2012) that finds almost all *B*-smooth twins

- >  $S^{(0)} = \{1, 2, \cdots, B-1\}$  representing *B*-smooth twins  $(1, 2), (2, 3), \cdots, (B-1, B)$
- ▶ For each  $r, s \in S^{(0)}$  with r < s compute

$$rac{t}{t'} = rac{r}{r+1} \cdot rac{s+1}{s}$$
 with  $\gcd(t,t') = 1$ 

$$\succ S^{(1)} := S^{(0)} \cup \{\text{new solutions } t : t' = t + 1\}$$

> Repeat this with  $S^{(1)}$  instead of  $S^{(0)}$ 

An algorithm devised by Conrey, Holmstrom and McLaughlin (2012) that finds almost all *B*-smooth twins

- >  $S^{(0)} = \{1, 2, \cdots, B-1\}$  representing *B*-smooth twins  $(1, 2), (2, 3), \cdots, (B-1, B)$
- > For each  $r, s \in S^{(0)}$  with r < s compute

$$rac{t}{t'} = rac{r}{r+1} \cdot rac{s+1}{s}$$
 with  $\gcd(t,t') = 1$ 

$$\succ S^{(1)} := S^{(0)} \cup \{ \text{new solutions } t : t' = t + 1 \}$$

- > Repeat this with  $S^{(1)}$  instead of  $S^{(0)}$
- > Algorithm terminates when  $S^{(d+1)} = S^{(d)}$  for some d

An algorithm devised by Conrey, Holmstrom and McLaughlin (2012) that finds almost all *B*-smooth twins

- ≻  $S^{(0)} = \{1, 2, \cdots, B-1\}$  representing *B*-smooth twins  $(1, 2), (2, 3), \cdots, (B-1, B)$
- > For each  $r, s \in S^{(0)}$  with r < s compute

$$rac{t}{t'} = rac{r}{r+1} \cdot rac{s+1}{s}$$
 with  $\gcd(t,t') = 1$ 

$$\succ S^{(1)} := S^{(0)} \cup \{ \text{new solutions } t : t' = t + 1 \}$$

- > Repeat this with  $S^{(1)}$  instead of  $S^{(0)}$
- > Algorithm terminates when  $S^{(d+1)} = S^{(d)}$  for some d

When t' = t + 1, this equivalent to  $t = \frac{r(s+1)}{s-r}$  being an integer

We illustrate the algorithm for B = 5. The starting set is

 $S^{(0)} = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}.$ 

#### CHM in action

We illustrate the algorithm for B = 5. The starting set is

$$S^{(0)} = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}.$$

Going through all pairs  $r, s \in S^{(0)}$  with r < s, we see when the computation yields a new twin smooth pair (t, t + 1)

#### CHM in action

We illustrate the algorithm for B = 5. The starting set is

$$S^{(0)} = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}.$$

Going through all pairs  $r, s \in S^{(0)}$  with r < s, we see when the computation yields a new twin smooth pair (t, t + 1)

$$\frac{2}{2+1} \cdot \frac{3+1}{3} = \frac{8}{9}, \quad \frac{2}{2+1} \cdot \frac{4+1}{4} = \frac{5}{6}, \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{3}{3+1} \cdot \frac{4+1}{4} = \frac{15}{16}$$

#### CHM in action

We illustrate the algorithm for B = 5. The starting set is

$$S^{(0)} = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}.$$

Going through all pairs  $r, s \in S^{(0)}$  with r < s, we see when the computation yields a new twin smooth pair (t, t + 1)

$$\frac{2}{2+1} \cdot \frac{3+1}{3} = \frac{8}{9}, \quad \frac{2}{2+1} \cdot \frac{4+1}{4} = \frac{5}{6}, \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{3}{3+1} \cdot \frac{4+1}{4} = \frac{15}{16}$$

Hence, we add 5, 8 and 15 to get the next set

$$S^{(1)} = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 15\}$$

We illustrate the algorithm for B = 5. The starting set is

$$S^{(0)} = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}.$$

Going through all pairs  $r, s \in S^{(0)}$  with r < s, we see when the computation yields a new twin smooth pair (t, t + 1)

$$\frac{2}{2+1} \cdot \frac{3+1}{3} = \frac{8}{9}, \quad \frac{2}{2+1} \cdot \frac{4+1}{4} = \frac{5}{6}, \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{3}{3+1} \cdot \frac{4+1}{4} = \frac{15}{16}$$

Hence, we add 5, 8 and 15 to get the next set

$$S^{(1)} = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 15\}$$

The second and third iterations find two and one new twins (resp.)

 $S^{(2)} = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 15, 24\}, S^{(3)} = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 15, 24, 80\}$ 

$$S^{(1)} = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 15\}, \quad S^{(2)} = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 15, 24\}, \quad S^{(3)} = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 15, 24, 80\}$$

$$S^{(1)} = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 15\}, \hspace{1em} S^{(2)} = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 15, 24\}, \hspace{1em} S^{(3)} = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 15, 24, 80\}$$

The fourth iteration does not produce any new numbers

 $S^{(4)} = S^{(3)} = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 15, 24, 80\}$ 

$$S^{(1)} = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 15\}, \quad S^{(2)} = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 15, 24\}, \quad S^{(3)} = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 15, 24, 80\}$$

The fourth iteration does not produce any new numbers

$$S^{(4)} = S^{(3)} = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 15, 24, 80\}$$

This is exactly all 5-smooth twins!

 $S^{(1)} = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 15\}, \quad S^{(2)} = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 15, 24\}, \quad S^{(3)} = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 15, 24, 80\}$ 

The fourth iteration does not produce any new numbers

$$S^{(4)} = S^{(3)} = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 15, 24, 80\}$$

This is exactly all 5-smooth twins!

Warning: In general this method does not guarantee to produce all B-smooth twins
The fourth iteration does not produce any new numbers

$$S^{(4)} = S^{(3)} = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 15, 24, 80\}$$

This is exactly all 5-smooth twins!

Warning: In general this method does not guarantee to produce all B-smooth twins

B = 7: All 7-smooth twins are found expect one

The fourth iteration does not produce any new numbers

$$S^{(4)} = S^{(3)} = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 15, 24, 80\}$$

This is exactly all 5-smooth twins!

Warning: In general this method does not guarantee to produce all B-smooth twins

The fourth iteration does not produce any new numbers

$$S^{(4)} = S^{(3)} = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 15, 24, 80\}$$

This is exactly all 5-smooth twins!

Warning: In general this method does not guarantee to produce all B-smooth twins

B = 7: All 7-smooth twins are found expect one — (4374, 4375) is not found X 11  $\leq B < 41$ : Finds all *B*-smooth twins

The fourth iteration does not produce any new numbers

$$S^{(4)} = S^{(3)} = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 15, 24, 80\}$$

This is exactly all 5-smooth twins!

Warning: In general this method does not guarantee to produce all B-smooth twins

- $11 \le B < 41$ : Finds all *B*-smooth twins
  - $B \ge 41$ : Conjecturally finds almost all B-smooth twins

The fourth iteration does not produce any new numbers

$$S^{(4)} = S^{(3)} = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 15, 24, 80\}$$

This is exactly all 5-smooth twins!

Warning: In general this method does not guarantee to produce all B-smooth twins

- $11 \le B < 41$ : Finds all *B*-smooth twins
  - $B \ge 41$ : Conjecturally finds *almost all B*-smooth twins
  - B = 100: Original authors found all except 41 *B*-smooth twins

The fourth iteration does not produce any new numbers

$$S^{(4)} = S^{(3)} = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 15, 24, 80\}$$

This is exactly all 5-smooth twins!

Warning: In general this method does not guarantee to produce all B-smooth twins

- $11 \leq B < 41$ : Finds all *B*-smooth twins
  - $B \ge 41$ : Conjecturally finds *almost all B*-smooth twins
  - B = 100: Original authors found all except 41 *B*-smooth twins
  - B = 200: They found 346,192 such twins which took them 2 weeks to run

Subsequently we ran it fully for B = 547 and found 82,026,426 twins – the largest twin found was the following 122-bit twin

 $r = 5^{4} \cdot 7 \cdot 13^{2} \cdot 17^{2} \cdot 19 \cdot 29 \cdot 41 \cdot 109 \cdot 163 \cdot 173 \cdot 239 \cdot 241^{2} \cdot 271 \cdot 283 \cdot 499 \cdot 509, \text{ and}$  $r + 1 = 2^{8} \cdot 3^{2} \cdot 31^{2} \cdot 43^{2} \cdot 47^{2} \cdot 83^{2} \cdot 103^{2} \cdot 311^{2} \cdot 479^{2} \cdot 523^{2}.$ 

Subsequently we ran it fully for B = 547 and found 82,026,426 twins – the largest twin found was the following 122-bit twin

 $r = 5^{4} \cdot 7 \cdot 13^{2} \cdot 17^{2} \cdot 19 \cdot 29 \cdot 41 \cdot 109 \cdot 163 \cdot 173 \cdot 239 \cdot 241^{2} \cdot 271 \cdot 283 \cdot 499 \cdot 509, \text{ and}$  $r + 1 = 2^{8} \cdot 3^{2} \cdot 31^{2} \cdot 43^{2} \cdot 47^{2} \cdot 83^{2} \cdot 103^{2} \cdot 311^{2} \cdot 479^{2} \cdot 523^{2}.$ 



Subsequently we ran it fully for B = 547 and found 82,026,426 twins – the largest twin found was the following 122-bit twin

 $r = 5^{4} \cdot 7 \cdot 13^{2} \cdot 17^{2} \cdot 19 \cdot 29 \cdot 41 \cdot 109 \cdot 163 \cdot 173 \cdot 239 \cdot 241^{2} \cdot 271 \cdot 283 \cdot 499 \cdot 509, \text{ and}$  $r + 1 = 2^{8} \cdot 3^{2} \cdot 31^{2} \cdot 43^{2} \cdot 47^{2} \cdot 83^{2} \cdot 103^{2} \cdot 311^{2} \cdot 479^{2} \cdot 523^{2}.$ 



This data suggests that  $B \ge 5000$  to expect to find 256-bit twins

#### Further optimisations for larger *B*

 $\begin{array}{ll} \texttt{global-}k: & r < s < k \cdot r \text{ for fixed } 1 < k \leq 2 \\ \texttt{constant-range:} & R \text{ successors } s \text{ of } r \text{ in } S^{(i)} \text{ for a range } R \end{array}$ 

global-k:  $r < s < k \cdot r$  for fixed  $1 < k \le 2$ constant-range: R successors s of r in  $S^{(i)}$  for a range R

	Variant	Parameter	Runtime	Speedup	#twins	#twins from largest 100	
	Full CHM	-	4705s	1	2300724	100	
	global-k	k = 2.0	364s	13	2289000	86	
		k = 1.5	226s	21	2282741	82	
		k = 1.05	27s	174	2206656	65	
	constant-range	R = 10000	82s	57	2273197	93	
		R = 5000	35s	134	2247121	87	
		R = 1000	16s	294	2074530	75	

Table 1: Performance of our CHM optimisations for B = 300

 $\begin{array}{ll} \texttt{global-}k: & r < s < k \cdot r \text{ for fixed } 1 < k \leq 2 \\ \texttt{constant-range:} & R \text{ successors } s \text{ of } r \text{ in } S^{(i)} \text{ for a range } R \end{array}$ 

Variant	Parameter	Runtime	Speedup	#twins	#twins from largest 100
Full CHM	-	4705s	1	2300724	100
global-k	k = 2.0	364s	13	2289000	86
	k = 1.5	226s	21	2282741	82
	k = 1.05	27s	174	2206656	65
	R = 10000	82s	57	2273197	93
constant-range	R = 5000	35s	134	2247121	87
	R = 1000	16s	294	2074530	75

Table 1: Performance of our CHM optimisations for B = 300

For example, we ran B = 1300 using constant-range with R = 5000



## Twin smooth integers in isogeny-based cryptography

#### Twin smooth integers in isogeny-based cryptography

Cryptographic sized primes p such that p + 1 and p - 1 are as smooth as possible

#### Twin smooth integers in isogeny-based cryptography

Cryptographic sized primes p such that p+1 and p-1 are as smooth as possible

$$\begin{array}{ll} & \phi: E \to E' \\ & \# E(\mathbb{F}_{p^2}) = (p-1)^2, (p+1)^2 \end{array} \qquad \qquad SQISign$$

Cryptographic sized primes p such that p+1 and p-1 are as smooth as possible

**B-SHDH** 
$$\phi: E \to E'$$
  
 $\#E(\mathbb{F}_{p^2}) = (p-1)^2, (p+1)^2$  SQISign

Such primes can be found from twin smooth integers, (r, r + 1), if p = 2r + 1 is prime

(p-1, p+1) = (2r, 2(r+1))

Cryptographic sized primes p such that p+1 and p-1 are as smooth as possible

B-SHDH 
$$\phi: E \to E'$$
  
 $\#E(\mathbb{F}_{p^2}) = (p-1)^2, (p+1)^2$  SQISign

Such primes can be found from twin smooth integers, (r, r + 1), if p = 2r + 1 is prime

$$(p-1, p+1) = (2r, 2(r+1))$$

This p makes all of  $p^2 - 1$  smooth, but in isogeny-based cryptosystems a large smooth divisor of  $p^2 - 1$  is sufficient (i.e. a large factor  $T' \mid p^2 - 1$  that is smooth)

Cryptographic sized primes p such that p+1 and p-1 are as smooth as possible

B-SHDH 
$$\phi: E \to E'$$
  
 $\#E(\mathbb{F}_{p^2}) = (p-1)^2, (p+1)^2$  SQISign

Such primes can be found from twin smooth integers, (r, r + 1), if p = 2r + 1 is prime

$$(p-1, p+1) = (2r, 2(r+1))$$

This p makes all of  $p^2 - 1$  smooth, but in isogeny-based cryptosystems a large smooth divisor of  $p^2 - 1$  is sufficient (i.e. a large factor  $T' \mid p^2 - 1$  that is smooth)

*B-SIDH (pre Kani)*:  $M \mid p-1$  and  $N \mid p+1$  with  $M \approx N$  large smooth divisors

# Signing with isogeny skies

SQISign: builds a signature from an identification protocol by solving an isogeny problem

## Signing with isogeny skies

SQISign: builds a signature from an identification protocol by solving an isogeny problem



## Signing with isogeny skies

SQISign: builds a signature from an identification protocol by solving an isogeny problem



 $\sigma$  is computed from  $\varphi \circ \psi \circ \hat{\tau}$  and the secret knowledge of  $\operatorname{End}(E_A)$  and  $\operatorname{End}(E_2)$ 

# SQISign requirements

State-of-the-art requirements on the prime *p* 

$$2^{f}T\mid p^{2}-1, \quad f$$
 is as large as possible,  $Tpprox p^{5/4+\epsilon}$  is  $B$ -smooth,  $\sqrt{B}/f$  is small

# SQISign requirements

State-of-the-art requirements on the prime *p* 

 $2^{f}T \mid p^{2}-1$ , f is as large as possible,  $T \approx p^{5/4+\epsilon}$  is B-smooth,  $\sqrt{B}/f$  is small

T is used in the signing to compute  $\psi$  and  $\phi$ ;  $\sqrt{B}/f$  is a rough signing cost metric

# SQISign requirements

State-of-the-art requirements on the prime *p* 

 $2^{f}T \mid p^{2}-1, \quad f$  is as large as possible,  $T \approx p^{5/4+\epsilon}$  is *B*-smooth,  $\sqrt{B}/f$  is small

 ${\cal T}$  is used in the signing to compute  $\psi$  and  $\phi;~\sqrt{B}/f$  is a rough signing cost metric

 $2^{f}$  is used in the verification to compute  $\sigma$ 

State-of-the-art requirements on the prime *p* 

 $2^{f}T \mid p^{2}-1, \quad f$  is as large as possible,  $T \approx p^{5/4+\epsilon}$  is *B*-smooth,  $\sqrt{B}/f$  is small

 ${\cal T}$  is used in the signing to compute  $\psi$  and  $\phi;\,\sqrt{B}/f$  is a rough signing cost metric

 $2^{f}$  is used in the verification to compute  $\sigma$ 

Thus verification is fast and signing is slow

State-of-the-art requirements on the prime *p* 

 $2^{f}T \mid p^{2}-1, \quad f$  is as large as possible,  $T \approx p^{5/4+\epsilon}$  is *B*-smooth,  $\sqrt{B}/f$  is small

 ${\cal T}$  is used in the signing to compute  $\psi$  and  $\phi;\,\sqrt{B}/f$  is a rough signing cost metric

 $\mathbf{2}^{\mathrm{f}}$  is used in the verification to compute  $\sigma$ 

Thus verification is fast and signing is slow

How his doos a pood to bo?	NIST security level	p(bits)	Existed?
	I	<i>p</i> (bits) 256 384 512	$\checkmark$
How big does p need to be:	III	384	×
	V	512	X

This was found using the *extended Euclidean algorithm* method from Costello (2020):

- $\succ$  Force the large power of two and three in  $p\pm 1$  as well as some small primes
- > Use XGCD to recover the integer p
- > Repeat by changing the distribution of the small prime divisors
This was found using the *extended Euclidean algorithm* method from Costello (2020):

- $\succ$  Force the large power of two and three in  $p\pm 1$  as well as some small primes
- > Use XGCD to recover the integer p
- $\succ$  Repeat by changing the distribution of the small prime divisors

While  $\sqrt{B}/f \approx 0.96$  is not optimally small<sup>2</sup>, it performs the best due to the large power of three

 $^2 \text{Some}$  existing primes have  $\sqrt{B}/f$  as small as 0.63



 $4x^{n}(x-1) \mid p_{n}^{2}(x) - 1$  for all n, and  $4x^{n}(x-1)(x+1) \mid p_{n}^{2}(x) - 1$  when n is even

> Find small CHM twins  $(r, r \pm 1)$ 

- > Find small CHM twins  $(r, r \pm 1)$
- > Choose *n* and evaluate  $p = p_n(r)$

- > Find small CHM twins  $(r, r \pm 1)$
- > Choose *n* and evaluate  $p = p_n(r)$
- > Compute the smooth factor  $T' = 2^f \cdot T \mid p^2 1$ , with T odd

- > Find small CHM twins  $(r, r \pm 1)$
- > Choose *n* and evaluate  $p = p_n(r)$
- > Compute the smooth factor  $T' = 2^f \cdot T \mid p^2 1$ , with T odd
- > Keep p if it is prime,  $T \approx p^{5/4+\epsilon}$  and  $\sqrt{B}/f$  is small

 $4x^{n}(x-1) \mid p_{n}^{2}(x) - 1$  for all n, and  $4x^{n}(x-1)(x+1) \mid p_{n}^{2}(x) - 1$  when n is even

- > Find small CHM twins  $(r, r \pm 1)$
- > Choose *n* and evaluate  $p = p_n(r)$
- > Compute the smooth factor  $T' = 2^f \cdot T \mid p^2 1$ , with T odd
- > Keep p if it is prime,  $T \approx p^{5/4+\epsilon}$  and  $\sqrt{B}/f$  is small

The amount of guaranteed smoothness in T' is  $\approx p^{1+1/n}$  coming from  $(r, r \pm 1)$ 

 $4x^{n}(x-1) \mid p_{n}^{2}(x) - 1$  for all n, and  $4x^{n}(x-1)(x+1) \mid p_{n}^{2}(x) - 1$  when n is even

- > Find small CHM twins  $(r, r \pm 1)$
- > Choose *n* and evaluate  $p = p_n(r)$
- > Compute the smooth factor  $T' = 2^f \cdot T \mid p^2 1$ , with T odd
- $\succ$  Keep p if it is prime,  $T \approx p^{5/4+\epsilon}$  and  $\sqrt{B}/f$  is small

The amount of guaranteed smoothness in T' is  $\approx p^{1+1/n}$  coming from  $(r, r \pm 1)$ 

Depending on *n* and the power of two *f*, extra smooth factors might be required<sup>3</sup> to get  $T \approx p^{5/4+\epsilon}$ 

<sup>3</sup>Which comes with an associated smoothness probability

$$(r-1,r) \implies p = p_n(r) = 2r^n - 1$$

$$(r-1,r) \implies p = p_n(r) = 2r^n - 1$$

 $\mathbf{n} = \mathbf{2}: p_2(r)^2 - 1 = r^2(r-1)(r+1)$ 

guaranteed smoothness  $T' \approx p^{3/2}$ , requires  $\log_2(r) \approx 128$  for  $\log_2(p) \approx 256$ 

$$(r-1,r) \implies p = p_n(r) = 2r^n - 1$$

$$\begin{split} \mathbf{n} &= \mathbf{2} : p_2(r)^2 - 1 = r^2(r-1)(r+1) \\ &\text{guaranteed smoothness } T' \approx p^{3/2} \text{, requires } \log_2(r) \approx 128 \text{ for } \log_2(p) \approx 256 \\ \mathbf{n} &= \mathbf{3} : p_2(r)^2 - 1 = r^3(r-1)(r^2 + r + 1) \\ &\text{guaranteed smoothness } T' \approx p^{4/3} \text{, requires } \log_2(r) \approx 85 \text{ for } \log_2(p) \approx 256 \end{split}$$

$$(r-1,r) \implies p = p_n(r) = 2r^n - 1$$

 $\mathbf{n} = \mathbf{2} : p_2(r)^2 - 1 = r^2(r-1)(r+1)$ guaranteed smoothness  $T' \approx p^{3/2}$ , requires  $\log_2(r) \approx 128$  for  $\log_2(p) \approx 256$  $\mathbf{n} = \mathbf{3} : p_2(r)^2 - 1 = r^3(r-1)(r^2 + r + 1)$ guaranteed smoothness  $T' \approx p^{4/3}$ , requires  $\log_2(r) \approx 85$  for  $\log_2(p) \approx 256$  $\mathbf{n} = \mathbf{4} : p_2(r)^2 - 1 = r^4(r-1)(r+1)(r^2 + 1)$ guaranteed smoothness  $T' \approx p^{5/4}$ , requires  $\log_2(r) \approx 64$  for  $\log_2(p) \approx 256$ 

$$(r-1,r) \implies p = p_n(r) = 2r^n - 1$$

 $\mathbf{n} = \mathbf{2} : p_2(r)^2 - 1 = r^2(r-1)(r+1)$ guaranteed smoothness  $T' \approx p^{3/2}$ , requires  $\log_2(r) \approx 128$  for  $\log_2(p) \approx 256$  $\mathbf{n} = \mathbf{3} : p_2(r)^2 - 1 = r^3(r-1)(r^2 + r + 1)$ guaranteed smoothness  $T' \approx p^{4/3}$ , requires  $\log_2(r) \approx 85$  for  $\log_2(p) \approx 256$  $\mathbf{n} = \mathbf{4} : p_2(r)^2 - 1 = r^4(r-1)(r+1)(r^2 + 1)$ guaranteed smoothness  $T' \approx p^{5/4}$ , requires  $\log_2(r) \approx 64$  for  $\log_2(p) \approx 256$  $\mathbf{n} = \mathbf{6} : p_2(r)^2 - 1 = r^6(r-1)(r+1)(r^2 - r + 1)(r^2 + r + 1)$ guaranteed smoothness  $T' \approx p^{7/6}$ , requires  $\log_2(r) \approx 43$  for  $\log_2(p) \approx 256$ 

$$(r-1,r) \implies p = p_n(r) = 2r^n - 1$$

$$\begin{split} \mathbf{n} &= \mathbf{2} : p_2(r)^2 - 1 = r^2(r-1)(r+1) \\ &\text{guaranteed smoothness } T' \approx p^{3/2}, \text{ requires } \log_2(r) \approx 128 \text{ for } \log_2(p) \approx 256 \\ \mathbf{n} &= \mathbf{3} : p_2(r)^2 - 1 = r^3(r-1)(r^2 + r + 1) \\ &\text{guaranteed smoothness } T' \approx p^{4/3}, \text{ requires } \log_2(r) \approx 85 \text{ for } \log_2(p) \approx 256 \\ \mathbf{n} &= \mathbf{4} : p_2(r)^2 - 1 = r^4(r-1)(r+1)(r^2 + 1) \\ &\text{guaranteed smoothness } T' \approx p^{5/4}, \text{ requires } \log_2(r) \approx 64 \text{ for } \log_2(p) \approx 256 \\ \mathbf{n} &= \mathbf{6} : p_2(r)^2 - 1 = r^6(r-1)(r+1)(r^2 - r + 1)(r^2 + r + 1) \\ &\text{guaranteed smoothness } T' \approx p^{7/6}, \text{ requires } \log_2(r) \approx 43 \text{ for } \log_2(p) \approx 256 \end{split}$$

For other n, the smoothness probability is too small

## Distribution of CHM twins with B = 547



We used n = 2, 3, 4 to find a collection of 256-bit SQISign friendly primes

## **NIST-I** parameters

We used n = 2, 3, 4 to find a collection of 256-bit SQISign friendly primes

253-bit prime  $p = 2r^4 - 1$  with r = 8077251317941145600:  $p + 1 = 2^{49} \cdot 5^8 \cdot 13^4 \cdot 41^4 \cdot 71^4 \cdot 113^4 \cdot 181^4 \cdot 223^4 \cdot 457^4$ , and  $p - 1 = 2 \cdot 3^2 \cdot 7^5 \cdot 17 \cdot 31 \cdot 53 \cdot 61 \cdot 73 \cdot 83 \cdot 127 \cdot 149 \cdot 233 \cdot 293 \cdot 313 \cdot 347 \cdot 397 \cdot 467 \cdot 479 \cdot R$ 

# **NIST-I** parameters

We used n = 2, 3, 4 to find a collection of 256-bit SQISign friendly primes

253-bit prime  $p = 2r^4 - 1$  with r = 8077251317941145600:  $p + 1 = 2^{49} \cdot 5^8 \cdot 13^4 \cdot 41^4 \cdot 71^4 \cdot 113^4 \cdot 181^4 \cdot 223^4 \cdot 457^4$ , and  $p - 1 = 2 \cdot 3^2 \cdot 7^5 \cdot 17 \cdot 31 \cdot 53 \cdot 61 \cdot 73 \cdot 83 \cdot 127 \cdot 149 \cdot 233 \cdot 293 \cdot 313 \cdot 347 \cdot 397 \cdot 467 \cdot 479 \cdot R$ 

Comparison with the state-of-the-art:

- $\succ \sqrt{B}/f \approx 0.45$
- $\succ\,$  Expect signing to be  $\approx$  30 50% faster
- > Expect verification to be  $\approx$  31% slower (which is still very fast)

# **NIST-I** parameters

We used n = 2, 3, 4 to find a collection of 256-bit SQISign friendly primes

253-bit prime  $p = 2r^4 - 1$  with r = 8077251317941145600:  $p + 1 = 2^{49} \cdot 5^8 \cdot 13^4 \cdot 41^4 \cdot 71^4 \cdot 113^4 \cdot 181^4 \cdot 223^4 \cdot 457^4$ , and  $p - 1 = 2 \cdot 3^2 \cdot 7^5 \cdot 17 \cdot 31 \cdot 53 \cdot 61 \cdot 73 \cdot 83 \cdot 127 \cdot 149 \cdot 233 \cdot 293 \cdot 313 \cdot 347 \cdot 397 \cdot 467 \cdot 479 \cdot R$ 

Comparison with the state-of-the-art:

$$\succ \sqrt{B}/f \approx 0.45$$

- $\succ\,$  Expect signing to be  $\approx$  30 50% faster
- > Expect verification to be  $\approx$  31% slower (which is still very fast)

Remark: True comparison can only be done with an implementation

We used n = 3, 4, 6 to find a collection of 384-bit SQISign friendly primes

We used n = 3, 4, 6 to find a collection of 384-bit SQISign friendly primes

375-bit prime  $p = 2r^4 - 1$  with r = 12326212283367463507272925184:  $p + 1 = 2^{77} \cdot 11^4 \cdot 29^4 \cdot 59^4 \cdot 67^4 \cdot 149^4 \cdot 331^4 \cdot 443^4 \cdot 593^4 \cdot 1091^4 \cdot 1319^4$ , and  $p - 1 = 2 \cdot 3 \cdot 5 \cdot 13 \cdot 17 \cdot 31 \cdot 37 \cdot 53 \cdot 83 \cdot 109 \cdot 131 \cdot 241 \cdot 269 \cdot 277 \cdot 283 \cdot 353 \cdot 419$  $\cdot 499 \cdot 661 \cdot 877 \cdot 1877 \cdot 3709 \cdot 9613 \cdot 44017 \cdot 55967 \cdot R$ 

We used n = 3, 4, 6 to find a collection of 384-bit SQISign friendly primes

375-bit prime  $p = 2r^4 - 1$  with r = 12326212283367463507272925184:  $p + 1 = 2^{77} \cdot 11^4 \cdot 29^4 \cdot 59^4 \cdot 67^4 \cdot 149^4 \cdot 331^4 \cdot 443^4 \cdot 593^4 \cdot 1091^4 \cdot 1319^4$ , and  $p - 1 = 2 \cdot 3 \cdot 5 \cdot 13 \cdot 17 \cdot 31 \cdot 37 \cdot 53 \cdot 83 \cdot 109 \cdot 131 \cdot 241 \cdot 269 \cdot 277 \cdot 283 \cdot 353 \cdot 419$  $\cdot 499 \cdot 661 \cdot 877 \cdot 1877 \cdot 3709 \cdot 9613 \cdot 44017 \cdot 55967 \cdot R$ 

382-bit prime  $p = 2r^6 - 1$  with r = 11896643388662145024:

 $p + 1 = 2^{79} \cdot 3^6 \cdot 23^{12} \cdot 107^6 \cdot 127^6 \cdot 307^6 \cdot 401^6 \cdot 547^6, \text{ and}$   $p - 1 = 2 \cdot 5^2 \cdot 7 \cdot 11 \cdot 17 \cdot 19 \cdot 47 \cdot 71 \cdot 79 \cdot 109 \cdot 149 \cdot 229 \cdot 269 \cdot 283 \cdot 349 \cdot 449 \cdot 463$   $\cdot 1019 \cdot 1033 \cdot 1657 \cdot 2179 \cdot 2293 \cdot 4099 \cdot 5119 \cdot 10243 \cdot R$ 

We used n = 4,6 to find a collection of 512-bit SQISign friendly primes

### **NIST-V** parameters

We report the first NIST-III and NIST-V parameters

We used n = 4, 6 to find a collection of 512-bit SQISign friendly primes

499-bit prime  $p = 2r^6 - 1$  with r = 9469787780580604464332800:  $p + 1 = 2^{109} \cdot 5^{12} \cdot 7^{12} \cdot 13^6 \cdot 61^6 \cdot 179^6 \cdot 281^6 \cdot 379^6 \cdot 1367^6 \cdot 1427^6$ , and  $p - 1 = 2 \cdot 3^3 \cdot 19 \cdot 23^3 \cdot 31 \cdot 43^2 \cdot 73 \cdot 139 \cdot 337 \cdot 461 \cdot 641 \cdot 971 \cdot 1069 \cdot 1097 \cdot 5843$  $\cdot 12841 \cdot 23671 \cdot 39667 \cdot 51193 \cdot 75223 \cdot 459317 \cdot 703981 \cdot R$ 

We used n = 4, 6 to find a collection of 512-bit SQISign friendly primes

499-bit prime  $p = 2r^6 - 1$  with r = 9469787780580604464332800:  $p + 1 = 2^{109} \cdot 5^{12} \cdot 7^{12} \cdot 13^6 \cdot 61^6 \cdot 179^6 \cdot 281^6 \cdot 379^6 \cdot 1367^6 \cdot 1427^6$ , and  $p - 1 = 2 \cdot 3^3 \cdot 19 \cdot 23^3 \cdot 31 \cdot 43^2 \cdot 73 \cdot 139 \cdot 337 \cdot 461 \cdot 641 \cdot 971 \cdot 1069 \cdot 1097 \cdot 5843$  $\cdot 12841 \cdot 23671 \cdot 39667 \cdot 51193 \cdot 75223 \cdot 459317 \cdot 703981 \cdot R$ 

508-bit prime  $p = 2r^6 - 1$  with r = 26697973900446483680608256:

$$p + 1 = 2^{85} \cdot 17^{12} \cdot 37^6 \cdot 59^6 \cdot 97^6 \cdot 233^6 \cdot 311^{12} \cdot 911^6 \cdot 1297^6, \text{ and}$$

$$p - 1 = 2 \cdot 3^2 \cdot 5 \cdot 7 \cdot 11^2 \cdot 23^2 \cdot 29 \cdot 127 \cdot 163 \cdot 173 \cdot 191 \cdot 193 \cdot 211 \cdot 277 \cdot 347 \cdot 617$$

$$\cdot 661 \cdot 761 \cdot 1039 \cdot 4637 \cdot 5821 \cdot 15649 \cdot 19139 \cdot 143443 \cdot 150151 \cdot R$$

NIST security level	n	r	$\lceil \log_2(p) \rceil$	f	В	$\sqrt{B}/f$	$\log_{\rho}(T)$
NIST-I	2	1211460311716772790566574529001291776	241	49	1091	0.67	1.28
		2091023014142971802357816084152713216	243	49	887	0.61	1.28
	3	3474272816789867297357824	246	43	547	0.54	1.29
		10227318375788227199589376	251	31	383	0.63	1.31
		21611736033260878876800000	254	31	421	0.66	1.28
		20461449125500374748856320	254	46	523	0.50	1.26
		26606682403634464748953600	255	40	547	0.58	1.28
	4	1466873880764125184	243	49	701	0.54	1.28
		8077251317941145600	253	49	479	0.45	1.30
		34848218231355211776*	261	77	2311	0.62	1.30
NIST-III	3	1374002035005713149550405343373848576	362	37	1277	0.97	1.25
	4	5139734876262390964070873088	370	45	11789	2.41	1.26
		12326212283367463507272925184	375	77	55967	3.07	1.31
		18080754980295452456023326720	377	61	95569	5.07	1.26
		27464400309146790228660255744	379	41	13127	2.79	1.29
		2628583629218279424	369	73	13219	1.58	1.27
	6	5417690118774595584	375	79	58153	3.05	1.27
		11896643388662145024	382	79	10243	1.28	1.30
NIST-V	4	114216781548581709439512875801279791104*	507	65	75941	4.24	1.26
		123794274387474298912742543819242587136*	508	41	15263	3.01	1.29
	6	9469787780580604464332800	499	109	703981	7.70	1.25
		12233468605740686007808000	502	73	376963	8.41	1.28
		26697973900446483680608256	508	85	150151	4.56	1.26
		31929740427944870006521856	510	91	550657	8.15	1.25
		41340248200900819056793600	512	67	224911	7.08	1.28

Table 2: SQISign parameters  $p = p_n(r)$  found using CHM twins. The f is the power of two dividing  $(p^2 - 1)/2$  and B is the smoothness bound of  $T \approx p^{5/4+\epsilon}$ . Those marked with an asterisk correspond to primes p not found using the CHM machinery.













Answer: Yes, but up to 128-bit twins
# Summary



### Answer: Yes, but up to 128-bit twins

Can be powerlifted using  $p_n(x) = 2x^n - 1$ to find new SQISign parameters



# Summary



## Answer: Yes, but up to 128-bit twins

Can be powerlifted using  $p_n(x) = 2x^n - 1$  to find new SQISign parameters

Including first parameters targeting higher security levels





## Answer: Yes, but up to 128-bit twins

Can be powerlifted using  $p_n(x) = 2x^n - 1$  to find new SQISign parameters

Including first parameters targeting higher security levels

*Open question*: Can we find cryptographic sized twins with a small *B*?



# Thanks for listening Questions?



ia.cr/2022/1439