


# Practical Settlement Bounds for Longest-Chain Consensus

**Peter Gaži**

IOG



INPUT | OUTPUT

**Ling Ren**

University of Illinois  
at Urbana-Champaign



UNIVERSITY OF  
**ILLINOIS**  
URBANA - CHAMPAIGN

**Alexander Russell**


University of Connecticut  
and IOG



University of  
Connecticut


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- transactions-carrying **blocks** appended in ever-growing **blocktree**
- blocks connected by hash links
- block-creation based on a **leadership lottery** (PoW/PoS)




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
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- honest leaders extend **longest chain**, adversary extends arbitrarily
- **stable ledger state** : longest chain minus **unstable suffix**



Settlement is gradual and subjective!



# How fast is longest-chain settlement?



# Our Results

1. a rigorous method for obtaining settlement guarantees for longest-chain consensus:



Assuming

- some **honest** and **adversarial** power (hashing/stake)
- bound on **message delays**

how many blocks guarantee settlement except with acceptable error?

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
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
how many blocks guarantee settlement except with acceptable error?

2. concrete numerical results of practical interest:

PoW (Ethereum)



PoS (Cardano)




# Our Model

## Timeline and Message Delays:

### Discrete model

- discrete slots of length  $t$
- msgs delayed by:  $\leq \Delta$  slots



- natural for PoS
- good approximation for PoW (as  $t \rightarrow 0$ )




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
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**Adversary:** arbitrary strategy

- cannot break hash function or the lottery

# Tools: Characteristic Strings and Blocktrees


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char. string  $w =$  (1,0) (1,0) (1,0) (2,0) (0,2) (1,0) (1,0) (1,1) (0,0) (1,0)

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
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
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
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
Does a string  $w$  admit a blocktree  $F$  with long diverging segments?

# Characteristic Strings and Forks ( $\Delta = 3$ )







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


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


Tools: The Margin Quantity  $\beta(\cdot)$


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


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
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
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
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
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
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# Detour: Longest-Chain Consistency Region

An easier but related question:



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
Fully answered in earlier work ([GKR,DKTTVWZ] @ CCS'20):



PoW/PoS longest-chain consensus is secure if  $r_a < \frac{1}{\Delta + 1/r_h}$ .




# Intuition for the Consistency Region






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
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


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


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


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
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
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






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
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- descends with certainty
- leaves quickly

- argument depends mainly on the bias outside the Critical region
- [GKR20] has a wide Critical region
  - loose analysis within it  $\Rightarrow$  bad crossing probability
  - sufficient for an asymptotic statement, but not good for concrete bounds

$\beta_\ell$  remains negative  $\Rightarrow$  honest parties won't disagree up to slot  $\ell$

- stays forever with constant prob.
- leaves quickly if at all

This Work: Technical Overview in a Nutshell


# This Work: Technical Overview in a Nutshell

- a novel way to analyze the execution in larger chunks (“**phases**”)




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


- allows for:
  - a narrow critical region
  - a practically tight analysis of margin while crossing it




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
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- margin recurrences that can be simulated for practical settlement bounds


# Splitting Execution into Phases

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
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
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1. Devise recurrences upper-bounding  $\beta_\ell(\mathbf{wsxt})$  based on
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$$\beta_\ell(\mathbf{wsxt}) \leq \beta_\ell(\mathbf{ws}) + F(\mathbf{xt})$$

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
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2. Iteratively upper-bound  $\beta_\ell(\cdot)$  throughout the full execution

# PoW Phase Recurrences: Intuition

- “ideal” recurrence

$$\beta_\ell(wsxt) = \beta_\ell(ws) + \dots - \dots$$




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
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

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

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

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

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+1 for each adversarial success

-1 for each honest depth increase



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
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
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Proofs: Tree surgery.

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  - single (adversarial) success allows extending many chains


# PoS Complications

- different **tree** notion
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  - **reach**: the maximal “potential” length of a chain
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- different **tree** notion
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- two intertwined characteristic quantities
  - **reach**: the maximal “potential” length of a chain
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  - **margin**: analogous to the PoW margin
    - more complicated than in PoW, as it depends on reach
- the recurrence must compute these in tandem
  - determine both values for **wsxt** based on both values on **ws**

$$Q(\text{wsxt}) \leq Q(\text{ws}) + F(\text{xt})$$





# PoW vs. PoS Phase Recurrences

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
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- PoW recurrences give slightly faster settlement

# Explicit Results

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
## Ethereum (PoW)



- block time: 13 seconds
- $\Delta = 2$  seconds
- adversarial mining power: 10%


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
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
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
## Cardano (PoS)



less than 3 blocks from optimality

- block time: 20 seconds
- $\Delta = 2$  seconds
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# Explicit Results: Comparing PoW to PoS



- block time: 13 seconds
- $\Delta = 2$  seconds
- adversarial mining power/stake: 10%



Thank you for your attention!

