# Lattice-Based Timed Cryptography

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Joint work with Russell Lai







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### --- Solution!



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### Time-Lock Puzzles

#### Solution!



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- Time-Lock Puzzles
- Proofs of Sequential Work

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- Time-Lock Puzzles
- Proofs of Sequential Work
- Verifiable Delay Functions

### Solution!

# Applications





### **Seal-Bid Auctions**

**E-Voting** 





### Randomness Generation

Contract Signing



# **More Applications**

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# ethereum

### Hardness vs Fine-Grained Hardness

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**One-Way Problems** 



 $P \neq NP$ 

## Hardness vs Fine-Grained Hardness

**One-Way Problems** 



 $P \neq NP$ 

### **Sequential Problems**



 $NC \neq P$ 

Unstructured

Structured

Real-World

Structured

Unstructured

**Repeated Squaring** 

 $f_N(x) = x^2 \mod N$ 



**Real-World** 



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**Isogeny Shortcut** 

 $f_{\Phi}(x) = \Phi(x)$ 



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**Isogeny Shortcut** 

$$(x) = \Phi(x)$$

**Universal Functions** 

Obfuscation, FHE

# **Enter Quantum Computing**



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### **Universal Functions**

### Obfuscation, FHE



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Unstructured		<b>Random Oracles</b> $f_{\mathcal{H}}(x) = \mathcal{H}(x)$	<b>Isoge</b> $f_{\Phi}(x)$
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### **Universal Functions**

Obfuscation, FHE





# Can we construct efficient post-quantum timed cryptography?



A new candidate "lattice-based" sequential function



- A new candidate "lattice-based" sequential function
  - Evidence of sequentiality



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- Open problems



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# $f_{\mathbf{A}}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y} = \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{x}) \iff$

 $m \approx n \cdot \log q$ 





### $\mathbf{u} \in \{0,1\}^m$



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- More heuristic evidence & cryptanalysis (see paper)

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- Soundness: No prover of depth << T can pass the verification</li>

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T = 2t + 1

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- Verifier's runtime ~log(T)

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- Can extract a valid transcript in time o(T)
  - Contradiction!



#### **Open Problems**

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# Thank you!

