# Orbweaver <br> Succinct Linear Functional Commitments from Lattices 



Lattice Orbweaver spider by Jackie Parker

## Ben Fisch, Zeyu Liu, and Psi Vesely

Yale University

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## Abstract linear map equation

$$
\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} f_{i} \cdot Y^{-i}\right) \cdot\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_{i} \cdot Y^{i}\right) \equiv\langle\mathbf{f}, \mathbf{x}\rangle+\sum_{\substack{i=-n+1, i \neq 0}}^{n-1} b_{i} \cdot Y^{i} \bmod q
$$

Form used in [Gro10,LRY16,AC20]

## Evaluation verification equation

$$
\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} f_{i} \cdot Y^{-i}\right) \cdot\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_{i} \cdot Y^{i}\right) \equiv\langle\mathbf{f}, \mathbf{x}\rangle+\sum_{\substack{i=-n+1, i \neq 0}}^{n-1} b_{i} \cdot Y^{i} \bmod q
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Form used in [Gro10,LRY16,AC20], translated to lattice setting using techniques from [ACLMT22]

## Evaluation verification equation

$$
\frac{\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} f_{i} \cdot Y^{-i}\right)}{c_{\mathbf{f}}} \cdot \frac{\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_{i} \cdot Y^{i}\right) \equiv\langle\mathbf{f}, \mathbf{x}\rangle+\sum_{i=-n+1,}^{i \neq 0}}{\sum_{\mathbf{x}}^{n-1}} b_{i} \cdot Y^{i} \bmod q
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Form used in [Gro10,LRY16,AC20], translated to lattice setting using techniques from [ACLMT22]

## Ring Vandermonde SIS (R-V-SIS) commitment

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c:=\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_{i} \cdot v^{i} \bmod q, \text { where } v \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} R_{q} \text { is public }
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- Ajtai's R-SIS commitment, with a Vandermonde key
- Similar to assumption used in PASS Sign. If we pick vinstead from the primitive roots of unity binding reduces to Vandermonde R-SIS [HS15,LZA18,BSS22]


## Evaluation verification equation

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \left(\frac{\mathbf{f}, \mathbf{x} \text { short }}{\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} f_{i} \cdot Y^{-i}\right)} \cdot\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_{i} \cdot Y^{i}\right) \equiv\langle\mathbf{f}, \mathbf{x}\rangle+\sum_{\substack{i=-n+1, i \neq 0}}^{n-1} b_{i} \cdot Y^{i} \bmod q\right. \\
& c_{\mathbf{x}} \\
& \text { (preprocessed) }
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\begin{gathered}
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c_{\mathbf{f}}
\end{array} \frac{\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_{i} \cdot Y^{i}\right)}{c_{\mathbf{x}}} \equiv\langle\mathbf{f}, \mathbf{x}\rangle+\sum_{\substack{i=-n+1, i \neq 0}}^{n-1} b_{i} \cdot Y^{i} \bmod q\right. \\
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\end{gathered}
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## Prover key

Generate short preimages $\mathbf{u}_{i}$ for $i \in\{-n+1, \ldots, n-1\} \backslash\{0\}$ such that

$$
\left\langle\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{u}_{i}\right\rangle \equiv v^{i} \bmod q
$$

Using a trapdoor public SIS matrix a [MP12]

## Computing the proof

- Given $\left\langle\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{u}_{i}\right\rangle \equiv v^{i} \bmod q$ except for $i=0$
- Where $b_{i}$ is the sum of cross terms corresponding to the coefficient of $v^{i}$ compute

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\pi:=\sum_{\substack{i=-n+1, i \neq 0}}^{n-1} b_{i} \cdot \mathbf{u}_{i} \bmod q
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- Then

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$$

- $\mathbf{f}, \mathbf{x}$ short $\Longrightarrow b_{i}$ short, $u_{i}$ short $\Longrightarrow \pi$ short


## Evaluation binding

$$
\frac{\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} f_{i} \cdot v^{-i}\right) \cdot\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_{i} \cdot v^{i}\right)}{c_{\mathbf{f}}} \cdot \frac{\left.\mathbf{f}_{\mathbf{x}} \mathbf{x} \mathbf{x}\right\rangle+\sum_{\substack{i=-n+1,}}^{\sum_{\substack{i \neq 0}}^{n-1} b_{i} \cdot v^{i} \bmod q}}{\langle\mathbf{a}, \pi\rangle \bmod q}
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- k-R-ISIS family of assumptions: can only generate short preimages for targets short linear span of the $v^{i}$ or for random targets [ACLMT22]
- $y^{\prime}-y$ is short, while for $v \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} R_{q}$ all $v^{i} \bmod q$ will be long whp, as will the random targets


## Multiple outputs

Can prove $\left\langle\mathbf{f}_{i}, \mathbf{x}\right\rangle=y_{i}$ for $i \in[t]$ with a single evaluation proof:

$$
\langle\mathbf{a}, \pi\rangle \equiv c \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{t} h_{i} \cdot \mathrm{ck}_{\mathbf{f}_{i}}-\sum_{i=1}^{t} h_{i} \cdot y_{i} \bmod q
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Key observation: straightline extractor uses separate knowledge proof to obtain $\mathbf{x}$. Don't have to extract the hypothetical $\pi_{i}$

$$
\pi=\sum_{i=1}^{t} h_{i} \cdot \pi_{i}
$$

## Multiple outputs

Using extracted $\mathbf{x}$ we get
$\langle\mathbf{a}, \pi\rangle \equiv \sum_{i=1}^{t} h_{i} \cdot\left(\left\langle\mathbf{f}_{i}, \mathbf{x}\right\rangle-y_{i}\right)-\sum_{i=1}^{t} h_{i} \cdot \sum_{\substack{j=-n+1, j \neq 0}}^{n-1} b_{i, j} \cdot Y^{i} \bmod q$

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\langle\mathbf{a}, \pi\rangle \equiv \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{t} h_{i} \cdot\left(\left\langle\mathbf{f}_{i}, \mathbf{x}\right\rangle-y_{i}\right)}{p\left(h_{1}, \ldots, h_{t}\right)}-\sum_{i=1}^{t} h_{i} \cdot \sum_{\substack{j=-n+1, j \neq 0}}^{n-1} b_{i, j} \cdot Y^{i} \bmod q
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- Can pick exponential size "exceptional set" $\mathscr{H}$ over $R_{q}$ for large $q$ [LS18] and invoke Generalized Alon-Füredi Theorem [BCPS18]


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- Can pick exponential size "exceptional set" $\mathscr{H}$ over $R_{q}$ for large $q$ [LS18] and invoke Generalized Alon-Füredi Theorem [BCPS18]
- Better to perform ternary decomposition on $\mathbf{f}, \mathbf{x}$ and batch verification


## Proof and SRS sizes for $\mathbb{Z}_{2^{32}}$

| $\log 2(\mathbf{x})$ | 18 | 22 | 26 | 30 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\|c\|(B)$ | 293 | 347 | 422 | 505 |
| total proof size (KiB) | 845 | 1,081 | 1,315 | 1,571 |
| verifier key (MiB) | 12 | 17 | 23 | 30 |
| prover key (CiB) | 0.3 | 6 | 111 | 2,070 |

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- Binding only version reduces proof size by $\sim 65 \%$, prover key size by $\sim 75 \%$
- Smallest compressing proofs start around 165 KiB (binding) and 668 KiB (extractable) - recursion threshold

Valerio Cini ${ }^{1}$, Russell W. F. Lai ${ }^{2}$, Giulio Malavolta ${ }^{3}$
${ }^{1}$ AIT Austrian Institute of Technology, Austria
${ }^{2}$ Aalto University, Finland
${ }^{3}$ Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy, Germany
CRYPTO, Santa Barbara, CA, U.S., 2023

## Lattice-based Succinct Arguments

| Approach | Publicly verifiable | Sublinear-verifier <br> (preprocessing) | Linear-prover |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| PCP/IOP + linear-only enc. <br> [BCIOP13; BISW17; BISW18; <br> GMNO18] | $X$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| Linearisation + folding <br> [BLNS20; AL21; ACK21; <br> BS22] | $\checkmark$ | $\times \tilde{O}_{\lambda}(\mid$ stmt $\mid)$ | $\checkmark$ |
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This work (and [BCS23])

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## Our Results

$\dagger$ New assumption: Vanishing Short Integer Solution (vSIS)
$\ddagger$ generalization of SIS

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New tool: vSIS commitment for committing to polynomials with short coefficients
Very small (polylog(|stmt|)) commitment key
(Almost) additively and multiplicatively homomor phic
Admit \(\tilde{O}(\mid\) stmt \(\mid)\)-prover polylog \((\mid\) stmt \(\mid)\)-verifier arguments for commitment openings
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New lattice-based succinct arguments for NP $\Leftarrow$ Succinct arguments for vSIS commitment openings

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## Our Results

| Instantiations | $\|\pi\|$ | $\operatorname{Time}(\mathcal{P})$ | $\operatorname{Time}(\mathcal{V})$ | Setup | Assumptions |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  | $\tilde{O}_{\lambda}(1)$ | $\tilde{O}_{\lambda}(\mid$ stmt $\mid)$ | $\tilde{O}_{\lambda}(1)$ | Transparent | vSIS (+ RO for NI) |
| Folding | $\tilde{O}_{\lambda}(1)$ | $\tilde{O}_{\lambda}(\mid$ stmt $\mid)$ | $\tilde{O}_{\lambda}(1)$ | Trusted | vSIS + Knowledge-kRISIS |

## Roadmap

1. vSIS assumptions and commitments
2. Quadratic Relations using vSIS commitments
3. Succinct arguments for vSIS commitment openings

## Short Integer Solution (SIS) Assumption

$\dagger$ Parameters: \# rows $n$, \# columns $m$, modulus $q$.
$\dagger$ Instance: A matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \mathcal{R}_{q}^{n \times m}$.
$\dagger$ Problem: Find a short vector $\mathbf{u} \in \mathcal{R}^{m}$ such that
$\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{u}=\mathbf{0} \bmod q$
and

$$
0<\|\mathbf{u}\| \approx 0
$$

$\dagger$ Shorthand: If $\mathbf{u}$ is a short non-zero vector satisfying $\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{u}=\mathbf{v} \bmod q$, write

$$
\mathbf{u} \in \mathbf{A}^{-1}(\mathbf{v})
$$

## Vanishing SIS as SIS Generalisations

## SIS

Find short solution to linear equations

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$$

SIS (Alternative Interpretation)
Find linear function with short coefficients which vanishes at all given points

Vanishing SIS (vSIS)
Find polynomial (from some class) with short coefficients which vanishes at all given points

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Find polynomial (from some class) with short coefficients which vanishes at all given points

## Vanishing Short Integer Solution (vSIS) Assumption

## Example: Univariate

$\dagger$ Problem: Find short degree $m$ polynomial without constant term

$$
p(X)=p_{1} X+\ldots+p_{m} X^{m} \in \mathcal{R}[X]
$$

which vanishes at $v \in \mathcal{R}_{q}^{\times}$modulo $q$, i.e.

$$
p(v)=0 \bmod q \quad \text { and } \quad 0<\|p\| \approx 0
$$

In other words, find short vector $\mathbf{p} \in \mathcal{R}^{m}$ such that

$$
\left[\begin{array}{llll}
v & v^{2} & \ldots & v^{m}
\end{array}\right] \cdot \mathbf{p}=0 \bmod q \quad \text { and } \quad 0<\|\mathbf{p}\| \approx 0
$$

## Simple vSIS Commitments (or Hash Functions)

$\dagger$ Domain: Polynomials $p \in \mathcal{R}\left[X, X^{-1}\right]$ (of some class) with short coefficients.
$\dagger$ Public parameters: Random unit $v \longleftarrow \$ \mathcal{R}_{q}^{\times}$.
Commitment of polynomial p:

$$
\operatorname{com}(p)=p(v) \bmod q
$$

Binding: If $p(v)=p^{\prime}(v) \bmod q$, then we break vSIS, i.e.

(Almost) additively and multiplicatively homomorphic (w.r.t. polynomial addition and multiplications):


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$$
\begin{aligned}
p(v)+p^{\prime}(v) & =\left(p+p^{\prime}\right)(v) \bmod q \\
p(v) \cdot p^{\prime}(v) & =\left(p \cdot p^{\prime}\right)(v) \bmod q
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\left\|p+p^{\prime}\right\| \leq\|p\|+\left\|p^{\prime}\right\| \approx 0
$$

$$
\left\|p \cdot p^{\prime}\right\| \lesssim\|p\| \cdot\left\|p^{\prime}\right\| \approx 0
$$

## Encoding Vectors as (Laurent) Polynomials

$$
\begin{array}{rr}
\mathbf{a}:=\left(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m}\right) \in \mathcal{R}^{m} & \bar{p}_{\mathbf{a}}(X):=p_{\mathbf{a}}\left(X^{-1}\right):=a_{1} X^{-1}+a_{2} X^{-2}+\ldots+a_{m} X^{-m} \\
\mathbf{b}:=\left(b_{1}, \ldots, b_{m}\right) \in \mathcal{R}^{m} & p_{\mathbf{b}}(X):=b_{1} X+b_{2} X^{2}+\ldots+b_{m} X^{m}
\end{array}
$$

## Note that

$$
\bar{p}_{\mathrm{a}}(X) \cdot p_{\mathrm{b}}(X)=\hat{p}_{\mathbf{a} * \mathrm{~b}}(X) \Longrightarrow \hat{p}_{\mathbf{a} * \mathbf{b}} \text { has } O(m) \text { terms (lots of collisions!) }
$$

## where

$\mathbf{a} * \mathbf{b}:=\left(\sum_{j-i=k} a_{i} \cdot b_{j}\right)_{k=}^{m}$
"convolution", and
constant term is given by $\langle\mathrm{a}, \mathrm{b}\rangle$

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$$

where
$\dagger \mathbf{a} * \mathbf{b}:=\left(\sum_{j-i=k} a_{i} \cdot b_{j}\right)_{k=-m}^{m}$ "convolution", and
$\dagger$ constant term is given by $\langle\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}\rangle$.

## Key Example

Want to prove that $\mathbf{x}$ is binary (i.e. $x_{i} \cdot\left(1-x_{i}\right)=0$ for all $\left.i\right)$.
$\dagger \mathbf{x}$ is committed in vSIS commitment as $c_{\mathbf{x}}:=p_{\mathbf{x}}(v)$.
$\dagger \mathbf{x}$ is committed also in dual vSIS commitment as $\bar{c}_{\mathbf{x}}:=\bar{p}_{\mathbf{x}}(v)$,
$\dagger \mathbf{1}$ is committed in dual vSIS commitment as $\bar{c}_{1}:=\bar{p}_{1}(v)$.

## Observe that



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$$
\underbrace{\underbrace{\sum_{i} x_{i} \cdot v^{i}}_{c_{\mathbf{x}}} \cdot(\underbrace{\sum_{j} x_{j} \cdot v^{-j}}_{\bar{c}_{\mathbf{x}}}-\underbrace{\sum_{j} 1 \cdot v^{-j}}_{\bar{c}_{1}})}_{\hat{p}_{\mathbf{x} *(1-\mathbf{x})}(v)}=\underbrace{\sum_{i} x_{i} \cdot\left(x_{i}-1\right)}_{\langle\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}-\mathbf{1}\rangle} \text { + mixed terms }
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$$

To prove that a vSIS commitment is committing to a (Laurent) polynomial without constant term:

$$
\left[\begin{array}{cccc}
v & v^{2} & \ldots & v^{m} \\
v^{-1} & v^{-2} & \ldots & v^{-m}
\end{array}\right] \cdot \mathbf{x}=\left[\begin{array}{c}
c_{\mathbf{x}} \\
\bar{c}_{\mathbf{x}}
\end{array}\right] \bmod q \wedge\|\mathbf{x}\| \approx 0
$$

and

$$
\left[\begin{array}{llllll}
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1. using knowledge-kRISIS [ACLMT22], or
2. using folding arguments "Bulletproofs" [BLNS20]

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## Knowledge-kRISIS Assumption(s) [ACLMT22] (a Member of)

$\dagger$ Parameters:
$\ddagger$ SIS parameters $(n, m, q)$,
$\ddagger$ submodule rank $t<n$, and
$\ddagger t$-tuples of Laurent monomials $\mathcal{G}$.

## Assumption: If a PPT (quantum) algorithm $\mathcal{A}$, which on input

$\left(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{T}, v,\left(\mathbf{u}_{\mathrm{g}}\right)_{\mathbf{g} \in \mathcal{G}}\right)$
where
$\mathbf{A} \in \mathcal{R}_{q}^{n \times m}$,

$v \in \mathcal{R}_{q}^{\times}$
and
$\mathbf{u}_{g} \in \mathbf{A}^{-1}(\mathbf{T} \cdot \mathbf{g}(v))$,
can find ( $\mathbf{u}, \mathrm{c}$ ) where

then it must "know" short linear combination $\mathbf{x}$ such that


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$$
\mathbf{u} \in \mathbf{A}^{-1}(\mathbf{T} \cdot \mathbf{c})
$$

then it must "know" short linear combination $\mathbf{x}$ such that

$$
\mathbf{c}=\sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \mathbf{g}(v) \cdot x_{g} \bmod q
$$

## Using Knowledge-kRISIS

Want to prove $\hat{c}$ and $\mathbf{w} \in \mathcal{R}^{2 m+1}$ satisfies:

$$
w_{0}=0 \quad \hat{c}=\hat{p}_{\mathbf{w}}(v) \quad\|\mathbf{w}\| \approx 0
$$

Public parameters: kRISIS instance $\left(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{t}, v,\left(\mathbf{u}_{i}\right)_{i \in \pm[m]}\right)$ where


Prover: Output $\mathbf{u}=\sum_{i \in \pm[m]} \mathbf{u}_{i} \cdot w_{i}$.
Verifier: Check that $\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{u}=\mathbf{t} \cdot \hat{\mathbf{c}} \bmod \mathrm{c}$ and $\|\mathbf{u}\| \approx 0$.
Knowledge-soundness follows immediately from the knowledge-kRISIS assumption.
Prover runs in $\tilde{O}_{\lambda}(m)$ time.
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## Lattice-based Bulletproofs

Goal: Prove SIS relation with $O(\log m)$ communication:

$$
\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{R}^{m}: \mathbf{M} \cdot \mathbf{x}=\mathbf{y} \bmod q \wedge\|\mathbf{x}\| \approx 0
$$

where $m=2^{\ell}, \mathbf{M}=\left[\mathbf{M}_{1} \mid \mathbf{M}_{2}\right], \mathbf{x}=\left[\begin{array}{l}\mathbf{x}_{1} \\ \mathbf{x}_{2}\end{array}\right]$.


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$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { Prover } \mathcal{P}((\mathbf{M}, \mathbf{y}), \mathbf{x}) \\
& \text { Verifier } \mathcal{V}(\mathbf{M}, \mathbf{y}) \\
& \mathbf{y}_{12}:=\mathbf{M}_{1} \cdot \mathbf{x}_{2} \\
& c \leftarrow \mathcal{C} \\
& \mathbf{y}_{21}:=\mathbf{M}_{\mathbf{2}} \cdot \mathbf{x}_{1} \\
& \xrightarrow{\mathbf{y}_{12}, \mathbf{y}_{21}} \\
& \hat{\mathbf{M}}_{c}:=\mathbf{M}_{1}+c \cdot \mathbf{M}_{2} \\
& \hat{\mathbf{x}}_{c}:=c \cdot \mathbf{x}_{1}+\mathbf{x}_{2} \\
& \text { c } \\
& \hat{\mathbf{y}}_{c}:=\mathbf{y}_{12}+\mathbf{y} \cdot c+\mathbf{y}_{21} \cdot c^{2} \bmod q \\
& \hat{\mathbf{x}}_{c} \\
& \text { return }\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\hat{\mathbf{M}}_{c} \cdot \hat{\mathbf{x}}_{c}=\hat{\mathbf{y}}_{c} \\
\left\|\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{c}\right\| \approx 0
\end{array}\right. \\
& \text { Just another SIS relation but with only } m / 2 \text { columns } \Longrightarrow \text { Recursion }
\end{aligned}
$$

## Lattice-based Bulletproofs

After $\ell$-fold recursive composition:

$$
\text { Prover } \mathcal{P}((\mathbf{M}, \mathbf{y}), \mathbf{x})
$$

$$
\text { Verifier } \mathcal{V}(\mathbf{M}, \mathbf{y})
$$

$\xrightarrow{\mathbf{y}_{12}^{(1)}, \mathbf{y}_{21}^{(1)}}$

$\xrightarrow{\mathbf{y}_{12}^{(\ell)}, \mathbf{y}_{21}^{(\ell)}}$


$$
\left(\hat{\mathbf{M}}_{c_{1}, \ldots, c_{\ell}}, \hat{\mathbf{y}}_{c_{1}, \ldots, c_{\ell}}\right):=\ldots
$$

$$
\text { return }\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\hat{\mathbf{M}}_{c_{1}, \ldots, c_{\ell}} \cdot \hat{\mathbf{x}}_{c_{1}, \ldots, c_{\ell}}=\hat{\mathbf{y}}_{c_{1}, \ldots, c_{\mu}} \\
\left\|\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{c_{1}, \ldots, c_{\ell}}\right\| \approx 0
\end{array}\right.
$$

## Lattice-based Bulletproofs

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$$
\begin{aligned}
& \underline{\text { Prover } \mathcal{P}((\mathbf{M}, \mathbf{y}), \mathbf{x}) \quad \underline{\text { Verifier } \mathcal{V}(\mathbf{M}, \mathbf{y})}} \\
& \left(\hat{\mathbf{M}}_{c_{1}}, \hat{\mathbf{y}}_{c_{1}}\right):=\ldots \\
& \left(\hat{\mathbf{M}}_{c_{1}, \ldots, c_{\ell}}, \hat{\mathbf{y}}_{c_{1}}, \ldots, c_{\ell}\right):=\ldots \\
& \text { return }\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\hat{\mathbf{M}}_{c_{1}, \ldots, c_{\ell}} \cdot \hat{\mathbf{x}}_{c_{1}, \ldots, c_{\ell}}=\hat{\mathbf{y}}_{c_{1}, \ldots, c_{\mu}} \\
\left\|\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{c_{1}, \ldots, c_{\ell}}\right\| \approx 0
\end{array}\right.
\end{aligned}
$$

Main verifier bottleneck: Computing $\hat{\mathbf{M}}_{\mathcal{C}_{1}, \ldots, c_{\ell}}$. In general, this requires $\Omega_{\lambda}(m)$ time.

## Structured Folding for vSIS

## Core Idea

For $\mathbf{M}$ corresponding to vSIS instance, computing $\hat{\mathbf{M}}_{c_{1}, \ldots, c_{\ell}}$ takes $\tilde{O}_{\lambda}(\log m)=\tilde{O}_{\lambda}(1)$ time .

Example for $\ell=3$


## Structured Folding for vSIS

## Core Idea

For $\mathbf{M}$ corresponding to vSIS instance, computing $\hat{\mathbf{M}}_{c_{1}, \ldots, c_{\ell}}$ takes $\tilde{O}_{\lambda}(\log m)=\tilde{O}_{\lambda}(1)$ time.

Example for $\ell=3$

$$
\left.\begin{array}{rl}
\mathbf{M} & =\left(\begin{array}{llllll}
v & v^{2} & v^{3} & v^{4} & v^{5} & v^{6}
\end{array} v^{7}\right. \\
v^{8}
\end{array}\right) .
$$

## Conclusion

$\dagger$ Vanishing Short Integer Solution (vSIS) assumption and commitments
$\dagger$ Succinct arguments for vSIS commitment openings
$\dagger$ Used to construct succinct arguments for NP
$\ddagger$ Lattice-based
$\ddagger$ Quasi-linear-time prover
$\ddagger$ Public and Polylogarithmic-time verifier (after preprocessing)
$\ddagger$ Transparent setup (RO instantiation)

## Valerio Cini

AIT Austrian Institute of Technology

