### Orbweaver Succinct Linear Functional Commitments from Lattices

### Ben Fisch, Zeyu Liu, and Psi Vesely Yale University



Lattice Orbweaver Spider by Jackie P (CC BY 4.0)





• Lattice arguments with  $O(\log n \log \log n)$  complexity verifier\*



with Karatsuba)

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### Results

- Lattice arguments with  $O(\log n \log \log n)$  complexity verifier\* ( $O(\log^{1.58} n)$  with Karatsuba)
- Constructions for both cyclotomic rings  $R_q$  and integers  $\mathbb{Z}_q$  of:
  - Linear map functional commitments/ inner product argument
  - Polynomial commitments
  - SNARK for R1CS

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### Abstract linear map equation

 $\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} f_i \cdot Y^{-i}\right) \cdot \left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i \cdot Y^i\right)$ 

### Form used in [Gro10,LRY16,AC20]

$$\equiv \langle \mathbf{f}, \mathbf{x} \rangle + \sum_{\substack{i = -n+1, \\ i \neq 0}}^{n-1} b_i \cdot Y^i \mod q$$

# **Evaluation verification equation f**, **x** short $\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} f_{i} \cdot Y^{-i}\right) \cdot \left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_{i} \cdot Y^{i}\right) \equiv \langle \mathbf{f}, \mathbf{x} \rangle + \sum_{i=-n+1}^{n-1} f_{i} \cdot Y^{-i}\right)$

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### **Ring Vandermonde SIS (R-V-SIS) commitment**

### $c := \sum x_i \cdot v^i \mod q$ , where $v \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} R_q$ is public i=1

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# **Ring Vandermonde SIS (R-V-SIS) commitment** $c := \sum x_i \cdot v^i \mod$ i=1

- Ajtai's R-SIS commitment, with a Vandermonde key
- Similar to assumption used in PASS Sign. If we pick v instead from the primitive roots of unity binding reduces to Vandermonde R-SIS [HS15,LZA18,BSS22]

$$q$$
, where  $v \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} R_q$  is public

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### (preprocessed)

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•  $C_{\mathbf{x}} \equiv y$ 

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**Evaluation verification equation** f, x short

### (preprocessed)





- Generate short preimages  $\mathbf{u}_i$  for  $i \in \{-n+1, ..., n-1\} \setminus \{0\}$  such that  $\langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{u}_i \rangle \equiv v^i \mod q$

Using a trapdoor public SIS matrix **a** [MP12]

### **Computing the proof**

- Given  $\langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{u}_i \rangle \equiv v^i \mod q$  except for i = 0
- Where  $b_i$  is the sum of cross terms corresponding to the coefficient of  $v^i$ compute

$$\pi := \sum_{\substack{i = -n \\ i \neq 0}}^{n-1} \sum_{i=n}^{n-1}$$



 $b_i \cdot \mathbf{u}_i \mod q$ + 1,

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• Then



$$b_i \cdot \mathbf{u}_i \mod q$$
  
+ 1,

$$\sum_{i=1}^{-1} b_i \cdot v_i \mod q$$

$$i = n + 1,$$

$$\neq 0$$

## **Computing the proof**

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- Where  $b_i$  is the sum of cross terms corresponding to the coefficient of  $v^i$  compute

• Then

 $\langle \mathbf{a}, \pi \rangle \equiv \sum_{i=-n}^{n}$ 

• **f**, **x** short  $\implies b_i$  short,  $u_i$  short  $\implies \pi$  short

$$\pi := \sum_{\substack{i=-n+1,\\i\neq 0}}^{n-1} b_i \cdot \mathbf{u}_i \mod q$$

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n-1} b_i \cdot v^i \mod q$$
  
$$p = n + 1,$$
  
$$\neq 0$$





### $\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} f_i \cdot v^{-i}\right) \cdot \left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i \cdot v^i\right) \equiv \langle \mathbf{f}, \mathbf{x} \rangle + \sum_{i=-n+1, i=-n+1, i=-n+$ $i \neq 0$ $c_{\mathbf{f}} \cdot c_{\mathbf{x}} \equiv y +$ $\langle \mathbf{a}, \boldsymbol{\pi} \rangle \mod q$





### $\langle \mathbf{a}, \pi - \pi' \rangle \equiv y' - y \mod q$

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 k-R-ISIS family of assumptions: can only generate short preimages for targets within a short linear span of the v<sup>i</sup> or for random targets [ACLMT22]

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- k-R-ISIS family of assumptions: can only generate short preimages for targets within a short linear span of the  $v^{i}$  or for random targets [ACLMT22]
- y' y is short, while for  $v \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} R_q$  all  $v^i \mod q$  will be long whp, as will the random targets

$$\equiv y' - y \mod q$$

### Can prove $\langle \mathbf{f}_i, \mathbf{x} \rangle = y_i$ for $i \in [t]$ with a single evaluation proof:

i=1



Can prove  $\langle \mathbf{f}_i, \mathbf{x} \rangle = y_i$  for  $i \in [t]$  with a single evaluation proof:

$$\langle \mathbf{a}, \pi \rangle \equiv c \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{t} h_i \cdot \mathsf{ck}_{\mathbf{f}_i} - \sum_{i=1}^{t} h_i \cdot y_i \mod q$$

which we extract x. It's thus unnecessary to extract the hypothetical  $\pi_i$  s.t.

Key observation: the prover submits a separate knowledge proof  $\pi'$  for c from

$$\sum_{i=1}^{t} h_i \cdot \pi_i$$

# Using extracted x we get n-1i=1 j=-n+1, $j \neq 0$

# $\langle \mathbf{a}, \pi \rangle \equiv \sum_{i=1}^{l} h_i \cdot (\langle \mathbf{f}_i, \mathbf{x} \rangle - y_i) - \sum_{i=1}^{l} h_i \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} b_{i,j} \cdot Y^i \mod q$ i=1



**Multiple outputs** i=1

 $p(h_1, ..., h_t)$ 

• For  $h_1, \ldots, h_t \leftarrow \mathcal{H}$  want  $p(h_1, \ldots, h_t) = 0$  only with negligible probability if p is not the zero polynomial

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• Can pick exponential size "exceptional set"  $\mathcal{H}$  over  $R_q$  for large q[LS18] and invoke Generalized Alon-Füredi Theorem [BCPS18]

$$\langle \mathbf{a}, \pi \rangle \equiv \sum_{i=1}^{t} h_i \cdot \left( \langle \mathbf{f}_i, \mathbf{x} \rangle - y_i \right) - \sum_{i=1}^{t} h_i \cdot \sum_{\substack{j=-n+1, \ j \neq 0}}^{n-1} b_{i,j} \cdot Y^i \mod q$$

$$p(h_1,\ldots,h_t)$$

- is not the zero polynomial
- invoke Generalized Alon-Füredi Theorem [BCPS18]
- Better to perform ternary decomposition on **f**, **x** and batch verification

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### **Proof and SRS sizes for** $\mathbb{Z}_{2^{32}}$

log2(x)	18	22	26	30
c  (B)	293	347	422	505
total proof size (KiB)	845	1,081	1,315	1,571
verifier key (MiB)	12	17	23	30
prover key (GiB)	0.3	6	111	2,070

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• Binding only version reduces proof size by ~65%, prover key size by ~75%



### **Proof and SRS sizes for** $\mathbb{Z}_{232}$

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- Evaluation binding only version (no extractability) reduces proof size by ~65%, prover key size by ~75%
- (extractable) recursion threshold



• These are maximum proof sizes. When  $\mathbf{f}$  or  $\mathbf{x}$  are sparse or have entries much

Smallest compressing proofs start around 165 KiB (binding) and 668 KiB



### Lattice-based Succinct Arguments from Vanishing Polynomials

### Valerio Cini<sup>1</sup>, Russell W. F. Lai<sup>2</sup>, Giulio Malavolta<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>AIT Austrian Institute of Technology, Austria <sup>2</sup>Aalto University, Finland <sup>3</sup>Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy, Germany

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### Lattice-based Succinct Arguments

Approach	Publicly verifiable	Sublinear-verifier (preprocessing)	Linear-prover
PCP/IOP + linear-only enc. [BCIOP13; BISW17; BISW18; GMNO18]	×	✓	✓
Linearisation + folding [BLNS20; AL21; ACK21; BS22]	$\checkmark$	$oldsymbol{arksymbol{\mathcal{K}}}  ilde{\mathcal{O}}_{\lambda}( stmt )$	√
Direct [ACLMT22]	✓	$\checkmark$	$oldsymbol{\check{S}}$ $ ilde{O}_{\lambda}( stmt ^2)$
This work (and [BCS23])	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	<i>_</i>

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### † New assumption: Vanishing Short Integer Solution (vSIS)

‡ generalization of SIS

New tool: vSIS commitment for committing to polynomials with short coefficients

- Very small (polylog(|stmt|)) commitment key
- (Almost) additively and multiplicatively homomorphic
- $\ \$  Admit  $ilde{O}(|\mathsf{stmt}|)$ -prover polylog $(|\mathsf{stmt}|)$ -verifier arguments for commitment openings

New lattice-based succinct arguments for NP  $\leftarrow$  Succinct arguments for vSIS commitment openings

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 $\dagger$  New lattice-based succinct arguments for NP  $\Leftarrow$  Succinct arguments for vSIS commitment openings

Instantiations	$ \pi $	$Time(\mathcal{P})$	$Time(\mathcal{V})$	Setup	Assumptions
Folding	$ ilde{O}_{\lambda}(1)$	$ ilde{O}_{\lambda}( stmt )$	$ ilde{O}_\lambda(1)$	Transparent	vSIS (+ RO for NI)
Knowledge assumption	$ ilde{O}_\lambda(1)$	$ ilde{O}_\lambda( stmt )$	$ ilde{O}_\lambda(1)$	Trusted	vSIS + Knowledge-kRISIS

### Roadmap

- 1. vSIS assumptions and commitments
- 2. Quadratic Relations using vSIS commitments
- 3. Succinct arguments for vSIS commitment openings

### Short Integer Solution (SIS) Assumption

- † Parameters: # rows *n*, # columns *m*, modulus *q*.
- † Instance: A matrix  $\mathbf{A} \in \mathcal{R}_a^{n \times m}$ .
- $\dagger$  Problem: Find a short vector  $\mathbf{u} \in \mathcal{R}^m$  such that

$$\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{u} = \mathbf{0} \mod q$$
 and  $\mathbf{0} < \|\mathbf{u}\| \approx \mathbf{0}$ .

† Shorthand: If **u** is a short non-zero vector satisfying  $\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{u} = \mathbf{v} \mod q$ , write

 $\mathbf{u} \in \mathbf{A}^{-1}(\mathbf{v}).$ 

### Vanishing SIS as SIS Generalisations

SIS			
Find short solution to linear equations			
$\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{u} = 0 \mod q$	and	$0 < \  oldsymbol{u} \  pprox 0.$	
SIS (Alternative Interpretation)			
Find linear function with chart coefficients		t all aiven nainte	

Vanishing SIS (vSIS)

Find polynomial (from some class) with short coefficients which vanishes at all given points

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Vanishing SIS (vSIS)

Find polynomial (from some class) with short coefficients which vanishes at all given points

### Vanishing Short Integer Solution (vSIS) Assumption

### Example: Univariate Problem: Find short degree *m* polynomial without constant term $p(X) = p_1 X + \ldots + p_m X^m \in \mathcal{R}[X]$ which vanishes at $v \in \mathcal{R}_{q}^{\times}$ modulo q, i.e. $p(v) = 0 \mod q$ $0 < \|p\| \approx 0.$ and In other words, find short vector $\mathbf{p} \in \mathcal{R}^m$ such that $\begin{bmatrix} v & v^2 & \dots & v^m \end{bmatrix} \cdot \mathbf{p} = 0 \mod q$ $0 < \|\mathbf{p}\| \approx 0.$ and

- † Domain: Polynomials  $p \in \mathcal{R}[X, X^{-1}]$  (of some class) with short coefficients.
- † Public parameters: Random unit  $v \leftarrow R_q^{\times}$ .
- † Commitment of polynomial *p*:

 $\operatorname{com}(p) = p(v) \mod q.$ 

† Binding: If  $p(v) = p'(v) \mod q$ , then we break vSIS, i.e.

 $(p-p')(v)=0 \mod q$   $||p-p'|| \leq ||p|| + ||p'|| \approx 0.$ 

$$p(v) + p'(v) = (p + p')(v) \mod q \qquad \qquad \left\| p + p' \right\| \le \|p\| + \|p'\| \approx 0$$
$$p(v) \cdot p'(v) = (p \cdot p')(v) \mod q \qquad \qquad \left\| p \cdot p' \right\| \lessapprox \|p\| \cdot \|p'\| \approx 0.$$

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 $\|p + p'\| \le \|p\| + \|p'\| \approx 0$   
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### **Encoding Vectors as (Laurent) Polynomials**

$$\mathbf{a} \coloneqq (a_1, \dots, a_m) \in \mathcal{R}^m \qquad \bar{p}_{\mathbf{a}}(X) \coloneqq p_{\mathbf{a}}(X^{-1}) \coloneqq a_1 X^{-1} + a_2 X^{-2} + \dots + a_m X^{-m} \\ \mathbf{b} \coloneqq (b_1, \dots, b_m) \in \mathcal{R}^m \qquad p_{\mathbf{b}}(X) \coloneqq b_1 X + b_2 X^2 + \dots + b_m X^m$$

Note that

$$ar{p}_{a}(X)\cdot p_{b}(X)=\hat{p}_{a*b}(X)\implies \hat{p}_{a*b}$$
 has  $O(m)$  terms (lots of collisions!)

where

† 
$$\mathbf{a} * \mathbf{b} := \left( \sum_{j=i=k} a_i \cdot b_j \right)_{k=-m}^m$$
 "convolution", and

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Want to prove that **x** is binary (i.e.  $x_i \cdot (1 - x_i) = 0$  for all *i*).

- † **x** is committed in vSIS commitment as  $c_{\mathbf{x}} := p_{\mathbf{x}}(v)$ .
- † **x** is committed also in dual vSIS commitment as  $\bar{c}_{\mathbf{x}} := \bar{p}_{\mathbf{x}}(v)$ ,
- † **1** is committed in dual vSIS commitment as  $\bar{c}_1 := \bar{p}_1(v)$ .

$$\underbrace{\sum_{i} x_{i} \cdot v^{i}}_{\substack{c_{\mathbf{x}} \\ \underbrace{c_{\mathbf{x}}}}} \underbrace{\left(\sum_{j} x_{j} \cdot v^{-j} - \sum_{j} 1 \cdot v^{-j}\right)}_{\hat{c}_{\mathbf{x}} \\ \underbrace{c_{\mathbf{x}}}_{\hat{c}_{\mathbf{x}}}}_{\hat{c}_{\mathbf{x}} \\ \underbrace{c_{\mathbf{x}}}_{\hat{c}_{\mathbf{x}}}} \underbrace{\sum_{j} x_{j} \cdot (x_{j} - 1)}_{\langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x} - 1 \rangle} + \text{mixed terms}$$

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- † **x** is committed in vSIS commitment as  $c_{\mathbf{x}} := p_{\mathbf{x}}(v)$ .
- † **h**  $\circ$  **x** is committed also in dual vSIS commitment as  $\bar{c}_{h \circ x} := \bar{p}_{h \circ x}(v)$ ,
- † **h** is committed in dual vSIS commitment as  $\bar{c}_{h} := \bar{p}_{h}(v)$ .

$$\underbrace{\sum_{i} x_{i} \cdot v^{i}}_{C_{\mathbf{x}}} \cdot \underbrace{\left(\sum_{j} h_{j} \cdot x_{j} \cdot v^{-j} - \sum_{j} h_{j} \cdot v^{-j}}_{\overline{c}_{h}}\right)}_{\hat{p}_{\mathbf{x} * h \circ (\mathbf{x} - 1)}(v)} = \underbrace{\sum_{i} h_{i} \cdot x_{i} \cdot (x_{i} - 1)}_{\langle \mathbf{h}, \mathbf{x} \circ (\mathbf{x} - 1) \rangle} + \text{mixed terms}$$

To prove that a vSIS commitment is committing to a (Laurent) polynomial without constant term:

$$\begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{v} & \mathbf{v}^2 & \cdots & \mathbf{v}^m \\ \mathbf{v}^{-1} & \mathbf{v}^{-2} & \cdots & \mathbf{v}^{-m} \end{bmatrix} \cdot \mathbf{x} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}} \\ \overline{\mathbf{c}}_{\mathbf{x}} \end{bmatrix} \mod q \land \|\mathbf{x}\| \approx \mathbf{0},$$

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### Knowledge-kRISIS Assumption(s) [ACLMT22] (a Member of)

### Parameters:

- $\ddagger$  SIS parameters (n, m, q),
- t submodule rank t < n, and
- <sup>‡</sup> *t*-tuples of Laurent monomials  $\mathcal{G}$ .

 $^\dagger\,$  Assumption: If a PPT (quantum) algorithm  ${\cal A}$ , which on input

 $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{T}, v, (\mathbf{u}_{g})_{g \in \mathcal{G}})$ 

where 
$$\mathbf{A} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{n imes m}$$
,  $\mathbf{T} \in (\mathcal{R}_q^{ imes})^{n imes t}$ ,  $v \in \mathcal{R}_q^{ imes}$ , and  $\mathbf{u}_g \in \mathbf{A}^{-1}(\mathbf{T} \cdot \mathbf{g}(v))$ ,  
an find  $(\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{c})$  where  
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then it must "know" short linear combination  $\boldsymbol{x}$  such that

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Want to prove $\hat{c}$ and $\mathbf{w} \in \mathcal{R}^{2m+1}$ satisfies:				
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- † Prover: Output  $\mathbf{u} = \sum_{i \in \pm[m]} \mathbf{u}_i \cdot w_i$ .
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### Lattice-based Bulletproofs

Goal: Prove SIS relation with  $O(\log m)$  communication:

$$\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{R}^m$$
:  $\mathbf{M} \cdot \mathbf{x} = \mathbf{y} \mod q \wedge \|\mathbf{x}\| \approx 0$   
where  $m = 2^{\ell}$ ,  $\mathbf{M} = [\mathbf{M}_1 \mid \mathbf{M}_2]$ ,  $\mathbf{x} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{x}_1 \\ \mathbf{x}_2 \end{bmatrix}$ .

$$\begin{array}{cccc} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} Prover \ \mathcal{P}((\mathbf{M},\mathbf{y}),\mathbf{x}) \\ \mathbf{y}_{12} \coloneqq \mathbf{M}_{1} \cdot \mathbf{x}_{2} \end{array} & & \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} Verifier \ \mathcal{V}(\mathbf{M},\mathbf{y}) \\ \hline \mathbf{c} \leftarrow \$ \ \mathcal{C} \end{array} \end{array} \\ \mathbf{y}_{21} \coloneqq \mathbf{M}_{2} \cdot \mathbf{x}_{1} & & \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \mathbf{y}_{12}, \mathbf{y}_{21} \end{array} & & \begin{array}{c} \mathbf{\hat{M}}_{c} \coloneqq \mathbf{M}_{1} + c \cdot \mathbf{M}_{2} \end{array} \end{array} \\ \mathbf{\hat{x}}_{c} \coloneqq c \cdot \mathbf{x}_{1} + \mathbf{x}_{2} & & \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} c \end{array} & & \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \mathbf{\hat{y}}_{c} \coloneqq \mathbf{y}_{12} + \mathbf{y} \cdot c + \mathbf{y}_{21} \cdot c^{2} \mbox{ mod } q \end{array} \\ \hline \mathbf{\hat{x}}_{c} & & \end{array} & & \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \mathbf{\hat{x}}_{c} \end{array} & & \begin{array}{c} \mbox{ return} \end{array} & \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \mathbf{\hat{M}}_{c} \cdot \mathbf{\hat{x}}_{c} = \mathbf{\hat{y}}_{c} \end{array} \\ \hline \mathbf{\hat{x}}_{c} \end{array} \right\} & & \end{array} & \\ \end{array} & & \begin{array}{c} \end{array} & \\ \end{array} \end{array} \end{array}$$

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After  $\ell$ -fold recursive composition:



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### Structured Folding for vSIS

Core Idea

For **M** corresponding to vSIS instance, computing 
$$\hat{\mathbf{M}}_{c_1,...,c_\ell}$$
 takes  $\tilde{O}_{\lambda}(\log m) = \tilde{O}_{\lambda}(1)$  time.

Example for  $\ell=$  3

$$\begin{split} \mathbf{M} &= \begin{pmatrix} v & v^2 & v^3 & v^4 & v^5 & v^6 & v^7 & v^8 \end{pmatrix} \\ \hat{\mathbf{M}}_{c_1} &= \begin{pmatrix} v & v^2 & v^3 & v^4 \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} v^5 & v^6 & v^7 & v^8 \end{pmatrix} \cdot c_1 \\ &= \begin{pmatrix} v & v^2 & v^3 & v^4 \end{pmatrix} \cdot (1 + v^4 \cdot c_1) \\ \hat{\mathbf{M}}_{c_1, c_2} &= \begin{pmatrix} v & v^2 \end{pmatrix} \cdot (1 + v^4 \cdot c_1) \cdot (1 + v^2 \cdot c_2) \\ \hat{\mathbf{M}}_{c_1, c_2, c_3} &= v \cdot (1 + v^4 \cdot c_1) \cdot (1 + v^2 \cdot c_2) \cdot (1 + v \cdot c_3) \\ &= v \cdot \prod_{i=1}^3 (1 + v^{2^{3-i}} \cdot c_i) \end{split}$$

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### Conclusion

† Vanishing Short Integer Solution (vSIS) assumption and commitments

- † Succinct arguments for vSIS commitment openings
- † Used to construct succinct arguments for NP
  - ‡ Lattice-based
  - ‡ Quasi-linear-time prover
  - ‡ Public and Polylogarithmic-time verifier (after preprocessing)
  - ‡ Transparent setup (RO instantiation)

Valerio Cini AIT Austrian Institute of Technology