

On the Impossibility of Algebraic NIZK In Pairing-Free Groups


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Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Arguments

\mathcal{R} an NP relation, $(x, w) \in \mathcal{R}$



Completeness


Soundness

Zero-Knowledge


Proof of Knowledge

Requires the **random oracle** or a **trusted setup** (CRS).


NIZK in the CRS model



Pairing Equations [GS12]



Correlation-Intractable Hash Functions [CGH04]



NIZK from Prime-Order Groups

Groth-Sahai Proofs [GS12]

- ✔ Uses the group **black-box**
- ✘ Requires **pairings**

Jain-Jin CIHF [JJ21]

from sub-exponential DDH

- ✘ Non **black-box** group usage
- ✔ Does not require **pairings**

Q

Do best of both worlds NIZKs exist?

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What does
black-box mean?

Q


Do best of both
worlds NIZKs exist?

$(\mathbb{G}, +)$ is modeled as an **oracle machine** with a list of group elements V .

- Initially $V = [G]$
- (add, i, j) : append $V[i] + V[j]$ to V
- (eq, i, j) : return $V[i] == V[j]$.

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Unlike **Shoup's** model, elements have **no (random) representation**.

Our Result

We show that these primitives are impossible in Maurer's GGM:

NIZK-AoK for the preimage relation for **one-way functions**.

$$\mathcal{R} = \{(x, w) : f(w) = x\}$$

- Discrete Logarithm
- "Powers of τ " $(g^{\tau^i})_{i=1}^n$

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NIZK for **hard subset membership** problems.

$$x \leftarrow \mathcal{L}, z \leftarrow \overline{\mathcal{L}} : x \approx_c z$$

- Decisional Diffie-Helman
- MDDH, DLin

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... secure against an **unbounded** adversary with **polynomial** GGM queries (**GPPT**).

How to Circumvent our Result?

**Using group elements
representation**

(Hashing, Padding)

Using more structure


(Pairing, Unknown order)


**Using external
hardness assumptions**

(RSA, LWE, iO)

NIZK-AoK Impossibility

Overview






Position Binding: Computing two openings for position i is hard.

[CFG22]: In Maurer's GGM, $|c| \cdot |\pi_i| = \Omega(n)$.

Algebraic Hiding VC Lower Bound



Improved Bound: For any VC in Maurer's GGM

Hiding + Position Binding \Rightarrow c contains $\geq n$ group elements.

Hiding VC from NIZK-AoK (DLog)

Let $h : \mathbb{F}_q \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be an hard-core predicate for DLog
i.e. $h(x)$ is hard to guess given only g^x .

$$\text{CRS} = g_1, \dots, g_n \quad \text{Uniformly Sampled}$$

$$\text{Com}(b_1, \dots, b_n) = \prod_{i=1}^n g_i^{x_i} \quad h(x_i) = b_i$$

$$\text{Open}(b_i) = x_i, (g^{x_j}, \pi_j)_{j \neq i} \quad \text{AoK for } x_j$$

- The commitment only contains **1 group element!**

Hiding VC from NIZK-AoK (OWF family)

$f_k : \{0, 1\}^\mu \rightarrow \mathbb{G}^m$ OWF family, with key space $k \sim \mathbb{G}^\kappa$

CRS = k_1, \dots, k_n ————— Uniformly
Sampled

Com(b_1, \dots, b_n) = $\prod_{i=1}^n f_{k_i}(x_i), r_1, \dots, r_n$ ————— $\langle x_i, r_i \rangle = b_i$

Open(b_i) = $x_i, (f_{k_j}(x_j), \pi_j)_{j \neq i}$ ————— AoK for x_j

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
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- [GL89]: $\langle x, r \rangle$ is an **hardcore predicate** for $F_k(x, r) = (f_k(x), r)$
- In GPPT time, $f_k(\cdot)$ can be restricted to be **collision resistant**
- The commitment only contains **$O(1)$ group elements!**

NIZK for hard subset membership Impossibility

Overview




Hard Subset Membership Problems

Hard Subset Membership Problem


Can sample indistinguishably from \mathcal{L} (with a **witness**) and $\bar{\mathcal{L}}$.

Eg. DDH, MDDH, DLin.



Signatures from NIZK

Single element message space $M = \{0\}$.




Correctness: \mathcal{S} cannot tell x is false $\Rightarrow \pi$ is almost always correct.

Without loss of generality crs, vk are vectors of group elements.

Either:

- Finds a forgery σ
- Finds $v : \langle v, \text{vk} \rangle = 0$.


Fails with probability $\frac{1}{\text{poly}(\lambda)}$



In our case $\text{crs} = x \in \overline{\mathcal{L}}$ and $\text{vk} = \text{NIZK.crs}$

NIZK Adversary


Initially get NIZK.crs



NIZK Adversary

Initially get NIZK.crs

$b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$



Conclusion

Conclusion & Open Questions

We proved that in **Maurer's GGM**, there exist **GPPT** adversaries breaking the security of any

- **NIZK-AoK** for the preimage relation of many OWF families,
- **NIZK** for hard subset membership problems.

Open questions:

- Can **witness hiding** be achieved?
- Do NIZK for non-trivial non-HSMP languages exists?

Thanks for your attention!