# Publicly-Verifiable Deletion via Target-Collapsing Functions

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Can we prove that data has been deleted?

## Quantum Encryption with Certified Deletion (BI'20)



Alice  $CT \leftarrow Enc_k(m)$ 

## Quantum Encryption with Certified Deletion (BI'20)

Bob



#### **Prior work:**

- Broadbent and Islam (TCC '20): Private-key encryption
- Hiroka, Morimae, Nishimaki and Yamakawa (Asiacrypt '21): Public-key encryption and attribute-based encryption
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#### Publicly-verifiable deletion?

Anyone should be able to verify a certificate  $\pi$  to determine whether CT was successfully deleted.

• Hiroka, Morimae, Nishimaki and Yamakawa (Asiacrypt '21): *Public-key encryption* with PVD assuming one-shot signatures and extractable witness encryption.

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THIS WORK: PVD under standard assumptions.

- Initiate the study of (certified-everlasting) target-collapsing hashes:
  - Proof of Strong Gaussian-Collapsing Conjecture (implies PVD under LWE/SIS)
  - Proof that the public-key encryption scheme by Hhan, Morimae, Yamawaka (Eurocrypt'23) enables PVD (implies PVD under non-abelian group actions)
- Generic compiler for cryptosystems with PVD from target-collapsing hashes (for example, assuming *almost-regular one-way functions*)

#### Candidate construction:

Dual-Regev public-key scheme with PVD

Poremba (ITCS '23)

$$|\psi
angle = \sum_{\mathbf{x}\in\mathbb{Z}_q^m} 
ho_{\sigma}(\mathbf{x}) |\mathbf{x}
angle \otimes |\mathbf{A}\cdot\mathbf{x} \pmod{q}
angle, \qquad 
ho_{\sigma}(\mathbf{x}) = \exp(-\pi \|\mathbf{x}\|^2/\sigma^2).$$

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Measure the second register, which results in an outcome  $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{Z}_{a}^{n}$ .

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Superposition of short vectors **x** subject to the constraint that

 $\mathbf{A}\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{y} \pmod{q}$ .

(solutions to inhomogenous SIS problem)

# **Duality of Gaussian States**





#### **Duality of Gaussian States**

Use primal domain to *encrypt* messages.

$$\sum_{\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n} \sum_{\mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m} \rho_{q/\sigma}(\mathbf{e}) \, \omega_q^{-\langle \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{y} \rangle} | \mathbf{s}^\mathsf{T} \mathbf{A} \! + \! \mathbf{e}^\mathsf{T} \rangle$$

Primal state

Use dual domain to prove deletion.







## Dual-Regev public-key encryption with PVD [Poremba, ITCS'23]

- KeyGen $(1^{\lambda})$  generate  $\mathsf{pk} = \mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$  and  $\mathsf{sk} = \mathbf{t}$  with  $\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{t} = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$ .
- $\mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(b)$  generate a verification key vk  $\leftarrow$  (**A**, **y**  $\in$   $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$ ) and ciphertext

$$|\mathsf{CT}\rangle \leftarrow \sum_{\mathbf{s}\in\mathbb{Z}_q^n}\sum_{\mathbf{e}\in\mathbb{Z}_q^n} \rho_{q/\sigma}(\mathbf{e})\,\omega_q^{-\langle\mathbf{s},\mathbf{y}
angle} |\mathbf{s}^\mathsf{T}\mathbf{A} + \mathbf{e}^\mathsf{T} + (0,\ldots,0,b\cdot\lfloor q/2\rfloor)\rangle.$$

Dec<sub>sk</sub>(|CT⟩) measure the ciphertext in the computational basis with outcome
 c ∈ Z<sup>m</sup><sub>q</sub> and round c<sup>T</sup> · sk ∈ Z<sub>q</sub> with respect to 0 and L<sup>q</sup>/<sub>2</sub>].

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To delete the ciphertext, apply the quantum Fourier transform resulting in

$$|\widehat{\mathsf{CT}}
angle = \sum_{\substack{\mathbf{x}\in\mathbb{Z}_q^m:\\ \mathbf{A}\mathbf{x}=\mathbf{y} \pmod{q}}} 
ho_{\sigma}(\mathbf{x}) \, \omega_q^{\langle \mathbf{x},(0,\dots,0,b\cdot\lfloor rac{q}{2} 
floor) 
angle} \ket{\mathbf{x}}$$

and measure to obtain a *short* solution  $\pi$  to the ISIS problem  $\mathbf{A} \cdot \pi = \mathbf{y}$  (public verification!)

# Security

## **Certified Deletion Experiment**

### $CD-EXP_{\mathcal{A}}(b)$ :

- 1. Sample a matrix  $\mathbf{A} \stackrel{s}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_{q}^{n \times m}$ .
- 2. Generate a pair  $(\mathbf{y}, |\psi_{b,\mathbf{y}}\rangle)$  with

$$|\psi_{b,\mathbf{y}}
angle = \sum_{\mathbf{x}\in\mathbb{Z}_q^m \text{ s.t. } \mathbf{A}\mathbf{x}=\mathbf{y}} 
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angle} |\mathbf{x}
angle.$$

3. Run  $\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{y}, |\psi_{b, \mathbf{y}}\rangle)$  to produce certificate  $\pi$  and residual state  $\rho$ .

4. If  $\pi$  is short and  $\mathbf{A} \cdot \pi = \mathbf{y}$ , output  $\rho$ . Else, output  $|\perp\rangle\langle\perp|$ .

Security: For any QPT  $\mathcal{A}$ : TD(CD-EXP<sub> $\mathcal{A}$ </sub>(0), CD-EXP<sub> $\mathcal{A}$ </sub>(1))  $\leq$  negl.

(Certified-Everlasting) Target-Collapsing Hashes

## **Certified-Everlasting Gaussian-Collapsing**

### **CEGC**-**EXP**<sub> $\mathcal{A}$ </sub>(*b*):

- **1**. Sample a matrix  $\mathbf{A} \stackrel{\hspace{0.1em}\mathsf{\scriptscriptstyle\$}}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ .
- 2. Generate a pair  $(\mathbf{y},|\psi_{\mathbf{y}}
  angle_{\mathsf{X}})$  with

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angle_{\mathsf{X}} = \sum_{\mathbf{x}\in\mathbb{Z}_{a}^{m} ext{ s.t. } \mathbf{A}\mathbf{x}=\mathbf{y}} 
ho_{\sigma}(\mathbf{x}) \, |\mathbf{x}
angle_{\mathsf{X}}.$$

- 3. If b = 1, additionally measure register X in computational basis.
- 4. Run  $\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{X})$  to produce certificate  $\pi$  and residual state  $\rho$ .
- 5. If  $\pi$  is short and  $\mathbf{A} \cdot \pi = \mathbf{y}$ , output  $\rho$ . Else, output  $|\perp\rangle\langle\perp|$ .

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<u>Proof idea:</u> • use entanglement via  $|+\rangle_{C}$ : superposition of non-measured/measured register X. • wait until  $\mathcal{A}$  replies with  $\pi$ , then perform projective measurement on register C.

## Generalization: Certified-Everlasting Target-Collapsing

Let  $\mathcal{H} = \{h : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}\}_h$  be a hash family,  $\mathcal{D}$  be a distribution and  $\mathcal{M}$  be a measurement.

#### Certified-Everlasting $(\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{M})$ -Target-Collapsing

- Ajtai hash function ightarrow random hash h in  ${\mathcal H}$
- Gaussian distribution  $\rightarrow$  distribution specified by  $\mathcal{D}.$
- Computational basis measurement of X  $\rightarrow$  measurement specified by  $\mathcal{M}.$

$$|\psi\rangle_{\mathsf{X}\mathsf{Y}} = \sum_{x\in\mathcal{X}} \sqrt{\mathcal{D}(x)} |x\rangle_{\mathsf{X}} \otimes |h(x)\rangle_{\mathsf{Y}}.$$

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Main Theorem: If the hash function family  $\mathcal H$  satisfies

- $(\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{M})$ -target-collision-resistance
- $(\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{M})$ -target-collapsing

then  $\mathcal H$  is certified-everlasting ( $\mathcal D,\mathcal M)\text{-target-collapsing}.$ 

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<u>Main Theorem</u>: If the hash function family  $\mathcal{H}$  satisfies

- $(\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{M})$ -target-collision-resistance ( $\leftarrow$  quantum generalization of classical TCR)
- $(\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{M})$ -target-collapsing ( $\leftarrow$  weakening of collapsing property [Unruh'16])

then  $\mathcal{H}$  is certified-everlasting  $(\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{M})$ -target-collapsing.

# Conclusion

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- We introduce a natural weakening of *collapsing* called target-collapsing.
- We show that hash functions which satisfy basic (non-everlasting) security properties *automatically* satisfy certified-everlasting target-collapsing.
- We use our framework to prove that the encryption schemes of Poremba (ITCS'23) and Hhan, Morimae and Yamakawa (Eurocrypt'23) enable PVD.
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#### **Open Problems:**

- investigate the relationship between target-collapsing and target-collision-resistance, and related notions.
- new cryptographic applications of target-collapsing hashes.

# **Questions?**