

# Sublinear-Communication MPC does not require FHE

Elette Boyle<sup>1,2</sup>   Geoffroy Couteau<sup>3</sup>   Pierre Meyer<sup>1,3</sup>


<sup>1</sup>Reichman University

<sup>2</sup>NTT Research


<sup>3</sup>Université Paris Cité, IRIF, CNRS

Eurocrypt 2023

# Sublinear-Communication Secure Computation



# Sublinear-Communication Secure Computation

 $x_A$  $x_B$ 


$$y = C(x_A, x_B)$$

Communication

$$\mathcal{O}(|x_A| + |x_B| + |y|) + o(|C|) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$$

Sublinear in the Circuit-Size

# Sublinear-Communication Secure Computation

 $x_A$  $x_B$ 

$$y = C(x_A, x_B)$$



Supported Class?

P/Poly (ideally)

For now:

$\omega(1)$ -depth


Layered Circuits

## Communication

$$\mathcal{O}(|x_A| + |x_B| + |y|) + o(|C|) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$$

Sublinear in the Circuit-Size

# Sublinear-Communication Secure Computation

 $x_A$  $x_B$ 

$$y = C(x_A, x_B)$$

Semi-Honest

2PC or (2+)PC

Static

Dishonest Majority

Supported Class?

P/Poly (ideally)

For now:

$\omega(1)$ -depth


Layered Circuits

## Communication



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Sublinear in the Circuit-Size

# Sublinear Secure Computation of Layered Circuits




# Sublinear Secure Computation of Layered Circuits



$$\text{Total Comm. } \frac{D}{k} \cdot \mathcal{O}(w) = \mathcal{O}(s/k)$$

# Sublinear Secure Computation of Layered Circuits



$$\text{Total Comm. } \frac{D}{k} \cdot \mathcal{O}(w) = \mathcal{O}(s/k)$$

“Communication-Optimal” MPC for depth- $k$  Circuits  $\Rightarrow$  (Factor  $k$ ) Sublinear MPC for Layered Circuits



**Correlated Randomness**

**Fully Homomorphic  
Encryption**

**Homomorphic  
Secret Sharing**

(or equivalently its “dual”:  
**Function Secret Sharing**)

# Correlated Randomness

## Trusted Setup

[Ishai-Kushilevitz-Meldgaard-Orlandi-Paskin'13]

[Damgård-Nielsen-Nielsen-Ranellucci'17]

[Couteau'19]

## DDH

[Boyle-Gilboa-Ishai'16]

## poly-modulus LWE

[Boyle-Kohl-Scholl'19]

# Homomorphic Secret Sharing

## DCR

[Fazio-Gennaro-Jafarikhah-Skeith'17]

[Orlandi-Scholl-Yacoubov'21]

[Roy-Singh'21]

## Class Groups

[Abram-Damgård-Orlandi-Scholl.'22]

## superpoly-LPN

[Couteau-Meyer'21]

# Fully Homomorphic Encryption

## Lattice-Based Assumptions

[Gentry'09]

[Brakerski-Vaikuntanathan'11]

...

## Correlated Randomness

Trusted Setup

DDH

poly-modulus LWE

DCR

## Homomorphic Secret Sharing

Class Groups

superpoly-LPN

## Correlated SPIR

[Boyle-Couteau-Meyer'22] QR+LPN

## Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Lattice-Based Assumptions


# (Single-Server) Symmetric Private Information Retrieval

[Chor-Goldreich-Kushilevitz-Sudan'95] and [Kushilevitz-Ostrovsky'97]



index:  $i$

Client



Server


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index:  $i$

Client



Server

- ▶ **Information Retrieval:** The client gets  $x_i$
- ▶ **Privacy:** The server does not learn  $i$
- ▶ **Communication Requirement:**  $o(N)$ ; ideally  $\text{polylog}(N)$


# (Single-Server) Symmetric Private Information Retrieval

[Chor-Goldreich-Kushilevitz-Sudan'95] and [Kushilevitz-Ostrovsky'97]



index:  $i$

Client



Server

- ▶ **Information Retrieval:** The client gets  $x_i$
- ▶ **Privacy:** The server does not learn  $i$
- ▶ **Symmetric Privacy:** The client does not learn  $x_j$  if  $j \neq i$
- ▶ **Communication Requirement:**  $o(N)$ ; ideally  $\text{polylog}(N)$

# Correlated SPIR

[Boyle-Couteau-Meyer'22]



Database 1



Database 2



...


Database  $k$



“Entropy”:  $x$

# Correlated SPIR

[Boyle-Couteau-Meyer'22]




- ▶ Public Correlation:  $Q_1(\cdot), \dots, Q_k(\cdot)$



# Correlated SPIR


[Boyle-Couteau-Meyer'22]



- ▶ Public Correlation:  $Q_1(\cdot), \dots, Q_k(\cdot)$
- ▶ Upload communication  $\mathcal{O}(|x|)$  and Download  $\mathcal{O}(k)$

# Correlated SPIR

[Boyle-Couteau-Meyer'22]



- ▶ Public Correlation:  $Q_1(\cdot), \dots, Q_k(\cdot)$
- ▶ Upload communication  $\mathcal{O}(|x|)$  and Download  $\mathcal{O}(k)$
- ▶ [Boyle-Couteau-Meyer'22]:  
Construction based on rate-1 LHE of [Brakerski-Branco-Döttling-Pu'22]  
(LPN + {QR  $\vee$  DCR  $\vee$  DDH  $\vee$  poly-modulus LWE})

Correlated Randomness

Trusted Setup

DDH

poly-modulus LWE

**Fully Homomorphic Encryption**

Lattice-Based Assumptions

DCR

**Homomorphic Secret Sharing**

Class Groups

superpoly-LPN

**Correlated SPIR**

[Boyle-Couteau-Meyer'22] QR+LPN

**Correlated Randomness**

Extends to MPC

**Fully Homomorphic Encryption**

Extends to MPC

**Homomorphic Secret Sharing**

Mostly 2PC?

**Correlated SPIR**

Only 2PC?

Correlated Randomness

**In This Talk:**

$N$ -Party HSS + corr-SPIR  
 $\Rightarrow$   
 $(N + 1)$ -Party Sublinear

Fully Homomorphic  
Encryption

Extends to MPC

**Homomorphic  
Secret Sharing**

Mostly 2PC?

**MPC!**

**Correlated SPIR**

Only 2PC?

## Selected Results for this Talk

1. **A Framework for Sublinear  $(N + 1)$ -PC**

2. **Sublinear  $\{3,4,5\}$ PC without FHE**

## Selected Results for this Talk

### 1. **A Framework for Sublinear $(N + 1)$ -PC**

▶ Tools:

- ▶  $N$ -Party Function Secret Sharing
- ▶ Correlated Symmetric PIR

### 2. **Sublinear $\{3,4,5\}$ PC without FHE**

- ▶ Assumptions: LPN + {DDH  $\vee$  QR  $\vee$  DCR  $\vee$  poly-modulus LWE}

# Selected Results for this Talk

## 1. A Framework for Sublinear $(N + 1)$ -PC

- ▶ Tools:
  - ▶  $N$ -Party Function Secret Sharing
  - ▶ Correlated Symmetric PIR
- ▶ Circuit Class:
  - ▶ Layered Circuits (Sublinear Communication)
  - ▶ LogLog-Depth Circuits (“Very Low” Comm.)

## 2. Sublinear $\{3,4,5\}$ PC without FHE

- ▶ Assumptions: LPN + {DDH  $\vee$  QR  $\vee$  DCR  $\vee$  poly-modulus LWE}
- ▶ Circuit Class:
  - ▶ Layered Circuits  $\mathcal{O}(|in| + |out| + \frac{|C|}{\log \log |C|})$
  - ▶ LogLog-Depth Circuits  $\mathcal{O}(|in| + |out| + \sqrt{|C|})$ .



# Template for $(N + 1)$ -Party Computation

For now, think secret-shared truth table

Secret Share the Function

$$f(\cdot) := C(\cdot, x_1, \dots, x_N)$$

as  $f = f_1 + \dots + f_N$

$x_1 \uparrow \downarrow f_1$

$P_1$

$\downarrow f_1$

Oblivious  
Evaluation

$x_0 \uparrow \downarrow y_1$

$x_2 \uparrow \downarrow f_2$

$P_2$

$\downarrow f_2$

Oblivious  
Evaluation

$x_0 \uparrow \downarrow y_2$

...

$x_N \uparrow \downarrow f_N$

$P_N$

$\downarrow f_N$

Oblivious  
Evaluation

$x_0 \uparrow \downarrow y_N$

$P_0$  only learns  
 $y_i := f_i(x_0)$

$P_0$

$y_1 + \dots + y_N$

Broadcast

Everyone gets  
 $f(x_0) = C(x_0, \dots, x_N)$

# Function Secret Sharing (FSS)

[Boyle-Gilboa-Ishai'15]


$FSS = (FSS.Gen, FSS.Eval)$

# Function Secret Sharing (FSS)

[Boyle-Gilboa-Ishai'15]

FSS = (FSS.Gen, FSS.Eval)

## Goal




# Function Secret Sharing (FSS)


[Boyle-Gilboa-Ishai'15]

FSS = (FSS.Gen, FSS.Eval)

**Goal**




**Using FSS**



# Function Secret Sharing (FSS)

[Boyle-Gilboa-Ishai'15]


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
Compressing Function Shares to Short Keys

$$f_i(\cdot) \approx \text{FSS.Eval}(k_i, \cdot)$$

# Using FSS to compress function shares down to short keys



# General Framework – The FSS Viewpoint



## Properties of the $N$ -FSS

### 1. Efficient Key-Distribution


Comm.  $\mathcal{O}(|x_1| + \dots + |x_N|)$

### 2. Efficient Oblivious Eval.

Comm.  $\mathcal{O}(|x_0| + |y|)$

# Oblivious Evaluation from Correlated SPIR

$$g(\cdot, \cdot)$$



Skipping Ahead:


$$g(\cdot, \cdot) = \text{FSS.Eval}(\cdot, \cdot)$$



# Oblivious Evaluation from Correlated SPIR

$$g(x_A, \cdot)$$

$n_B$  inputs



$m$  outputs

Skipping Ahead:



$$g(x_A, \cdot) = \text{FSS.Eval}(k_j, \cdot)$$

# Oblivious Evaluation from Correlated SPIR

Skipping Ahead:


$$g(x_A, \cdot) = \text{FSS.Eval}(k_i, \cdot)$$

$$g(x_A, \cdot)$$



Total Communication  $\mathcal{O}(n_B + m)$  using Correlated SPIR

## Using FSS with log log-depth Eval



# Less General Framework – FSS with log log-depth Eval


## Properties of the $N$ -FSS

### 1. Efficient Key-Distribution

Comm.  $\mathcal{O}(|x_1| + \dots + |x_N|)$

### 2. Low-Depth Evaluation

log log-depth  $\text{FSS.Eval}(k_i, \cdot)$



# Less General Framework – FSS with log-log-depth Eval


## Properties of the $N$ -FSS

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Comm.  $\mathcal{O}(|x_1| + \dots + |x_N|)$


### 2. Low-Depth Evaluation


log log-depth  $\text{FSS.Eval}(k_i, \cdot)$




**Question:** Can we build such an FSS scheme?

# Back to the Template for $(N + 1)$ -Party Computation












$$C(\cdot, x_1, \dots, x_N)$$




$$C(\cdot, x_1, \dots, x_N)$$



$P_i$

Truth Table of  
 $i^{\text{th}}$  Share of  $C_5$

Truth Table of  
 $i^{\text{th}}$  Share of  $C_{10}$



Generate HSS Shares of  $(x_1, \dots, x_N)$   
 (to be expanded to shares of  
 the truth table of each  $C_j(\cdot, x_1, \dots, x_N)$ )




**$N$ -HSS for the function  
 “Generate Local Tables”**



Truth Table of  
 $i^{\text{th}}$  Share of  $C_5$


Truth Table of  
 $i^{\text{th}}$  Share of  $C_{10}$

$C(\cdot, x_1, \dots, x_N)$



Secret Share the Function  
 $f(\cdot) := C(\cdot, x_1, \dots, x_N)$   
 as  $f = f_1 + \dots + f_N$


~~For now, think  
 secret shared  
 truth table~~




Generate HSS Shares of  $(x_1, \dots, x_N)$   
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


$C(\cdot, x_1, \dots, x_N)$



Secret Share the Function  
 $f(\cdot) := C(\cdot, x_1, \dots, x_N)$   
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
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
# 1. General Framework:

FSS for  $C$  s.t.

1. FSS.Gen can be distributed with comm.  $o(|C|)$
2. FSS.Eval can be distributed with comm.  $o(|C|)$



$$C(\cdot, x_1, \dots, x_N)$$



## 2. Framework for LogLog-Depth Circuits:

### 1. $N$ -party HSS for Table

- ▶  $N = 4$ : DCR
- ▶  $N = 2$ : DDH, DCR, Quasipoly-LPN, poly-modulus LWE

### 2. Correlated SPIR

- ▶ LPN + {QR  $\vee$  DDH  $\vee$  DCR  $\vee$  poly-modulus LWE}

## Some Other Results

- 3. Instantiating the framework with  $N$ -party “Las Vegas” HSS (+ correlated SPIR)**
- 4. 4-Party HSS for any  $\log \log$ -depth circuit from DCR**

## Some Other Results

### 3. Instantiating the framework with $N$ -party “Las Vegas” HSS (+ correlated SPIR)

▶ Core Issue:

Error Propagation (most elements of each truth table are shared erroneously!)

▶ Solution:

DPF + PIR to oblivious correct errors

### 4. 4-Party HSS for any $\log \log$ -depth circuit from DCR

## Some Other Results

### 3. Instantiating the framework with $N$ -party “Las Vegas” HSS (+ correlated SPIR)

▶ Core Issue:

Error Propagation (most elements of each truth table are shared erroneously!)

▶ Solution:

DPF + PIR to obliviously correct errors

**See the paper for the details!**

### 4. 4-Party HSS for any $\log \log$ -depth circuit from DCR



## Some Other Results

### 3. Instantiating the framework with $N$ -party “Las Vegas” HSS (+ correlated SPIR)

▶ Core Issue:

Error Propagation (most elements of each truth table are shared erroneously!)

▶ Solution:

DPF + PIR to obliviously correct errors

**See the paper for the details!**

### 4. 4-Party HSS for any log log-depth circuit from DCR

Tweak of “Scooby” [Chillotti-Orsini-Scholl-Smart-vLeeuwen’22]  
(4-Party constant-depth HSS from DCR)

## Open Directions

1. Beyond  $\{3,4,5\}$  parties?
  - ▶ Bottleneck:  $N$ -party HSS, or “succinct function sharing” alternative.
2. Beyond boolean circuits?
  - ▶ Bottleneck: Correlated SPIR  $\leftrightarrow$  Correlated Oblivious Polynomial Evaluation (OPE)
3. Beyond loglog-depth or layered circuits?
  - ▶ Bottleneck: Our “local truth tables” approach
4. Native malicious security?  
(without communication-preserving compilers)

Thank you!