


Supersingular Curves You Can Trust

Andrea Basso, Giulio Codogni, Deirdre Connolly, Luca De Feo,
Tako Boris Fouotsa, Guido Maria Lido, Travis Morrison, Lorenz Panny,
Sikhar Patranabis, Benjamin Wesolowski

Lyon, 26 April 2023


Plenty of reasons to distrust a supersingular elliptic curve

- ▶ Elliptic curves have a lot of structure, among which the **endomorphism ring**.





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
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
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 - ▶ Several hard problems become **easy** when you **know $\text{End}(E)$** . Including the isogeny problem!
- ⇒ $\text{End}(E)$ can be used to **backdoor** several isogeny-based protocols.



A big open problem

Solution: Supersingular Elliptic Curves with Unknown Endomorphism Ring.

“SECUER”

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Reality: Less great; next slide.

Constructing supersingular curves

- ▶ Bröker's algorithm: Reduce a CM curve from characteristic zero to \mathbb{F}_p .

Constructing supersingular curves


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
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
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


The connecting isogeny is a **backdoor** to the endomorphism ring.


Folklore workaround: Distributed trusted setup

E_0


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
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
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
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
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


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


This is clearly secure as long as at least one participant is trustworthy — **or is it?**


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
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
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
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
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The solution: Proof of Isogeny Knowledge

Solution: a **zero-knowledge proof for each isogeny** $\psi_i: E_{i-1} \rightarrow E_i$.

•
 E_0


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
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
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
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
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
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Main result

Assuming $\text{End}(E)$ is hard to compute, the trusted-setup protocol is **provably secure** in the simplified UC model if the proof of knowledge π is

- ▶ **Correct** for the relation

$\varphi: E_0 \rightarrow E_1$ is a cyclic d -isogeny.

- ▶ **Special-sound** for the relation

$\varphi: E_0 \rightarrow E_1$ is a cyclic isogeny (not necessarily of degree d).


- ▶ **Statistically zero-knowledge**.

\implies Trusted setup is resistant against future cryptanalysis.


Starting point: proof of isogeny knowledge

$$E_0 \xrightarrow{\varphi} E_1$$


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
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Good things:

- ▶ No auxiliary points
- ▶ No SIDH attacks!!

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
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Bad things:

- ▶ Isogenies are rational \implies short
- ▶ Only computational ZK

Achieving statistical zero-knowledge (in theory)


- ▶ The supersingular isogeny graph is Ramanujan.
⇒ Random walks quickly converge to \approx uniform.



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
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


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


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


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- ▶ The graph with level structure is also Ramanujan!
⇒ More information revealed, hence longer walks.



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- ▶ We need to construct SIDH squares with **degrees much larger than p** .
Kernel points are **irrational**, which makes things tricky computationally.


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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- ▶ **Any base field**: Choose $a = b = 1$, potentially going to a degree- $O(1)$ extension.

Performance: Not great, not terrible

$\log(p)$	Isogeny Lengths		Proof Size (kB)	Running Time	
	\rightarrow	\downarrow		Prove (s)	Verify (s)
434	705	890	191.19	2.96	0.32
503	774	977	215.75	4.17	0.44
610	1010	1275	404.32	12.12	1.24
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- ▶ **Practical enough** for trusted-setup protocols.
 - ▶ We plan to run a trusted setup ceremony **in the real world**.
- \implies Result: the world's first and only **SECUERs**!