

Towards Topology-Hiding Computation from Oblivious Transfer

Marshall Ball, **Alexander Bienstock**, Lisa Kohl, Pierre Meyer

What is Topology-Hiding Computation (THC)?


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
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
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- Typically -- assume secure point-to-point communication channels between all parties




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Connectivity in MPC




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
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 - Maybe topology is based on location data (e.g., vehicle-to-vehicle comms)
 - Maybe topology is based on users' relationships (e.g., social networks)
- What does this mean?


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
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
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Goal: P_6 should learn nothing else beyond its local view (its neighbors)

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Definition [MOR15]

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
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
$) \approx \text{View}(\Pi)_6$

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
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


$$) \approx \text{View}(\Pi)_6$$

- (Protocol reveals nothing beyond input/output, and neighbors in graph)
- Can consider different number of corruptions, **passive**/active, **static**/adaptive


Why is THC hard (even with passive adversaries)?

Flooding Broadcast




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
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Each party learns:

- Distance to BC
- Nbrs' distance to BC

Not Topology-Hiding!

Our Question

THC

Oblivious Transfer

MPC

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
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Known Results

Semi-Honest, Static, Arbitrary Number of Corruptions

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Semi-Honest, Static, Arbitrary Number of Corruptions

- [MOR15]: **Constant Round MPC with Constant Overhead** => THC for graphs with **constant degree** and **logarithmic diameter**
- [AM17,ALM17,LZM+18]: **Key-homomorphic, re-randomizable encryption** => THC for all graphs
 - Only known from structured algebraic assumptions; e.g., QR, DDH, LWE

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

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Our Contributions

- Assuming **constant round 2PC with constant overhead**, THC for semi-honest, static adversaries corrupting all-but-one parties exists **for all graphs**
 1. Define Locally-Simulatable MPC (for any fixed Graph)
 2. Use Locally-Simulatability + Correlated Random Walks [ALM17] to reduce THC to Locally-Simulatable OR on a Path
 3. Construct Locally-Simulatable OR on a Path from constant round 2PC with constant overhead


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For each time step, each node u defines a permutation on its neighbors




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
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
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This establishes several (correlated) random walks




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
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
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
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


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


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
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


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- "Random" -- The law of each individual walk is random
- Maybe we can design protocols just for paths now?

Locally Simulatable MPC on a Path



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- **New Requirement:** Can simulate views of 4 and 8 independently --

$$\{\text{Sim}(x_4, y; r_4), \text{Sim}(x_8, y; r_8)\} \approx \text{View}(\Pi)_{4,8}$$

- Namely, r_4, r_8 independent

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- Broadcast == OR function where broadcaster inputs broadcast bit, everyone else inputs 0

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THB Protocol

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
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
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- From view of P_3, P_6 , these look the same due to locally simulatability




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
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- Can be done using local simulation




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
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
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
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
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
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
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

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 - Need to simulate messages for virtual party without entire input (not an issue for [MOR15])
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 - If $OR = 1$, Sim pretends all honest inputs = 1 -- OK since simulated messages should be independent of virtual party's input

Conclusion


- We build THC from constant round 2PC with constant overhead
 - First such result for all graph classes (even with constant round/overhead)
- We define Locally Simulatable MPC (may be of independent interest)
- **Still Open:**
 - THC for all graph classes with *only* (polynomial-round) Oblivious Transfer?

Thanks!


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


Local Simulation on a Path



- Requirement: Can simulate views of P_3 and P_2 independently --
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