



On the Round Complexity of Fully Secure Solitary MPC with Honest Majority

Saikrishna Badrinarayanan, Peihan Miao, Pratyay Mukherjee and **Divya Ravi**

TCC 2023



Solitary MPC





MPC: allows group of parties to securely compute joint function on private inputs

Solitary MPC: only a *single* designated party obtains output

Standard MPC

vs

Solitary MPC



Standard MPC

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Full Security (G.O.D)
in dishonest majority

Impossible [Cleve 86]

Impossible [HIKMR19]

Standard MPC

VS

Solitary MPC

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G.O.D in Honest Majority: [HIKMR19, FGMO05]
Need to assume **either broadcast or PKI**

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3 rounds [GIKR02, GLS15, PR18,
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Broadcast is
necessary in first
and second round

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$\Omega(t)$ rounds [DS83]

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4 rounds necessary
5 rounds sufficient

[**This Work**]

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3 rounds [This Work,
BJMS18, ACGJ18]

G.O.D with PKI (no broadcast)

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4 rounds necessary
5 rounds sufficient

[This Work]

$t \geq 3$
Study special cases
 $t = 1, 2$

5-Round upper bound with PKI (no broadcast)

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[GLS15] 2-round (non-solitary) G.O.D protocol using PKI and Broadcast

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$n = 3, t = 1$


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pk, sk_1, sk_2, sk_3

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
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
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

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
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
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


($t + 1$) partial decryptions
can be combined to get output

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


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
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


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
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
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


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
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


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


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
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
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
Need to agree!

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
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
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Broadcast would need $t + 1$ rounds

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

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

We only need to agree
if Q is honest



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


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


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



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



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

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

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



Q says P_1 did not send anything.
Is Q corrupt or P_1 ?



5-Round upper bound with PKI (no broadcast)

Decentralized threshold FHE Setup: pk, sk_1, sk_2, sk_3






$n = 3, t = 1$



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Decentralized threshold FHE Setup: pk, sk_1, sk_2, sk_3






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




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



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
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



- Q must include a cipher text from party
- received directly in round 1
 - Via different party in round 2



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
Decentralized threshold FHE Setup: pk, sk_1, sk_2, sk_3

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Q must include a cipher text for **P₁** since I sent him one!





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
Decentralized threshold FHE Setup: pk, sk_1, sk_2, sk_3

$n = 3, t = 1$



Q must include a cipher text for P_1 since I sent him one!

- Q must include a cipher text from party
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- Via different party in round 2



Round Complexity of Solitary MPC with G.O.D

- Need to assume **either broadcast or PKI** [HIKMR19, FGMO05]

Broadcast	PKI	Threshold	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
✓	✓	$t < n/2$	2 [HLP11]	2 [GLS15]
✓	✗	$t < n/2$	3 [This work]	3 [ACGJ18, BJMS18]
✗	✓	$n/2 > t \geq 3$	4 [This work]	5 [This Work]



Additional Results:

- Optimal use of broadcast
- Special cases $t = 1$ & $t = 2$

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thank you!



Additional Results:

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