FLI: Folding Lookup Instances

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A folding scheme is an interactive protocol between P and V where:









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- P also has witnesses w_1, w_2 such that $(x_1; w_1), (x_2; w_2) \in R.$

 $(x_1; w_1)$ $(x_2; w_2)$







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- If $(x_3; w_3) \in \mathbb{R}$, then $(x_1; w_1), (x_2; w_2) \in R$, e.w.n.p.









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Folding reduces the task of proving 2 instance-witness to proving 1 instance-witness.







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 $(x_i; w_i) = (x'_i, Com(w_i); w_i)$





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• Usually the commitment is homomorphic: $cm_{w_1+w_2} = cm_{w_1} + cm_{w_2}$

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 $Com(w_i); w_i)$











































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Exchange messages







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Exchange messages

Uniformly sampled challenge $\alpha \in \mathbb{F}$

 $(x_1, \operatorname{cm}_{w_1})$ $(x_2, \operatorname{cm}_{w_2})$





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 (x_1, Cm_{w_1}) (x_2, Cm_{w_2})





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• Where $x_3 = x_1 + \alpha x_2$ $w_3 = x_1 + \alpha x_2$

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 \checkmark

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- Where $x_3 = x_1 + \alpha x_2$ $w_3 = w_1 + \alpha w_2$
- V computes cm_{W_3} using that $\operatorname{cm}_{W_1} + \alpha \operatorname{cm}_{W_2} = cm_{W_1 + \alpha W_2}$

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- V computes cm_{W_3} using that $\operatorname{cm}_{W_1} + \alpha \operatorname{cm}_{W_2} = cm_{W_1 + \alpha W_2}$
- (Disclaimer: this is an extremely simplified, technically incorrect, blueprint)

Exchange messages

Uniformly sampled challenge $\alpha \in \mathbb{F}$

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 $(x_1, \operatorname{Cm}_{w_1})$

 (x_2, CM_{w_2})



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• $v_i \in S$ for all i = 1, ..., n.

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 - $\approx 2^{20}$ constraints as R1CS.

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• Here "expensive" means that a huge circuit is required. E.g. SHA-256 requires

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• Simply, the i - th row of M indicates a position of S that equals v_i

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$$(\Leftrightarrow \exists M_{1}, M_{2}; M_{1} \cdot S^{T} = v_{1}^{T}, M_{2} \cdot S^{T} = v_{2}^{T}, M_{1}, M_{2} \in R_{elem})$$
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$$(M_{1} + \alpha M_{2}) \cdot S^{T} = (v_{1} + \alpha v_{2})^{T}, M_{1}, M_{2} \in R_{elem} \quad (**)$$

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• It can be seen that, with high probability (over the choice of α), (*) holds if

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 - $M_{ii}^2 = M_{ii}$ for all entries M_{ii} of M. This ensures M contains only 0 or 1's.
 - $M \cdot \mathbf{1}^T = \mathbf{1}^T$. With the above, this ensures each row contains exactly one 1.

 $(M_1 + \alpha M_2) \cdot S^T = (v_1 + \alpha v_2)^T, \quad M_1, M_2 \in R_{elem}$ (**)

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• $R_{elem-relaxed}$ is a "relaxed version" of R_{elem} , similar to a relaxed R1CS.

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- $M \in R_{elem}$ iff $M_{ii}^2 = M_{ij}$, $M \cdot \mathbf{1}^T = \mathbf{1}^T$.
- matrix M.
- type approach.
- The final folded instance has the form :

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• Leveraging the sparseness of M_i the overall cost for P and V is similar to



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 Note: Any other scheme working with huge SOS-dec. tables needs also to increase the number of folds per step by c (though c can be taken smaller), and FLI can make

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- Jolt (Arun et al. 2023): Many S's of interest are SOS-dec. E.g. RISC-V instructions



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- These conditions are equivalent to $v = (M_1 \cdot S') + 2^{16}(M_2 \cdot S')$ and $M_1, M_2 \in R_{elem}$
- We now use a Hypernova-style sumcheck to reduce the equality to two linear equalities, plus $M_1, M_2 \in R_{elem}$. Then we perform folding similarly as before.

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- FLI can leverage SOS decomposability of *S* with much less field operations and commitments than other schemes: Protostar (Bünz, Biny Chen, 2023), Proofs for Deep Thougth (Bünz, Jessica Chen, 2024), NeutronNova (Kothapally, Setty, 2024)

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 - $S = \{(x | |y| | z) | (x, y) \text{ input to an instruction, } z \text{ output} \}$
- Example: An instruction could be bitwise XOR of 64-bit strings. Then $|S| = 2^{3 \cdot 64} = 2^{192}$.

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 - Fold the 2⁵ lookups and then prove the folded claim.