

Revisiting Pairing-Friendly Curves with Embedding Degrees 10 and 14

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Background

Elliptic curves

Figure 1: Group law on elliptic curve*^a*

An elliptic curve E over \mathbb{F}_p with $p > 3$ can be defined by an equation $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b.$

 $\bullet \ \ E(\bar{\mathbb{F}}_p)$ forms an addition group.

•
$$
j(E) = 1728 \frac{4a^3}{4a^3 + 27b^2}
$$
.

- $\#E(\mathbb{F}_p) = p + 1 t$, where $|t| \leq 2\sqrt{p}$.
- If $t \neq 0$, then E is ordinary.
- $\bullet~$ Cryptographic applications: $\#E(\mathbb{F}_p)$ has a large prime divisor r .

*^a*This picture comes from Luca De Feo's github.

A cryptographic pairing on elliptic curves

$$
e:\mathbb{G}_1\times\mathbb{G}_2\to\mathbb{G}_T,
$$

where e is bilinear and non-degenerate.

Figure 2: pairing*^a*

• $\mathbb{G}_1 = E(\mathbb{F}_p)[r].$

$$
\bullet \ \ \mathbb{G}_2=E(\mathbb{F}_{p^k})[r]\cap (\pi-[p]).
$$

$$
\bullet \ \ \mathbb{G}_T=\{\mu\in \mathbb{F}_{p^k}|\mu^r=1\}.
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A cryptographic pairing on elliptic curves

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Main building blocks in pairings-based protocols:

- $\bullet\,$ Hashing to ${\mathbb G}_{1}$ and ${\mathbb G}_{2}.$
- $\bullet~$ group exponentiations in \mathbb{G}_{1} , \mathbb{G}_{2} and $\mathbb{G}_{T}.$
- $\bullet~$ subgroup membership testing for \mathbb{G}_{1} , \mathbb{G}_{2} and $\mathbb{G}_{T}.$
- pairing computation.

Pairing-friendly curves: small values of k and $\rho = \log p / \log r$.

Optimal pairing

Optimal pairing

$$
\begin{aligned} e: \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 &\rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T, \\ (P,Q) &\rightarrow \left(\prod_{i=0}^L f_{c_i,Q}^{p^i}(P) \cdot \prod_{i=0}^{L-1} \frac{\ell_{[s_{i+1}]Q,[c_ip^i]Q}(P)}{\nu_{[s_i]Q}(P)} \right)^{\frac{(p^k-1)}{r}} \end{aligned}
$$

• $f_{m,Q}$: a rational function with divisor

 $div(f_{m,Q}) = m(Q) - ([m]Q) - (m-1)(\mathcal{O}_F).$

- $\ell_{[i]R,[j]R}$: straight line passing through $[i]R$ and $[j]R$.
- $\nu_{[i+j]B}$: a vertical line passing through $[i+j]R$.
- $\bullet\;\; \mathbf{c} = (c_0, c_1, \cdots, c_L) \in \mathbb{Z}^{L+1}$ with $\sum_{i=0}^L c_i p^i \equiv 0 \bmod r.$
- $s_i = \sum_{j=i}^{L} c_j p^j$.

The shortest target vector satisfies that $\|\mathbf{c}\| \approx r^{1/\varphi(k)}$.

Miller's algorithm

Algorithm 1 MILLERLOOP (x, Q, P)

$$
\begin{array}{ll}\text{Input: } P \in \mathbb{G}_1, Q \in \mathbb{G}_2, x = \sum_{i=0}^{\lfloor log_2 x \rfloor} x_i 2^i\\ \text{Output: } f_{x,Q}(P)\\ \text{1: } T \leftarrow Q, f \leftarrow 1\\ \text{2: for } i = \lfloor log_2 x \rfloor - 1 \text{ downto 0 do}\\ \text{3: } & f \leftarrow f^2 \cdot \frac{\ell_{T,T}(P)}{\nu_{2T}(P)}, T \leftarrow 2T\\ \text{4: } & \text{if } x_i = 1 \text{ then}\\ \text{5: } & f \leftarrow f \cdot \frac{\ell_{T,Q}(P)}{\nu_{T+Q}(P)}, T \leftarrow T + Q\\ \text{return } f\end{array}
$$

Efficient implementation of Miller's algorithm:

- Optimal pairing \rightarrow log $r/\varphi(k)$ iterations.
- Fast point operation in projective coordinates.
- Denominator elimination $\rightarrow \nu_R$ can be ignored if 2 | k.

Most of mainstream pairing-friendly curves can be parameterized by polynomials.

- the seed z should guarantee p and r are prime (or r has a large prime divisor).
- the sizes of p and r depend on the selected security level.

Parameters

Pairing-friendly curves at around 128-bit security level under the attack of the variant of number field sieve(NFS):

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How to choose pairing-friendly curves:

- BLS12-381: fast pairing for non-conservative curves.
- BLS12-446: fast pairing for conservative curves.
- $\bullet~$ BW13-310: fast group exponentiation in $\mathbb{G}_1.$

The performance difference of pairing computation between BW13-310 and BN446 is slight. More details for pairing computation on BW13-310:

- $\bullet~$ The point doubling/addition is costly as \mathbb{G}_{2} is defined over $\mathbb{F}_{p^{13}}.$
- The trick of denominator elimination is not suitable any more.
- The length of Miller loop can be reduced to around $\log r/(2\varphi(k)).$

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Question

Are there pairing-friendly curves with such that the Miller loop can be performed in $\log r/(2\varphi(k))$ iterations, and the trick of denominator elimination applies as well?

Yes! Pairing-friendly curves with embedding degrees 10 **and** 14**.**

Curves with embedding degrees 10 **and** 14

Curve parameters and pairing formulas

Freeman, Scott and Teske construct a list of pairing-friendly curves with embedding degrees 10 and 14.

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10

Efficiently computable endomorphisms on ordinary curves:

- the Frobenius map: $\pi : (x, y) \to (x^p, y^p).$
- the GLV map: $\tau : \begin{cases} (x, y) \to (\omega \cdot x, y), & j(E) = 0, \omega^2 + \omega + 1 = 0 \text{ mod } p; \\ (y, y) = \omega, & j(E) = 0, \omega^2 + \omega + 1 = 0 \text{ mod } p; \end{cases}$ $(x, y) \rightarrow (-x, i \cdot y), \quad j(E) = 1728, i^2 + 1 = 0 \text{ mod } p.$

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Main idea

Restricting the above two endomorphisms on \mathbb{G}_2 for our target curves, the GLV map is not a power of the Frobenius map. More interesting, there always exists an integer m such that $\pi^m \tau(Q) = [z] Q$ for $\mathbb{G}_2 \in Q.$

New pairing formulas

Optimized formulas of the optimal pairing on pairing-friendly curves with embedding degrees 10 and 14:

1. Rewrite $f_{z^2,Q}(P)$ as $f_{z^2,Q}(P) = f_{z,Q}^z(P) \cdot f_{z,[z]Q}(P) = f_{z,Q}^z(P) \cdot f_{z,\pi^m \tau(Q)}(P)$ $=f_{z,Q}^z(P)\cdot f_{z,Q}^{p^m}(\hat{\tau}(P))$

where $\hat{\tau}$ is the dual of τ .

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2. Raise the output of the Miller loop to a power of p^{k-m} such that the exponent of $f_{z,O}(\hat{\tau}(P))$ is equal to 1.

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Shared Miller's algorithm

The computation of $f_{z,Q}^{z\cdot p^{k-m}}(P)\cdot f_{z,Q}(\widehat{\tau}(P))$ can be performed in a shared Miller's algorithm at around log $z \approx \log r / 2(\varphi(k))$ iterations.

Algorithm 2 Computing $f_{z,Q}^{z\cdot p^{k-m}}(P)\cdot f_{z,Q}(\widehat{\tau}(P))$

Require: $P \in \mathbb{G}_1$, $Q \in \mathbb{G}_2$, $z = \sum_{i=0}^{L} z_i \cdot 2^i$ with $z_i \in \{-1, 0, 1\}$ **Ensure:** $f_{z,Q}^{z\cdot p^{k-m}}(P)\cdot f_{z,Q}(\hat{\tau}(P))$

$$
\begin{array}{llll} 1: \; T \leftarrow Q, \, f \leftarrow 1, \text{tab} \leftarrow [\, , \, j \leftarrow 0 & 12 \colon \text{end for} \\ 2: \; \text{for} \; i = L-1 \; \text{down to} \; 0 \; \text{do} & 13 \colon \; g \leftarrow f^{p^{k-m}}, \, h \leftarrow g, \, j \leftarrow 0 \\ 3: \; & \; f \leftarrow f^2 \cdot \ell_{T,T}(P), \text{tab}[j] \leftarrow \ell_{T,T}(\hat{\tau}(P)) \; \; 14 \colon \text{for} \; i = L-1 \; \text{down to} \; 0 \; \text{do} \\ 4: \; & \; T \leftarrow 2T, \, j \leftarrow j+1 & 15 \colon \quad h \leftarrow h^2 \cdot \text{tab}[j], \, j \leftarrow j+1 \\ 5: \; & \; \text{if} \; z_i = 1 \; \text{then} & 16 \colon \quad \text{if} \; z_i = 1 \; \text{then} \\ 6: \; & \; f \leftarrow f \cdot \ell_{T,Q}(P), \text{tab}[j] \leftarrow \ell_{T,Q}(\hat{\tau}(P)) \; \; 17 \colon \quad & \; h \leftarrow h \cdot g \cdot \text{tab}[j], \, j \leftarrow j+1 \\ 7: \; & \; T \leftarrow T+Q, \, j \leftarrow j+1 & 18 \colon \; & \; \text{elif} \; z_i = -1 \; \text{then} \\ 8: \; & \; \text{elif} \; z_i = -1 \; \text{then} & 19 \colon \quad & \; h \leftarrow h \cdot \bar{g} \cdot \text{tab}[j], \, j \leftarrow j+1 \\ 9: \; & \; f \leftarrow f \cdot \ell_{T,-Q}(P), \text{tab}[j] \leftarrow \ell_{T,-Q}(\hat{\tau}(P)) \; \text{20} \colon \; \text{end if} \\ 10: \; & \; T \leftarrow T-Q, \, j \leftarrow j+1 & 21 \colon \text{end for} \\ 11: \; & \; \text{end if} \end{array}
$$

The best seed z can quarantee that:

- the size of \mathbb{F}_{p^k} is large enough to resist the attacks of the variant of NFS.
- the sum of bit length and Hamming weight (in non-adjacent form) of the selected seed z is as small as possible.
- the selected prime p satisfies that $p \equiv 1$ mod k .

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- the size of \mathbb{F}_{n^k} is large enough to resist the attacks of the variant of NFS.
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- the selected prime p satisfies that $p \equiv 1$ mod k.

Remark1: The candidate curves are conservative 128-bit secure.

Remark2: The candidate curves are collectively called BW curves since they are essentially generated using the Brezing-Weng method.

Recall that the first pairing group $\mathbb{G}_1 = E(\mathbb{F}_p)[r].$ There exists an efficiently computable endomorphism on \mathbb{G}_1 :

$$
\tau: \begin{cases} (x,y) \rightarrow (\omega \cdot x,y), \quad \ j(E)=0, \omega^2+\omega+1=0 \bmod p; \\ (x,y) \rightarrow (-x,i\cdot y), \quad j(E)=1728, i^2+1=0 \bmod p. \end{cases}
$$

The operations in \mathbb{G}_1 :

- $\bullet~$ group exponentiation in \mathbb{G}_{1} : log $r/2$ iterations by using GLV method.
- $\bullet~$ membership testing for \mathbb{G}_{1} : log $r/2$ iterations with a fixed scalar.
- $\bullet \ \$ hashing to \mathbb{G}_1 : hashing to $E(\mathbb{F}_p)+$ cofactor clearing.

cofactor clearing for \mathbb{G}_1

The process of cofactor clearing for \mathbb{G}_1 :

$$
E(\mathbb{F}_p) \xrightarrow{m_1} E(\mathbb{F}_p)[n_1 \cdot r] \to E(\mathbb{F}_p)[r] = \mathbb{G}_1
$$

where $E(\mathbb{F}_p) \cong \mathbb{Z}_{m_1} \oplus \mathbb{Z}_{m_1 \cdot n_1 \cdot r}$.

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How to clear n_1 :

- 1. Determine the integer λ_1 such that $\tau = \lambda_1$ in $E(\mathbb{F}_p)[n_1 \cdot r]$.
- 2. Applying the LLL algorithm, find a short vector $\mathbf{a} = (a_0, a_1)$ such that $a_0 + a_1 \cdot \lambda_1 \equiv 0$ mod n_1 with max{log $|a_0|,$ log $|a_1| \} \approx \log n_1/2$.
- 3. Clearing the cofactor n_1 by using the endomorphism $a_0 + a_1 \tau.$

The second pairing group

The degree-2 twisted curve

For our target curves, there exists a twisted curve E' over \mathbb{F}_{n^e} of degree 2 such that $E' \cong E$ over \mathbb{F}_{n^k} under a twisted map ϕ , where $e = k/2$.

The group $\mathbb{G}_2 = E[r] \cap \mathsf{ker}(\pi{-}[p])$ can be efficiently represented as $E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^e})[r].$

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$$
\tau, \pi' = \phi^{-1} \circ \pi \circ \phi, \Psi = \tau \circ \pi',
$$

where the order of Ψ restricting on \mathbb{G}_{2} is $2k$ (if $j(E)=1728)$ or $3k$ (if $j(E)=0).$

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where the order of Ψ restricting on \mathbb{G}_{2} is $2k$ (if $j(E)=1728)$ or $3k$ (if $j(E)=0).$ The operations in \mathbb{G}_2 :

- $\bullet~$ group exponentiation in \mathbb{G}_2 : log $r/(2\varphi(k))$ iterations by combining the GLV and GLS methods.
- $\bullet~$ subgroup membership testing for ${\mathbb G}_2$: log $r/(2\varphi(k))$ iterations with a fixed scalar.
- hashing to \mathbb{G}_2 : hashing to $E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^e})+$ cofactor clearing.

Cyclotomic zero subgroup of E'

Define $\mathbb{G}_0' = \{Q \in E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^e}) | \Phi_k(\pi')(Q) = \mathcal{O}_{E'}\}$, where Φ_k is the $k{\rm-th}$ cyclotomic polynomial.

- $\mathbb{G}_2 \subseteq \mathbb{G}'_0 \subseteq E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^e}).$
- the order of \mathbb{G}_0' is equal to $\frac{\#E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^e}) + \#E(\mathbb{F}_p)}{\#E(\mathbb{F}_{p^2})}$ $#E(\mathbb{F}_{p^2})$.
- $\bullet~$ Given a random point $Q\in E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^e}),$ then $R=(\pi'+1)Q\in \mathbb{G} _0'$ as

$$
\Phi_k(\pi')(R)=(\pi'^e+1)Q=\mathcal{O}_{E'}.
$$

cofactor clearing for \mathbb{G}_2

The process of cofactor clearing for \mathbb{G}_2 :

$$
E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^e}) \rightarrow \mathbb{G}'_0 \xrightarrow{m_2} E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^e})[n_2 \cdot r] \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_2,
$$

where $\mathbb{G}_0' \cong \mathbb{Z}_{m_2} \oplus \mathbb{Z}_{m_2 \cdot n_2 \cdot r}$ for some integers m_2 and $n_2.$

cofactor clearing for \mathbb{G}_2

The process of cofactor clearing for \mathbb{G}_2 :

 $E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^e}) \to \mathbb{G}'_0$ $\stackrel{m_2}{\longrightarrow} E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^e})[n_2\cdot r] \to \mathbb{G}_2,$ where $\mathbb{G}_0' \cong \mathbb{Z}_{m_2} \oplus \mathbb{Z}_{m_2 \cdot n_2 \cdot r}$ for some integers m_2 and $n_2.$

How to clear n_2 :

- 1. Determine the integer λ_2 such that $\Psi = \lambda_2$ in $E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^{k/2}})[n_2 \cdot r]$.
- 2. Applying the LLL algorithm, find $\textbf{a} = (a_0, a_1, {\cdots}, a_{2\varphi(k)-1})$ such that

$$
a_0 + a_1 \cdot \lambda_2 + \cdots + a_{2\varphi(k)-1} \cdot \lambda_2^{2\varphi(k)-1} \equiv 0 \bmod n_2
$$

with max $\{ \log |a_i| \} \approx \log n_2/(2\varphi(k)).$

3. Clearing the cofactor n_2 by using the endomorphism

$$
a_0 + a_1 \Psi + \dots + a_{2\varphi(k)-1} \Psi^{2\varphi(k)-1}.
$$

The operations in \mathbb{G}_T :

- $\bullet~$ group exponentiation in \mathbb{G}_T : log $r/\varphi(k)$ iterations by using the GLS method.
- $\bullet~$ subgroup membership testing for \mathbb{G}_T : log $r/\varphi(k)$ iterations with a fixed exponent.

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Remark 1: Inversion in \mathbb{G}_T is almost free as it is equal to its conjugate.

Remark 2: Squaring in \mathbb{G}_T is slightly faster than the squaring in $\mathbb{F}_{p^k}.$

Implementation results

conservative curves: BLS12-446, BN-446, BW13-310 VS BW10-511, BW14-351

Target platform: Intel Core i9-12900K processor

Library: RELIC

Table 1: Timings in 10^3 cycles averaged over 10^4 executions. 21

https://github.com/eccdaiy39/BW10-14

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Thank you!