

Unclonable Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge

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Motivation: No-Cloning Theorem

No-cloning Theorem:

- ❖ Cannot create independent, identical “clone” of arbitrary, unknown quantum state

Led to many unclonable primitives [AC13, CLLZ21, Got03, AKL+22, GZ20, KN23, MS24, AGLL24...]

Open problems posed by Aaronson [Aar09]:

- ❖ Can we construct unclonable quantum proofs?
- ❖ How do these proofs relate to quantum money?


Applications: Signatures & Credentials

- ❖ Unclonable Signatures of Knowledge
- ❖ Revocable Anonymous Credentials
- ❖ Unclonable Anonymous Credentials
- ❖ Certified Deletion of NIZK

Application: Signatures

Non-Interactive Prevention of Replay Attacks


Replay Attack



Application: Signatures

Non-Interactive Prevention of Replay Attacks


Replay Attack



Application: Signatures

Non-Interactive Prevention of Replay Attacks


Replay Attack




Application: Signatures

Non-Interactive Prevention of Replay Attacks

❖ Current: Session ID Approach



❖ Proposed: Unclonability Approach



Recall: Non-Interactive Proof System for NP

Prover (P)



Common Reference String

Verifier (V)



Output accept/reject

❖ Completeness

- $\forall x \in L, \Pr[V \text{ accepts}] = 1$

❖ Soundness

- $\forall P^*, x \notin L, \Pr[V \text{ accepts}] = \text{negl}(\lambda)$

❖ Zero-Knowledge

- V^* learns nothing beyond $x \in L$

Problem #1: Define Unclonable Proofs


Prover (P)



x, w




Adversary




x

Problem #1: Define Unclonable Proofs



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Challenges: Define Unclonable Proofs

- ❖ Must be quantum, otherwise...


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
Adversary



x


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
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x, w



Verifier (V^*)




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❖ Quantum


Challenges: Define Unclonable Proofs

❖ Must be Zero-Knowledge, otherwise...

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
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❖ Quantum

Challenges: Define Unclonable Proofs

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❖ Quantum

❖ Zero-Knowledge

Challenges: Define Unclonable Proofs

- ❖ Must be “Non-Malleable” (must be defined carefully), otherwise...


Prover (P)



x, w



Adversary



x

- ❖ Quantum


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Challenges: Define Unclonable Proofs

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Adversary

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


❖ Quantum

❖ Zero-Knowledge

Challenges: Define Unclonable Proofs

❖ Must be “Non-Malleable” (must be defined carefully), otherwise...



- ❖ Quantum
- ❖ Zero-Knowledge
- ❖ “Non-Malleable”

Problem #2: Construct Unclonable NIZK

Theorem Statements (Informal)

❖ Assuming

- Public-key quantum money
- Public-key encryption
- Commitments
- Simulation-sound NIZK for NP

❖ Then we have Unclonable NIZK

- In common reference string model

❖ Assuming

- Public-key quantum money
- Sigma protocols for NP

❖ Then we have Unclonable NIZK

- In quantum random oracle model

Recall: Public-Key Quantum Money

Unforgeability




Recall: Public-Key Quantum Money

Unforgeability



Recall: Public-Key Quantum Money

Unforgeability




Construction: Unclonable NIZK in CRS

Prover (P)



x, w

$$pk, c = Com(0)$$



$$ct = Enc_{pk}(w)$$

NIZK Proof:

“ ct is an encryption of w ”
OR
“ c is a commitment of serial number s ”



Verifier (V)



x

1. Verify banknote
2. Verify NIZK proof

Proof: Unclonable

Key Insight:

Adversary must have w unless they forge a quantum money banknote


Assume...

Prover (P)




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Adversary



x

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Assume...

$$pk, c = Com(0)$$

$|\$, s$

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
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


Proof: Unclonable

Key Insight:

Adversary must have w unless they forge a quantum money banknote

Assume...



Proof: Unclonable

Key Insight:

Adversary must have w unless they forge a quantum money banknote

Indistinguishably switch to second branch...

Prover (P)




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Adversary



x

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Proof: Unclonable

Key Insight:

Adversary must have w unless they forge a quantum money banknote

Indistinguishably switch to second branch...

Simulator (Sim)



x

$pk, c = Com(s)$

$|\$, s$

$ct = Enc_{pk}(0)$

Adversary



x

NIZK Proof:

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

Proof: Unclonable

Key Insight:

Adversary must have w unless they forge a quantum money banknote

Either...


$$pk, c = Com(s)$$



⊥ breaks unforgeability of quantum money

Or...

$$pk, c = Com(s)$$



One of  s :

contains $ct = Enc_{pk}(w)$

Adversary knows w !

Unclonable NIZK \Rightarrow Quantum Money



$\pi, (crs, x)$



$(x, w) \leftarrow (X, W)$
 $crs \leftarrow \text{UNIZK.Setup}(1^\lambda)$
 $\pi \leftarrow \text{UNIZK.Prove}(crs, x, w)$

$\text{UNIZK.Verify}(crs, x, \pi)$

Summary of Results

- ❖ Define Unclonable (Extractable) NIZKs
- ❖ Quantum Money (and other standard assumptions) \Rightarrow Unclonable NIZK
 - ❖ In CRS and QRO model
- ❖ Unclonable NIZK \Rightarrow Quantum money
 - ❖ In CRS and QRO model

