


# Amplification of Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge, Revisited

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# Security Amplification



- Weak primitives are often easier to construct.
- Famous examples: Yao's OWF amplification and XOR lemma [Yao 82].

# Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge

[Blum-Feldman-Micali 88]

- Completeness:

$\forall (x, w) \in R_L \Rightarrow V$  accepts.

- Soundness:


$\forall$  malicious prover  $P^*$

$Pr[x \notin L \text{ and } V \text{ accepts}] = \text{negl.}$

- Zero Knowledge:


$\exists$  PPT SIM  $\forall (x, w) \in R_L$

$(crs, \pi) \approx \text{SIM}(x).$



# Weak NIZK

- Completeness:  
 $\forall (x, w) \in R_L \Rightarrow V$  accepts.
- Soundness:  
 $\forall$  malicious prover  $P^*$   
 $Pr[x \notin L \text{ and } V \text{ accepts}] \leq \epsilon_s.$
- Zero Knowledge:  
 $\exists$  PPT SIM  $\forall (x, w) \in R_L$   
 $(crs, \pi) \approx_{\epsilon_z} \text{SIM}(x).$



# Weak NIZK — The Non-Trivial Case

- (1,0)-weak NIZK: prover sends nothing, verifier accepts.
- (0,1)-weak NIZK: prover sends witness in the clear.
- (p,1-p)-weak NIZK: p-biased bit in the CRS, indicating which of the above to run.
- Interested in the non-trivial case where  $\varepsilon_S + \varepsilon_Z < 1$ .

# Previous Results

Goyal, Jain and Sahai suggest a way to amplify weak NIZK for any constants  $\varepsilon_s + \varepsilon_z < 1$ .

- Based on MPC-in-the-head paradigm [[Ishai-Kushilevitz-Ostrovsky-Sahai 07](#)].
- Assuming sub-exponential PKE.
- Authors discovered a gap in their proof.

# Our Results

- Amplifying NIZK **arguments** for NP assuming only **polynomially-secure** public-key encryption, for any constants  $\varepsilon_s + \varepsilon_z < 1$ .

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# Our Results

- Amplifying NIZK **arguments** for NP assuming only **polynomially-secure** public-key encryption, for any constants  $\varepsilon_s + \varepsilon_z < 1$ .
- Amplifying NIZK **proofs** for NP assuming only **one-way functions**, for any constants  $\varepsilon_s + \varepsilon_z < 1$ .
- When the soundness error  $\varepsilon_s$  is negligible to begin with, we can also amplify NIZK arguments for NP assuming only one-way functions.
- Based on the hidden-bits paradigm [[Feige-Lapidot-Shamir 99](#)], reduction to pseudorandomness amplification.

# Weak-NIZK Constructions?


- Currently unaware of weak NIZK from weaker assumptions, except weak NISZK from batch arguments [[Bitansky-Kamath-Paneth-Rothblum-Vasudevan 24](#)].
- Combiners: random choice is weak.
- We mostly view NIZK amplification as a foundational hardness amplification question.

# Technical Overview

# Outline


- Zero-Knowledge amplifier  $(1 - (1 - \varepsilon_S)^k, \varepsilon_Z^k)$ .
- **Soundness\*** amplifier  $(\varepsilon_S^k, 1 - (1 - \varepsilon_Z)^k)$ .
- Combining the amplifiers.
- Proofs: soundness\* for free.
- Arguments: soundness\* from PKE.

# Outline

- Zero-Knowledge amplifier  $(1 - (1 - \varepsilon_S)^k, \varepsilon_Z^k)$ .  Main component
- **Soundness\*** amplifier  $(\varepsilon_S^k, 1 - (1 - \varepsilon_Z)^k)$ .
- Combining the amplifiers.
- Proofs: soundness\* for free.
- Arguments: soundness\* from PKE.

# Hidden-Bits Generator

[Quach-Rothblum-Wichs 19, Kitagawa-Matsuda-Yamakawa 20]



- PRG  $G: \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{t(n)}$ , with subset-consistency proofs.
- $G_{\bar{I}}, G_I, \pi_I \approx U, G_I, \pi_I$ .
- Sufficient for NIZK (hidden-bits model [Feige-Lapidot-Shamir 99]).

# HBG From Weak NIZK

- Prover generates  $G(s_1), \dots, G(s_k)$  for PRG  $G$  and parameter  $k$ .
- Hidden bit-string is set to  $\bigoplus_{i=1}^k G(s_i)$ .
- Using weak NIZK, generate  $k$  independent consistency proofs  $\pi_I(s_1), \dots, \pi_I(s_k)$  for the revealed  $G_I(s_1), \dots, G_I(s_k)$ .

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- Limited to  $\varepsilon_z < 0.5$ . What if last bit always leaked?



# Tighter Amplification via Extraction

Maurer and Tessaro amplify weak PRGs using the concatenate and extract approach with a strong extractor:

$$\text{Ext}(G(s_1), \dots, G(s_k); r), r .$$

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Maurer and Tessaro amplify weak PRGs using the concatenate and extract approach with a strong extractor:

$$\text{Ext}(G(s_1), \dots, G(s_k); r), r .$$

- Issue:  $\text{Ext}_I$  may depend on all bits, not just  $G_I$ .

# Tighter Amplification via Extraction

$E(F_{s_1}(1), \dots, F_{s_k}(1))$	$E(F_{s_1}(2), \dots, F_{s_k}(2))$	...	$E(F_{s_1}(t), \dots, F_{s_k}(t))$
$F_{s_1}(1)$	$F_{s_1}(2)$	...	$F_{s_1}(t)$
$F_{s_2}(1)$	$F_{s_2}(2)$	...	$F_{s_2}(t)$
...	...	...	...
$F_{s_k}(1)$	$F_{s_k}(2)$	...	$F_{s_k}(t)$

- Use  $n$ -bit-output PRF  $F_s$  to generate  $t$  blocks, apply the extractor to each block separately.
- To reveal subset  $I$ , exhibit  $F_{s_1}(I), \dots, F_{s_k}(I)$ , along with independent consistency proofs  $\pi_I(s_1), \dots, \pi_I(s_k)$ .

# Tighter Amplification via Extraction

	$E(F_{s_1}(1), \dots, F_{s_k}(1))$	$E(F_{s_1}(2), \dots, F_{s_k}(2))$	...	$E(F_{s_1}(t), \dots, F_{s_k}(t))$
$\pi_I(s_1)$	$F_{s_1}(1)$	$F_{s_1}(2)$	...	$F_{s_1}(t)$
$\pi_I(s_2)$	$F_{s_2}(1)$	$F_{s_2}(2)$	...	$F_{s_2}(t)$
...	...	...	...	...
$\pi_I(s_k)$	$F_{s_k}(1)$	$F_{s_k}(2)$	...	$F_{s_k}(t)$

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# Open Questions

- Polynomially small gap: how to amplify  $(0.5, 0.5 - 1/n)$ ?
- Zero-knowledge amplifier for non-adaptive soundness.
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Thank you!

