

Pairing-Free Blind Signatures from Standard Assumptions in the ROM

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Motivations & Contributions

Round-optimal schemes [see *our paper for extensive ref's*]

- Generic and **inefficient**, or
- need **pairings or lattices**, or
- rely on **interactive assumptions** (+ ROM).

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
- Generic and **inefficient**, or
- need **pairings or lattices**, or
- rely on **interactive assumptions** (+ ROM).

Can we have efficient round-optimal blind signatures in ROM, from non-interactive assumptions, w/out pairings nor lattices?

Motivations & Contributions


Round-Optimal Blind Signatures
Against Malicious Signers from
DDH & sRSA

Motivations & Contributions



Relaxed
Range
Proofs w/
Subversion-ZK

Round-Optimal Blind Signatures Against Malicious Signers from DDH & sRSA




Compact
Commitments
In Arbitrary
Groups

Differences from Previous Talk

	Our work	Previous Talk
Setting	Hidden-Order & Prime-order Pairing-free Groups	Prime-order Pairing-free Groups
Goal	Efficient, Round-optimal, from standard non-interactive assumptions in ROM	In ROM w/out AGM nor GGM
Starting point	Fischlin Framework	Blind Schnorr & Blind BLS
Main challenges	Blindness against malicious signers, efficiency	Concurrent one- more unforgeability


Recall: Fischlin Framework (1)

[Fischlin06, Katsumata-Reichle-Sakai23]




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
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
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
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
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
Recall: Fischlin Framework (2)

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
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
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
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
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Our Signature for Fischlin



??

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—> Modified Fischlin-Cramer-Shoup [Fischlin03,Cramer-Shoup99]
Based on sRSA

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Properties:

(NIZK-friendly) Fixing m ,
have NIZKPoK



(Setup w/ trapdoors)

Simulated signing
by trapdoors in



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



(Setup w/ trapdoors)



Simulated signing
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Our S_{fis} in Sect. 4 ✓

Our Commitment for Fischlin




; Com = m, r  ??



-  Req1: S_{fis} -compatible
-  Req2: add. homomorphic

Our Commitment for Fischlin

S_{fis}
m


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m $\rightarrow (e, a, y)$

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$$y^e = h \cdot h_1^a \cdot h_2^{a+m} \pmod{N}$$



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
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
1st try:  = $h_2^m \cdot g^r \pmod N$

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
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


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
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Our Commitment for Fischlin

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 m, r
 $\rightarrow (e, a, y_r)$

$y_r =$  $m \cdot g^{\frac{r}{e}} \pmod N$


1st try:  $m, r = h_2^m \cdot g^r \pmod N$



“  m, r -  $0, r =$  ”


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
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 “  m, r -  $0, r = \text{ } m \Rightarrow \text{ } m := y_r \cdot g^{-\frac{r}{e}} \pmod N$ ”



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
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
2nd try: $\underbrace{\text{envelope icon}}_{m, r} = h_2^m \cdot g^{e \cdot r} \pmod{N}$

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
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


$$y_r^e = h \cdot h_1^a \cdot h_2^a \cdot h_2^m g^{e \cdot r} \pmod{N}$$

2nd try: $\underbrace{\text{envelope icon with 'm, r' above it and a red arrow pointing down}}_{\text{m, r}} = h_2^m \cdot g^{e \cdot r} \pmod{N}$




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
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 “  m, r -  $0, r =$  $m \Rightarrow$  $m := y_r \cdot g^{-r} \pmod N$ 


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Dealing with e from S_{fis}




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
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
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
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
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
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
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


One-More Unforgeability (1)

Simulating signing queries

(Setup w/ trapdoors)

Simulated signing
by trapdoors in  sim-pk




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
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One-More Unforgeability (2)


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
Exploit the forgery



Malicious Blindness (1)

Problems from Malicious Signer   - Commitments **Not Hiding**

 $pk = (N, h, h_1, h_2); crs$



Malicious Blindness (2)

Commitments **Not Hiding** - Our Solution

$$\begin{array}{c} m, r \\ \downarrow \\ \text{✉} \end{array} = h_2^m \cdot g^{e \cdot r} \pmod N \text{ 😈}$$

Malicious Blindness (2)

Commitments **Not Hiding** - Our Solution

$$\begin{matrix} m, r \\ \downarrow \\ \text{envelope} \end{matrix} = h_2^m \cdot g^{e \cdot r} \pmod N$$

 proves
subversion-SND

$$\langle h_2 \rangle = \langle g \rangle$$

Malicious Blindness (2)

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$$\begin{array}{c} m, r \\ \downarrow \\ \text{envelope} \end{array} = h_2^m \cdot g^{e \cdot r} \pmod N$$

  proves
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$$\langle h_2 \rangle = \langle g \rangle$$

\Rightarrow

$$\langle h_2 \rangle = \langle g^e \rangle \pmod N$$

e prime, arbitrary N 

Malicious Blindness (2)

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⇒

Large enough r
gives hiding

Malicious Blindness (2)


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$$m, r \downarrow \text{envelope} = h_2^m \cdot g^{e \cdot r} \pmod N$$

Compact Commitments In Arbitrary Groups

 proves subversion-SND $\langle h_2 \rangle = \langle g \rangle$




$$\Rightarrow \langle h_2 \rangle = \langle g^e \rangle \pmod N$$


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Malicious Blindness (2)


Problems from Malicious Signer   - NIZKs **Not** ZK


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Malicious Blindness (2)

Problems from Malicious Signer  - NIZKs **Not ZK**

 $pk = (N, h, h_1, h_2); crs$



Malicious Blindness (4)

NIZKs **Not ZK** - Solution

Subversion-ZK in ROM: 

1. ZK stills holds with crs
2. ROM to embed
fresh trapdoors

Malicious Blindness (4)

NIZKs **Not ZK** - Solution

Subversion-ZK in ROM: 

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crs has

Malicious Blindness (4)




NIZKs **Not ZK** - Solution

Subversion-ZK in ROM:

1. ZK stills holds with crs
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crs has

unif-rs : prime-order structure for S-ZK in ROM


struct-rs link the different orders of the groups,
e.g.  in \mathbb{Z}_N^* ,  Z in \mathbb{G} ;
Also, we can use efficient RSA-based RPs.

Malicious Blindness (4)

NIZKs **Not ZK** - **Solution**

Subversion-ZK in ROM: 🍆

1. ZK stills holds with crs
2. ROM to embed fresh trapdoors

Relaxed Range Proofs w/ Subversion-ZK

🍆
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
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🍆
struct-rs link the different orders of the groups,
e.g. 📧 in \mathbb{Z}_N^* , 📧 in \mathbb{G} ;
Also, we can use efficient RSA-based RPs.


Conclusion

New Blind Signatures:

- *Round-Optimal*
- *Blindness Against Malicious Signers*
- *In ROM from DDH & sRSA*



Relaxed
Range
Proofs w/
Subversion-ZK




Compact
Commitments
In Arbitrary
Groups

Conclusion


New Blind Signatures:

- *Round-Optimal*
- *Blindness Against Malicious Signers*
- *In ROM from DDH & sRSA*

1. *Reduce vk 's size?*
2. *Better efficiency?*
3. *Remove the need of sRSA?*
4. *Non-hybrid constructions?*



Relaxed
Range
Proofs w/
Subversion-ZK



Compact
Commitments
In Arbitrary
Groups