

# *Cryptanalysis of Algebraic Verifiable Delay Functions*

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### CRYPTO 2024

## *. . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . Parallel root computation . . . . . . Optimizing the smoothness attack . . . . . . Application to VDF . . Conclusion Verifiable Delay Functions* [Boneh, Bonneau, Bünz & Fisch, CRYPTO'18] *Function* public function *f* ∶ *X* → *Y Delay*  $f(x)$  cannot be computed faster than *T*, for random *x* (security claim) *Verifiable* comes with a proof for fast verification of correctness *Security claim: sequentiality*  $\triangleright$  There exist an evaluation algorithm in time  $(1 + \varepsilon)T$  with few processors ▶ There is no evaluation algorithm faster than *T*, even with many processors *Example usage: Randomness beacons in blockchains*  $\blacktriangleright$  Users contribute inputs  $x_i$ ▶ A party computes hash of inputs and publishes output ▶ Problem: last user to contribute can brute-force output to bias it ▶ Biasing the output requires fast evaluation ⇒ VDF

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- $\blacktriangleright$  Huge number of rounds to make it slow (e.g.  $2^{40}$ )
- ▶ Use SNARK to make it verifiable
- ▶ S-Box candidate: *a*-th root for small *a*

 $x \mapsto \sqrt[a]{x}$ 

- ▶ Permutation when gcd(*a*, *p* − 1) = 1
- ▶ High degree, somewhat slow, efficient ZK proofs

### *Evaluation of <sup>a</sup>* √ ⋅

- ▶ Fermat's little theorem: *<sup>a</sup>* √*x* = *x* 1/*a* mod *p*−1
- $\blacktriangleright$  Fast exponentiation:  $\log_2(\rho)$  squaring and multiply
- $\blacktriangleright$  Latency lo $_{3_2}(p)$  with 2 processors

▶  $y = \sqrt[3]{x}$   $\Longleftrightarrow$   $y^a = x$  $\blacktriangleright$   $y^a = x$  has low degree

*ZK proof for <sup>a</sup>* √ ⋅

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#### *. . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . Parallel root computation . . . . . . Optimizing the smoothness attack . . . . . . Application to VDF . . Conclusion VDF cryptanalysis*

- ▶ Slow hash function, over a large field, with an unusual security claim
- ▶ Security claim: high delay even with massive parallelism and precomputation
	- ▶ Delay is measured as *latency*: time between receiving input and computing output
	- ▶ Complexity in number of operations can be large

### *Cryptanalysis targets*

- *1* Can we find shortcuts in the iteration of *n* rounds?
- *2* Can we compute the round function faster in parallel?



### *. . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . Parallel root computation . . . . . . Optimizing the smoothness attack . . . . . . Application to VDF . . Conclusion Computing roots in p* ▶ We focus on root computation: *x* ↦ *<sup>a</sup>* √*x* ▶ Most expensive part of the round function ▶ Can we compute root with low latency using many processors and precomputation?  $\blacktriangleright$  Fast exponentiation has latency log<sub>2</sub>(p) squarings ▶ We consider two techniques to compute root with low latency *1* Precomputation *2* Smoothness ▶ Roots and power function are homomorphisms: *<sup>a</sup>*√*x* ⋅ *a*√*y*

- ▶ Given input *x*, we can randomize it with *r*:
- ▶ And deduce root of *x* from root of *y*:
- ▶ Precompute *r*<sup>ª</sup> and *r*<sup>-1</sup>

$$
y = x \cdot r^a \mod p
$$
  

$$
\sqrt[a]{x} = \sqrt[a]{y} \cdot r^{-1} \mod p
$$

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- ▶ Can we compute root with low latency using many processors and precomputation?  $\blacktriangleright$  Fast exponentiation has latency log<sub>2</sub>(p) squarings
- ▶ We consider two techniques to compute root with low latency
	- *1* Precomputation
	- *2* Smoothness

### *Randomization*

- ▶ Roots and power function are homomorphisms:
- ▶ Given input *x*, we can randomize it with *r*:
- ▶ And deduce root of *x* from root of *y*:
- ▶ Precompute *r*<sup>a</sup> and *r*<sup>-1</sup>

*<sup>a</sup>*√*x* ⋅ *a*√*y*

 $y = x \cdot r^a \mod p$ 

*<sup>a</sup>*√*x* = *<sup>a</sup>*√*y* ⋅ *r* <sup>−</sup><sup>1</sup> mod *p*

#### *. . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . Parallel root computation . . . . . . Optimizing the smoothness attack . . . . . . Application to VDF . . Conclusion Idea 1: Precomputation*

- ▶ Precompute roots of small values *T*[*i*] =  $\sqrt[3]{i}$  for *i* <  $\sqrt{p}$
- ▶ Randomization:  $y = x \cdot r^a$  mod  $p$ , with  $\sqrt{p}$  different values *r* 
	- ▶ With high probabiliy, match between *y* and *i*
	- ▶ Fetch *<sup>a</sup>*√*y* = *T*[*y*] and deduce *<sup>a</sup>* √*x*
- ▶ Similar to baby-step giant-step algorithm for discrete logarithm

### *Online algorithm*

```
{\sf Input:} \,\, x \in \mathbb{F}_pfor 0 \le r \le \sqrt{p} do
         y \leftarrow x \cdot r^a \mod pif y \le \sqrt{p} then
               return a√y ⋅ r
−1 mod p
```
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- ▶ Similar to baby-step giant-step algorithm for discrete logarithm
- ▶ Parallel implementation
	- ▶ √*p* processors, each processor only does a few operation
	- ▶ √*p* memory (only one CPU makes an access)
	- ▶ Latency: 2 Mul + 1 Lookup





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	- ▶ √*p* processors, each processor only does a few operation
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	- $\triangleright$  Latency: 2 Mul + 1 Lookup
- ▶ Concrete parameters
	- ▶ 2<sup>128</sup> processors, 2<sup>128</sup> memory, speedup 32



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- ▶ Parallel implementation
	- $\triangleright$  Groups of  $\pi(B)$  processors (subexponential complexity)
	- ▶ Latency: 1 Mul + 1 TrialDiv + a few Mul





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▶ Almost-smoothness: Assume that *y* has small factors, and a medium factor:

$$
y = q' \cdot \prod q_i, \quad \text{with } q_i \leq B, q' \leq B'
$$

- ▶ Remove small factors with trial division, check is remaining value is small
- ▶ Deduce  $\sqrt[3]{y} = \sqrt[3]{q'} \cdot \Pi \sqrt[3]{q_i}$
- ▶ Precompute and tabulate roots of medium primes  $q'$  ≤  $B'$
- ▶ Parallel implementation
	- ▶ Latency: 2 Mul + 1 TrialDiv + 1 Lookup + a few Mul
- ▶ Concrete parameters
	- ▶ *B* =  $2^{32}$ , *B'* =  $2^{65}$  Pr[almost-smooth] ≈  $2^{-18}$
	- ▶  $2^{48}$  processors,  $2^{59.5}$  memory, speedup 20



- - ▶ Latency: 2 Mul + 1 TrialDiv + 1 Lookup + a few Mul



**…** *r*  $y \leftarrow x \cdot r^a \mod p$ ∀*q* ∶ *z<sup>q</sup>* ← 1 **…** *q* **If** *q* ∣ *y*  $z_q \leftarrow \sqrt[q]{q}$ *z* ← ∏ *z<sup>q</sup>* mod *p*  $w \leftarrow y/z$ **If**  $w \leq B'$  $\mathsf{Ret}\, z \cdot \sqrt[d]{w} \cdot r^{-1} \bmod p$ 

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- ▶ Observation: Randomizing step uses a single CPU per group
- ▶ Improvement: Try a set of values  $r_{i'}$  keep most promising  $y_i$  = x  $\cdot$   $r_i$  mod  $p$  in each group
	- ▶ Simple filter: keep smallest *<sup>y</sup><sup>i</sup>*
	- $\blacktriangleright$  Advanced filter: trial division with small bound  $B_0$  <  $B$ , keep  $y$  with large  $B_0$ -smooth part
- $\blacktriangleright$  Filtering improves the probability that  $y_i$  is (almost)-smooth
- ▶ Parallel implementation
	- ▶ Latency: 2 Mul + 2 TrialDiv + 1 Lookup + a few Mul
- ▶ Concrete parameters
	- ▶ *B* =  $2^{32}$ , *B'* =  $2^{65}$ , *B*<sub>0</sub> =  $2^{20}$ , Pr[almost-smooth | filter] ≈  $2^{-9.5}$
	- ▶ 2 $^{40}$  processors, 2 $^{59.5}$  memory, speedup 18



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#### *. . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . Parallel root computation . . . . . . Optimizing the smoothness attack . . . . . . Application to VDF . . Conclusion Improvement 3: Parallel smoothness test*

- ▶ Additive randomization:  $y = x + rp$  (as integers), instead of  $y = x \cdot r^a$  mod  $p$ 
	- ▶ Lift *<sup>y</sup>* to integers, and check if *<sup>B</sup>*-smooth: *<sup>y</sup>* <sup>=</sup> <sup>∏</sup> *<sup>q</sup><sup>i</sup>* with *<sup>q</sup><sup>i</sup>* ≤ *B*
	- ▶ Deduce  $\sqrt[3]{x} = \sqrt[3]{y} = \prod \sqrt[3]{q_i}$
- ▶ Advantage: we can test all values *y* for smoothness simultaneously
	- ▶  $q \mid x + rp \iff r \equiv -x \cdot p^{-1} \mod q$
	- ▶ Precompute *p* <sup>−</sup><sup>1</sup> mod *q*
- ▶ Parallel implementation
	- ▶ Latency: 2 Mul + 1 ModRed + 1 Lookup + a few Mul
- ▶ Concrete parameters
	- ▶ *B* = 2<sup>32</sup>, *B'* = 2<sup>45</sup>, *B*<sub>0</sub> = 2<sup>20</sup>, Pr[almost-smooth | filter] ≈ 2<sup>-24</sup>
	- ▶  $2^{29}$  processors,  $2^{40}$  memory, speedup 20



*Gaëtan Leurent Cryptanalysis of Algebraic Verifiable Delay Functions CRYPTO 2024 11 / 15*

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#### *. . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . Parallel root computation . . . . . . Optimizing the smoothness attack . . . . . . Application to VDF . . Conclusion Application to MinRoot and Veedo*

- ▶ Speedup of root computation directly applicable to MinRoot and Veedo
	- ▶ Various trade-offs between latency and number of processors
		- ▶ More improvements in the paper
- ▶ Concrete parameters for MinRoot ( $p \approx 2^{256}$ ):



#### *. . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . Parallel root computation . . . . . . Optimizing the smoothness attack . . . . . . Application to VDF . . Conclusion Application to Sloth++*

- $\blacktriangleright$  Sloth++ uses square roots in  $\mathbb{F}_{\rho^2}$ 
	- $\blacktriangleright$  Smoothness not directly applicable in  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$
- $\blacktriangleright$  Assume  $\mathbb{F}_{\rho^2}$  is constructed as  $\mathbb{F}_\rho[X]/\left(X^2+\alpha\right)$  (elements are polynomials)
- $\triangleright$  Square root  $z_0 + z_1 X$  of  $b_0 + b_1 X$  satisfies:

$$
(z_0 + z_1 X)^2 = b_0 + b_1 X \iff \begin{cases} 2z_0 z_1 = b_1 \\ z_0^2 - \alpha z_1^2 = b_0 \end{cases}
$$

$$
\iff \begin{cases} z_0 = b_1 / 2z_1 \text{ (assuming } z_1 \neq 0) \\ \frac{a_1^2}{4z_1^2} - \alpha z_1^2 = b_0 \end{cases} \Rightarrow \text{quadratic equation in } z_1^2
$$

 $\blacktriangleright$  Solve with quadratic formula, deduce  $z_1^2$  $\frac{2}{1}$  then  $z_1$  by computing square roots in  $\mathbb{F}_p$ .



- ▶ In theory, this clearly breaks the security model
- ▶ In practice, communication is the bottleneck
- ▶ We need a billion CPU, with high speed communication
	- ▶ At each round, one CPU computes the root and sends result to all CPUs
	- ▶ Communication must be faster than computing root naively: 230ns (Supranational)
- ▶ Obviously not practical with current technology
- ▶ Does not seem to break laws of physics
- ▶ More work needed to evaluate practical impact



- $\blacktriangleright$  Computing roots in  $\mathbb{F}_p$  is not sequential
	- ▶ Various trade-offs between latency and number of processors
	- ▶ Breaks security claims of MinRoot: speedup 20 with  $2^{29}$  CPU and  $2^{40}$  memory
	- Almost practical for Veedo (128-bit prime):  $2^{13}$  CPU  $2^{40}$  memory
	- Extension to  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$  (Sloth++)
- ▶ Strong link to discrete logarithm
	- ▶ Techniques similar to DL algorithms
	- ▶ Reduction from a class of parallel power-function algorithms to DL
- ▶ Open questions
	- ▶ Can we use more advanced discrete logarithm algorithm in this context? (ECM, NFS, ...)
	- ▶ What is the difficulty of parallel discrete logarithm?

*. . Possible countermeasures*

*. Modeling latency .*

*Possible countermeasures*

*Modeling latency*

*Gaëtan Leurent Cryptanalysis of Algebraic Verifiable Delay Functions CRYPTO 2024 16 / 15*

*Additional slides*

### *. Modeling latency .*

## *Possible countermeasures for VDF construction*

- *1* Make a weaker delay claim
	- $\blacktriangleright$  1 operation per round rather than  $\log_2(p)$
- *2* Use *x*  $\mapsto$  *x*<sup>a</sup> instead of *x*  $\mapsto \sqrt[3]{x}$  for the S−Box
	- ▶ Warning: some ideas for parallel evaluation of low-degree powers in the paper
- *3* Use a larger prime

*. . Possible countermeasures*

- ▶ Number of processors for our attack is sub-exponential
- *4* Use more complex groups
	- $\blacktriangleright$  Index calculus only works in  $\mathbb{F}_{p'}$  but more advanced algorithms might be applicable
- ▶ More cryptanalysis needed!

# *. . Possible countermeasures . Modeling latency . Modeling latency* ▶ Simple model for the latency of operations ▶ Concrete values strongly dependent on architecture and technology ▶ Basic operations have latency O(log(log(*p*))) using optimized hardware ⇒ 1 unit ▶ Modular addition (up to log(*p*) operands) ▶ Modular multiplication, Multiply-and-add ▶ Trial division by a constant ► Lookup in a small table with *k* entries has latency log(*k*) ⇒ 1 unit if *k* ≤ log<sub>2</sub>(*p*) → Memory access has larger latency  $\Rightarrow$  1 unit if  $k \leq \log_2(p)$ ▶ Memory access has larger latency ▶ We ignore latency of communication ▶ O(log(*n*)) latency for *n* processors with hypercube tolopology [Valiant, 1982]