# Cryptanalysis of Algebraic Verifiable Delay Functions

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### **CRYPTO 2024**

# Verifiable Delay Functions

#### [Boneh, Bonneau, Bünz & Fisch, CRYPTO'18]

Function public function  $f: X \rightarrow Y$ Delay f(x) cannot be computed faster than T, for random x Verifiable comes with a proof for fast verification of correctness

(security claim)

### Security claim: sequentiality

- There exist an evaluation algorithm in time (1 + ε)T with few processors
- There is no evaluation algorithm faster than T, even with many processors

#### Example usage: Randomness beacons in blockchains

- Users contribute inputs  $x_i$
- A party computes hash of inputs and publishes output
- Problem: last user to contribute can brute-force output to bias it
- Biasing the output requires fast evaluation  $\Rightarrow$  VDF

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Conclusion 0

# Algebraic VDF

- Construct hash function using algebraic operations in a large field  $\mathbb{F}_p$ 
  - Additions, multiplications
  - Huge number of rounds to make it slow (e.g. 2<sup>40</sup>)
- Use SNARK to make it verifiable
- S-Box candidate: a-th root for small a
  - Permutation when gcd(a, p 1) = 1
  - High degree, somewhat slow, efficient ZK proofs

### Evaluation of $\sqrt[3]{\cdot}$

- Fermat's little theorem:  $\sqrt[a]{x} = x^{1/a \mod p-1}$
- Fast exponentiation: log<sub>2</sub>(p) squaring and multiply
- Latency log<sub>2</sub>(p) with 2 processors

 $x \mapsto \sqrt[a]{x}$ 

# *ZK proof for* $\sqrt[a]{\cdot}$

► 
$$y = \sqrt[a]{x} \iff y^a = x$$

y<sup>a</sup> = x has low degree

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 Examples

 Sloth++
 [Boneh, Bonneau, Bünz & Fisch, CRYPTO'18]

 Veedo
 [StarkWare, 2020]

 MinRoot
 [Khovratovich, Maller & Tiwari, ePrint 2022/1626]

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- Two elements in  $\mathbb{F}_p$   $p = 2^{254} + 2^{32} \cdot 0x224698fc094cf91b992d30ed + 1$  

   Using 5-th root in  $\mathbb{F}_p$  a = 5
- Planned for use in Ethereum's consensus protocol and Filecoin
- ASIC developed by Supranational

Security claim

• Even with 2<sup>128</sup> processors and 2<sup>128</sup> memory, speedup at most 2

4/15




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
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# *VDF cryptanalysis*

- Slow hash function, over a large field, with an unusual security claim
- Security claim: high delay even with massive parallelism and precomputation
  - > Delay is measured as *latency*: time between receiving input and computing output
  - Complexity in number of operations can be large



Can we find shortcuts in the iteration of *n* rounds?
 Can we compute the round function faster in parallel?



# *Computing roots in* $\mathbb{F}_p$

- We focus on root computation:  $x \mapsto \sqrt[4]{x}$ 
  - Most expensive part of the round function
- Can we compute root with low latency using many processors and precomputation?
  - Fast exponentiation has latency log<sub>2</sub>(p) squarings
- We consider two techniques to compute root with low latency
  - 1 Precomputation
  - 2 Smoothness

#### Randomization

- Roots and power function are homomorphisms:
- Given input *x*, we can randomize it with *r*:
- And deduce root of x from root of y:
- ▶ Precompute *r*<sup>a</sup> and *r*<sup>-1</sup>

 $\sqrt[a]{xy} = \sqrt[a]{x} \cdot \sqrt[a]{y}$  $y = x \cdot r^{a} \mod p$  $\sqrt[a]{x} = \sqrt[a]{y} \cdot r^{-1} \mod p$ 

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### Idea 1: Precomputation

- Precompute roots of small values  $T[i] = \sqrt[3]{i}$  for  $i < \sqrt{p}$
- **Randomization:**  $y = x \cdot r^a \mod p$ , with  $\sqrt{p}$  different values r
  - With high probabiliy, match between y and i
  - Fetch  $\sqrt[3]{y} = T[y]$  and deduce  $\sqrt[3]{x}$
- Similar to baby-step giant-step algorithm for discrete logarithm

### Online algorithm

```
Input: x \in \mathbb{F}_p
for 0 \le r < \sqrt{p} do
y \leftarrow x \cdot r^a \mod p
if y \le \sqrt{p} then
return \sqrt[a]{y} \cdot r^{-1} \mod p
```

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Conclusion 0

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- Parallel implementation
  - $\checkmark$   $\sqrt{p}$  processors, each processor only does a few operation
  - $\sqrt{p}$  memory (only one CPU makes an access)
  - Latency: 2 Mul + 1 Lookup

$$r = 2$$
 $r = 3$  $y \leftarrow x \cdot 2^a \mod p$  $y \leftarrow x \cdot 3^a \mod p$ If  $y \le \sqrt{p}$ If  $y \le \sqrt{p}$ Ret  $\sqrt[a]{y} \cdot 2^{-1} \mod p$ Ret  $\sqrt[a]{y} \cdot 3^{-1} \mod p$ 

... r  $y \leftarrow x \cdot r^{a} \mod p$ If  $y \le \sqrt{p}$ Ret  $\sqrt[a]{y} \cdot r^{-1} \mod p$ 

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7/15

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  - Latency: 2 Mul + 1 Lookup
- Concrete parameters
  - 2<sup>128</sup> processors, 2<sup>128</sup> memory, speedup 32

 $p \approx 2^{256}$ 

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## Idea 2: Smoothness

- Precompute roots of small primes q<sub>i</sub> ≤ B
- Randomization:  $y = x \cdot r^a \mod p$ 
  - Lift y to integers, and check if B-smooth:  $y = \prod q_i$  with  $q_i \le B$
  - Deduce  $\sqrt[3]{y} = \prod \sqrt[3]{q_i}$
- Similar to index calculus for discrete logarithm
  - ▶ Probability of  $y \le p$  to be *B*-smooth  $\approx \rho(\log_2(p)/\log_2(B))$
  - Sub-exponential complexity

## Online algorithm


Input:  $x \in \mathbb{F}_p$ loop  $y \leftarrow x \cdot r^a \mod p$ if  $y = \prod q_{i'}$  with  $q_i \leq B$  then return  $\sqrt[a]{y} \cdot r^{-1} \mod p$  [Dickman, 1930]


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### *Idea 2: Smoothness*

- Parallel implementation
  - Groups of π(B) processors (subexponential complexity)
  - Latency: 1 Mul + 1 TrialDiv + a few Mul





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- Parallel implementation
  - Groups of π(B) processors (subexponential complexity)
  - Latency: 1 Mul + 1 TrialDiv + a few Mul
- Concrete parameters
  - $B = 2^{35}$ ,  $\pi(B) \approx 2^{30.5}$ , Pr[smooth]  $\approx 2^{-21.6}$
  - 2<sup>54.5</sup> processors, speedup 42

Already known for parallel modular exponentiation! [Adleman & Kompella, STOC'88]

Coming next: improvements to this technique, and application to concrete VDF

8 / 15

[Dickman, 1930]

 $p \approx 2^{256}$ 

# Improvements 1: Almost-smoothness

Almost-smoothness: Assume that y has small factors, and a medium factor:

$$\mathbf{y} = q' \cdot \prod q_i$$
, with  $q_i \leq B, q' \leq B'$ 

- Remove small factors with trial division, check is remaining value is small
- Deduce  $\sqrt[3]{y} = \sqrt[3]{q'} \cdot \prod \sqrt[3]{q_i}$
- Precompute and tabulate roots of medium primes  $q' \leq B'$
- Parallel implementation
  - Latency: 2 Mul + 1 TrialDiv + 1 Lookup + a few Mul
- Concrete parameters
  - ►  $B = 2^{32}, B' = 2^{65} \Pr[\text{almost-smooth}] \approx 2^{-18}$
  - 2<sup>48</sup> processors, 2<sup>59.5</sup> memory, speedup 20

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
Application to VDF

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# Improvements 1: Almost-smoothness

### Parallel implementation

Latency: 2 Mul + 1 TrialDiv + 1 Lookup + a few Mul



 r			
$y \leftarrow x \cdot r^a \mod p$ $\forall q : z_q \leftarrow 1$			
	<i>q</i>		
	$     If q \mid y \\     z_q \leftarrow \sqrt[3]{q} $		
$z \leftarrow \prod z_q \mod p$ $w \leftarrow y/z$ If $w \le B'$ Ret $z \cdot \sqrt[3]{w} \cdot r^{-1} \mod p$			

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 $p\approx 2^{256}$ 

# Improvements 2: Prefiltering

- Observation: Randomizing step uses a single CPU per group
- Improvement: Try a set of values  $r_{i'}$  keep most promising  $y_i = x \cdot r_i \mod p$  in each group
  - Simple filter: keep smallest y<sub>i</sub>
  - Advanced filter: trial division with small bound  $B_0 < B$ , keep y with large  $B_0$ -smooth part
- Filtering improves the probability that  $y_i$  is (almost)-smooth
- Parallel implementation
  - Latency: 2 Mul + 2 TrialDiv + 1 Lookup + a few Mul
- Concrete parameters
  - ►  $B = 2^{32}, B' = 2^{65}, B_0 = 2^{20}, Pr[almost-smooth | filter] \approx 2^{-9.5}$
  - 2<sup>40</sup> processors, 2<sup>59.5</sup> memory, speedup 18

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
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
Conclusion 0

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## *Improvement 3: Parallel smoothness test*

Additive randomization: y = x + rp (as integers), instead of  $y = x \cdot r^a \mod p$ 

- Lift y to integers, and check if B-smooth:  $y = \prod q_i$  with  $q_i \le B$
- Deduce  $\sqrt[3]{x} = \sqrt[3]{y} = \prod \sqrt[3]{q_i}$

Advantage: we can test all values *y* for smoothness simultaneously

- $q \mid x + rp \iff r \equiv -x \cdot p^{-1} \mod q$
- Precompute  $p^{-1} \mod q$
- Parallel implementation

Latency: 2 Mul + 1 ModRed + 1 Lookup + a few Mul


Concrete parameters

- ►  $B = 2^{32}$ ,  $B' = 2^{45}$ ,  $B_0 = 2^{20}$ , Pr[almost-smooth | filter]  $\approx 2^{-24}$
- 2<sup>29</sup> processors, 2<sup>40</sup> memory, speedup 20

# Improvement 3: Parallel smoothness test

#### Parallel implementation

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11/15

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 $p \approx 2^{256}$ 

# Application to MinRoot and Veedo

- Speedup of root computation directly applicable to MinRoot and Veedo
  - Various trade-offs between latency and number of processors
  - More improvements in the paper
- Concrete parameters for MinRoot ( $p \approx 2^{256}$ ):

Т	#CPU	М	speedup	Techniques
256	1	0	1	Fast exponentiation (reference)
8	2 <sup>128</sup>	2 <sup>128</sup>	32	Baby-step, giant-step
6	2 <sup>54.5</sup>	0	42	Smoothness
13	2 <sup>48</sup>	2 <sup>59.5</sup>	20	Smoothness with medium-size factor
14	2 <sup>40</sup>	2 <sup>59.5</sup>	18	Smoothness with medium-size factor and prefilter
21	2 <sup>36</sup>	2 <sup>64</sup>	12	Smoothness with special shape of <i>p</i>
54	2 <sup>34</sup>	2 <sup>40</sup>	4.7	Smoothness with rational reconstruction
13	2 <sup>29</sup>	2 <sup>40</sup>	20	Smoothness with parallel smoothness test
68	2 <sup>25</sup>	2 <sup>40</sup>	3.7	Smoothness with parallel rational reconstruction

## *Application to Sloth++*

- Sloth++ uses square roots in F<sub>p</sub><sup>2</sup>
  - Smoothness not directly applicable in  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$
- Assume  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$  is constructed as  $\mathbb{F}_p[X]/(X^2 + \alpha)$  (elements are polynomials)

Square root  $z_0 + z_1 X$  of  $b_0 + b_1 X$  satisfies:

$$(z_0 + z_1 X)^2 = b_0 + b_1 X \iff \begin{cases} 2z_0 z_1 = b_1 \\ z_0^2 - \alpha z_1^2 = b_0 \end{cases}$$

$$\iff \begin{cases} z_0 = b_1/2z_1 \text{ (assuming } z_1 \neq 0) \\ \frac{a_1^2}{4z_1^2} - \alpha z_1^2 = b_0 \end{cases} \Rightarrow \text{ quadratic equation in } z_1^2 \end{cases}$$

Solve with quadratic formula, deduce  $z_1^2$  then  $z_1$  by computing square roots in  $\mathbb{F}_p$ .

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Application to VDF

Conclusion 0

## Practical limitations

- In theory, this clearly breaks the security model
- In practice, communication is the bottleneck
- We need a billion CPU, with high speed communication
  - At each round, one CPU computes the root and sends result to all CPUs
  - Communication must be faster than computing root naively: 230ns (Supranational)
- Obviously not practical with current technology
- Does not seem to break laws of physics
- More work needed to evaluate practical impact

14/15

Introduction

*Parallel root computation* 000

*Optimizing the smoothness attack* 000

Application to VDI

Conclusion

# Conclusion

### • Computing roots in $\mathbb{F}_p$ is not sequential

- Various trade-offs between latency and number of processors
- ▶ Breaks security claims of MinRoot: speedup 20 with 2<sup>29</sup> CPU and 2<sup>40</sup> memory
- Almost practical for Veedo (128-bit prime): 2<sup>13</sup> CPU 2<sup>40</sup> memory
- Extension to  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$  (Sloth++)
- Strong link to discrete logarithm
  - Techniques similar to DL algorithms
  - Reduction from a class of parallel power-function algorithms to DL
- Open questions
  - Can we use more advanced discrete logarithm algorithm in this context? (ECM, NFS, ...)
  - What is the difficulty of parallel discrete logarithm?

# Additional slides

Possible countermeasures

Modeling latency

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# Possible countermeasures for VDF construction

1 Make a weaker delay claim

- 1 operation per round rather than log<sub>2</sub>(p)
- 2 Use  $x \mapsto x^a$  instead of  $x \mapsto \sqrt[a]{x}$  for the S-Box
  - Warning: some ideas for parallel evaluation of low-degree powers in the paper

### 3 Use a larger prime

- Number of processors for our attack is sub-exponential
- 4 Use more complex groups
  - Index calculus only works in  $\mathbb{F}_{p'}$  but more advanced algorithms might be applicable
- More cryptanalysis needed!



# Modeling latency

- Simple model for the latency of operations
  - Concrete values strongly dependent on architecture and technology
- ► Basic operations have latency  $O(\log(\log(p)))$  using optimized hardware  $\Rightarrow$  1 unit
  - Modular addition (up to log(p) operands)
  - Modular multiplication, Multiply-and-add
  - Trial division by a constant
- ► Lookup in a small table with k entries has latency log(k)  $\Rightarrow$  1 unit if  $k \leq log_2(p)$
- Memory access has larger latency
- We ignore latency of communication
  - O(log(n)) latency for n processors with hypercube tolopology

[Valiant, 1982]

 $\Rightarrow \approx 6 \text{ units}$