### Improved Reductions from Noisy to Bounded and Probing Leakages via Hockey-Stick Divergences

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What does  $Z$  leak about  $X$ ?

### Primitive-level countermeasures

- Leakage resilient cryptography
- Typical simplified model: bounded leakage
	- Realistic?



### Implementation-level countermeasures

- Masking / secret sharing
- Typical simplified model: random probing



### Primitive-level countermeasures

### ℓ-Bounded leakage model

- Secret  $X \leftarrow \mathcal{X}$  is sampled.
- Adversary chooses leakage function  $f: \mathcal{X} \to \{0,1\}^{\ell}$ .
- $Z = f(X)$  is leaked to Adversary

#### Mother of all leakages (Brian et al. 2021) Noisy leakage: randomized function  $f: \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Z}$ .

- Real world
	- Secret  $X \leftarrow \mathcal{X}$  is sampled.

-  $Z = f(X)$  is leaked to Adversary.

- Simulation
	- Secret  $X \leftarrow \mathcal{X}$  is sampled.
	- Simulator chooses bounded leakage function  $g: \mathcal{X} \to \{0,1\}^{\ell}$ .
	- $-U = g(X)$  is leaked to Simulator
	- Simulator chooses Z.
	- Z is leaked to adversary.

 $\epsilon =$  simulation error = distinguishing advantage

### Limitations of statistical distance and mutual information

- Some common leakage measures:
	- Statistical distance:  $SD(P_{XZ}, P_X \otimes P_Z)$
	- Mutual information:  $I(X; Z)$
- Decrease slowly with noise
- No graceful security degradation
	- Example: leak all of X with probability  $\delta$ , else leak nothing
	- $SD(P_{XZ}, P_X \otimes P_Z) \approx \delta$ , so simulation from no leakage for  $\epsilon \geq \delta$ .
	- No security at all with probability δ. Even with n−1 bits of bounded leakage we have  $\epsilon \geq \delta/2$ .

#### Mother of all leakages (Brian et al. 2021)

- Dense leakages
	- Simulation from bounded leakage
	- Relations with several other leakage models
- In comparison, we get:
	- Tighter simulator analysis
	- Composition Theorem

# Hockey-stick divergence

• SD<sub>t</sub>(P; Q) = sup<sub>S</sub>[P(S) - 2<sup>t</sup>Q(S)]  
= 
$$
\sum_x \max(0, P(x) - 2tQ(x))
$$

- Equivalent to statistical distance when  $t = 0$
- Asymmetrical in  $P$  vs  $Q$ when  $t > 0$
- Used in Differential Privacy



# $(t, \delta)$ -SD-noisy leakage

•  $Z = f(X)$  has  $(t, \delta)$ -SD-noisy leakage when

 $\delta \geq SD_t(P_{XZ}, P_X \otimes P_Z)$ 

- Generalization:
	- $(t, \delta)$ -GSD-Noisy leakage:  $\delta \geq SD_t(P_{XZ}, P_X \otimes Q)$ for some distribution Q
	- $Q$  "simulates" leakage Z without knowing X



# Simulation via bounded leakage

•  $(t,\delta)$ -GSD-noisy leakage can be simulated from  $\ell$ bits of bounded leakage with simulation error  $\epsilon$ 

### $-\ell = t + \log(\ln(1/\alpha))$

- $-\epsilon = \delta + \alpha$
- Holds for any  $\alpha > 0$

# Rejection sampling simulator

- For  $i := 0$  to  $2^{\ell} 1$ :
	- Sample  $z \leftarrow Q$  (according to random tape R)
	- With probability min  $\left(2^{-t} \cdot \frac{P_{XZ}(x,z)}{P_{X}(x) \cdot Q(z),1}\right)$ :
		- $\bullet$  Return *i* as leakage
	- Return  $2^{\ell}-1$  as leakage
- Simulator returns  $z_i$ , the *i*<sup>th</sup> sample of z (according to random tape R)

### Rejection sampling simulator

- For  $i := 0$  to  $2^{\ell} 1$ :
	- Sample  $z \leftarrow Q$  (according to random tape R)
	- With probability min  $\left(2^{-t} \cdot \frac{P_{XZ}(x,z)}{P_x(x) \cdot Q(z),1}\right)$ :
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	- Return  $2^{\ell}-1$  as leakage

$$
\begin{array}{c}\n\text{Simulation error } \delta + \alpha, \\
\text{for } \ell = t + \log(\ln(1/\alpha))\n\end{array}
$$



# Composition

- Typical leakage occurs multiple times (e.g., once for each round)
- Let  $Z_1$  and  $Z_2$  be conditionally independent  $(t_1, \delta_1)/(t_2, \delta_2)$ -GSD-noisy leakages from X
	- $\implies$   $(Z_1, Z_2)$  is a  $(t_1+t_2, \delta_1+\delta_2)$ -GSD-noisy leakage.
	- Adapted from differential privacy s basic composition ' theorem (Dwork and Lei 2009)
- Does advanced composition of m leakages work?
	- Yes, but only for small t (e.g.  $t < 1/\sqrt{m}$ ) and a more limited class of leakages.

### Parameter computation

- $SD_t(P; Q) = sup [P(S) 2^t Q(S)]$
- Worst case:

$$
- S = \{(x, z) | P(x, z) > 2^t Q(x, z)\}
$$

- Evaluate 
$$
P(S) - 2^t Q(S)
$$

- For  $(t, \delta)$ -SD-Noisy Leakage,  $\delta = SD_t(P_{XZ}, P_X \otimes P_Z)$
- For  $(t, \delta)$ -GSD-Noisy Leakage,  $\delta = SD_t(P_{XZ}, P_X \otimes Q)$ 
	- Future research: how to choose Q optimally?

#### Evaluation model





#### Evaluation: SD



# Implementation-level countermeasures

# Random probing

- Duc et al. 2014
	- p-random probing leakage:
		- Leak  $Z = X$  with probability p
		- Else, leak  $Z = \perp$
	- Relationship with statistical distance
		- If X is uniform in  $\mathcal X$  then
		- Note  $p$ 's dependence on  $|\mathcal{X}|$ .

# Reverse SD Leakage

•  $Z = f(X)$  has  $(t, \delta)$ -RevSDnoisy leakage when

 $\delta \geq SD_t(P_X \otimes P_Z, P_{XZ})$ 

- Note swap of product and joint distributions
- Has similar generalization to  $(t, \delta)$ -RevGSD-Noisy leakage



### Simulation via Random Probing

- Let X be uniform on  $\mathcal X$ Let  $Z = f(X)$  be a  $(t,\delta)$ -RevSD-noisy leakage.
- $\implies$  Z can be simulated from p-random probing, where $p = (1 - 2^{-t}) + 2^{-t}\delta \cdot |\mathcal{X}|$

$$
\frac{\frac{\frac{1}{1} \cdot 2^{-t} \cdot P_{Z}(Z)}{P_{Z|X=0}(Z)}}{\frac{P_{Z|X=1}(X,Z)}{P_{Z|X=1}(X,Z)}}
$$

#### Evaluation: RevSD



The  $\delta \cdot |\mathcal{X}|$  term is hidden by rapidly decreasing  $\delta$ 

### Evaluation: RevSD

• Comparison with Average Relative Error (ARE) (Prest et al. 2019)



### Conclusion

- SD-noisy and RevSD-noisy leakage models
- Reduction to bounded leakage (resp. random probing).
	- This is tight for SD-noisy leakage
	- Provides a bridge between theory and practice
- Composition of SD-noisy leakages
- Evaluation on Hamming weight model
	- Non-trivial concrete bounds