

New Records in Collision Attacks on SHA-2

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Overview

1 Background

- SHA-2

2 (FS/SFS) Collision Attacks on SHA-2


- SFS Collision Attack on 39-step SHA-256
- The First Practical FS Collision for 40-step SHA-224
- The Collision Attacks on 31-Step SHA-512
- More Results

3 Summary

SHA-2

- A popular hash function family standardized by NIST.
- Strengthening SHA-1 (more complex compression function).
- Two main versions: SHA-256 and SHA-512.
- Used worldwide, e.g. SHA-256 is used in Bitcoin.

Compression Functions of SHA-256



■ Step function

$$E_i = A_{i-4} \boxplus E_{i-4} \boxplus \Sigma_1(E_{i-1}) \boxplus \text{IF}(E_{i-1}, E_{i-2}, E_{i-3}) \boxplus K_i \boxplus W_i,$$

$$A_i = E_i \boxplus A_{i-4} \boxplus \Sigma_0(A_{i-1}) \boxplus \text{MAJ}(A_{i-1}, A_{i-2}, A_{i-3}).$$

Compression Functions of SHA-256

■ Boolean function Σ_0 , Σ_1 , IF and MAJ are given by

$$\begin{aligned}\text{IF}(x, y, z) &= (x \wedge y) \oplus (x \wedge z) \oplus z, \\ \text{MAJ}(x, y, z) &= (x \wedge y) \oplus (x \wedge z) \oplus (y \wedge z), \\ \Sigma_0(x) &= (x \ggg 2) \oplus (x \ggg 13) \oplus (x \ggg 22), \\ \Sigma_1(x) &= (x \ggg 6) \oplus (x \ggg 11) \oplus (x \ggg 25).\end{aligned}$$

Compression Functions of SHA-256

■ Message expansion

The message expansion of SHA-256 splits the 512-bit message block M_j into 16 words m_i , $i = 0, \dots, 15$, and expands them into 64 expanded message words W_i

$$W_i = \begin{cases} m_i & 0 \leq i \leq 15, \\ \sigma_1(W_{i-2}) \boxplus W_{i-7} \boxplus \sigma_0(W_{i-15}) \boxplus W_{i-16} & 16 \leq i \leq 63. \end{cases}$$

The functions $\sigma_0(x)$ and $\sigma_1(x)$ are given by

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma_0(x) &= (x \ggg 7) \oplus (x \ggg 18) \oplus (x \gg 3), \\ \sigma_1(x) &= (x \ggg 17) \oplus (x \ggg 19) \oplus (x \gg 10). \end{aligned}$$

(FS/SFS) Collision Attacks on SHA-2

Finding a valid attack requires attackers to finish the following three tasks:

Three tasks

- Task 1: Select the message difference to construct a local collision;
- Task 2: Search for a corresponding differential trail in (W_i, A_i, E_i) ;
- Task 3: Find a conforming message pair to verify the differential trail.

Our contribution is Task 2:

- Use a SAT/SMT-based method to solve Task 2;

SFS Collision Attack on 39-step SHA-256

Search for the 39-step differential trail:

- 1 Minimize the Hamming weight of ΔW_i . The nonzero message differences are injected in $(W_8, \dots, W_{12}, W_{16}, W_{17}, W_{24}, W_{26})$. The only goal is to find the minimal value $t_w = \sum_{i=0}^{38} \mathbf{H}(\Delta W_i)$.

| i | ΔA_i | ΔE_i | ΔW_i |
|-----|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| -4 | | | |
| -3 | | | |
| -2 | | | |
| -1 | | | |
| 0 | | | |
| 1 | | | |
| 2 | | | |
| 3 | | | |
| 4 | | | |
| 5 | | | |
| 6 | | | |
| 7 | | | |
| 8 | ???????????????????? | ???????????????????? | ???????????????????? |
| 9 | ???????????????????? | ???????????????????? | ???????????????????? |
| 10 | ???????????????????? | ???????????????????? | ???????????????????? |
| 11 | ???????????????????? | ???????????????????? | ???????????????????? |
| 12 | ???????????????????? | ???????????????????? | ???????????????????? |
| 13 | ???????????????????? | ???????????????????? | ???????????????????? |
| 14 | ???????????????????? | ???????????????????? | |
| 15 | ???????????????????? | ???????????????????? | |
| 16 | ???????????????????? | ???????????????????? | ???????????????????? |
| 17 | ???????????????????? | ???????????????????? | ???????????????????? |
| 18 | ???????????????????? | ???????????????????? | |
| 19 | | ???????????????????? | |
| 20 | | ???????????????????? | |
| 21 | | ???????????????????? | |
| 22 | | ???????????????????? | |
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| 37 | | | |
| 38 | | | |

SFS Collision Attack on 39-step SHA-256

- ② Minimize the Hamming weight of ΔA_i . Under the

$$\delta A_{19 \leq i \leq 38} = 0, \delta E_{23 \leq i \leq 38} = 0, \sum_{i=0}^{38} \mathbf{H}(\Delta W_i) = t_w$$

find the minimal value of $t_A = \sum_{i=0}^{38} \mathbf{H}(\Delta A_i)$ such that there exists a solution. Still, we only aim at the minimal value t_A , and do not fix $(\Delta W_i, \Delta A_i, \Delta E_i)$.

| i | ΔA_i | ΔE_i | ΔW_i |
|-----|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| -4 | | | |
| -3 | | | |
| -2 | | | |
| -1 | | | |
| 0 | | | |
| 1 | | | |
| 2 | | | |
| 3 | | | |
| 4 | | | |
| 5 | | | |
| 6 | | | |
| 7 | | | |
| 8 | | | |
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| 31 | | | |

SFS Collision Attack on 39-step SHA-256

Search for the 39-step differential trail:

- ③ **Minimize the Hamming weight of ΔE_i .** In addition to the conditions at Step 2, we further add the condition $\sum_{i=0}^{38} \mathbf{H}(\Delta A_i) = t_A$. Under these conditions, find and output the solution of $(\Delta W_i, \Delta A_i, \Delta E_i)$ for $0 \leq i \leq 38$ that minimizes $\sum_{i=0}^{38} \mathbf{H}(\Delta E_i)$.

| i | ΔA_i | ΔE_i | ΔW_i |
|-----|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| -4 | | | |
| -3 | | | |
| -2 | | | |
| -1 | | | |
| 0 | | | |
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| 31 | | | |
| 32 | | | |
| 33 | | | |
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| 35 | | | |

SFS Collision Attack on 39-step SHA-256

Finding a conforming message pair:

- 1 Extract all the constraints on (W_i, A_i, E_i) for this differential trail.
- 2 Add these constraints to the SAT/SMT model for the value transitions of SHA-256.
- 3 Solve the model find a solution of these variables.

The 39-step SHA-256 SFS colliding message pair (M, M')

| | | | | | | | | |
|------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| CV | 02b19d5a | 88e1df04 | 5ea3c7b7 | f2f7d1a4 | 86cb1b1f | c8ee51a5 | 1b4d0541 | 651b92e7 |
| M | c61d6de7 | 755336e8 | 5e61d618 | 18036de6 | a79f2f1d | f2b44c7b | 4c0ef36b | a85d45cf |
| | f72b8c2f | 0def947c | a0eab159 | 8021370c | 4b0d8011 | 7aad07f6 | 33cd6902 | 3bad5d64 |
| M' | c61d6de7 | 755336e8 | 5e61d618 | 18036de6 | a79f2f1d | f2b44c7b | 4c0ef36b | a85d45cf |
| | e72b8c2f | 0fcf907c | b0eab159 | 81a1bfc1 | 4b098611 | 7aad07f6 | 33cd6902 | 3bad5d64 |
| hash | 431cadcd | ce6893bb | d6c9689a | 334854e8 | 3baae1ab | 038a195a | ccf54a19 | 1c40606d |

The First Practical FS Collision for 40-step SHA-224

In SHA-224, the last one output word ($E_{60} + E_{-4}$) was truncated. We inject differences in E_{-4} and $(W_0, W_9, W_{10}, W_{11}, W_{12}, W_{13}, W_{17}, W_{18}, W_{25}, W_{27})$ to mount a FS collision attack. The searching strategy is almost the same as the 39-step SHA-256.

| i | ΔA_i | ΔE_i | ΔW_i |
|-----|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| -4 | | | |
| -2 | | | |
| -1 | | | |
| 0 | | | |
| 1 | | | |
| 2 | | | |
| 3 | | | |
| 4 | | | |
| 5 | | | |
| 6 | | | |
| 7 | | 0111..... | |
| 8 | | 1000..... | |
| 9 | | | |
| 10 | | | |
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| 12 | | | |
| 13 | | | |
| 14 | | | |
| 15 | | | |
| 16 | | | |
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| 28 | | | |
| 29 | | | |
| 30 | | | |
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| 37 | | | |
| 38 | | | |
| 39 | | | |

The FS colliding message pair for 40-step SHA-224

The 40-step SHA-224 FS colliding message pair (M, M')

| | | | | | | | | |
|-------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| CV | 791c9c6b | baa7f900 | f7c53298 | 9073cbbd | c90690c5 | 5591553c | 43a5d984 | af92402d |
| CV' | 791c9c6b | baa7f900 | f7c53298 | 9073cbbd | c90690c5 | 5591553c | 43a5d984 | bf92402d |
| M | f41d61b4 7eba797d | ce033ba2 88b06a8f | dd1bc208 3bc3015c | a268189b d36f38cc | ee6bda2c cfcb88e0 | 5ddbe94d 3c70f7f3 | 9675bbd3 faa0c1fe | 32c1ba8a 35c62535 |
| M' | e41d61b4 7eba797d | ce033ba2 98b06a8f | dd1bc208 39e3055c | a268189b c36f38cc | ee6bda2c ce4b002d | 5ddbe94d 3c74f1f3 | 9675bbd3 faa0c1fe | 32c1ba8a 35c62535 |
| hash | 9af50cac | c165a72f | b6f1c9f3 | ef54bad9 | af0cfb1f | 57d357c9 | c6462616 | |

The Collision Attacks on 31-Step SHA-512

Search for the 31-step differential trail:

- 1 Find a solution of $(\Delta W_i)_{0 \leq i \leq 30}$ with the minimal $\sum_{i=0}^{30} \mathbf{H}(\Delta W_i)$, while keeping the minimal $\mathbf{H}(\Delta W_{16})$ and $\mathbf{H}(\Delta W_{18})$, which allows a local collision in the message expansion.

| i | Δ_i | ΔE_i | ΔW_i |
|-----|------------|--------------|--------------|
| -4 | | | |
| -3 | | | |
| -2 | | | |
| -1 | | | |
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The Collision Attacks on 31-Step SHA-512

Search for the 31-step differential trail:

- With the fixed solution of $(\Delta W_i)_{0 \leq i \leq 30}$ obtained at Step 1, find a valid solution of $(\Delta A_i, \Delta E_i)_{0 \leq i \leq 30}$. We expect to find the smallest possible $\sum_{i=0}^{30} \mathbf{H}(\Delta A_i) = tr$ in a reasonable time at this step.

| i | ΔA_i | ΔE_i | ΔW_i |
|-----|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| -1 | | | |
| -3 | | | |
| -2 | | | |
| -1 | | | |
| 0 | | | |
| 1 | | | |
| 2 | | | |
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The Collision Attacks on 31-Step SHA-512

Search for the 31-step differential trail:

- ③ With the fixed solution of $(\Delta A_i, \Delta W_i)_{0 \leq i \leq 30}$, find a valid solution of $(\Delta E_i)_{0 \leq i \leq 30}$ with the minimal $\sum_{i=0}^{30} \mathbf{H}(\Delta E_i)$, which allows a 31-step collision attack.

| i | ΔA_i | ΔE_i | ΔW_i |
|-----|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| -4 | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| -3 | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| -2 | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| -1 | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| 0 | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| 1 | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| 2 | ----- | ----- | ----- |
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| 4 | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| 5 | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| 6 | ----- | ----- | ----- |
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| 14 | ----- | ----- | ----- |
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| 26 | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| 27 | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| 28 | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| 29 | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| 30 | ----- | ----- | ----- |

The Collision Attacks on 31-Step SHA-512

It is found that the obtained 31-step differential trail is **invalid**. Therefore, we propose a method to correct this obtained 31-step differential trail.

The Collision Attacks on 31-Step SHA-512

Correct the 31-step differential trail:

- 1 Set $(\Delta E_i)_{5 \leq i \leq 7}$ as unknown variables. For the remaining $(\Delta E_i)_{0 \leq i \leq 30}$ where $i \notin \{5, 6, 7\}$, keep them the same as those in the obtained solution. For $(\Delta A_i)_{0 \leq i \leq 30}$ and $(\Delta W_i)_{0 \leq i \leq 30}$, they are also kept the same as those in the obtained solution.

| i | ΔA_i | ΔE_i | ΔW_i |
|-----|--------------|--|--------------|
| -4 | | | |
| -3 | | | |
| -2 | | | |
| -1 | | | |
| 0 | | | |
| 1 | | | |
| 2 | | | |
| 3 | | | |
| 4 | | | |
| 5 | | ?? | |
| 6 | | ?? | |
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The Collision Attacks on 31-Step SHA-512

Correct the 31-step differential trail:

- 2 Add the constraints describing the value transitions for $(A_i, E_i, W_i)_{7 \leq i \leq 12}$ to the model.

| i | ΔA_i | ΔE_i | ΔW_i |
|----|--------------|--|--------------|
| -4 | ===== | ===== | ===== |
| -3 | ===== | ===== | ===== |
| -2 | ===== | ===== | ===== |
| -1 | ===== | ===== | ===== |
| 0 | ===== | ===== | ===== |
| 1 | ===== | ===== | ===== |
| 2 | ===== | ===== | ===== |
| 3 | ===== | ===== | ===== |
| 4 | ===== | ===== | ===== |
| 5 | ===== | ===== | ===== |
| 6 | ===== | ===== | ===== |
| 7 | ===== | ===== | ===== |
| 8 | ===== | 1111001100u000100u1a00a0011==u=0000u=0u0u0a0a1a00010a011110 | ===== |
| 9 | ===== | 11a1==11=0101101101101101000u0=01u1a0u0=01100101011=10101101 | ===== |
| 10 | ===== | =10=1==111*10u0=101=0u0=11=1101011=1u=0110=0u=1101=uu | ===== |
| 11 | ===== | =1a1=====u0=0=0=11011u=====uuuu0u=0=====u=10=100 | ===== |
| 12 | ===== | =00=====0u=1=1=10=1u=00=1010a11=1=====1=1=0=11u | ===== |
| 13 | ===== | =1=====110=1=01=====11=11=====1111=1=0=====0=1=====1 | ===== |
| 14 | ===== | =====0=====0=====0=====0 | ===== |
| 15 | ===== | =====1=====1=====1=====1 | ===== |
| 16 | ===== | ===== | ===== |
| 17 | ===== | ===== | ===== |
| 18 | ===== | ===== | ===== |
| 19 | ===== | ===== | ===== |
| 20 | ===== | ===== | ===== |
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| 25 | ===== | ===== | ===== |
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| 30 | ===== | ===== | ===== |

The Collision Attacks on 31-Step SHA-512

We utilize the degrees of freedom in $(\Delta E_i)_{5 \leq i \leq 7}$ and the model for value transitions to correct an invalid 31-step differential trail.

| i | ΔA_i | ΔE_i | ΔW_i |
|-----|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| -4 | | | |
| -3 | | | |
| -2 | | | |
| -1 | | | |
| 0 | | | |
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| 7 | | | |
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The Collision Attacks on 31-Step SHA-512

To demonstrate that the 31-step differential trail is valid, we provide a 31-step SFS collision message pair.

The SFS colliding message pair (M, M') for 31-step differential trail

| | | | | |
|------|--|--|--|--|
| CV | e8db5ea7aa921652 022c1b11afc030cd | b99d911402b6f13b 0b5ab5d050736da3 | d67789b44900bbd3 6624b6d94833584f | 6dd99e5934fa4c36 0377be3bbc9ee6a9 |
| M | c84e359a94cfa415 4b1c2f410a70233a c272b2af2a91b091 62188a13372b78d5 | 8b62e2794d50178a 2568946b7b20f000 0a209a722f595461 00074c63ff27970c | cc95cf1218bc494a 8e82c5955ff61841 958e7d6a665ca726 0810031ff62c060a | 000000404e263440 857f82c3b6494b6c b82d422e9e59e3e3 c007835890369005 |
| M' | c84e359a94cfa415 4b1c2f410a70233a 4176aa8f6b93b091 62188a13372b78d5 | 8b62e2794d50178a 0529156e8728c010 0a289a322d595460 00074c63ff27970c | cc95cf1218bc494a 2ec244995fe6dd3f 958e7d6a665ca726 0810031ff62c060a | 000000404e263440 c57e82cbf80b496d b82d422e9e59e3e3 c007835890369005 |
| hash | 18061dacede7a45d fe74b9d90faa1325 | 8a673215307a0c75 989da85d39d29187 | ad7d40871fa4d4a5 38eef206acaca3e0 | cb84a2098efd50af d1fdb4c54da389f |

More New Results for SHA-2

- 1 The first valid 28-step differential trail for SHA-512.

| i | ΔA_i | ΔE_i | ΔW_i |
|-----|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| -4 | | | |
| -3 | | | |
| -2 | | | |
| -1 | | | |
| 0 | | | |
| 1 | | | |
| 2 | | | |
| 3 | | | |
| 4 | | | |
| 5 | | | |
| 6 | | | |
| 7 | | | |
| 8 | | | |
| 9 | | | |
| 10 | | | |
| 11 | | | |
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| 27 | | | |

More New Results for SHA-2

- 2 The first collision for 28-step SHA-512.

The colliding message pair (M, M') for 28-step SHA-512

| | | | | |
|------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| M | 1f736d69a0368ef6 | 7277e5081ad1c198 | e953a3cdc4cbe577 | bd05f6a203b2f75f |
| | dd18b3e39f563fca | cad0a5bb69049fcd | 4d0dd2a06e2efdc0 | 86db19c26fc2e1cf |
| | 0184949e92cdd314 | 82fb3c1420112000 | e4930d9b8295ab26 | 5500d3a2f30a3402 |
| | 26f0aa8790cb1813 | a9c09c5c5015bc0d | 53892c5a64e94edb | 8e60d500013a1932 |
| M' | 1f736d69a0368ef6 | 7277e5081ad1c198 | e953a3cdc4cbe577 | bd05f6a203b2f75f |
| | dd18b3e39f563fca | cad0a5bb69049fcd | 4d0dd2a06e2efdc0 | 86db19c26fc2e1cf |
| | 037a8f464c0bb995 | 8303bd41e111fff | e4930d9b8295ab26 | 5500d3a2f30a3402 |
| | 26f0aa8790cb1813 | a9809e5c4015bc45 | 53892c5a64e94edb | 8e60d500013a1932 |
| hash | dceb3d88adf54bd2 | 966c4cb1ab0cf400 | 01e701fdf10ab603 | 796d6e5028a5e89a |
| | f29a7517b216c09f | 46dbae73b1db8cce | 8ea44d45041010ea | 26a7a6b902f2632f |

Summary

| State size | Hash size | Attack type | Steps | Time | Memory | Year |
|------------|---------------|---------------|------------------|-------------------------|------------------|------------|
| 256 | All | collision | 28 | <i>practical</i> | \ | 2013 |
| | | | 31 | $2^{65.5}$ | 2^{34} | 2013 |
| | | | 31 | $2^{49.8}$ | 2^{48} | our |
| | 256 | SFS collision | 38 | <i>practical</i> | \ | 2013 |
| | | | 39 | <i>practical</i> | \ | our |
| | 256 | FS collision | 52 | $2^{127.5}$ | \ | 2012 |
| | 224 | FS collision* | 39 | <i>practical</i> | \ | 2015 |
| | | | 40 | 2^{110} | \ | 2012 |
| | | | 40 | <i>practical</i> | \ | our |
| | 512 | All | collision | 27 | <i>practical</i> | \ |
| 28 | | | | <i>practical</i> | \ | our |
| 31 | | | | $2^{115.6}$ | $2^{77.3}$ | our |
| 512 | | SFS collision | 38 | <i>practical</i> | \ | 2014 |
| | | | 39 | <i>practical</i> | \ | 2015 |
| 384 | | FS collision | 40 | 2^{183} | \ | 2012 |
| | | | 41 | <i>practical</i> | \ | 2015 |
| 256 | | FS collision* | 43 | <i>practical</i> | \ | 2015 |
| 224 | FS collision* | 44 | <i>practical</i> | \ | 2015 | |