

# The Complexity of Algebraic Algorithms for LWE

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## Learning With Errors (LWE)

- $q, n \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 1}$ ,  $q$  a prime.
- $\chi$  probability distribution on  $\mathbb{Z}$ .
- $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$  secret vector.
- LWE sample  $(\mathbf{a}, b) \in \mathbb{F}_q^n \times \mathbb{F}_q$

$$b = \langle \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a} \rangle + e = \sum_{i=1}^n s_i \cdot a_i + e \in \mathbb{F}_q,$$

where  $e \leftarrow \chi$ .

- Typically  $\chi$  is discrete Gaussian distribution.
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  - Choose interval  $[-N, N] \subset \mathbb{Z}$  and set up the polynomial

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- For LWE sample  $(\mathbf{a}, b = \langle \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a} \rangle + e)$ , the polynomial

$$f(b - \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a} \rangle) = 0 \in \mathbb{F}_q[x_1, \dots, x_n] = \mathbb{F}_q[\mathbf{x}]$$

has root  $\mathbf{s}$  with probability,  $N = t \cdot \sigma$ ,

$$1 - \mathbb{P}[|e| > t \cdot \sigma] \geq 1 - \frac{2}{t \cdot \sqrt{2 \cdot \pi}} \cdot \exp\left(-\frac{t^2}{2}\right).$$

- LWE polynomial system,  $m \geq n$ ,

$$\mathcal{F}_{\text{LWE}}: f(b_1 - \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a}_1 \rangle) = \dots = f(b_m - \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a}_m \rangle) = 0.$$

- Previous secret recovery via
  - Linearization [AG11].
  - Gröbner bases under semi-regularity assumption [ACF<sup>+</sup>15].
  - Linearization under semi-regularity assumption [STA20].

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- Previous secret recovery via
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- **This work:**
  - Proven Gröbner basis complexity estimation.
  - Framework for worst-case (designer's perspective) Gröbner basis complexity estimation.
  - Incorporating hints into LWE polynomial systems.



$$P = K[x_1, \dots, x_n], m = \prod_{i=1}^n x_i^{d_i}, \mathbf{d} = (d_1, \dots, d_n)$$

## Degree Reverse Lexicographic (DRL) Term Order

$\mathbf{a} >_{DRL} \mathbf{b}$  if

- $\sum_{i=1}^n a_i > \sum_{i=1}^n b_i$ , or
- $\sum_{i=1}^n a_i = \sum_{i=1}^n b_i$  and the last non-zero entry of  $\mathbf{a} - \mathbf{b}$  is negative.

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$$I = (f_1, \dots, f_m) \subset P \text{ ideal, } I = \{f \mid f = \sum_{i=1}^m h_i \cdot f_i, h_i \in P\}$$

## DRL Gröbner Basis [Buc65]

- $I \subset P$  ideal.
- $\mathcal{G} \subset I$  finite basis.
- $(LM_{DRL}(f) \mid f \in I) = (LM_{DRL}(g) \mid g \in \mathcal{G})$ .

$$\mathcal{F} = \{f_1, \dots, f_m\} \subset P = K[x_1, \dots, x_n]$$

## Macaulay Matrix $M_{\leq d}$

- $d \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}$ :

Monomials:  $s \in P, \deg(s) \leq d$

Polynomials:

$$t \in P, f_i \in \mathcal{F}, \\ \deg(t \cdot f_i) \leq d$$

$$t \cdot f_i \begin{pmatrix} & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ \hline & & & \text{coeff.} \\ \hline & & & \end{pmatrix}$$

- Columns sorted via DRL.

$$\mathcal{F} = \{f_1, \dots, f_m\} \subset P = K[x_1, \dots, x_n]$$

## Solving Degree [CG21, Definition 6]

- $\text{sd}_{DRL}(\mathcal{F})$  least  $d \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}$  such that Gaussian elimination on  $M_{\leq d}$  produces Gröbner basis.
- Complexity estimate [Sto00]

$$\mathcal{O} \left( m \cdot \text{sd}_{DRL}(\mathcal{F}) \cdot \binom{n + \text{sd}_{DRL}(\mathcal{F}) - 1}{\text{sd}_{DRL}(\mathcal{F})}^\omega \right),$$

where  $2 \leq \omega \leq 3$ .

$$\mathcal{F} = \{f_1, \dots, f_m\} \subset P = K[x_1, \dots, x_n]$$

### Degree of Regularity [BFS04, Definition 4]

- $f^{\text{top}} = f^{\text{hom}} \bmod (x_0)$ .
- $d_{\text{reg}}(\mathcal{F}) = \min \{d \geq 0 \mid (\mathcal{F}^{\text{top}})_d = P_d\}$ .
- Heuristic: The larger  $|\mathcal{F}|$  the lower  $d_{\text{reg}}(\mathcal{F})$ .

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$$m \geq n + 1, d_1 = \deg(f_1) \geq \dots \geq d_m = \deg(f_m)$$

### Solving Degree Bound [CG21, Theorem 10, Corollary 2], [Ste24, Theorem 3.2]

- If  $d_{\text{reg}}(\mathcal{F}) < \infty$ , then
- $\text{sd}_{\text{DRL}}(\mathcal{F}) \leq \text{reg}(\mathcal{F}^{\text{hom}}) \leq \sum_{i=1}^{n+1} (d_i - 1) + 1$ .

- LWE sample vector matrix:  $\text{rank}(\mathbf{a}_1 \ \dots \ \mathbf{a}_m) = n \Rightarrow d_{\text{reg}}(\mathcal{F}_{\text{LWE}}) < \infty$ .

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- General LWE  $q, n, \sigma = \sqrt{\frac{n}{2 \cdot \pi}}$

$$\mathcal{O}\left(n \cdot 2^{\omega \cdot \mathcal{O}(n^{1.2787})}\right), \quad p_{\text{success}} \geq 1 - \frac{2}{\pi \cdot \sqrt{n}}.$$



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$$\mathcal{O}\left(m \cdot (D - 1) \cdot n \cdot 2^{\omega \cdot \mathcal{O}(n)}\right).$$

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- Small secret LWE  $|\mathcal{S}| = D$

$$\mathcal{O}\left(m \cdot (D - 1) \cdot n^2 \cdot 2^{\omega \cdot \mathcal{O}(n^{1.2787})}\right).$$

- Previous analysis [ACF<sup>+</sup>15] assumed that  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{LWE}}$  is semi-regular.
  - $d_{\text{reg}}(\mathcal{F}_{\text{LWE}})$  computable.
  - $d_{\text{reg}}(\mathcal{F}_{\text{LWE}})$  DRL Gröbner basis complexity measure.

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### Refined DRL Solving Degree [CG23, Definition 1.1]

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- Iterate until  $\mathcal{B}_i = \mathcal{B}_{i+1}$ .
- $\overline{\text{sd}}_{\text{DRL}}(\mathcal{F})$  least  $d \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}$  such that Gaussian elimination on iterated Macaulay matrices produces DRL-Gröbner basis.



## Theorem

- $\mathcal{F} \subset K[x_1, \dots, x_n], d_{\text{reg}}(\mathcal{F}) < \infty.$
- $\overline{\text{sd}}_{\text{DRL}}(\mathcal{F}) \leq 2 \cdot d_{\text{reg}}(\mathcal{F}) - 1.$
- *Complexity*

$$\mathcal{O} \left( m \cdot \overline{\text{sd}}_{\text{DRL}}(\mathcal{F})^3 \cdot \binom{n + \overline{\text{sd}}_{\text{DRL}}(\mathcal{F}) - 1}{\overline{\text{sd}}_{\text{DRL}}(\mathcal{F})}^{\omega+2} \right).$$

Gaussian elimination on

- Iterated Macaulay matrices.
- $\overline{\text{sd}}_{DRL}(\mathcal{F}) \leq 2 \cdot d_{\text{reg}}(\mathcal{F}) - 1$ .
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- Single Macaulay matrix.
- $\text{sd}_{DRL}(\mathcal{F}) \leq \text{reg}(\mathcal{F}^{\text{hom}})$ .
- $d_{\text{reg}}(\mathcal{F}) \leq \text{reg}(\mathcal{F}^{\text{hom}})$   
[CG23, Theorem 5.3].
- Complexity:

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## How To Compute Degree of Regularity?

$\mathcal{F}_{\text{LWE}} = \{f_1, \dots, f_m\} \subset P = \mathbb{F}_q[x_1, \dots, x_n], \forall i: \deg(f_i) = D$

- Compute DRL Gröbner basis of homogeneous system

$$(\mathcal{F}_{\text{LWE}}^{\text{top}}) = (\mathcal{F}_{\text{LWE}}^{\text{hom}}, x_0).$$

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- Infeasible in practice.
- But we can estimate “**Lowest Achievable Degree of Regularity**” via necessary condition:

$$|\mathcal{F}_{\text{LWE}}| \cdot \underbrace{\binom{n+d-1}{d}}_{=\dim_{\mathbb{F}_q}(P_d)} \stackrel{!}{\geq} \underbrace{\binom{n+D+d-1}{D+d-1}}_{=\dim_{\mathbb{F}_q}(P_{D+d})}.$$

- Specify LWE parameters  $q$ ,  $n$ ,  $m$ ,  $\chi$ , and LWE polynomial degree  $D$ .

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## LWE Worst Case Complexity estimation

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### Binary Secret LWE

- $n$ ,  $m$ ,  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{LWE}} = \{f_1, \dots, f_m, x_1^2 - x_1, \dots, x_n^2 - x_n\}$ ,  $D = \deg(f_i)$ .

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- Necessary condition simplifies to:  $m \cdot \binom{n}{d} \stackrel{!}{\geq} \binom{n}{D+d}$ .
- If  $m \in \mathcal{O}(n^D)$ , then complexity  $\mathcal{O} \left( n^D \cdot D \cdot 2^{\omega \cdot \mathcal{O}(n^{0.6393})} \right)$ .

- Complexity estimation for Kyber768 [SAB<sup>+</sup>22] with  $\omega = 2$ .
  - Small secret small error LWE instance with  $|\mathcal{S}| = |\mathcal{E}| = 5$ .
  - $n = m = 3 \cdot 256$ .
  - Complexities of lattice-based attacks are computed via the lattice estimator [APS15].

Method	BKW	USVP	BDD	BDD Hybrid	BDD MiTM Hybrid	Dual	Dual Hybrid	Proven complexity estimate	Iterated Macaulay Matrices	Single Macaulay Matrix
Samples	$2^{226}$	768	768	768	768	768	768	768 768 <sup>4</sup>	768 768 <sup>4</sup>	768 768 <sup>4</sup>
Complexity (bits)	239	205	201	201	357	214	206	5554 5581	4717 419	1588 203

- Hardness of LWE in presence of side-information.
  - Improvement of lattice attacks [DDGR20, DGHK23].

### Types of Hints

- Perfect hints:  $\langle \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{v} \rangle = l \in \mathbb{F}_q$ .
- Modular hints:  $\langle \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{v} \rangle \equiv l \pmod k$ .
- Approximate hints:  $\langle \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{v} \rangle + e_\sigma = l \in \mathbb{F}_q$ .
- Short vector hints:  $\mathbf{v} \in \Lambda_{\text{LWE}}$ .

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- In principle any hint which can be modeled in  $\mathbb{F}_q[\mathbf{x}]$  can be added to  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{LWE}}$ .
  - The closer one can get to binary secret/error LWE the better:

$$m \cdot \binom{n+d-1}{d} \stackrel{!}{\geq} \binom{n+D+d-1}{D+d} \text{ vs. } m \cdot \binom{n}{d} \stackrel{!}{\geq} \binom{n}{D+d}.$$

$$f(x) = x \cdot \prod_{i=1}^N (x - i) \cdot (x + i),$$

$$\mathcal{F}_{\text{LWE}} = \left\{ f(b_i - \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a}_i \rangle) \right\}_{1 \leq i \leq m} \subset \mathbb{F}_q[\mathbf{x}]$$

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$$\mathbf{y} = \hat{\mathbf{A}}\mathbf{x}.$$

- Then

$$\left\{ y_1^{2 \cdot N + 1}, \dots, y_n^{2 \cdot N + 1} \right\} \subset \mathcal{F}_{\text{LWE}}^{\text{top}} \Rightarrow d_{\text{reg}}(\mathcal{F}_{\text{LWE}}) < \infty.$$

- Impact of hints on small secret small error LWE:

$$|\mathcal{S}| = |\mathcal{E}| = D = 5, n = 256, m = 256^{\frac{3}{2}}.$$

## Hints Complexity Example

- Impact of hints on small secret small error LWE:

$$|\mathcal{S}| = |\mathcal{E}| = D = 5, n = 256, m = 256^{\frac{3}{2}}.$$

- The closer one can move a LWE to binary secret/error LWE the better.
  - Necessary degree of regularity condition:

$$m \cdot \binom{n+d-1}{d} \stackrel{!}{\geq} \binom{n+D+d-1}{D+d} \text{ vs. } m \cdot \binom{n}{d} \stackrel{!}{\geq} \binom{n}{D+d}.$$

## Hints Complexity Example

- Impact of hints on small secret small error LWE:

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- Column  $d$  lists degree for the lowest achievable degree of regularity  $\hat{d}_{\text{reg}}(\mathcal{F}_{\text{LWE}}) = D + d$ .

	Small Secret Small Error LWE $D = 5$		Binary Secret LWE $D = 5$		Binary Secret Binary Error LWE $D = 2$	
Perfect hints	$d$	Single Macaulay Matrix (bits)	$d$	Single Macaulay Matrix (bits)	$d$	Single Macaulay Matrix (bits)
$\omega = 2$						
0	57	481	38	370	3	92
50	45	393	30	303	2	78
150	22	221	15	174	1	59



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