

Cryptanalysis of rank-2 module-LIP in Totally Real Number Fields

G. Mureau, A. Pellet-Mary, H. Pliatsok, A. Wallet

Eurocrypt 2024, Zurich, May 30th



Hawk (Ducas, Postlethwaite, Pulles, van Woerden 2022)¹

- 1 NIST submission (additional call for signatures)
- 2 based on module-LIP over cyclotomic fields
- 3 efficient / compact

¹Hawk: Module LIP makes Lattice Signatures Fast, Compact and Simple

Hawk (Ducas, Postlethwaite, Pulles, van Woerden 2022)¹

- 1 NIST submission (additional call for signatures)
- 2 based on module-LIP over cyclotomic fields
- 3 efficient / compact

This talk: Heuristic polynomial time (in many cases) algorithm solving module-LIP for rank-2 modules when K is **totally real**.

¹Hawk: Module LIP makes Lattice Signatures Fast, Compact and Simple

Hawk (Ducas, Postlethwaite, Pulles, van Woerden 2022)¹

- ① NIST submission (additional call for signatures)
- ② based on module-LIP over cyclotomic fields
- ③ efficient / compact


This talk: Heuristic polynomial time (in many cases) algorithm solving module-LIP for rank-2 modules when K is **totally real**.

Does not break Hawk!

¹Hawk: Module LIP makes Lattice Signatures Fast, Compact and Simple

The module-Lattice Isomorphism Problem


- LIP: Find an isometry (distance preserving map) sending \mathcal{L}_1 on \mathcal{L}_2 .



Given $(b_1|b_2)$ and $(b'_1|b'_2)$, find O .

The module-Lattice Isomorphism Problem

- LIP: Find an isometry (distance preserving map) sending \mathcal{L}_1 on \mathcal{L}_2 .



Given $(b_1|b_2)$ and $(b'_1|b'_2)$, find O .

State of the art: need to compute many short vectors in \mathcal{L}_1 and \mathcal{L}_2
(SVP, hard problem)

The module-Lattice Isomorphism Problem

- LIP: Find an isometry (distance preserving map) sending \mathcal{L}_1 on \mathcal{L}_2 .
- **module lattices** are finitely generated modules over \mathcal{O}_K (K a number field).

Examples. $K = \mathbb{Q}[X]/(X^{2^k} + 1)$ and $\mathcal{O}_K = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^{2^k} + 1)$ (or $K = \mathbb{Q}$ and $\mathcal{O}_K = \mathbb{Z}$).

The module-Lattice Isomorphism Problem

- LIP: Find an isometry (distance preserving map) sending \mathcal{L}_1 on \mathcal{L}_2 .
- **module lattices** are finitely generated modules over \mathcal{O}_K (K a number field).

Examples. $K = \mathbb{Q}[X]/(X^{2^k} + 1)$ and $\mathcal{O}_K = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^{2^k} + 1)$ (or $K = \mathbb{Q}$ and $\mathcal{O}_K = \mathbb{Z}$).

- 1 fractional ideals of K (rank one)
- 2 $\mathcal{O}_K \oplus \mathcal{O}_K$ (rank two)
- 3 in general: $M = \mathfrak{a}_1 \mathbf{v}_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus \mathfrak{a}_\ell \mathbf{v}_\ell$ (rank ℓ , $\mathbf{v}_i \in K^\ell$, $\mathfrak{a}_i \subset K$)

The module-Lattice Isomorphism Problem

- LIP: Find an isometry (distance preserving map) sending \mathcal{L}_1 on \mathcal{L}_2 .
- **module lattices** are finitely generated modules over \mathcal{O}_K (K a number field).

Examples. $K = \mathbb{Q}[X]/(X^{2^k} + 1)$ and $\mathcal{O}_K = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^{2^k} + 1)$ (or $K = \mathbb{Q}$ and $\mathcal{O}_K = \mathbb{Z}$).

- ① fractional ideals of K (rank one)
 - ② $\mathcal{O}_K \oplus \mathcal{O}_K$ (rank two)
 - ③ in general: $M = \mathfrak{a}_1 \mathbf{v}_1 \oplus \dots \oplus \mathfrak{a}_\ell \mathbf{v}_\ell$ (rank ℓ , $\mathbf{v}_i \in K^\ell$, $\mathfrak{a}_i \subset K$)
- module-LIP: Same as LIP but \mathcal{L}_1 and \mathcal{L}_2 are module lattices and seek for isometry preserving the **module structure**.

The module-Lattice Isomorphism Problem

- LIP: Find an isometry (distance preserving map) sending \mathcal{L}_1 on \mathcal{L}_2 .
- **module lattices** are finitely generated modules over \mathcal{O}_K (K a number field).

Examples. $K = \mathbb{Q}[X]/(X^{2^k} + 1)$ and $\mathcal{O}_K = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^{2^k} + 1)$ (or $K = \mathbb{Q}$ and $\mathcal{O}_K = \mathbb{Z}$).

- ① fractional ideals of K (rank one)
 - ② $\mathcal{O}_K \oplus \mathcal{O}_K$ (rank two)
 - ③ in general: $M = \mathfrak{a}_1 \mathbf{v}_1 \oplus \dots \oplus \mathfrak{a}_\ell \mathbf{v}_\ell$ (rank ℓ , $\mathbf{v}_i \in K^\ell$, $\mathfrak{a}_i \subset K$)
- module-LIP: Same as LIP but \mathcal{L}_1 and \mathcal{L}_2 are module lattices and seek for isometry preserving the **module structure**.

State of the art: embed module lattices to lattices $\subset \mathbb{R}^{d\ell}$ and solve LIP instance.

The module-Lattice Isomorphism Problem

Motivating example. K any number field and $M = \mathcal{O}_K \oplus \mathcal{O}_K$ (as in Hawk).

Notation: $X^* := \overline{X}^T$, for any $X \in M_2(K)$.

The module-Lattice Isomorphism Problem

Motivating example. K any number field and $M = \mathcal{O}_K \oplus \mathcal{O}_K$ (as in Hawk).

Notation: $X^* := \overline{X}^T$, for any $X \in M_2(K)$.

M' is **isomorphic** to M iff $\exists O : O^*O = Id$ and $M' = O \cdot M$.

The module-Lattice Isomorphism Problem

Motivating example. K any number field and $M = \mathcal{O}_K \oplus \mathcal{O}_K$ (as in Hawk).

Notation: $X^* := \overline{X}^T$, for any $X \in M_2(K)$.

M' is **isomorphic** to M iff $\exists O : O^* O = Id$ and $M' = O \cdot M$.

$M' = M'(B')$ is isomorphic to $M = M(B)$ iff $\exists U \in GL_2(\mathcal{O}_K) : B' = OBU$.

The module-Lattice Isomorphism Problem

Motivating example. K any number field and $M = \mathcal{O}_K \oplus \mathcal{O}_K$ (as in Hawk).

Notation: $X^* := \overline{X}^T$, for any $X \in M_2(K)$.

M' is **isomorphic** to M iff $\exists O : O^* O = Id$ and $M' = O \cdot M$.

$M' = M'(B')$ is isomorphic to $M = M(B)$ iff $\exists U \in GL_2(\mathcal{O}_K) : B' = OBU$.

Move to **quadratic forms**:

$B \mapsto G = B^* B$; $B' \mapsto G' = B'^* B'$, Gram matrix / Humbert form.

$B' = OBU \implies G' = U^* G U$, **congruent** to G .

The module-Lattice Isomorphism Problem

Motivating example. K any number field and $M = \mathcal{O}_K \oplus \mathcal{O}_K$ (as in Hawk).

Notation: $X^* := \overline{X}^T$, for any $X \in M_2(K)$.

M' is **isomorphic** to M iff $\exists O : O^*O = Id$ and $M' = O \cdot M$.

$M' = M'(B')$ is isomorphic to $M = M(B)$ iff $\exists U \in GL_2(\mathcal{O}_K) : B' = OBU$.

Move to **quadratic forms**:

$B \mapsto G = B^*B$; $B' \mapsto G' = B'^*B'$, Gram matrix / Humbert form.

$B' = OBU \implies G' = U^*GU$, **congruent** to G .

Taking $B = G = I_2$, module-LIP with parameter K and I_2 is

module-LIP $_K^{1/2}$

Input: G' Gram matrix congruent to I_2

Goal: Compute **all** $U \in GL_2(\mathcal{O}_K)$ s.t. $G' = U^*I_2U = U^*U$.

Hawk : $K = \mathbb{Q}(\zeta_{2^k})$ **cyclotomic** number field (**not** totally real)
 $U \in \text{GL}_2(\mathcal{O}_K)$ (secret basis of $\mathcal{O}_K \oplus \mathcal{O}_K$)
 $G = U^* U$ (public Gram matrix).

Hawk : $K = \mathbb{Q}(\zeta_{2^k})$ **cyclotomic** number field (**not** totally real)

$U \in \text{GL}_2(\mathcal{O}_K)$ (secret basis of $\mathcal{O}_K \oplus \mathcal{O}_K$)

$G = U^* U$ (public Gram matrix).

- Recovering U from G is a module-LIP $_K^{1/2}$ instance.

Hawk : $K = \mathbb{Q}(\zeta_{2^k})$ **cyclotomic** number field (**not** totally real)

$U \in \text{GL}_2(\mathcal{O}_K)$ (secret basis of $\mathcal{O}_K \oplus \mathcal{O}_K$)

$G = U^* U$ (public Gram matrix).

- Recovering U from G is a module-LIP $_K^{1/2}$ instance.
- Any solution $V^* V = G$ is a **key recovering** (up to automorphism).

The attack over totally real fields

From now on K is **totally real** (e.g., $K = \mathbb{Q}(\zeta + \zeta^{-1})$) and $U = \begin{pmatrix} a & c \\ b & d \end{pmatrix} \in \mathrm{GL}_2(\mathcal{O}_K)$

Attack: Main idea

From now on K is **totally real** (e.g., $K = \mathbb{Q}(\zeta + \zeta^{-1})$) and $U = \begin{pmatrix} a & c \\ b & d \end{pmatrix} \in \text{GL}_2(\mathcal{O}_K)$

Goal : Recover U from $G = U^* U$.

Attack: Main idea

From now on K is **totally real** (e.g., $K = \mathbb{Q}(\zeta + \zeta^{-1})$) and $U = \begin{pmatrix} a & c \\ b & d \end{pmatrix} \in \text{GL}_2(\mathcal{O}_K)$

Goal : Recover U from $G = U^* U$.

$$G = U^* U = \begin{pmatrix} a\bar{a} + b\bar{b} & * \\ * & c\bar{c} + d\bar{d} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} a^2 + b^2 & * \\ * & c^2 + d^2 \end{pmatrix}$$

because K is **totally real!** Diagonal elements are **sums of two squares** in \mathcal{O}_K .

Attack: Main idea

From now on K is **totally real** (e.g., $K = \mathbb{Q}(\zeta + \zeta^{-1})$) and $U = \begin{pmatrix} a & c \\ b & d \end{pmatrix} \in \text{GL}_2(\mathcal{O}_K)$

Goal : Recover U from $G = U^* U$.

$$G = U^* U = \begin{pmatrix} a\bar{a} + b\bar{b} & * \\ * & c\bar{c} + d\bar{d} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} a^2 + b^2 & * \\ * & c^2 + d^2 \end{pmatrix}$$

because K is **totally real**! Diagonal elements are **sums of two squares** in \mathcal{O}_K .

$a^2 + b^2 = (a + ib)(a - ib) =: N_{L/K}(a + ib)$ **relative norm** of $a + ib \in K(i) = L$.

Attack: Main idea

From now on K is **totally real** (e.g., $K = \mathbb{Q}(\zeta + \zeta^{-1})$) and $U = \begin{pmatrix} a & c \\ b & d \end{pmatrix} \in \text{GL}_2(\mathcal{O}_K)$

Goal : Recover U from $G = U^* U$.

$$G = U^* U = \begin{pmatrix} a\bar{a} + b\bar{b} & * \\ * & c\bar{c} + d\bar{d} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} a^2 + b^2 & * \\ * & c^2 + d^2 \end{pmatrix}$$

because K is **totally real!** Diagonal elements are **sums of two squares** in \mathcal{O}_K .

$a^2 + b^2 = (a + ib)(a - ib) =: N_{L/K}(a + ib)$ **relative norm** of $a + ib \in K(i) = L$.

Main idea: Solve relative norm equations to reconstruct U .

Attack: Solving norm equations

- Howgrave-Graham, Szydlo, "A Method to Solve Cyclotomic Norm Equations $f \star \bar{f}$ "

NormEquation

Input: $q \in \mathcal{O}_K$, prime factorization of $|N_{K/\mathbb{Q}}(q)| \in \mathbb{N}$.

Output: all pairs $(x, y) \in \mathcal{O}_K \times \mathcal{O}_K$ such that $N_{L/K}(x + iy) = x^2 + y^2 = q$.

Attack: Solving norm equations

- Howgrave-Graham, Szydło, "A Method to Solve Cyclotomic Norm Equations $f \star \bar{f}$ "

NormEquation

Input: $q \in \mathcal{O}_K$, prime factorization of $|N_{K/\mathbb{Q}}(q)| \in \mathbb{N}$.

Output: all pairs $(x, y) \in \mathcal{O}_K \times \mathcal{O}_K$ such that $N_{L/K}(x + iy) = x^2 + y^2 = q$.

It runs in time

$$\text{poly}(\text{deg}(K), (\log |N_{K/\mathbb{Q}}(q)|)^{\mathbf{r}}),$$

where \mathbf{r} is the number of distinct prime factors of $q \cdot \mathcal{O}_K$.

Attack: Solving norm equations

- Howgrave-Graham, Szydlo, "A Method to Solve Cyclotomic Norm Equations $f \star \bar{f}$ "

NormEquation

Input: $q \in \mathcal{O}_K$, prime factorization of $|N_{K/\mathbb{Q}}(q)| \in \mathbb{N}$.

Output: all pairs $(x, y) \in \mathcal{O}_K \times \mathcal{O}_K$ such that $N_{L/K}(x + iy) = x^2 + y^2 = q$.

It runs in time

$$\text{poly}(\text{deg}(K), (\log |N_{K/\mathbb{Q}}(q)|)^{\mathbf{r}}),$$

where \mathbf{r} is the number of distinct prime factors of $q \cdot \mathcal{O}_K$.

- Randomization of the input to guarantee $\mathbf{r} = 1$.

$|N_{K/\mathbb{Q}}(q)|$ prime power ✓

Heuristic ✗

Attack: Solving norm equations

- Howgrave-Graham, Szydlo, "A Method to Solve Cyclotomic Norm Equations $f \star \bar{f}$ "

NormEquation

Input: $q \in \mathcal{O}_K$, prime factorization of $|N_{K/\mathbb{Q}}(q)| \in \mathbb{N}$.

Output: all pairs $(x, y) \in \mathcal{O}_K \times \mathcal{O}_K$ such that $N_{L/K}(x + iy) = x^2 + y^2 = q$.

It runs in time

$$\text{poly}(\text{deg}(K), (\log |N_{K/\mathbb{Q}}(q)|)^{\mathbf{r}}),$$

where \mathbf{r} is the number of distinct prime factors of $q \cdot \mathcal{O}_K$.

- Randomization of the input to guarantee $\mathbf{r} = 1$.

$|N_{K/\mathbb{Q}}(q)|$ prime power ✓

Heuristic ✗

⇒ Get norm equations easy to solve.

GaussianGram

Input : G matrix, $s > 0$ sampling parameter.

Output : $(u, v) \in \mathcal{O}_K \oplus \mathcal{O}_K$ follows a discrete Gaussian distribution.

- 1 Sample $V \in M_2(\mathcal{O}_K)$ invertible, using two calls to $\text{GaussianGram}(G, s)$

GaussianGram

Input : G matrix, $s > 0$ sampling parameter.

Output : $(u, v) \in \mathcal{O}_K \oplus \mathcal{O}_K$ follows a discrete Gaussian distribution.

- 1 Sample $V \in M_2(\mathcal{O}_K)$ invertible, using two calls to $\text{GaussianGram}(G, s)$
- 2 Compute $G_V = V^T G V = \begin{pmatrix} q_1 & \star \\ \star & q_2 \end{pmatrix}$
- 3 Repeat until $q_1 \cdot \mathcal{O}_K$ and $q_2 \cdot \mathcal{O}_K$ are **prime ideals**

Attack: Randomization step

GaussianGram

Input : G matrix, $s > 0$ sampling parameter.

Output : $(u, v) \in \mathcal{O}_K \oplus \mathcal{O}_K$ follows a discrete Gaussian distribution.

- 1 Sample $V \in M_2(\mathcal{O}_K)$ invertible, using two calls to `GaussianGram(G, s)`
- 2 Compute $G_V = V^T G V = \begin{pmatrix} q_1 & \star \\ \star & q_2 \end{pmatrix}$
- 3 Repeat until $q_1 \cdot \mathcal{O}_K$ and $q_2 \cdot \mathcal{O}_K$ are **prime ideals**

Heuristic for the probability of success.

Numerical experiments + theoretical results (distribution of prime ideals, involves ρ_K , residue of ζ_K at 1).

Solving module-LIP for $\mathcal{O}_K \oplus \mathcal{O}_K$.

Suppose $K = \mathbb{Q}(\zeta_{2^k} + \zeta_{2^k}^{-1})$ and G a Gram matrix.

\exists heuristic algorithm solving module-LIP $_{K}^{1/2}$ on input G in expected time

$$\text{poly}(\rho_K, \text{deg}(K), \text{size}(G)),$$

ρ_K residue of ζ_K at 1 (small in our experiments).

Numerical experiments

Full attack here: <https://gitlab.inria.fr/capsule/code-for-module-lip>

$(m, 2d)$	(64, 32)	(128, 64)	(256, 128)
Time	2	25	850

$(m, 2d)$	(228, 72)	(276, 88)	(260, 96)	(232, 112)	(340, 128)	(296, 144)
Time (s)	74	195	434	652	2980	4205

Table: Times in seconds for attacks over various maximal totally real subfields K of cyclotomic fields with conductors $m = 4k$, averaged over 5 instances. The degree d of K is $\varphi(m)/2$, and the lattices involved have dimension $2d$. The upper table are powers-of-two. Experiments performed on a MacBook Pro (Apple M2), with Sagemath 10.2 and Pari/GP 2.15.5.

More generally

- module-LIP defined for any number field, any module lattice $M \subset K^\ell$.

Find all "congruence matrices" U s.t. $G' = U^*GU$

More generally

- module-LIP defined for any number field, any module lattice $M \subset K^\ell$.

Find all "congruence matrices" U s.t. $G' = U^*GU$

- Attack for **any totally real number field K , any module lattice $M \subset K^2$** .

More generally

- module-LIP defined for any number field, any module lattice $M \subset K^\ell$.

Find all "congruence matrices" U s.t. $G' = U^*GU$

- Attack for **any totally real number field K , any module lattice $M \subset K^2$** .
- In general, can't hope for polynomial time complexity. Depends on the "Gram ideal" $\mathcal{G}(M) = \langle \|v\|^2 \mid v \in M \rangle$. *e.g.*, $\mathcal{G}(\mathcal{O}_K \oplus \mathcal{O}_K) = \mathcal{O}_K$.

More generally

- module-LIP defined for any number field, any module lattice $M \subset K^\ell$.

Find all "congruence matrices" U s.t. $G' = U^*GU$

- Attack for **any totally real number field K , any module lattice $M \subset K^2$** .
- In general, can't hope for polynomial time complexity. Depends on the "Gram ideal" $\mathcal{G}(M) = \langle \|v\|^2 \mid v \in M \rangle$. *e.g.*, $\mathcal{G}(\mathcal{O}_K \oplus \mathcal{O}_K) = \mathcal{O}_K$.

Solving module-LIP for rank-2 modules in totally real number fields.

Parameters: K totally real, $M \subset K^2$, with (pseudo-)basis B and $G = B^*B$.

Input: G' (pseudo-)Gram matrix congruent to G .

More generally

- module-LIP defined for any number field, any module lattice $M \subset K^\ell$.

Find all "congruence matrices" U s.t. $G' = U^*GU$

- Attack for **any totally real number field** K , **any module lattice** $M \subset K^2$.
- In general, can't hope for polynomial time complexity. Depends on the "Gram ideal" $\mathcal{G}(M) = \langle \|v\|^2 \mid v \in M \rangle$. *e.g.*, $\mathcal{G}(\mathcal{O}_K \oplus \mathcal{O}_K) = \mathcal{O}_K$.

Solving module-LIP for rank-2 modules in totally real number fields.

Parameters: K totally real, $M \subset K^2$, with (pseudo-)basis B and $G = B^*B$.

Input: G' (pseudo-)Gram matrix congruent to G .

\exists heuristic algorithm finding all congruence matrices in expected time

$$\left(\text{poly}(\rho_K, \log \Delta_K, \text{size}(\mathbf{G}')) \right)^{\mathbf{r}+1} + T_{\text{factor}}(N_{K/\mathbb{Q}}(\mathcal{G}(M))),$$

where \mathbf{r} is the number of distinct prime factors of $\mathcal{G}(M)$.

To sum up

- When K totally real and M has rank 2, module-LIP reduces to **norm equations** in number fields.

To sum up

- When K totally real and M has rank 2, module-LIP reduces to **norm equations** in number fields.
- Classical problem. We randomize to have easy instances.

- When K totally real and M has rank 2, module-LIP reduces to **norm equations** in number fields.
- Classical problem. We randomize to have easy instances.
- Under some heuristic for the randomization, polynomial time (in many cases) algorithm solving module-LIP.

- When K totally real and M has rank 2, module-LIP reduces to **norm equations** in number fields.
- Classical problem. We randomize to have easy instances.
- Under some heuristic for the randomization, polynomial time (in many cases) algorithm solving module-LIP.

Open questions.

- For modules with rank $\ell > 2$?
- Rank 2 over K cyclotomic ?

Thanks for your attention!



Full article here!