

Circuit Bootstrapping: Faster and Smaller

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Outline

□ **Background**

- Fully Homomorphic Encryption
- FHEW/TFHE Scheme
- FHEW/TFHE Bootstrapping

□ **LHE Evaluation Mode**

□ **Improved Circuit Bootstrapping**

□ **Performance**

□ **Discussion**

□ **Q&A**




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Fully Homomorphic Encryption

- FHE: Allows computations on encrypted data without decryption.


$$\begin{array}{ccc} \boxed{x} & + & \boxed{y} \\ & \text{=} & \\ \boxed{x} & \times & \boxed{y} \end{array} = \begin{array}{c} \boxed{x+y} \\ \boxed{x \times y} \end{array}$$

- Applications: Secure cloud computing, Privacy-Preserving ML, ...




FHEW/TFHE Scheme

- FHEW/TFHE: Similar to, unified framework in [MP21].
- Known for bootstrapping efficiency.



FHEW/TFHE Bootstrapping

- Bootstrapping gate-by-gate: Fully homomorphic evaluation mode.
- “Sleepy Field” : Leveled homomorphic evaluation mode.



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□ LHE Evaluation Mode

- Look-Up-Table Via CMUX Gate
- Circuit Bootstrapping (CGGI17, CLOT21)

□ Improved Circuit Bootstrapping

□ Performance

□ Discussion

□ Q&A




LUT Via CMUX Gate

- Input: RGSW
- Output: LWE

CMUX: $\text{RGSW}(x_7) \boxdot (\text{RLWE}(T_1) - \text{RLWE}(T_0)) + \text{RLWE}(T_0)$

| x_0 | \cdots | x_7 | f_0 | \cdots | f_{31} |
|----------|----------|----------|------------------|----------|-------------------|
| 0 | \cdots | 0 | $\sigma_{0,0}$ | \cdots | $\sigma_{0,31}$ |
| 1 | \cdots | 0 | $\sigma_{1,0}$ | \cdots | $\sigma_{1,31}$ |
| 0 | \cdots | 0 | $\sigma_{2,0}$ | \cdots | $\sigma_{2,31}$ |
| 1 | \cdots | 0 | $\sigma_{3,0}$ | \cdots | $\sigma_{3,31}$ |
| \vdots | \cdots | \vdots | \vdots | \cdots | \vdots |
| 0 | \cdots | 1 | $\sigma_{252,0}$ | \cdots | $\sigma_{252,31}$ |
| 1 | \cdots | 1 | $\sigma_{253,0}$ | \cdots | $\sigma_{253,31}$ |
| 0 | \cdots | 1 | $\sigma_{254,0}$ | \cdots | $\sigma_{254,31}$ |
| 1 | \cdots | 1 | $\sigma_{255,0}$ | \cdots | $\sigma_{255,31}$ |




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
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| 0 | \dots | 0 | $\sigma_{2,0}$ | T_0 | $\sigma_{2,31}$ |
| 1 | \dots | 0 | $\sigma_{3,0}$ | \dots | $\sigma_{3,31}$ |
| \vdots | \dots | \vdots | \vdots | \vdots | \vdots |
| 0 | \dots | 1 | $\sigma_{252,0}$ | \dots | $\sigma_{252,31}$ |
| 1 | \dots | 1 | $\sigma_{253,0}$ | T_7 | $\sigma_{253,31}$ |
| 0 | \dots | 1 | $\sigma_{254,0}$ | \dots | $\sigma_{254,31}$ |
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LUT Via CMUX Gate

- Low-noise RGSW → high-noise LWE.
- Noise? Composability?


| x_0 | ... | x_7 | f_0 | ... | f_{31} |
|-------|-----|-------|------------------|-----|-------------------|
| 0 | ... | 0 | $\sigma_{0,0}$ | ... | $\sigma_{0,31}$ |
| 1 | ... | 0 | $\sigma_{1,0}$ | ... | $\sigma_{1,31}$ |
| 0 | ... | 0 | $\sigma_{2,0}$ | ... | $\sigma_{2,31}$ |
| 1 | ... | 0 | $\sigma_{3,0}$ | ... | $\sigma_{3,31}$ |
| : | ... | : | : | ⋮ | ⋮ |
| 0 | ... | 1 | $\sigma_{252,0}$ | ... | $\sigma_{252,31}$ |
| 1 | ... | 1 | $\sigma_{253,0}$ | ... | $\sigma_{253,31}$ |
| 0 | ... | 1 | $\sigma_{254,0}$ | ... | $\sigma_{254,31}$ |
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Circuit Bootstrapping

- Goal 1: Refresh noise.
- Goal 2: Convert ciphertext type.

| x_0 | \dots | x_7 | f_0 | \dots | f_{31} |
|----------|---------|----------|------------------|----------|-------------------|
| 0 | \dots | 0 | $\sigma_{0,0}$ | \dots | $\sigma_{0,31}$ |
| 1 | \dots | 0 | $\sigma_{1,0}$ | \dots | $\sigma_{1,31}$ |
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| \vdots | \dots | \vdots | \vdots | \vdots | \vdots |
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RGSW Construction

- An RGSW ciphertext consists of two decomposed RLWE ciphertexts.
- Circuit Bootstrapping: From **LWE** to refreshed **Gadget RLWEs**.

$$\text{RGSW}(m) \leftarrow \begin{cases} \text{RLWE}'(\mathbf{sk} \cdot m) \\ \text{RLWE}'(m) \end{cases} \leftarrow \begin{pmatrix} a_0(x) & b_0(x) \\ a_1(x) & b_1(x) \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ a_{l-1}(x) & b_{l-1}(x) \\ a_l(x) & b_l(x) \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ a_{2l-1}(x) & b_{2l-1}(x) \end{pmatrix} + m \cdot \begin{pmatrix} v_0 & 0 \\ v_1 & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ v_{l-1} & 0 \\ 0 & v_0 \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ 0 & v_{l-1} \end{pmatrix}$$

Gadget Vector: (v_0, \dots, v_l)

Gadget RLWE: $\text{RLWE}'(m) = (\text{RLWE}(v_0 \cdot m), \dots, \text{RLWE}(v_{l-1} \cdot m))$



Outline


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 - Conversion over the Polynomial Ring
 - Improved Automorphism-Based Blind Rotation
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
Original Idea

- Using (MV) functional bootstrapping to refresh the noise.
- Using **private key switching** to convert from LWE to RLWE' .



Original Idea

- Conversion step accounts for more than 70% CBS time.





RLWE → LWE → RLWE

Expensive!



Conversion over the Polynomial Ring

➤ Our idea: Avoid switching between LWE and RLWE.




Ring Structure




Conversion over the Polynomial Ring

- Key problem: there are some redundant terms after blind rotation.




Conversion over the Polynomial Ring

- Key problem: there are some **redundant terms** after blind rotation.



Conversion over the Polynomial Ring

- Solution: use HomTrace to turn them to 0.




Trace Property:

$$\prod_{t=\log \bar{N}-1}^0 \phi_t(\bar{N}^{-1}v_i \cdot m + y_1X + \dots + y_{\bar{N}-1}X^{\bar{N}-1}) = v_i \cdot m.$$



Conversion over the Polynomial Ring

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
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6



Conversion over the Polynomial Ring

- Solution: decompose HomTrace to $\log N$ HomAuto.



Trace Property:

$$\prod_{t=\log \bar{N}-1}^0 \phi_t(\bar{N}^{-1}v_i \cdot m + y_1X + \dots + y_{\bar{N}-1}X^{\bar{N}-1}) = v_i \cdot m.$$


Tower Case Decomposition:

$$\prod_{t=j}^0 \phi_t(X^i) = \phi_j \circ \dots \circ \phi_0(X^i) = \begin{cases} 0, & k \leq j \leq \log \bar{N}, \\ 2^{j+1}, & 0 \leq j < k. \end{cases}$$



Conversion over the Polynomial Ring

- Faster and Smaller.



Computational Complexity:

$$O(N^2) \rightarrow O(N \log^2 N),$$


Key Size:

$$O(N^2 \log Q) \rightarrow O(N \log N \log Q).$$




Automorphism-Based Blind Rotation

- LMKC23: choose odd numbers.
- Convert operations from an additive group to a multiplicative group.




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
Automorphism-Based Blind Rotation

- Map these elements to the powers of X.
- Then the multiplications are computed through automorphisms.




Automorphism-Based Blind Rotation

- Our improved method: choose more sparse numbers.
- Convert operations to a new multiplicative group.




Automorphism-Based Blind Rotation

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Automorphism-Based Blind Rotation

- Advantages: less automorphisms.
- Sparse blind rotation implies **Muti-Value** FBS for circuit bootstrapping.



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Performance

- **Implementation:** <https://github.com/LightFHE/CircuitBootstrap>
- **Based Library:** OpenFHE
- **Environment:** 11th Gen Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-11500 @ 2.70GHz, 32 GB RAM

| Parameter for Security | | | | | | |
|------------------------|--------|------|------|-----|------------------|-----------|
| λ | Q | N | q | n | σ_{fresh} | $Prob$ |
| 128 bit | 54 bit | 2048 | 1024 | 571 | 3.2 | 2^{-32} |

| Performance (with adjusted parameters) | | | | | |
|--|-------------|----------------|-------------|----------|----------|
| Sets | $Base_{ep}$ | $Base_{trace}$ | $Base_{ss}$ | Run Time | Key Size |
| I | 17 bit | 17 bit | 28 bit | 98 ms | 60 MB |
| II | 13 bit | 17 bit | 28 bit | 126 ms | 90 MB |
| III | 10 bit | 13 bit | 28 bit | 158 ms | 121 MB |



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| λ | Q | N | q | n | σ_{fresh} | $Prob$ |
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| Comparison | | | | | |
|--------------|----------|----------|------|-------------|--------------|
| Original | | | Ours | | |
| Method | Run Time | Key Size | Sets | Run Time | Key Size |
| TFHE | 877 ms | 479 MB | II | 126 ms (7×) | 90 MB (5×) |
| $TFHE_{pre}$ | 484 ms | 2720 MB | III | 158 ms (3×) | 121 MB (25×) |



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Discussion

- Compare with TFHE-lib, TFHEpp, MOSFET.
 - AVX-512
 - NTT vs FFT
- Wake up the “Sleepy Field” .
 - Batching , LUT through “batching RGSW” ?
 - Transciphering [WWLL+23, WLWL+24]
 - TT-network, spiking network ...

[WWLL+23] Benqiang Wei, Ruida Wang, Zhihao Li, Qinju Liu, Xianhui Lu. Fregata: Faster Homomorphic Evaluation of AES via TFHE. Information Security Conference, 2023:392-412.

[WLWL+24] Benqiang Wei, Xianhui Lu , Ruida Wang, Kun Liu, Zhihao Li, Kunpeng Wang. Thunderbird: Efficient Homomorphic Evaluation of Symmetric Ciphers in 3GPP by combining two modes of TFHE. IACR Trans. Cryptogr. Hardw. Embed. Syst. 2024(3).



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Thank you for listening!

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