

Pseudorandom Isometries

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May 27, 2024

Pseudorandomness

Classical

Cryptography primitives


PRG

PRF

Quantum
?

Pseudorandomness

Classical



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
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
Quantum
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Haar Random State



Haar random state looks like picking a random point on the Bloch sphere.

Haar Random State




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Haar Random Unitaries

Haar Random Unitaries

Unitary Group $U(d)$



Uniform Distribution


Haar Random Unitary “looks like”
it is picked uniformly from the
unitary group $U(d)$.

Figure: Haar measure on $U(d)$

Haar Random Unitaries

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Unitary Group $U(d)$



Uniform Distribution

Property: Invariance




Figure: Haar measure on $U(d)$

Quantum Pseudorandomness

States

Pseudorandom
States (PRS)

(JLS18, BS19, BS20, ...)

Pseudorandom
Function-like
States (PRFS)

(AQY22, AGQY22, BBSS23, ...)

Operations

Pseudorandom
Unitaries (PRU)

(JLS18, HBK23, MPSY24, ...)

Pseudorandom
State Scramblers
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Applications:

- Crypto from Minimal Assumptions

(Kre20,...)

- QML (HBC+21,...)

- AdS/CFT

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Can we find a
systematic method
to analyse these
primitives?


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Results

- **Pseudorandom Isometries (PRI):** Definition and framework to study other primitives.
- **Almost Invariance:** A technique to prove pseudorandomness.
- **Construction:** Using OWF to achieve PRI.
- **Applications:**
 - Length Extension Theorem
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Pseudorandom Isometries

What are Pseudorandom Isometries?

Haar Random Isometries

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



Figure: Quantum circuit representation of Haar isometries

Pseudorandom Isometries (PRI)

Efficiently implementable circuits that “behave like” Haar random isometries.

Pseudorandom Isometries (PRI)


1. Efficient implementation:



Notation: $(n, n + m)$ -PRI


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


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Pseudorandom Isometries (PRI)

2. \mathcal{Q} -security: $\rho \in \mathcal{Q}$ Notation: $(n, n + m)$ - \mathcal{Q} -secure-PRI

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PRI as a Framework to Analyze Other Primitives

How are Pseudorandom Isometries related to other primitives?

Relationship with Other Primitives

Relationship with Other Primitives

- **Pseudorandom States:**

PRI secure on $|0^n\rangle$ is a PRS.

$$\mathcal{Q} = \{|0^n\rangle^{\otimes t}\}$$

- **Pseudorandom State**

Scrambler:

PRI on t -tensor same state is a PRSS.

$$\mathcal{Q} = \{|\psi\rangle^{\otimes t} : |\psi\rangle \text{ is an } n\text{-qubit state}\}$$

- **Pseudorandom Function-like States:**

PRI secure on computation basis states is a PRFS.

$$\mathcal{Q} = \{\otimes_{i=1}^t |x_i\rangle : x_i \in \{0, 1\}^n\}.$$

- **PRU:**

- (n, n) -PRI is a PRU.
- PRU implies PRI.

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Almost Invariance Implies Security

How do we analyse Pseudorandomness
of PRIs (and other primitives)?

Almost Invariance Implies Security


Intuition: The **output** of Pseudorandom primitives are “**maximally scrambled**”, hence applying t -fold Haar shouldn't change it much.

Almost Invariance Implies Security

Almost Invariance implies security: If the **output** of a Pseudorandom primitive is **invariant** under t -fold Haar Unitary, then the Pseudorandom primitive is secure.


Almost Invariance Implies Security

PRI is \mathcal{Q} -secure iff $\rho \in \mathcal{Q}$




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PRI is \mathcal{Q} -secure iff $\rho \in \mathcal{Q}$ (Used by BM'24 (subsequent work) to prove pseudorandomness of PRU's.)




Proof of Almost Invariance Implies Security

Recall: Haar Invariance




Isometry definition




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


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
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
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Proof of Almost Invariance Implies Security

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Proof of Almost Invariance Implies Security

PRI is \mathcal{Q} -secure iff $\rho \in \mathcal{Q}$

$$\rho \longrightarrow \boxed{F_k^{\otimes t}} \longrightarrow \approx_s$$

$$\rho \longrightarrow \boxed{\mathcal{I}^{\otimes t}} \longrightarrow$$

=

$$\begin{array}{c} \rho \\ |0^m\rangle \end{array} \longrightarrow \boxed{\mathcal{U}^{\otimes t}} \longrightarrow$$


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
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


Characterisation of Almost invariance

Can we characterise these
“almost invariant” states?

Characterisation of Almost Invariant states

Define P_π :



Characterisation of Almost Invariant states


Theorem

A state ρ is almost invariant under t -fold Haar if and only if $\rho \approx_s \sum_{\pi} \alpha_{\pi} P_{\pi}$ for some $\pi \in S_t$.

Construction

Do we have a PRI from OWF?

Implementation



Security of the Construction

Theorem

Assuming the existence of post-quantum one-way functions, the given construction is Q -secure for $Q \in \{Q_{PRFS}, Q_{PRSS}, Q_{Haar}\}$.

Theorem (Conjecture)

Assuming the existence of post-quantum one-way functions, the given construction is Q -secure for $Q = \mathcal{D}(H)$.

Security of the Construction

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Theorem (MPSY'24 (subsequent work))

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
Applications

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Length Extension

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Security against Haar-queries

 $\mathcal{Q}_{\text{Haar}}$ -security:

Length Extension Theorem: Formal Statement


- Assuming the existence a $\mathcal{Q}_{\text{Haar}}$ -secure $(n, n + m)$ -pseudorandom isometry, then given an n -qubit PRSG, there exists an $n + m$ -qubit PRSG.
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Other Applications of PRI

- Quantum Message Authentication Codes (MACs).
- Multi-copy secure encryption schemes.
- Succinct quantum commitments.


Quantum Message Authentication Code (MAC)

Classical setting



Quantum Message Authentication Code (MAC)

Ideal setting



Quantum Message Authentication Code (MAC)

Setting 1

Challenger

Adversary

$$k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$$

$$|\psi_1\rangle, \dots, |\psi_t\rangle$$

$$\text{sign}(k, |\psi_1\rangle), \dots, \text{sign}(k, |\psi_t\rangle)$$

$$|\psi^*\rangle^{\otimes t}, |\phi^*\rangle^{\otimes t}$$

$$\text{SWAP}(|\psi^*\rangle, \text{ver}(k, |\phi^*\rangle))$$

t -times

Quantum Message Authentication Code (MAC)

Setting 2

Challenger

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Multi-Copy Secure Encryption and Succinct Quantum Commitments

Multi-Copy Secure Encryption

- The security should hold even if the adversary receives polynomially many copies of the ciphertext state.
- Q_{single} -PRI provides the necessary security for both public-key and private-key encryption schemes. We use techniques similar to those of [LQS + 23].

Succinct Quantum Commitments

- Achieved using pseudorandom isometries.
- Based on PRI implies one-time secure symmetric encryption schemes. We use techniques similar to those of [GJMZ23].

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Thank You