

Two-Round Maliciously-Secure Oblivious Transfer with Optimal Rate


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Nico Döttling *Helmholtz Center for Information Security (CISPA)*

Akshayaram Srinivasan *University of Toronto*



Oblivious Transfer




Oblivious Transfer



Receiver security: b is hidden from the sender

Sender security: m_{1-b} hidden from the receiver

Oblivious Transfer



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Main Application: OT is complete for 2PC/MPC

How much interaction needed for OT?

Rounds

≥ 2

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
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(#bits exchanged)**

≥ 2 bits per OT

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
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Previous works: [GH19, BDGM19, BB^BDP22, B^BDS23]

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Malicious Security?

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
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
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** In two rounds


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
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


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If communication is ≈ 3 then it's **optimal rate**

Malicious OT schemes with Optimal Rate

Malicious OT with **optimal rate** in **two rounds**?

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- **LWE** via spooky FHE [DHRW16]
- **QR/DCR with long CRS** via PCGs [OSY21]
- **LPN and Random Oracle** via silent OT extensions [BCG+19]

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Malicious two-round OT with **optimal rate** with a **short CRS**?

Our Results

Our Result: Two-round batch-OT scheme:

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- **UC-secure against malicious adversaries under QR+LPN.**
- **Short and reusable CRS**
- **Optimal rate:** Total communication of $3k + o(k) \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$ for a batch k

Blueprint of our Construction

OT from TDH “a la PVW”

Sender’s message:
optimal size

Receiver’s message:
large

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Hybrid Encryption
[BBDP22, BDS23]

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Perfect correctness

OT from TDH for linear functions

CRS: $hk, t \leftarrow \{0,1\}^L$

Sender (μ_0, μ_1) :

Receiver (b) :

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
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
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
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
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- **Correct:** For w_b , the shift $\langle \mathbf{t}, \mathbf{r} \rangle$ cancels out.
- **Secure:** For w_{1-b} , the shift $\langle \mathbf{t}, \mathbf{r} \rangle$ hides μ_{1-b} (by LHL).

OT from TDH for linear functions


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
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
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Problem!

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
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
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
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- Receiver's rate will be a problem!

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
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- Receiver's rate will be a problem!
- **Solution:** Make L independent of m .

Learning Parity with Noise

$$\left(\boxed{\mathbf{T}}, \boxed{\mathbf{r}} \boxed{\mathbf{T}} + \boxed{\mathbf{e}} \right)$$

\approx_c

$$\left(\boxed{\mathbf{T}}, \boxed{\mathbf{u}} \right)$$

$\mathbf{T} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n \times m}$, $\mathbf{r} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$, $\mathbf{u} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^m$ and $\mathbf{e} \leftarrow \text{Ber}(p)^m$

Learning Parity with Noise

$$\left(\mathbf{T}, \mathbf{r} \mathbf{T} + \mathbf{e} \right)$$

Expanding

$$\left(\mathbf{T}, \mathbf{u} \right) \approx_c$$


$$\mathbf{T} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n \times m}, \mathbf{r} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n, \mathbf{u} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^m \text{ and } \mathbf{e} \leftarrow \text{Ber}(p)^m$$

OT from TDH for linear functions

CRS: $hk, \mathbf{t} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^L$

Sender (μ_0, μ_1) :

- $\mathbf{r} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^L$
 - $h \leftarrow H(hk, \mathbf{r})$
 - $w_0 = \text{Enc}(ek, \mathbf{r}) \oplus e_0 \oplus \mu_0$
 - $w_1 = \text{Enc}(ek, \mathbf{r}) \oplus \langle \mathbf{t}, \mathbf{r} \rangle \oplus e_1 \oplus \mu_1$
- $e_0, e_1 \leftarrow \text{Ber}(p)$



Receiver (b):

- ek encodes $b \cdot \mathbf{t}$

OT from TDH for linear functions


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Receiver (b) :

- ek encodes $b \cdot \mathbf{t}$



Sender security: via

LPN

Since $\left(\mathbf{t}_i, \langle \mathbf{t}_i, \mathbf{r} \rangle \oplus e_{i,1-b_i} \right) \approx_c \left(\mathbf{t}_i, \mathbf{u}_i \right)$

OT from TDH for linear functions


CRS: $hk, \mathbf{t}_1, \dots, \mathbf{t}_m \leftarrow \{0,1\}^L$

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Receiver (b_1, \dots, b_m) :

- ek_1 encodes $b_1 \cdot \mathbf{t}_1$
- \vdots
- ek_m encodes $b_m \cdot \mathbf{t}_m$



Sender security: via

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Since $\left(\mathbf{t}_i, \langle \mathbf{t}_i, \mathbf{r} \rangle \oplus e_{i,1-b_i} \right) \approx_c \left(\mathbf{t}_i, \mathbf{u}_i \right)$

OT from TDH for linear functions

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Leak on \mathbf{r}

- $w_{1,0} = \text{Enc}(ek_1, \mathbf{r}) \oplus e_{1,0} \oplus \mu_{1,0}$

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- $w_{m,0} = \text{Enc}(ek_m, \mathbf{r}) \oplus e_{m,0} \oplus \mu_{m,0}$


- $w_{m,1} = \text{Enc}(ek_m, \mathbf{r}) \oplus \langle \mathbf{t}_m, \mathbf{r} \rangle \oplus e_{m,1} \oplus \mu_{m,1}$

Receiver (b_1, \dots, b_m) :

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- \vdots

- ek_m encodes $b_m \cdot \mathbf{t}_m$



Sender security: via

LPN

Since $\left(\mathbf{t}_i, \langle \mathbf{t}_i, \mathbf{r} \rangle \oplus e_{i,1-b_i} \right) \approx_c \left(\mathbf{t}_i, \mathbf{u}_i \right)$

OT from TDH for linear functions

CRS: $hk, \mathbf{t}_1, \dots, \mathbf{t}_m \leftarrow \{0,1\}^L$

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- \vdots

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
- $w_{m,1} = \text{Enc}(ek_m, \mathbf{r}) \oplus \langle \mathbf{t}_m, \mathbf{r} \rangle \oplus e_{m,1} \oplus \mu_{m,1}$

Receiver (b_1, \dots, b_m) :

- ek_1 encodes $b_1 \cdot \mathbf{t}_1$

- \vdots

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Sender security: via (entropic?) LPN

Since $\left(\mathbf{t}_i, \langle \mathbf{t}_i, \mathbf{r} \rangle \oplus e_{i,1-b_i} \right) \approx_c \left(\mathbf{t}_i, \mathbf{u}_i \right)$

OT from TDH for linear functions

CRS: $hk, \mathbf{t}_1, \dots, \mathbf{t}_m \leftarrow \{0,1\}^L$

Sender (μ_0, μ_1) :

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Leak on \mathbf{r}

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- \vdots

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
- $w_{m,1} = \text{Enc}(ek_m, \mathbf{r}) \oplus \langle \mathbf{t}_m, \mathbf{r} \rangle \oplus e_{m,1} \oplus \mu_{m,1}$

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Sender security: via

LPN


Since $\left(\mathbf{t}_i, \langle \mathbf{t}_i, \mathbf{r} \rangle \oplus e_{i,1-b_i} \right) \approx_c \left(\mathbf{t}_i, \mathbf{u}_i \right)$

OT from TDH for linear functions

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Receiver (b_1, \dots, b_m) :

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OT from TDH for linear functions


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Faulty correctness

OT from TDH for linear functions


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
2PC

OT from TDH for linear functions

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2PC

Communication overhead:


\sim (Hamming weight of error)

OT from TDH for linear functions

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2PC

Communication overhead:

\sim (Hamming weight of error)

↑
Set as m^ϵ

Malicious security against senders

Malicious security:

- Almost for free \longrightarrow Perfect correctness of TDH

Malicious security against senders

Malicious security:

- Almost for free \longrightarrow Perfect correctness of TDH

- h of \mathbf{r} are well-formed.



2PC

Communication overhead:

$$\sim |\mathbf{r}|$$



Set as m^ϵ

Recap

- **This talk:** two-round maliciously-sender secure OT with optimal download rate from QR + LPN.

Recap

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- ↓
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- **Main insight:** how to use TDH with LPN for improved communication and security.

Recap

- **This talk:** two-round maliciously-sender secure OT with optimal download rate from QR + LPN.



- **Main Result:** two-round maliciously-secure OT with optimal rate from QR + LPN.
- **Main insight:** how to use TDH with LPN for improved communication and security.

Thanks!

Two-Round Maliciously-Secure Oblivious Transfer with Optimal Rate

Pedro Branco *Max-Planck Institute for Security and Privacy*

Nico Döttling *Helmholtz Center for Information Security (CISPA)*

Akshayaram Srinivasan *University of Toronto*

