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## Introduction of LWE Estimator



BKZ-only Mode
Two-step Mode

## Introduction of LWE Estimators



## Introduction of LWE Estimators

## Comparison among different LWE Estimators

| Estimator | Mode | Reduction <br> Process | Search <br> Process | Terminal Condition | Cost |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BDD Estimator | Two-step | BKZ | Enumeration | Success Probability of last <br> Enumeration | $\frac{T_{\text {redu }}+T_{\text {Enum }}}{p_{\text {succ }}}$ |
| core-SVP | BKZ-only | BKZ | $/$ | Minimize $\beta$ by GSA and <br> expected target norm | $T_{\text {sieve }}(\beta)$ |
| lattice-estimator | Two-step | BKZ | Sieve | Minimize $\beta$ and $d_{\text {svp }}$ by GSA <br> and expected target norm | $T_{\text {BKZ }}(\beta)+T_{\text {sieve }}\left(d_{\text {svp }}\right)$ |
| (Improved <br> leaky-LWE-Estimator | BKZ-only | BKZ | $/$ | Estimate $\bar{\beta}$ by distribution <br> of target norm | $T_{B K Z}(\bar{\beta})$ |
| Our work(Refined) | Two-step | PnjBKZ <br> with jump>1 | Sieve | Minimize $d_{\text {svp }}$ by <br> distribution of target norm | $\frac{T_{P n j B K Z}(\beta, J)+T_{\text {sieve }}\left(d_{\text {svp }}\right)}{}$ |
| Our work(Lower <br> Bound) | Two-step | BKZ | Sieve | Estimate $d_{\text {svp }}$ by GSA and <br> expected target norm | $T_{\text {sieve }}\left(d_{\text {svp }}\right)$ |



## Our Contribution

1. Prove in theory that the Two-step mode is faster in solving uSVP than the BKZ-only mode under Geometric Series Assumption.
2. Construct a Refined LWE Hardness Estimator in Two-step mode. Give Experiments:
(1) Accuracy verification of Success Probability used in Refined LWE Hardness Estimator;
(2) Verification Experiments for Efficiency of Two-step Mode by Refined LWE Hardness

Estimator.
3. Give a Lower Bound Estimation for LWE in Two-step mode.
4. Re-evaluate the security bit of NIST PQC schemes both by the Refined LWE Hardness Estimator and Lower Bound Estimation .


## Efficiency of Two-step Mode

Heuristic 1 (Gaussian Heuristic) The expected first minimum of a lattice $\mathcal{L}$ (denoted as $\lambda_{1}(\mathcal{L}(\boldsymbol{B}))$ ) according to the Gaussian Heuristic denoted by $G H(\mathcal{L})$ is given by $\lambda_{1}(\mathcal{L}(\boldsymbol{B})) \approx G H(\mathcal{L})=\frac{\left(\Gamma\left(\frac{d}{2}+1\right) \cdot \operatorname{Vol}(\mathcal{L})\right)^{\frac{1}{d}}}{\sqrt{\pi}} \approx \sqrt{\frac{d}{2 \pi e}} \cdot \operatorname{Vol}(\mathcal{L})^{\frac{1}{d}}$. We also write $G H(\boldsymbol{B})=G H(\mathcal{L}(\boldsymbol{B}))$ and $G H\left(\operatorname{rr}_{[i: j]}\right)=G H\left(\boldsymbol{B}_{\pi[i: j]}\right)$.

Heuristic 2 (Geometric Series Assumption (GSA)) Let B be a lattice basis after lattice reduction, then Geometric Series Assumption states that $\left\|\boldsymbol{b}_{i}^{*}\right\| \approx \alpha \cdot\left\|\boldsymbol{b}_{i-1}^{*}\right\|, 0<\alpha<1$. Combine the GSA with root-Hermite factor and $\operatorname{Vol}(L(B))=\prod_{i=0}^{d-1}\left\|\boldsymbol{b}_{i}^{*}\right\|$, it infers that $\alpha=\delta^{-\frac{2 d}{d-1}} \approx \delta^{-2}$.

## Heuristic 4 in [7]

Let $\boldsymbol{B}$ be a lattice basis after reduction of several PnjBKZ- $\left(\beta_{i}, J_{i}\right)$ tours, $J_{i} \leq \frac{\mathrm{d} 4 \mathrm{f}\left(\beta_{i}\right)}{2}$. If $\boldsymbol{B}$ has same quality with a BKZ- $\beta$ reduced basis, then the basis cannot be further improved by a PnjBKZ-( $\beta, J$ ) tour for any $J \geq 1$.

## Efficiency of Two-step Mode

| B <br> $\downarrow$ | B <br> $\downarrow$ | Theorem 1. Assume Gaussian Heuristic (Heuristic 1), |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |



## Our Refined LWE Estimator in Two-step Mode



1. How to estimate the success probability of finding the target vector ?
2. How to estimate the time cost and memory cost?
3. Propose the success probability computation model combining BKZ and Sieve.
4. Compute the expected time cost and memory cost through success probability.

## Our Refined LWE Estimator in Two-step Mode

■ W: The event of solving LWE successfully during running Progressive BKZ or the final highdimension progressive sieve of Two-step mode.

■ $\mathrm{W}_{\beta}^{(1)}$ : The event of solving LWE by BKZ- $\beta$ successfully, $\mathrm{F}_{\beta}^{(1)}=\neg \mathrm{W}_{\beta}^{(1)}$.
■ $\mathrm{E}_{\beta_{i}}^{(1)}$ : The event of solving LWE successfully during the process of running Progressive BKZ: from BKZ- $\beta_{1}$ to BKZ- $\beta_{i}$.
$\square \mathrm{W}_{d_{\mathrm{svp}}}^{(2)}$ : The event of solving LWE by $d_{\text {svp }}$-dimensional progressive sieve successfully, $\mathrm{F}_{d_{\mathrm{svp}}}^{(2)}=\neg \mathrm{W}_{d_{\mathrm{svp}}}^{(2)}$.
$\square \mathrm{E}_{d_{\text {svp }}}^{(2)}$ : The event of finding the projection of the target vector exactly after a $d_{\text {svp }}$-dimensional sieve during progressive sieving .

## Our Refined LWE Estimator in Two-step Mode

Heuristic 3. The lattice basis is randomized each time by a reduction of $B K Z-\beta$ with larger $\beta$. Then, events $W_{\beta_{i}}^{(1)}$ and $F_{\beta_{j}}^{(1)}$ are independent for $i \neq j$.

## Success event of each BKZ is independently.

Based on Heuristic 3, $\operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{E}_{\beta_{k}}^{(1)}\right]=\sum_{i=1}^{\mathrm{k}} \operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{W}_{\beta_{i}}^{(1)} \wedge \wedge_{i>1, j=1}^{i-1} \mathrm{~F}_{\beta_{j}}^{(1)}\right]=\operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{E}_{\beta_{k-1}}^{(1)}\right]+\operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{W}_{\beta_{k}}^{(1)}\right] \cdot\left(1-\operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{E}_{\beta_{k-1}}^{(1)}\right]\right)$. (2)
Heuristic 4. For $i \in\left\{2, \ldots, d_{\text {svp }}\right\}, \mathrm{W}_{i}^{(2)} \supseteq \mathrm{W}_{i-1}^{(2)} \supseteq \mathrm{W}_{i-2}^{(2)} \supseteq \cdots \supseteq \mathrm{W}_{2}^{(2)}$. Then $\mathrm{E}_{i}^{(2)}=\mathrm{W}_{i}^{(2)}-\mathrm{W}_{i-1}^{(2)}$. Let $\operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{W}_{d_{\text {start }}-1}^{(2)}\right]=0$. Based on Heuristic 4, $\operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{E}_{d_{\mathrm{svp}}}^{(2)}\right]=\operatorname{Pr}\left[W_{d_{\mathrm{svp}}}^{(2)}\right]-\operatorname{Pr}\left[W_{d_{\mathrm{svp}}-1}^{(2)}\right]$.

Success event of each sieve in a Progressive sieve is dependently.

The cumulative probability of solving LWE in our refined LWE estimator in Two-step mode:

$$
\begin{align*}
& \operatorname{Pr}[\mathrm{W}]=\operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{W}_{\beta_{1}}^{(1)}\right]+\operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{W}_{\beta_{2}}^{(1)} \wedge \mathrm{F}_{\beta_{1}}^{(1)}\right]+\operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{W}_{\beta_{2}}^{(1)} \wedge \mathrm{F}_{\beta_{2}}^{(1)} \wedge \mathrm{F}_{\beta_{1}}^{(1)}\right]+\cdots+\operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{W}_{\beta_{2}}^{(1)} \wedge \wedge_{j=1}^{\text {end }-1} \mathrm{~F}_{\beta_{j}}^{(1)}\right]+\operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{W}_{d_{\text {svp }}}^{(2)} \wedge \wedge_{j=1}^{\text {end }} \mathrm{F}_{\beta_{j}}^{(1)}\right] \\
& =\left(\sum_{i=1}^{\mathrm{end}} \operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{~W}_{\beta_{i}}^{(1)} \wedge \wedge_{i>1, j=1}^{i-1} \mathrm{~F}_{\beta_{j}}^{(1)}\right]\right)+\operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{W}_{d_{\mathrm{svp}}}^{(2)} \wedge \wedge_{j=1}^{\mathrm{end}} \mathrm{~F}_{\beta_{j}}^{(1)}\right] \\
& =\operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{E}_{\beta_{\text {end }}}^{(1)}\right]+\left(1-\operatorname{Pr}\left[E_{\beta_{\text {end }}^{(1)}}^{(1)}\right]\right) \cdot \sum_{i=d_{\text {start }}}^{d_{\text {svp }}} \operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{E}_{i}^{(2)}\right] \\
& =\operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{E}_{\beta_{\text {end }}}^{(1)}\right]+\left(1-\operatorname{Pr}\left[E_{\beta_{\text {end }}}^{(1)}\right]\right) \cdot \operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{W}_{d_{\text {svp }}}^{(2)}\right] . \tag{4}
\end{align*}
$$

## Our Refined LWE Estimator in Two-step Mode


(a) $n=40, \alpha=0.005, q=1601$

(c) $n=60, \alpha=0.005, q=3607$

(b) $n=40, \alpha=0.015, q=1601$

(d) $n=45, \alpha=0.010, q=2027$

Success Probability Verification Experiments

The cumulative probability of solving LWE in our refined LWE estimator in Two-step mode:

$$
\begin{align*}
& \operatorname{Pr}[\mathrm{W}]=\operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{W}_{\beta_{1}}^{(1)}\right]+\operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{W}_{\beta_{2}}^{(1)} \wedge \mathrm{F}_{\beta_{1}}^{(1)}\right]+\operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{W}_{\beta_{2}}^{(1)} \wedge \mathrm{F}_{\beta_{2}}^{(1)} \wedge \mathrm{F}_{\beta_{1}}^{(1)}\right]+\cdots \\
& +\operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{W}_{\beta_{2}}^{(1)} \wedge \Lambda_{j=1}^{\mathrm{end}-1} \mathrm{~F}_{\beta_{j}}^{(1)}\right]+\operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{W}_{d_{\text {svp }}}^{(2)} \wedge \Lambda_{j=1}^{\mathrm{end}} \mathrm{~F}_{\beta_{j}}^{(1)}\right] \\
& =\left(\sum_{i=1}^{\mathrm{end}} \operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{~W}_{\beta_{i}}^{(1)} \wedge \bigwedge_{i>1, j=1}^{i-1} \mathrm{~F}_{\beta_{j}}^{(1)}\right]\right)+\operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{W}_{d_{\text {svp }}}^{(2)} \wedge \bigwedge_{j=1}^{\mathrm{end}} \mathrm{~F}_{\beta_{j}}^{(1)}\right]  \tag{1}\\
& =\operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{E}_{\beta_{\mathrm{end}}}^{(1)}\right]+\left(1-\operatorname{Pr}\left[E_{\beta_{\mathrm{end}}}^{(1)}\right]\right) \cdot \sum_{i=d_{\text {start }}}^{d_{\text {svp }}} \operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{E}_{i}^{(2)}\right] \\
& =\operatorname{Pr}\left[\underset{\Downarrow}{\mathrm{E}_{\text {end }}^{(1)}}\right]+\left(1-\operatorname{Pr}\left[E_{\beta_{\text {end }}}^{(1)}\right]\right) \cdot \operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{W}_{d_{\text {svp }}}^{(2)}\right] . \tag{4}
\end{align*}
$$

- The predication of the success rate of solving LWE given by Eq. $(4)$ is consistent with the experimental results.


## Our Refined LWE Estimator in Two-step Mode

gate $(\beta)$ : The gate count of a sieve algorithm with dimension $\beta$.
pgate $(\beta)=C \cdot \operatorname{gate}(\beta)$ : The gate count of a progressive sieve algorithm with dimension $\beta$.
$\operatorname{pbgate}(\beta)=(d-\beta+1) \cdot \operatorname{pgate}(\beta)$ : The gate count of BKZ- $\beta$.
pbgate $(\beta, J)=\frac{d-\beta+1}{J} \cdot \operatorname{pgate}(\beta)$ : The gate count of $\operatorname{PnjBKZ}-(\beta, J)$.
Gate Count of reduction step: $G_{1}=\sum_{i=1}^{\text {end }} \operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{W}_{\beta_{i}}^{(1)}\right] \cdot\left(1-\operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{E}_{\beta_{i-1}}^{(1)}\right]\right) \cdot\left[\sum_{j=0}^{i} \operatorname{pbgate}\left(\beta_{j}-\mathrm{d} 4 \mathrm{f}\left(\beta_{j}\right)\right)\right]$
Gate Count of search step: $G_{2}=\sum_{i=d_{\text {start }}}^{d_{\text {svp }}} \operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{E}_{i}^{(2)}\right] \cdot\left(1-\operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{E}_{\beta_{\text {end }}}^{(1)}\right]\right) \cdot\left[\left(\sum_{j=0}^{\mathrm{end}} \operatorname{pbgate}\left(\beta_{j}-\mathrm{d} 4 \mathrm{f}\left(\beta_{j}\right)\right)\right)+\operatorname{pgate}(i-\mathrm{d} 4 \mathrm{f}(i))\right]$
Total Gate Count: $G=G_{1}+G_{2}$
Memory Count of reduction step: $B_{1}=\sum_{i=1}^{\mathrm{end}} \operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{W}_{\beta_{i}}^{(1)}\right] \cdot\left(1-\operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{E}_{\beta_{i-1}}^{(1)}\right]\right) \cdot \operatorname{bit}\left(\beta_{j}-\mathrm{d} 4 \mathrm{f}\left(\beta_{j}\right)\right)$
Memory Count of search step: $B_{2}=\sum_{i=d_{\text {start }}}^{d_{\text {svp }}} \operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{E}_{i}^{(2)}\right] \cdot\left(1-\operatorname{Pr}\left[\mathrm{E}_{\beta_{\text {end }}}^{(1)}\right]\right) \cdot \max \left\{\operatorname{bit}\left(\beta_{j}-\mathrm{d} 4 \mathrm{f}\left(\beta_{j}\right)\right), \operatorname{bit}(i-\mathrm{d} 4 \mathrm{f}(i))\right\}$
Total Memory Count: $B=B_{1}+B_{2}$

## Our Refined LWE Estimator in Two-step Mode


(a) Kyber512

(c) Dilithium-II

(b) Kyber1024

(d) Dilithium-V
input : $n, m, q, \chi, \mathrm{~S}$;
output: $\mathrm{GB}_{\text {min }}$;

## Function TwoStepLWEEsimator $(n, m, q, \chi, \mathrm{~S})$ :

$\mathrm{GB}_{\min } \leftarrow(+\infty,+\infty) ; \mathrm{GB} \leftarrow(0,0) ; \mathrm{GB}_{\text {pre }} \leftarrow(0,0) ; p_{\text {tot }} \leftarrow 0 ;$
$\mathrm{rr} \leftarrow$ expected length of GS-basis of an LLL reduced LWE $_{n, m, q, \chi}$ instance for $\beta \in \mathrm{S}$ or $(\beta, J) \in \mathrm{S}$ do
$\mathrm{rr} \leftarrow \operatorname{BKZSim}(\mathrm{rr}, \beta) ; / / \operatorname{PnjBKZSim}(\mathrm{rr}, \beta, J)$ if $J>1$;
$P(\beta) \leftarrow \operatorname{Pr}\left[x \leftarrow \chi_{\beta}^{2} \mid x \leq(\operatorname{rr}[d-\beta])^{2}\right] ;$
$\mathrm{GB}_{\text {cum }} \leftarrow\left(\sum_{b=\beta_{0}}^{\beta} \operatorname{pbgate}(b-\mathrm{d} 4 \mathrm{f}(b)), \operatorname{bit}(\beta-\mathrm{d} 4 \mathrm{f}(\beta))\right)$;
$\mathrm{GB}_{\text {pre }} \leftarrow \mathrm{GB}_{\text {pre }}+\mathrm{GB}_{\text {cum }} \cdot\left(1-p_{\text {tot }}\right) \cdot P(\beta)$;
$p_{\text {tot }} \leftarrow p_{\text {tot }}+\left(1-p_{\text {tot }}\right) \cdot P(\beta) ; \mathrm{GB}_{\text {csieve }} \leftarrow(0,0) ; P\left(d_{\text {start }}-1\right) \leftarrow 0 ;$
for $d_{\text {svp }} \leftarrow d_{\text {start }}$ to $d$ do
$P\left(d_{\mathrm{svp}}\right) \leftarrow \operatorname{Pr}\left[x \leftarrow \chi_{d_{\mathrm{svp}}}^{2} \mid x \leq\left(\mathrm{GH}\left(\mathrm{rr}_{\left[d-d_{\mathrm{svp}}: d\right]}\right)\right)^{2}\right] ;$
$\mathrm{GB}_{\text {cum }}[0] \leftarrow \mathrm{GB}_{\text {cum }}[0]+\operatorname{pgate}\left(d_{\text {svp }}-\mathrm{d} 4 \mathrm{f}\left(d_{\text {svp }}\right)\right) ;$
$\mathrm{GB}_{\text {cum }}[1] \leftarrow \max \left\{\mathrm{GB}_{\text {cum }}[1]\right.$, $\left.\operatorname{bit}\left(d_{\text {svp }}-\operatorname{d4f}\left(d_{\text {svp }}\right)\right)\right\}$;
$\mathrm{GB}_{\text {csieve }} \leftarrow \mathrm{GB}_{\text {csieve }}+\mathrm{GB}_{\mathrm{cum}} \cdot\left(1-p_{\mathrm{tot}}\right) \cdot\left(P\left(d_{\mathrm{svp}}\right)-P\left(d_{\mathrm{svp}}-1\right)\right)$;
if $p_{\text {tot }}+\left(1-p_{\text {tot }}\right) \cdot P\left(d_{\mathrm{svp}}\right) \geq 0.999$ then
break;
$\mathrm{GB} \leftarrow \mathrm{GB}_{\text {pre }}+\mathrm{GB}_{\text {csieve }} ;$
if $\mathrm{GB}[0]<\mathrm{GB}_{\min }[0]$ then
$\mathrm{GB}_{\text {min }} \leftarrow \mathrm{GB}$;
return $\mathrm{GB}_{\text {min }}$;
Algorithm 2: Two-step LWE Estimator


## Improved Conservative Estimation for LWE

## Notation

$V$ : Lattice Volume.
$\delta(\beta)$ : The root Hermite factor of a BKZ- $\beta$ reduced lattice basis.
$\operatorname{rhf}(\delta, \beta)$ : A new root Hermite factor of lattice basis after one BKZ- $\beta$ tour under GSA.
$\operatorname{md}(\delta, M)$ : Minimum dimension for sieving to find the target vector with norm $M$.

## Heuristic 5

BKZ is the optimal algorithm for lattice reduction, i.e. generating a lattice basis satisfying GSA.

## Heuristic 6

The best way of solving $u S V P_{\gamma}$ or LWE is by performing lattice sieving on a projected sublattice of a reduced lattice basis satisfying GSA.

## Improved Conservative Estimation for LWE

How to compute $\operatorname{rhf}(\delta, \beta)$ ?
basis quality $\delta$ lattice Volume $V$

$$
\begin{gathered}
\text { GS-lengths under GSA } \\
\left(\delta^{d} V^{\frac{1}{d}}, \alpha \delta^{d} V^{\frac{1}{d}}, \ldots, \alpha^{d-1} \delta^{d} V^{\frac{1}{d}}\right) \\
\alpha=\delta^{-\frac{d-1}{2 d}}
\end{gathered}
$$

1. Compute $\left\|\boldsymbol{b}_{0}\right\|$ after a

$$
\begin{aligned}
\operatorname{rhf}(\delta, \beta) & \approx\left(\sqrt{\frac{\beta}{2 \pi e} \cdot \delta^{\frac{d(d-\beta)}{d-1}}}\right)^{\frac{1}{d}} \\
& =\delta^{\frac{d-\beta}{d-1}} \cdot\left(\frac{\beta}{2 \pi e}\right)^{\frac{1}{2 d}}
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\delta \leq \delta(\beta)
$$

(Lattice basis cannot be further reduced by BKZ- $\beta$ )

$$
\delta>\delta(\beta)
$$

(Lattice basis could be further reduced by BKZ- $\beta$ )

BKZ- $\beta$ by $\mathrm{GH}\left(\mathcal{L}_{\pi[0 ; \beta]}\right)$
2. Expand the remain GSlengths by GSA.



$$
\operatorname{rhf}(\delta, \beta)=\delta
$$

new RHF

## Improved Conservative Estimation for LWE

```
input : \(M, V \leftarrow \operatorname{Vol}(\mathcal{L})\);
output: \(T\);
Function LowerBoundEst \((M, V \leftarrow \operatorname{Vol}(\mathcal{L}))\) :
    for \(\beta \leftarrow \beta_{0}\) to \(d\) do
        con \(\leftarrow\) true;
        \(d_{\mathrm{svp}} \leftarrow \operatorname{md}(\delta(\beta), M)\);
        for \(\beta^{\prime} \leftarrow \beta+1\) to \(d\) do
            \(\delta^{\prime} \leftarrow \operatorname{rhf}\left(\delta(\beta), \beta^{\prime}\right) ;\)
            if \(T_{\text {sieve }}\left(d_{\text {svp }}\right)>T_{\mathrm{BKZ}}\left(\beta^{\prime}\right)+T_{\text {sieve }}\left(\operatorname{md}\left(\delta^{\prime}, M\right)\right)\) then
                con \(\leftarrow\) false; break;
        if con then
            \(\beta_{\text {optimal }} \leftarrow \beta\);
            return \(\beta_{\text {optimal }}, d_{\text {svp }}, T_{\text {sieve }}\left(d_{\text {svp }}\right)\);
```

Algorithm 4: Lower Bound Estimation

Find a $\beta$ and $d_{\text {svp }}=\operatorname{md}(\delta(\beta), M)$ such that
$T_{\text {sieve }}\left(d_{\text {svp }}\right) \leq T_{\mathrm{BKZ}}\left(\beta^{\prime}\right)+T_{\text {sieve }}\left(\operatorname{md}\left(\delta^{\prime}, M\right)\right)$
holds for all $\beta^{\prime} \geq \beta+1$, where $\delta^{\prime}=\operatorname{rhf}\left(\delta(\beta), \beta^{\prime}\right)$.
Then, output $T_{\text {sieve }}\left(d_{\text {svp }}\right)$ as the Lower Bound Estimation of LWE(or uSVP).

Find a $\beta$ and $d_{\text {svp }}$ such that one more BKZ- $\beta^{\prime}$ before last sieve cannot shorten the total cost for solving LWE( or uSVP).

Theorem 2. Assume that Gaussian Heuristic (Heuristic 1), GSA(Heuristic 2), Heuristic 5, 6, and Heuristic 4 in [7] hold, then the estimated cost of our lower bound estimation is strictly lower than the actual cost for solving $u S V P_{\gamma}$ in almost all lattices.

## Improved Conservative Estimation for LWE

input : $m_{\text {max }}, n, \sigma, q$;
output: $\beta_{\text {optimal }}, d_{\text {svp }}, T_{\text {sieve }}\left(d_{\text {svp }}\right)$;
Function LowerBoundEstWithOptimalM $\left(m_{\max }, n, \sigma, q\right)$ : $d_{\mathrm{svp}}^{*} \leftarrow m_{\max }+n+1 ; m_{\text {optimal }} \leftarrow m_{\max } ; \beta_{\text {optimal }} \leftarrow m_{\max }+n+1 ;$ for $m \leftarrow m_{\text {max }}$ to 1 do
$d \leftarrow n+m+1 ; M \leftarrow \sigma \cdot \sqrt{d} ; V \leftarrow q^{m} ;$
$\beta_{\text {current }}, d_{\text {svp }}, T_{\text {sieve }}\left(d_{\text {svp }}\right) \leftarrow$ LowerBoundEst $(M, V)$;
if $d_{\mathrm{svp}}^{*}>d_{\mathrm{svp}}$ then
$d_{\mathrm{svp}}^{*} \leftarrow d_{\mathrm{svp}} ; m_{\text {optimal }} \leftarrow m ; \beta_{\text {optimal }} \leftarrow \beta_{\text {current }} ;$
$d_{\text {optimal }} \leftarrow m_{\text {optimal }}+n+1 ;$
return $d_{\text {optimal }}, \beta_{\text {optimal }}, d_{\text {svp }}^{*}, T_{\text {sieve }}\left(d_{\text {svp }}^{*}\right)$;
Algorithm 5: Lower Bound Estimation with Optimal $m$

- Numerically optimize the number of LWE samples $m$ to minimize the lowerbound security estimation by Alg. 5.



## Estimated Results

| NIST standards | $\log _{2} \mathrm{G} / \log _{2}$ (gates) ${ }^{*}$ |  |  | $\log _{2} \mathrm{~B} / \log _{2}$ (bits) |  |  | $\Delta \log _{2} \mathrm{G}$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Previous | Our Refined LWE Estimator |  | Previous | Our Refined LWE Estimator |  |  |  |
|  |  | $\mathrm{S}_{0}$ | $\mathrm{S}_{\text {op }}$ |  | $\mathrm{S}_{0}$ | $\mathrm{S}_{\text {op }}$ | $\mathrm{S}_{0}$ | $\mathrm{S}_{\mathrm{op}}$ |
| Kyber512 | 146.0 | 142.6 | 141.4 | 94.0 | 99.1 | 98.1 | 3.4 | 4.6 |
| Kyber768 | 208.9 | 205.5 | 204.4 | 138.7 | 144 | 143.2 | 3.4 | 4.5 |
| Kyber1024 | 281.1 | 277.7 | 276.9 | 189.78 | 195.4 | 194.6 | 3.3 | 4.2 |
| Dilithium-II | 152.9 | 150.8 | 150.6 | 98.0 | 104.3 | 104.4 | 2.1 | 2.3 |
| Dilithium-III | 210.2 | 207.9 | 207.9 | 138.8 | 145.3 | 145.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 |
| Dilithium-V | 279.2 | 277.0 | 277.0 | 187.5 | 194.1 | 194.1 | 2.2 | 2.2 |

## Estimation of NIST standards by Our Refined LWE Estimator

## Estimated Results

| NIST standards | Kyber512 | Kyber768 | Kyber1024 | Dilithiumll | DilithiumIII | DilithiumV |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Lattice Dim $d$ | 1003 | 1424 | 1885 | 2049 | 2561 | 3582 |
| BKZ $\beta$ | 406 | 625 | 877 | 423 | 624 | 863 |
| CoreSVP | 118 | 182 | 256 | 123 | 182 | 252 |
| Lattice Dim $d$ | 1025 | 1477 | 1954 | 2039 | 2672 | 3461 |
| $\beta_{\text {optimal }}$ | 392 | 608 | 857 | 415 | 614 | 853 |
| $d_{\text {svp }}$ | 423 | 641 | 891 | 449 | 649 | 889 |
| LBE | 123.52 | 187.17 | 260.17 | 131.11 | 189.51 | 259.59 |
| LBE(d4f) | 112.44 | 172.32 | 241.24 | 119.57 | 174.52 | 240.69 |
| $\Delta H a r d n e s s$ | 5.52 | 5.17 | 4.17 | 8.11 | 7.51 | 7.59 |
| $\Delta$ Hardness(d4f) | -5.56 | -9.68 | -14.76 | -3.43 | -7.48 | -11.31 |

Estimation of NIST standards by Our Lower Bound LWE Estimator

- Our lower bound estimation is 4.17~8.11 bits higher than the Core-SVP estimation.
- If considering d4f technique, lower bound estimation will decrease by $3.42 \sim 14.76$ bits, which declares that Core-SVP model is not conservative enough to offset the influence of the d4f technique.

Open Source Code for Verfication Experiments: https://github.com/Summwer/test-for-refined-lwe-estimator

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