# An algorithm for efficient detection of (N, N)-splittings and its application to the isogeny problem in dimension 2

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In this work we look at the problem in dimension 2 and decrease the concrete complexity of the best attack due to Costello–Smith.

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For the purposes of this talk, we only need to keep in mind that there are two types of surfaces: "reducible" and "non-reducible".

In its most general form, the superspecial isogeny problem in two dimensions asks to find an isogeny

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The general isogeny problem can be viewed as finding a path between two nodes in the superspecial isogeny graph.

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 $\mathcal{S}(p)$  is equal to the disjoint union of:

$$\mathcal{E}(p) := \{A \in \mathcal{S}(p) : A \cong E \times E' \text{ with } E, E' \text{ supersingular ECs} \}.$$
$$\mathcal{J}(p) := \mathcal{S}(p) \setminus \mathcal{E}(p)$$
$$= \{A \in \mathcal{S}(p) : A \cong \operatorname{Jac}(C) \}$$



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**Naive Answer:** Compute all (N, N)-isogenies from  $A_i$ , but this is not efficient. Can we make the detection efficient?

# Detecting an (N, N)-splitting

There exist (easily computable) functions  $\alpha(A) = (\alpha_1(A), \alpha_2(A), \alpha_3(A))$ which assigns to A a triple of elements of  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$  which uniquely determine  $A^{\dagger}$ .

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For  $N \leq 11$ , Kumar [Kum15] provides rational functions  $i_1(r, s)$ ,  $i_2(r, s)$ ,  $i_3(r, s) \in \mathbb{F}_p(r, s)$ , such that if there exists a simultaneous solution  $r_0, s_0 \in \overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$  of

$$\begin{cases} i_1(r,s) = \alpha_1(A) \\ i_2(r,s) = \alpha_2(A) \\ i_3(r,s) = \alpha_3(A) \end{cases}$$

and the denominators do not vanish at  $(r_0, s_0)$ , then A is (N, N)-split.

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# Detecting an (N, N)-splitting

Let  $f_k(r,s) = i_k(r,s) - \alpha_k(A)$ .

(1) Computing resultants of (the numerators of)  $f_1(r, s)$ ,  $f_2(r, s)$  and  $f_2(r, s)$ ,  $f_3(r, s)$  (with respect to r) to get res<sub>1</sub>(s), res<sub>2</sub>(s).

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In fact, we obtain a more efficient method by precomputing the resultants generically.























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	Walks in $\Gamma_2(2; p)$			Walks in $\Gamma_2(2; p)$			
	$\Gamma_2(N; p)$	arching in	w. split se	nal searching	out additio	witho	
	This work			[CS20]			
imprv.	muls per	nodes per	set	muls per	nodes per	bits	prime
factor	node	10 <sup>8</sup> muls	$N \in \{\dots\}$	node	10 <sup>8</sup> muls	p	р
16.5	35	2830951	{2,3}	579	172712	50	$2^{11} \cdot 3^{24} - 1$
29.2	54	1858912	{3,4}	1575	63492	150	$2^{27} \cdot 3^{77} - 1$
52.4	56	1771608	{4,6}	2934	34083	250	$2^{181} \cdot 3^{43} - 1$
82.4	60	1667360	{4,6}	4941	20239	500	$2^{113} \cdot 3^{244} - 1$
116.3	65	1548504	{4,6}	7560	13228	800	$2^{107} \cdot 3^{437} - 1$
159.8	71	1403752	{4,6}	11346	8814	1000	$2^{721} \cdot 3^{176} - 1$

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without additional searching w. split searching ir	$\Gamma_2(N;p)$		
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prime bits nodes per muls per set nodes pe	r muls per	imprv.	
$p$ $p$ $10^8$ muls node $N \in \{\dots\}$ $10^8$ muls	node	factor	
$2^{11} \cdot 3^{24} - 1$ 50 172712 579 {2,3} 2830951	35	16.5	
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Any questions?

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