# Towards Practical MK-TFHE:

#### Parallelizable, Quasi-linear and Key-compatible

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# Fully Homomorphic Encryption



- Fully Homomorphic Encryption (HE) supports arbitrary function evaluation on encrypted data.
- Various Applications: privacy preserving machine learning, private information retrieval, private set intersection ...

### FHE for Multiple Parties

	MKHE	( <i>n</i> -out-of- <i>n</i> ) Threshold HE
Key structure	$ar{\mathbf{s}} := (s_1 s_2 \dots s_k)$	$ar{\mathbf{s}} := \sum_{i=1}^k s_i$
Dynamic	Dynamic	Static
Communication	Independent	Interactive
Time/Space Complexity	Dependent to k	Comparable to single-key

Table: Comparison between Multi-Party HE schemes.

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#### **Previous Works**

- Theoretical studies
  - LATV12, CM15, MW16, PS16, BP16, CZW17
  - (Mostly) GSW scheme
  - No implementations
- Practical schemes
  - CCS19<sup>1</sup> : TFHE/FHEW, quadratic complexity
  - CDKS19<sup>2</sup> : CKKS/BFV, quadratic complexity
- Better time complexity
  - KKLSS22<sup>3</sup> : CKKS/BFV, quasi-linear complexity
  - This work : TFHE/FHEW, quasi-linear complexity

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Chen, Chillotti and Song, Asiacrypt '19 <sup>2</sup>Chen, Dai, Kim and Song, CCS '19 <sup>3</sup>Kim, Kwak, Lee, Seo and Song, CCS '23

### TFHE/FHEW scheme description

- FHE scheme that supports bits operations (NAND, AND, OR...).
- Secret Key:
  - LWE secret  $\mathbf{s} = (s_1, \ldots, s_n)$
  - RLWE secret  $t \in R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^N + 1)$
- Encoding:  $m \in \{-1,1\} \mapsto \mu = \frac{q}{8}m \in \mathbb{Z}_q$

• **Decoding**: 
$$\begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \mu > 0 \\ -1 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

- Encryption:  $c = (b, \mathbf{a}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1}$  for  $\mathbf{a} \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_q^n)$ ,  $e \leftarrow$  small dist.,  $b = -\langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s} \rangle + \mu + e \pmod{q}$ .
- Decryption:  $b + \langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s} \rangle = \mu + e \pmod{q}$

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# Homomorphic Gate Evaluation (TFHE/FHEW)

• Each bit operation consists of the following pipeline:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} c_1 \longrightarrow \\ c_2 \longrightarrow \end{array} \quad \text{Linear Combination} \longrightarrow c \longrightarrow \text{Bootstrapping} \longrightarrow c' \end{array}$$

• Linear Combination : The linear combination corresponding to a Boolean gate is evaluated.

- ex) NAND : 
$$c = (\frac{q}{8}, \mathbf{0}) - c_1 - c_2$$

- output ciphertext contains a large noise e.
- Bootstrapping : Reduces the size of noise for further evaluation.
  - ex)  $\|e\| < rac{q}{8} 
    ightarrow \|e'\| < rac{q}{16}$
  - Consists of Blind Rotation and Key Switching

#### **Blind Rotation**

• Input :  $\mathbf{c} = (b, \mathbf{a})$  such that  $b + \langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s} \rangle = \frac{q}{8}m + e \pmod{q}$ .

• Let 
$$\tilde{b} = \left\lfloor \frac{2N}{q} \cdot b \right\rfloor$$
,  $\tilde{\mathbf{a}} = \left\lfloor \frac{2N}{q} \cdot \mathbf{a} \right\rfloor$ .  
•  $\tilde{b} + \langle \tilde{\mathbf{a}}, \mathbf{s} \rangle = \frac{2N}{8}m + \tilde{e} \pmod{2N}$ .

 Pre-assign the coefficients to a polynomial tv, so that the constant term of tv · X<sup>˜b+⟨ã,s⟩</sup> ∈ R<sub>q</sub> = R/qR is <sup>q</sup>/<sub>8</sub>m.

Since  $X^N + 1 = 0$ , mod 2N is naturally supported over the exponent.

- We can bootstrap the input ciphertext by computing tv · X<sup>˜b+(ã,s)</sup>, and extracting the constant term.
- Homomorphically multiply  $[X^{a_i s_i}]_t$  to  $tv \cdot X^b$  iteratively.
- This is the main bottleneck of TFHE/FHEW bootstrapping.

#### **MKTFHE** description

• Setup: Each *i*-th party samples...

– LWE secret 
$$\mathbf{s}_i = (s_{i,1}, \ldots, s_{i,n})$$

- RLWE secret  $t_i \in R$ 

• MK secret is the concatenation of each party's secret.

– LWE secret 
$$\bar{\mathbf{s}} = (\mathbf{s}_1 | \dots | \mathbf{s}_k)$$

- RLWE secret 
$$\overline{t} = (t_1, \ldots, t_k)$$

• Ciphertext: 
$$c = (b|\mathbf{a}_1| \dots |\mathbf{a}_k) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{kn+1}$$
  
-  $b + \sum_{i=1}^k \langle \mathbf{a}_i, \mathbf{s}_i \rangle \approx \mu \pmod{q}$ .

• Decryption: 
$$b + \sum_{i=1}^{k} \langle \mathbf{a}_i, \mathbf{s}_i \rangle = \mu + e$$

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# Blind Rotation (CCS19)

• Homomorphically multiply monomials  $[X^{a_{i,j}s_{i,j}}]_{t_i}$  to  $tv \cdot X^b$  iteratively.

- Major building block: Hybrid product
  - homomorphic multiplication between MK-RLWE ciphertext and single-key RGSW-style encryption.
  - Õ(kn) time complexity
- *kn* hybrid products, therefore overall time complexity is  $\tilde{O}(k^2n^2)$ .
- The timing scales quadratically as # of parties grows.

#### Our Idea

Motivation : Perform blind rotation party-wisely in a single-key manner, to achieve linear complexity  $\tilde{O}(kn^2)$ .

Challenge : No known homomorphic multiplication algorithm between multi-key and 'noisy' single-key ciphertexts.

Our Result : **()** Generalized External Product

 A new homomorphic multiplication operation between MK-RLWE and generic single-key RGSW-like ciphertexts

#### **2** Improved Hybrid Product

We improve Hybrid product by reducing the number of gadget decompositions.

#### Faster Blind Rotation

- The time complexity is reduced to  $\tilde{O}(kn^2)$ .
- Parallelizable, Key-compatible.

## Generalized External Product (Simplified)

#### Input:

- MK-RLWE encryption  $\overline{\text{ct}} = (c_0, \ldots, c_k)$  such that  $\sum_{j=0}^k c_j \cdot t_j \approx m \pmod{q}$ .
- RGSW-like (noisy) encryption **C** of  $\mu$  under secret  $t_i$
- RGSW-like (fresh) encryption **rlk** of  $t_i$  under secret  $t_i$
- Idea:
  - Multiply **C** to each index of  $\overline{ct}$  to obtain MK-RLWE encryption  $\overline{ct}' = (\mathbf{x}|\mathbf{y})$  of  $m \cdot \mu$ .
    - However, key is changed to  $(1, t_i) \bigotimes (1, t_1, \ldots, t_k)!$
    - ▶ i.e.,  $\langle \mathbf{x}, (1, t_1, \dots, t_k) \rangle + \langle \mathbf{y}, t_i \cdot (1, t_1, \dots, t_k) \rangle \approx m \cdot \mu \pmod{q}$
  - Multiply **rlk** to **y** using hybrid product, and add to **x**.
    - Key is changed back to  $(1, t_1, \ldots, t_k)$ .
- Time complexity:  $\tilde{O}(kn)$

#### Faster Blind Rotation

#### • Our Algorithm:

- **(**) Compute  $[X^{\langle \mathbf{a}_i, \mathbf{s}_i \rangle}]_t$  for each *i*-th party with RGSW-like ciphertext.
- 3 Multiply them to  $X^b \cdot tv$  iteratively, using the generalized external product.
- Time Complexity:
  - The first step requires  $\tilde{O}(n^2)$  time complexity for each party.
  - The second step requires k generalized external products.
  - In total, the time complexity is  $\tilde{O}(kn^2 + k^2n)$ .
  - In practice,  $k \ll n$  and therefore **quasi-linear**.
- Parallelizable: The first step can be algorithmically parallelizable.
- **Key-Compatible:** The public key is identical to the single-key scheme, with an extra relinearization key.

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#### Faster Blind Rotation



Figure: High-level overview of the blind rotation algorithm of MK variant of TFHE from CCS19 and Ours.

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#### **Timing Results**

k	CCS19	Ours	Parallelized
2	0.24s	0.24s	0.17s
4	0.89s	0.88s	0.27s
8	3.32s	2.23s	0.35s
16	24.72s	5.65s	0.47s
32	-	13.94s	0.88s

Table: The elapsed time of our scheme and the CCS19 scheme.

- We achieve 4.38x speedup without parallelization!
- **52.60x** speedup with parallelization!
- CCS19 doesn't support a practical parameter for  $\geq$ 32 parties.

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### **Timing Results**



Figure: The elapsed time of our scheme and the CCS19 scheme.

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- Julia : https://github.com/SNUCP/MKTFHE
- Go : https://github.com/sp301415/tfhe-go

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