

All Your Plaintext Are Belong To Us: How the Mercenary Spyware Industry Helps Governments Circumvent Encryption

Bill Marczak








Study novel technological threats to human rights



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"Targeted Threats": spyware, hacking, ...



We found that each version of Sogou Input Method encrypts sensitive data using an encryption system that is internally referred to as the "EncryptWall" encryption system. We found that the Windows and Android versions of Sogou Input Method contain vulnerabilities in this encryption system, including a vulnerability to a CBC padding oracle attack, which allow



"Please do not make it public" Vulnerabilities in Sogou Keyboard encryption expose keypresses to network eavesdropping

By Jeffrey Knockel, Zoë Reichert, and Mona Wang

August 9, 2023

阅读简体中文摘要 | 閱讀繁體中文摘要

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- Target clicks on a link in message
- Target's browser fetches malicious ad
- Target web request tampered with

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~24/7/365 All Popular Devices

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"Sometimes" Some Devices

What is "Mercenary Spyware"?


To:

Sent: Tuesday, 8 May 2012, 8:52

Subject: Torture reports on Nabeel Rajab

Acting president Zainab Al Khawaja for Human Rights Bahrain reports of torture on Mr. Nabeel Rajab after his recent arrest.

Please check the attached detailed report along with torture images.






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
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RIGHT-TO-LEFT OVERRIDE

Codepoint

U+202E

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
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         6e 2d 74 64 69 76 5f 71
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RIGHT-TO-LEFT OVERRIDE

Codepoint

U+202E







The challenges in today's communication technology are based on these facts:







FinFisher™ partners exclusively with Law Enforcement and Intelligence Agencies, being your reliable partner and trusted e advisor to effectively prevent and investigate terror and

crime.



Higher security standards



Martin Muench Head of FinFisher (Fmr.)



"GIVEN THAT A CAN OF FIZZY DRINK OR A CAR BATTERY CAN BE ABUSED AND USED AS AN IMPLEMENT OF TORTURE IT IS OF NO SURPRISE TO ANYONE IF OUR PRODUCTS CAN BE ABUSED TOO."







A Hacker Claims to Have Leaked 40GB of Docs on Government Spy Tool FinFisher

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should work but not working

Hi, its Arefin from Bangladesh. yesterday we have infected one target. He is online showed by the agent but we are not getting any feeding from him. Moreover, we have that confirmation that the person is in online and doing some activity. Please reply with suggestions Regards

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The infection rate is practically zero percent

Since the release of the new version i.e. 4.1 the trojan is unable to infect any target. There is absolutely no response from any of the targets we attacked. Plz look in to this matter as it is very serious one.

MOTHERBOARD

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
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
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
as it i Enquiry on how to copy a executable and run it on an infected computer


I have a target which the computer is already infected with finspy. Would like to check is there any way which I could upload an executable to the target computer and then execute it?

			AV Empty Trojan			Full Trojan		y	Empty Vista W7 USER Infection			Full Vista W7 USER Infection			MBR Full Trojan		File Infection (*.jpg)		Executable (*.ex		Word	(*.doc)	
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Spyware Vendor FinFisher Claims Insolvency Amid Investigation


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German prosecutors charge four over violating trade act to sell spyware to Turkey

SURELY THIS IS THE END OF THE STORY, RIGHT?







The Million Dollar Dissident

NSO Group's iPhone Zero-Days used against a UAE Human Rights Defender

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Bitter Sweet

Supporters of Mexico's Soda Tax Targeted With NSO Exploit Links

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Part 1: Bittersweet: Supporters of Mexico's Soda Tax Targeted With NSO Exploit Links

- Part 2: Reckless Exploit: Mexican Journalists, Lawyers, and a Child Targeted with NSO Spyware
- Part 3: Reckless Redux: Senior Mexican Legislators and Politicians Targeted with NSO Spyware
- Part 4: Reckless III: Investigation Into Mexican Mass Disappearance Targeted with NSO Spyware
- Part 5: Reckless IV: Lawyers For Murdered Mexican Women's Families Targeted with NSO Spyware
- Part 6: Reckless V: Director of Mexican Anti-Corruption Group Targeted with NSO Group's Spyware
- Part 7: Reckless VI: Mexican Journalists Investigating Cartels Targeted with NSO Spyware Following

<u>Assassination of Colleague</u>

Part 8: Reckless VII: Wife of Journalist Slain in Cartel-Linked Killing Targeted with NSO Group's Spyware

Jordanian Human Rights Defenders and Journalists Hacked with Pegasus Spyware

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Pearl 2 Pegasus

Bahraini Activists Hacked with Pegasus Just Days after a Report Confirming Other Victims


UK High Court says Dubai ruler hacked ex-wife Princess Haya's phone



Sheikh Mohammed (Emir of Dubai)

Princess Haya (his ex-wife)

Fiona Shackleton (her lawyer)






"[REPORTS OF PEGASUS
ABUSE] ARE HORRIBLE ...
BUT THIS IS THE PRICE OF
DOING BUSINESS..."



PREDATOR IN THE WIRES: Ahmed Eltantawy Targeted with Predator Spyware After Announcing Presidential Ambitions

September 22, 2023



wy Targeted with idential Ambitions



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Sweet QuaDreams: A First Look at Spyware Vendor QuaDream's Exploits, Victims, and Customers

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April 11, 2023



Hooking Candiru: Another Mercenary Spyware Vendor Comes into Focus

July 15, 2021

...and more on the horizon









What is "Mercenary Spyware"?

How do targets get hacked in practice?



July 13 2016 Simon, my father just died and we are devastated, I am sending you the dates of the wake, I hope you can come: [link] Simon amigo acaba de morir mi padre estamos devastados, te envio datos del velatorio espero puedas venir:

http://bit.ly/29xwXh5







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Simon amigo acaba de morir mi padre estamos devastados, te envio datos del velatorio espero puedas venir:

July 14 2016

You are an a hole Simon, while you are working I'm find king your old lady here is a photo: [link]

Eres un pendejo SIMON xq mientras trabajas yo me ando cogiendo a tu vieja y de prueba te mando esta

Aug 11 2016

You son of a whore Simon I saw you go out with my wife do not deny it we took this photo [link]

Ere un hijo de tu puta madre Simon ya te vi q sales con mi esposa v no lo niegues xa te tomamos esta foto:

foto:http://bit.ly/29EZ50G

http://bit.lv/29xwXh5

Aug 17 2016

Mr. Simon, [daughter's name] was just in an accident, she is in grave condition, I hope can you come, here is the where she is hospitalized: [link]

Sr. Simon se acaba de accidentar [nombre de su hija], esta muy grave, espero venga, le paso los datos donde esta internada: http://bit.lv/2b2cdOM

http://bit.ly/29EZ50G







HTTP/1.1 307 Temporary Redirect

Via: 1.0 middlebox

Location: https://c.betly[.]me/[REDACTED]

Connection: close



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Via: 1.0 middlebox

Location: https://c.betly[.]me/[REDACTED]


Connection: close

CVE-2023-41993: Processing web content may lead to arbitrary code execution.

CVE-2023-41992: A local attacker may be able to elevate their privileges.

CVE-2023-41991: A malicious app may be able to bypass signature validation.





So, you've got a nation-wide MiTM capability?

So, you've got a nation-wide MiTM capability?



HTTP-01 challenge

So, you've got a nation-wide MiTM capability?



HTTP-01 challenge

This is the most common challenge type today. Let's Encrypt gives a token to your ACME client, and your ACME client puts a file on your web server at http://<YOUR_DOMAIN>, well-known/acme-challenge/<TOKEN>.

Revealed: Israeli Cyber Firms Have Developed an 'Insane' New Spyware Tool. No Defense Exists

A Haaretz investigation reveals that Israeli cyber companies developed technology that exploits the advertising system at the heart of the online economy to monitor civilians, hack into their phones and computers, and spy on them. This terrifying capability, against which no defense currently exists, has already been sold to a nondemocratic country



















NSO Zero-Click Exploit: Turing-Complete CPU in Image File



by Richi Jennings on December 17, 2021

Press Release:

New document compression standard quadruples compression of today's fax standards and runs at unprecedented speeds


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THIS PHRASE EITHER MEANS SOMEONE SPENT SIX MONTHS GETTING A DISHWASHER TO PLAY MARIO OR YOU'RE UNDER ATTACK BY A NATION-STATE.





Google's OSS-Fuzz project has fuzzed hundreds of open source libraries for many years now, including libwebp

The problem, we now know, is that this format is incredibly complex and fragile, and the preconditions to trigger this issue are immense.

What is "Mercenary Spyware"?

How do targets get hacked in practice?

Wait... how do we know all this?

Pivoting/Internet Scanning

Pivoting/Internet Scanning



If you've seen one C&C server, you've seen them all.

— Ronald Reagan —

AZ QUOTES



Ahmed Mansoor UAE Human Rights Activist



"NEW SECRETS ABOUT TORTURE OF EMIRATIS IN STATE PRISONS."

"If you've seen one, you've seen them all"



```
<html><head><meta http-equiv='refresh'
content='0;url=http://www.google.com' /><m
eta http-equiv='refresh'
content='1;url=http://www.google.com' /><t
itle></title></head><body></body></html>
```


One "Them All"


"If you've seen one, you've seen them all"
















WE FINGERPRINTED NSO GROUP SERVERS BASED ON <u>DISTINCTIVE RESPONSES!!</u>

(2016)



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<html><head><meta http-equiv='refresh'
content='0;url=http://www.google.com' />
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```

"Them All"



WE FINGERPRINTED NSO GROUP SERVERS BASED ON <u>DISTINCTIVE RESPONSES!!</u>

(2016)

(2016-2018)

LET'S SEE YOU FINGERPRINT A SERVER THAT RETURNS A BLANK RESPONSE!!





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
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OK, BUT WE CAN STILL FINGERPRINT BASED ON THE TLS HANDSHAKE!!

(2018)





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(2018)

(2018-2020)

NOT IF THE SERVER USES PORT KNOCKING AND HAS NO OPEN PORTS!!





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(2018)

(2018-2020)

NOT IF THE SERVER USES PORT KNOCKING AND HAS NO OPEN PORTS!!





WELL ACTUALLY...

(2020)

Top-Down:

Analyze a spyware sample, understand what traces it leaves behind, then look for these traces



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Bottom-Up:

Analyze phone logs, looking for *implausible artifacts*, then analyze to see if these are traces of spyware



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Analyze a spyware sample, understand what traces it leaves behind, then look for these traces



Bottom-Up:

Analyze phone logs, looking for *implausible artifacts*, then analyze to see if these are traces of spyware



(CAN DETECT HERETOFORE UNKNOWN SPYWARE THIS WAY!!)

What is "Mercenary Spyware"?

How do targets get hacked in practice?

Wait... how do we know all this?

Surely this is "just a technical problem"?

Burn the exploits!

NSO Zero-Click Exploit: Turing-Complete CPU in Image File



by Richi Jennings on December 17, 2021

Burn the exploits!

NSO Zero-Click Exploit: Turing-Complete CPU in Image File



by Richi Jennings on December 17, 2021

CVE-2021-30860: Processing a maliciously crafted PDF may lead to arbitrary code execution.

CVE-2021-31010: A deserialization issue was addressed through improved validation



• Jan 2022: **LATENTIMAGE** (Find My)



Jan 2022: LATENTIMAGE (Find My)

• Jun 2022: **FINDMYPWN** (Find My + BlastDoor)



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- Sep 2023: BLASTPASS (HomeKit + WebP + BlastDoor SBX)
 - We got (part of) this one! CVE-2023-41064





So did that work? Nope.

- Jan 2022: LATENTIMAGE (Find My)
- Jun 2022: FINDMYPWN (Find My + BlastDoor)
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
What about new mitigations?


Apple iOS 14 Thwarts iMessage Attacks With BlastDoor System











What about new(er) mitigations?



Friday, September 9

9:41

Notification Center





Lockdown Mode block... Yesterday [redacted]@gmail.com attempted to access a Home.



Lockdown Mode block... Mon [redacted]@yahoo.com attempted to access a Home.



to access a Home.

[redacted]@yahoo.com attempted




OK THIS ONE ACTUALLY HAS AN IMPACT!

2:10 AM · Jun 2, 2023 · 1,941 Views

2 Retweets 29 Likes



Lockdown Mode block... Mon [redacted]@yahoo.com attempted to access a Home.






29 Likes

2 Retweets

Lockdown Mode block... Mon [redacted]@yahoo.com attempted to access a Home.

What about new(er) mitigations?



What about notifications?



November 23, 2021

Apple sent the following threat notification via email to

and via iMessage to We also sent a short notification to the recovery contacts associated with your account.

ALERT: State-sponsored attackers may be targeting your iPhone

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Threat Notification

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
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150 COUNTRIES!!





Do threat actors care about notifications?

Apple Threat Notifications:

- Nov 2021
- Nov 2022
- Dec 2022
- Mar 2023
- Jun 2023
- Oct 2023

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Apple Threat Notifications:

- Nov 2021
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Threat Actors:




Indian opposition MPs accuse government of trying to hack their iPhones

At least eight prominent Indian opposition politicians have reported receiving warnings from Apple that "state-sponsored attackers" might have targeted their iPhones, raising concerns about possible digital espionage ahead of next year's general election.

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Govt investigating whether Chinalinked agencies are behind Apple spyware attack



Things could be better if...

- Mitigations move from optional \rightarrow mandatory (e.g., Lockdown Mode takes the "2FA path")
- Better specificity from tech companies on threats
- For high-risk users, complex devices will eventually be hacked; design accordingly

There's also a role for... (gasp)... regulation




SECURITY RESEARCHERS SAY a proposed set of export rules meant to restrict the sale of surveillance software to repressive regimes are so broadly written that they could criminalize some research and restrict legitimate tools that professionals need to make software and computer systems more secure.



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Hacking Team loses global license to sell spyware

The move coincides with a sharp rise in diplomatic tensions between Italy and Egypt over the brutal murder of Giulio Regeni, a 28-year old Italian researcher in Cairo.




Regulating technologies

Regulating companies

NSO Pegasus spyware can no longer target UK phone numbers

Israeli maker of surveillance software blocked +44 code after detecting hack against Princess Haya, source says

"We shut down completely, hard-coded into the system [Pegasus], to all of our customers. We released a quick update in the middle of the night that none of our customers can work on UK numbers," the source close to the company added.





Scoop: Israel and France hold secret talks to end NSO spyware crisis

- The Israeli proposal included a commitment to ban the hacking of French mobile phone numbers in any future spyware deal between an Israeli firm and a third country.
- A similar ban already exists on hacking U.S. and U.K. numbers.

US State Department phones were reportedly hacked by NSO spyware

At least nine employees of the US State Department working in or with Uganda had their iPhones hacked with spyware made by NSO Group,

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Commerce Adds NSO Group and Other Foreign Companies to Entity List for Malicious Cyber Activities

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Commouse Adda NICO Custo

companies. Wednesday's move sanctions specific companies but sweeps broadly on the technology and items covered. American-made toilet paper, for instance, would be barred from being sent to NSO Group or any of the other listed companies.

Cybel Activities

Vietnam tried to hack U.S. officials, CNN with posts on X, probe finds

The attempts appear to have been unsuccessful, but came as the U.S. and Vietnam were negotiating an agreement that President Biden signed last month in Hanoi

Vietnam tri with posts (

The attempts appear to were negotiating an ag



cials, CNN

s the U.S. and Vietnam last month in Hanoi



Replying to @GjonajEtilda @ChrisMurphyCT and @GaryPeters

UK aims to deter Albanian refugees with 'make clear the perils' ad campaign southchinapost.net/eNISDKnI

4:35 AM · Jun 1, 2023 · 2 Views

