Incrementally Verifiable Computation for NP from Standard Assumptions

based on joint work with



Pratish Datta NTT Research



Abhishek Jain JHU & NTT Research



Zhengzhong Jin Northeastern



Surya Mathialagan MIT → NTT Research



Alexis Korb
UCLA



Amit Sahai UCLA

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(Nondeterministic) computation ${\mathcal M}$

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[Valiant '08]

 cf_0



(Nondeterministic) computation ${\mathcal M}$


[Valiant '08]

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


Fermat's little theorem


(Nondeterministic) computation ${\mathcal M}$




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




(Nondeterministic) computation \mathcal{M}


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
cf₅₀₀₀ cf_0 cf₁₀₀₀ cf_1 cf_T Fermat's little theorem Riemann Hypothesis





How can we trust the validity of the intermediate configurations?



































[Valiant '08]



• **Efficiency:** Proof size and verification time are **independent** of the number of hops.





- **Efficiency:** Proof size and verification time are **independent** of the number of hops.
- Soundness: Hard to come up with proofs for $cf_0 \nrightarrow cf_T$.





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^{*}We will not consider knowledge soundness since we are focusing on standard assumptions.


























[GL07, CKLM12, CKLM13]

ullet N parties encrypt **votes** under a rerandomizable scheme.

[GL07, CKLM12, CKLM13]

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ct₁

ct₁

- -

ct_N

[GL07, CKLM12, CKLM13]

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ct₁

ct₁

- -



Encrypted votes!

[GL07, CKLM12, CKLM13]

- N parties encrypt votes under a rerandomizable scheme.
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ct₁

ct₁


- -



Encrypted votes!


[GL07, CKLM12, CKLM13]

- N parties encrypt votes under a rerandomizable scheme.
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


votes!


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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- ullet Use ZK-IVC to verify that the final list is honest without reading L NIZKs!




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
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


How do we construct IVC?

Valiant's Recipe: Proof Merging (Prior work)

$$(cf, cf', t) \qquad \pi$$

$$(cf', cf'', t') \qquad \pi'$$





(Prior work)



• Proof of knowledge: If adversary gives accepting $(cf, cf'', t + t'), \pi''$, one can extract accepting tuples $(cf, cf', t), \pi$ and $(cf', cf'', t'), \pi'$.



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- Succinctness: $|\pi''| \approx |\pi|, |\pi'|$

Level 3

Level 2


Level 1

Level 0

 cf_0 cf_1 cf_2 cf_3 cf_4 cf_5 cf_6


Level 3

Level 2




Level 3

Level 2




Level 3




Proof Merging \rightarrow IVC! "Tree merging"


Level 3



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


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



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
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



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













































$$(cf, cf', 2^k) \qquad \pi$$


$$(cf', cf'', 2^k) \qquad \pi'$$









Claim: There exists cf', π , π' such that $\mathrm{Ver}_k(\mathrm{cf},\mathrm{cf}',\pi)=1$ and $\mathrm{Ver}_k(\mathrm{cf}',\mathrm{cf}'',\pi')=1$



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Claim: There exists cf', π , π' such $Ver_k(cf, cf', \pi) = 1$ and $Ver_k(cf', cf'', \pi)$


Level k SNARK Proof

Recursive composition is the backbone of many works!


[CT10, BCCT13,BGH19,

BCMS20, BDFG21, BCLMS21,


KS22, CCS22, etc]





Level 3





Given cheating proof, recursively extract











• Issue 1: SNARKs do not exist from standard assumptions!! [CGKS23]

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 - *Extraction* was extremely crucial to make the soundness analysis go through!


- Issue 1: SNARKs do not exist from standard assumptions!! [CGKS23]
 - *Extraction* was extremely crucial to make the soundness analysis go through!
- Actually, what about random oracle model?

IVC in Random Oracle Model?


SNARKs exist in the ROM!

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
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 - Shows that SNARGs and IVC are fundamentally different problems

This Work: How do we construct IVC for NP from standard assumptions?

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- We show how to achieve ZK in both settings.

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- Addresses the common misconception that IVC for NP is impossible due to Gentry-Wichs.






- Proof of knowledge: If adversary gives accepting $(cf, cf'', t + t'), \pi''$, one can extract accepting tuples $(cf, cf', t), \pi$ and $(cf', cf'', t'), \pi'$.
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
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
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
Achieved if BARG is rate-1


Construction


 cf_0 cf_1 cf_2 cf_3


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















Level 2



Level 1






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
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



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Breaks SNARG security!





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 - SNARGs without extraction? Smells like iO:)

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
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
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
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 - Can generate the CRS and guarantee soundness only knowing that a trapdoor exists






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- Our work gives a multi-hop verifiable shuffling scheme with short proofs from standard assumptions in the plain model.

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
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
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
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
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$$X_0, X_i, \pi_i$$













IVC.VCheck π_i = 0/1 x_0, x_i, π_i


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
















Obfuscate these programs and publish as CRS!!







The real scheme




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


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





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
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- This approach does not use extraction and achieves $poly(\lambda)$ -sized proof!

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 - We give an iO-based approach to IVC for "Trapdoor-NP".
 - Demonstrates a new approach to IVC without extraction!

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- We show two IVC constructions in the nondeterministic setting.
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 - Demonstrates a new approach to IVC without extraction!
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 - Open problem: Can we extend this to all of NP?

Thank you for your attention!

Bonus Slides

Common reference string




$$x_1, \ldots, x_k \in L$$



Common reference string







 w_1

 W_2

- - -

Common reference string







 W_1

 W_2

. .

Common reference string



 $x_1, \ldots, x_k \in L$

 π



Rate 1:
$$|\pi| \approx |w_i| + \text{poly}(\lambda)$$

 W_1

 W_2

- -

Common reference string



 $x_1, \ldots, x_k \in L$

 π



Rate 1: $|\pi| \approx |w_i| + \text{poly}(\lambda)$

 W_1

 W_2

- -

 W_k

Usually only require

$$|\pi| \ll k \cdot |w_i|$$
.

Common reference string $crs(i^*)$



 $x_1, \ldots, x_k \in L$

 π



 W_1

 W_2

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$$|\pi| \approx |w_i| + \text{poly}(\lambda)$$

Common reference string $crs(i^*)$



 $x_1, \ldots, x_k \in L$

 π



 W_1


 W_2

Rate 1:
$$|\pi| \approx |w_i| + \text{poly}(\lambda)$$

• Somewhere soundness: Can generate $crs(i^*)$ in trapdoor mode that let's you extract a witness for x_{i^*} .

Common reference string $crs(i^*)$





 π



 W_1


 W_2

Rate 1:
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- CRS indistinguishability: $crs \approx crs(i^*)$.

Common reference string $crs(i^*)$





 π




 W_1


 W_2

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- Somewhere soundness: Can generate $\operatorname{crs}(i^*)$ in trapdoor mode that let's you extract a witness for x_{i^*} .
- CRS indistinguishability: crs \approx crs (i^*) .

For construction, see [PP22, DGKV22, BDSZ24]






Construct a BARG proof π_{BARG} corresponding to:

BARG Statement: (cf, cf'), (cf', cf'').
BARG Witness: Level k proofs π, π'' .

Level k+1 proof: $\pi''=(cf',\pi_{BARG})$.




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
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
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


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 - Extract π and recurse!!



• Suppose \mathscr{A} creates cheating proofs (cf', π_{BARG}) with **prob.** $\geq \epsilon$.

- Needs careful complexity leveraging for NP (this work, based on BKK+17)!
 Ask me later:)
- By pigeonhole, cf \rightarrow cf' with prob $\geq \epsilon/2$ or cf'. WLOG first hop.
- Switch BARG CRS binding accordingly!
 - By index-hiding property of the BARG, should still cheat on this hop!!
 - Extract π and recurse!!