

Pseudorandom Unitaries in the Haar Random Oracle Model

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Crypto, 2025


August 18, 2025

Quantum Pseudorandomness

Quantum Complexity



Quantum Learning Theory



Wormholes and AdS/CFT



Quantum Cryptography



Pseudorandom Unitaries


A Central Primitive of Quantum Pseudorandomness

Pseudorandom Unitary (PRU)

Efficiently implementable circuits that “behave like” random unitary.

Pseudorandom Unitary (PRU)

1. Efficient implementation:



Pseudorandom Unitary (PRU)

2. Pseudorandomness

$$A^{G_k} \approx A^U$$

U : Haar random unitary


Strong Pseudorandom Unitary (sPRU)

2. Pseudorandomness

$$\mathcal{A}^{G_k, G_k^\dagger} \approx \mathcal{A}^{U, U^\dagger}$$

Previous work

- (JLS18) defined PRU.
- (AGKL22,LQS+23,BM24,MPSY24,CBB+24) gave partial results.
- (MH24) finally gave a construction for adaptive queries.



Defined Path-recording framework

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Why Should We Care About PRUs?

- Succinct Commitments to Quantum States (Chen-Movassagh'24)
- Multi-Copy Secure Encryption Scheme (AGKL24)
- Learning Theory and Complexity Theory
- AdS/CFT correspondence (Bouland-Fefferman-Vazirani'20)
- Kretschmer (Kre21) showed evidence that:
*Quantum pseudorandomness may exist **even if one-way functions do not exist.***

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Constructing PRUs Without One-Way Functions

- **Many constructions of quantum pseudorandomness:**
 - JLS18, BS19, BS20, AQY22, AGQY22, BBSS23, LQS+23, ABF+24, AGKL24, MPSY24, BM24
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Quantum Haar Random Oracle Model

[Bouland-Fefferman-Vazirani'20, Chen-Movassagh'24]

Quantum Haar Random Oracle Model (QHROM)

All parties P_i as well as the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ get oracle access to a Haar Unitary and its inverse.

$$U \leftarrow \mu_n$$

μ_n : Haar Distribution

A diagram illustrating the sampling of a Haar unitary. The expression $U \leftarrow \mu_n$ is shown, with a blue arrow pointing from the distribution μ_n to the unitary U . Below this, the text " μ_n : Haar Distribution" is written.

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
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
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
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Similarity to QROM

This model is similar to the Quantum Random Oracle Model (QROM) where all parties and the adversary get access to a random function oracle.

$$f \leftarrow \mathcal{F}_n$$



Why use QHROM

- Can Model Behaviour of Random Quantum Circuits.
- Abstraction to study Blackhole Dynamics.
- Gives a pathway to get results from PRU in the plain model.
- Helps show separations.

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Strong Pseudorandom Unitary (PRU)

Pseudorandomness

$$\mathcal{A}^{U, U^\dagger, G_k^{U, U^\dagger}} \approx \mathcal{A}^{U, U^\dagger, V}$$

What can we do in QHROM

- [Bouland-Fefferman-Vazirani'21] Give a candidate construction of PRUs in the QHROM without proof.
- [ABGY25,HY25] Made partial progress on showing PRUs exist in QHROM.

Results

In QHROM

- **Unbounded-poly-query secure strong PRUs in QHROM:**
Achieved with **two queries** to the Haar random oracle.



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- **Unbounded-poly-query secure strong PRUs in QHROM:**
Achieved with **two queries** to the Haar random oracle.
- **Strong Gluing Theorem for Haar Unitaries:**
How to construct “Large” Haar Unitaries from smaller ones.
[SHH24] shows how to do this in the inverseless case.

Consequences

Shrinking strong PRU Keys for Free, **in Plain Model**:

Unbounded query secure strong PRUs exist with keys of size $O(\lambda^{1/c})$ for any constant c , if strong PRU exists

Previously, GJMZ22 showed 1 query PRU with short keys exists if PRU exists.

Construction of other primitives in QHROM:

sPRU $\rightarrow$ PRU $\rightarrow$ PRFS $\rightarrow$ PRS $\rightarrow$ OWSG $\rightarrow$ EFI.

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Techniques

Strong PRU in QHRM

Potential constructions

Single Query

$$A_k U B_k$$

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Parallel Query

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Unprotected Query

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$$U^\dagger (U A_k U) U^\dagger = A_k$$

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No easy way to attack


PRU in QHROM

PRU in QHROM : $G^U(k_1 || k_2 || k_3) = X^{k_3} U X^{k_2} U X^{k_1}$



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PRU in QHROM

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$$\rho_{AB}^{\mathcal{A}} = \mathbb{E}_{\substack{U \leftarrow \mu_n \\ k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda}} \left[|\mathcal{A}^{U,U^\dagger,G_k^U}\rangle \langle \mathcal{A}^{U,U^\dagger,G_k^U} |_{AB} \right]$$

Very hard to understand this state.

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
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Techniques

Path Recording framework [MH24]

Purification




$$\rho_{AB}^A = \mathbb{E}_{\substack{U \leftarrow \mu_n \\ k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda}} \left[|\mathcal{A}^{U,U^\dagger,G_k^U}\rangle \langle \mathcal{A}^{U,U^\dagger,G_k^U} |_{AB} \right]$$

By Schmidt decomposition, for some $|\psi_{\mathcal{A}}\rangle$


$$\rho_{AB}^A = \text{Tr}_E (|\psi_{\mathcal{A}}\rangle \langle \psi_{\mathcal{A}}|_{ABE})$$

Compressed Purification




$$\mathbb{E}_{U \leftarrow \mu_n} \left[|\mathcal{A}^{U, U^\dagger, G_k^U}\rangle \langle \mathcal{A}^{U, U^\dagger, G_k^U} |_{AB} \right] \approx \text{Tr}_E \left(|\mathcal{A}^{PR, PR^\dagger, G_k^{PR}}\rangle \langle \mathcal{A}^{PR, PR^\dagger, G_k^{PR}} |_{ABE} \right)$$

Path Recording




$$\text{PR}_{AE} : |x\rangle_A |R\rangle_E \mapsto \frac{1}{\sqrt{N - |R|}} \sum_{\substack{y \in [N], \\ y \notin \text{Im}(R)}} |y\rangle_A \frac{|R \cup \{(x, y)\}\rangle_E}{\text{Path}}.$$

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Techniques

Analysing our construction

Ideal vs Real


Ideal

- First oracle: U_1
- Second oracle: U_2
- Purification is Two "Paths"
- $|\text{Path}_1\rangle \otimes |\text{Path}_2\rangle$

Real

- First oracle: U
- Second oracle: $X^{k_3}UX^{k_2}UX^{k_1}$
- Purification is one "Path" and Keys
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Key Simulator $\mathcal{I}^{\text{Sim}}$



Ideal vs Real


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
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
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
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
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
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- Second oracle: $X^{k_3} U X^{k_2} U X^{k_1}$
- Purification is one "Path" and Keys
- $|\text{Path}\rangle \otimes |\text{Keys}\rangle$

Key Simulator $\mathcal{I}^{\text{Sim}}$



Ideal vs Real


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
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
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
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


Ideal Experiment

First Oracle




Second Oracle




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


Second Oracle




Real Experiment

First Oracle




Second Oracle




Real Experiment

First Oracle




Second Oracle




Entries Correlated by Keys

Real Experiment

First Oracle



Second Oracle



Measuring Closeness

To prove closeness, we do **Query-by-Query** Analysis:

- Take any intermediate state
- The following two processes are close:
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
First Oracle

$$|\text{Path}_1\rangle \otimes |\text{Path}_2\rangle$$

Second Oracle

Progress Measure


First Oracle



Second Oracle

Progress Measure


First Oracle



Second Oracle

Progress Measure


First Oracle




Second Oracle

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First Oracle



Second Oracle



Conclusions and open-problems

Results

- **Unbounded-poly-query secure strong PRUs in QHROM**
- Strong Gluing Theorem for Haar Unitaries
- Shrinking strong PRU Keys for Free, **in Plain Model**

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Conjugate and Transpose to Haar oracle and PRU

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Thank You