

# Anamorphic-Resistant Encryption

Or, why the encryption debate is still alive


Yevgeniy Dodis, **Eli Goldin**

# Encryption Debate

## Privacy Advocate



Mr. Government




# Encryption Debate

Privacy Advocate



Everything should be encrypted

Mr. Government



# Encryption Debate


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As long as I can read it.

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# Encryption Debate

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


Everything should be encrypted

As long as I can read it.

Add backdoor?

Mr. Government



# Encryption Debate

Privacy Advocate




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

Add backdoor? -

- No way, bad idea



Mr. Government



# Steganography



# Steganography





Overthrow  
the govt. at  
midnight







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Overthrow  
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

# Steganography



- Looks like  
(comp. indis.)  
an honest photo  
to me.



# Steganography



- Looks like  
(comp. indis.)  
an honest photo  
to me.



ALWAYS possible (w/ enough  
randomness)




# Steganography

What must always be random?

# Steganography

What must always be random?



# Anamorphic Encryption

If you backdoor  
- encryption, people  
will just use the  
subliminal channel.



[HPRV19, PPY22]


# Anamorphic Encryption

Given encryption scheme  
(Gen, Enc, Dec)

Anamorphic instantiation is protocol  
(AGen, AEnc, ADec) formalizing  
steganographic channel

# Anamorphic Encryption $(Gen, \bar{Enc}, Dec)$

$A Gen \rightarrow$  

$A Enc(m, am) \rightarrow$  


$A Dec(\text{key}, \text{act}) \rightarrow am$





# Anamorphic Encryption $(Gen, \bar{Enc}, Dec)$







$A Gen \rightarrow$  

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
$A Dec(\text{key}, act) \rightarrow am$

"anamorphic  
instantiation of  
 $(Gen, \bar{Enc}, Dec)$ "


# Security Intuition




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


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
# Anamorphic Security

"Encrypt  $m$  please,  
and hide  $a$  in it."



# Anamorphic Security

"Encrypt  $m$  please,  
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




# Anamorphic Security


"Encrypt  $m$  please,  
and hide  $a_m$  in it."

doesn't  
exist!






# Anamorphic Encryption



always possible by  
rejection sampling


# Anamorphic Encryption



always possible by  
rejection sampling

$$H_{\text{key}}(\text{envelope}) = am$$

# Anamorphic Encryption



always possible by  
rejection sampling

Bandwidth:  $O(\log \lambda)$

# Anamorphic Encryption

Generic

$O(\log \lambda)$   
bandwidth  
[PPY22]

Linear Bandwidth

# Anamorphic Encryption

<u>Generic</u>	<u>Linear Bandwidth</u>	<u>Applicable Schemes</u>	<u>Properties</u>
$O(\log \lambda)$ bandwidth [PPY22]	<u>Paper</u> [PPY22]	<u>Naor-Yung</u>	

# Anamorphic Encryption

<u>Generic</u>	<u>Linear Bandwidth</u>	<u>Applicable Schemes</u>	<u>Properties</u>
$O(\log \lambda)$ bandwidth [PPY22]	Paper [PPY22] [BGH+24]	Naor-Yung randomness recoverable	robust

# Anamorphic Encryption

<u>Generic</u>	<u>Linear Bandwidth</u>	<u>Applicable Schemes</u>	<u>Properties</u>
$O(\log \lambda)$ bandwidth [PPY22]	Paper [PPY22] [BGH+24]	Naor-Yung randomness recoverable	robust
	[PPY24]	many CCA PKEs	public-key anamorphism
	⋮		

# Anamorphic Encryption

<u>Generic</u>	<u>Linear Bandwidth</u>	<u>Applicable Schemes</u>	<u>Properties</u>
$O(\log \lambda)$ bandwidth [PPY22]	Paper [PPY22] [BGH+24]	Naor-Yung randomness recoverable	robust
	[PPY24]	many CCA PKEs	public-key anamorphism
	$\vdots ([KPP+23] \times 2, [LGM24], \dots)$		



# Anamorphic Encryption

Hypothesis: linear bandwidth  
anamorphic instantiations are always  
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# Anamorphic Encryption

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anamorphic instantiations are always  
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Spoiler: NO

Philosophy

# Philosophical Question

Who picks what PKE schemes are legal?

# Dictatoria

Wants to read all  
messages  
(universal backdoor)



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Privacy against foreign  
nations



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
Privacy against foreign  
nations

Outlaw non-trivial  
anamorphism



# Warrantland

Wants to read messages  
when warrant issued






# Warrantland

Wants to read messages  
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Privacy against itself  
with no warrant




# Warrantland

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Outlaw non-trivial  
anamorphism



# Privatopia

Privacy against itself  
now and in the future



# Privatopia

Privacy against itself  
now and in the future

Wants to standardize  
anamorphic encryption




# Main Philosophical Question

Are there schemes which make



Dictatoria



Warrantland



Prinstopia

happy?

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Are there schemes which make



happy?

Results




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$(Gen, Enc, Dec)$  such that no non-trivial  
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ALL  $(A Gen, A Enc, A Dec)$




have  $|am| = O(\log \lambda)$

# Anamorphic Resistant Encryption

$(Gen, Enc, Dec)$  such that no non-trivial  
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ARE

# Dictatoria



Dictatoria  
ARE w/  
universal backdoor.



Dictatoria

ARE w/

universal backdoor.

Dictator can read all  
messages to detect anamorphism  
without secret-key access




Dictatoria in ROM  
ARE w/

universal backdoor.

Dictator can read all  
messages to detect anamorphism  
without secret-key access




# Warrantland







Warrantland  
ARE which needs  
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# Warrantland



ARE which needs  
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
If  $sk$  hidden, secure  
against govt. w/  backdoor



Warrantland in ROM

ARE which needs  
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If   $sk$  hidden, secure  
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
ARE

(Construction

# Anamorphic Resistant Encryption

Key plan: "only way to bias

$Enc(\text{pk}, m; R)$




is to do rejection sampling"

# Anamorphic Resistant Encryption

Idea #1: Replace  $R$  w/  $RO(R)$

$$Enc(\text{pk}, m; R) = E(\text{pk}, m; RO(R))$$



# Anamorphic Resistant Encryption

Idea #1: Replace  $R$  w/  $RO(R)$   
(Only way to bias  $RO(R)$  is rej. sampling)

$$Enc(\text{pk}, m; R) = E(\text{pk}, m; RO(R))$$



# Anamorphic Resistant Encryption

If

$$AEnc(m, am) =$$





# Anamorphic Resistant Encryption

If

$$AEnc(m, am) =$$



then  $RO(R_{am})$  can only provide  
 $\approx \log \lambda$  bits of info on  $am$

# Anamorphic Resistant Encryption

If

$$AEnc(m, am) =$$




might not be the case.

then  $RO(R_{am})$  can only provide  
 $\approx \log \lambda$  bits of info on  $am$

# Anamorphic Resistant Encryption


Key question: how to force


$$AEnc(m, am) =$$


A hand-drawn diagram of a light blue envelope with a white triangular flap. A yellow padlock is attached to the top of the flap. The label  $RO(R_{am})$  is written in green on the flap, and the label  $m$  is written in black on the body of the envelope. A large black question mark is positioned to the right of the envelope.


# Anamorphic Resistant Encryption

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
$$AE_{enc}(m, r_{am}) =$$


Idea 2: tell  R

# Anamorphic Resistant Encryption


$$\text{Enc}(\underbrace{\text{red key}}_{pp}, \underbrace{\text{yellow key}}_{pk}, m; R) =$$


The diagram illustrates the encryption process. It shows two blue envelopes. The first envelope has a yellow padlock on its flap, which is labeled  $RO(R)$ . The body of this envelope is labeled  $m$ . The second envelope has a red padlock on its flap and is labeled  $R$  on its body. A comma separates the two envelopes.


Idea 2: tell   $R$


# Anamorphic Resistant Encryption

$$\text{Enc}(\overset{\text{PP}}{\text{pp}}, \overset{\text{P}}{\text{pk}}, m; R) =$$



$$\text{AEnc}(m, \text{am}) =$$





Idea 2: tell   $R$

# Anamorphic Resistant Encryption


$$\text{Enc}(\overset{\text{PP}}{\text{pp}}, \overset{\text{P}}{\text{pk}}, m; R) =$$

$$\text{AEnc}(m, a_m) =$$



Idea 2: tell   $R$  can contain covert messages itself

# Deterministic Encryption




If  $R_{am}$  is not random,  
can't contain any anamorphic message.



# Deterministic Encryption


$DEnc(pk, m) =$



usually impossible

# Deterministic Encryption

$DEnc(\overset{\text{P}}{\underset{pk}{\text{key}}}, m) =$



Possible in restricted circumstances

# Deterministic Encryption


$$DEnc(\overset{\text{key}}{\underset{pk}{P}}, m) =$$


Possible in restricted circumstances

Including this one! (with work)


# Final Construction

$$\text{Enc}(\text{pp}, \text{pk}, m; R) =$$




# Final Construction

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


$$\text{AEnc}(\text{pp}, \text{pk}, \text{ak}, m, \text{am})$$




# Final Construction

$$\text{Enc}(\text{pp}, \text{pk}, m; R) =$$



$$\text{AEnc}(\text{pp}, \text{pk}, \text{ak}, m, \text{am})$$



only info on  
am,  
< log λ bits of info

Dictatoria in ROM  
ARE w/


universal backdoor.

Dictator can read all  
messages to detect anamorphism  
without secret-key access






Dictatoria

ARE








# Dictatoria ARE



# Dictatoria ARE




Dictator can read all  $m$  to detect covert messages



Warrantland in ROM

ARE which needs  
secret key access.



If  $sk$  hidden, secure  
against govt. w/ backdoor




# Warrantland ARE




# Warrantland ARE



# Warrantland ARE



Govt. needs  to detect anamorphism or break PKE.



# Open Questions

1. Standard Model ARE  
[ABG+25] from exponential DDH
2. Getting rid of public parameters.  
[CCGM25] does for weaker notion of ARE
3. Can we bypass this impossibility?  
Is a weaker notion always possible?

Thanks  
for  
listening!