

Zinc

Succinct Arguments with Small Arithmetization Overheads from IOPs of Proximity to the Integers



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$$R_{\mathsf{R1CS},\mathbb{F}} = \left\{ (x, \mathbf{w}) \in \mathbb{F}^n \mid q_1(x, \mathbf{w}) = \dots = q_m(x, \mathbf{w}) = 0 \right\}$$



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Other examples: AIR, Plonkish constraints, CCS, M3 (Irreducible)



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A lot to be gained (10x speedups? Ease of implementations?)



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Lattice operations	Lattice cryptography, FHE
Combinations of above	Classic hashes, legacy cryptography, recursion, zkVM, Ethereum blocks

Computation

Rationals, fixed point, floating point

Mult mod 2^n

Mult mod pq

Mult mod non-native q

XOR, NOT, etc.

Lattice operations

Combinations of above

Arithmetizing $x \cdot y = z \mod 2^{32}$ over 32 bit field \mathbb{F}

Computation	
Rationals, fixed point,	
floating point	
Mult mod 2 ⁿ	
Mult mod pq	
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XOR, NOT, etc.	С
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Binius' benchmarks (over GF(2^32))

2^20 mults	2^20 mult mod 2^32
80ms	2000ms

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Decompose x, y into 4 limbs of 8 bits.

$$x = \sum_{i} x_{i} 2^{8 \cdot i}, \quad y = \sum_{i} y_{i} 2^{8 \cdot i}, \quad x_{i}, y_{i} \in [0, 2^{8} - 1]$$

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- · Security risks,
- · Audits, FV, etc.

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Rationals, fixed point,	?
floating point	
Mult mod 2 ⁿ	?
Mult mod pq	?
Mult mod non-native q	?
XOR, NOT, etc.	Binius
Lattices	Dedicated SNARK
Combinations of above	?

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Combinations of above

Proving 33 SHA-256 compressions

	Plonky3*	Stwo*	Binius (2^13)**
Prover (s)	12	21	0.33
Size (MB)	1.7	39	0.38
Verifier (s)	0.18	N/A	0.14

³³ compressions https://hackmd.io/@clientsideproving/zkIDBenchmarks

Binius is not necessarily better than the others:

SHA-256 is native to it (not the AND and add mod 2³²)

^{** 2^13} compressions, ran on my MacBook Air

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Some use-cases involve a mix of computation types.

Computation	Hash-based native proof system
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Mult mod 2 ⁿ	Zinc
Mult mod pq	Zinc
Mult mod non-native q	Zinc
XOR, NOT, etc.	Binius
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Combinations of above	?

As first step, we limit ourselves to constraints over $\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$, \mathbb{Z} , \mathbb{Q} (n arbitrary)

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WIP: extension of Zinc to these



6

Framework and family of succinct arguments with:



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Performance

WIP Implementation



RESEARCH

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Zinc in a nutshell



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Compile into succinct argument for $R_{R1CS\ell, \mathbb{Z}}$



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- (1) Build a PIOP for $R_{\text{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Z}}$ (e.g. Spartan)
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(1) Solution: [CH2024]: V samples a random prime q. Then execute Spartan over \mathbb{F}_{a} , rather than over \mathbb{Z} .



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(2) Work over $\mathbb{Q}_{\leq B}$ instead of $\mathbb{Z}_{\leq B}$. Makes extraction simple.

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Works for any algebraic relation over \mathbb{Q} .

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None available comparable to hash-based P♥S's over F

(1) Solution: [CH2024]: V samples a random prime q. Then execute Spartan over \mathbb{F}_{a} , rather than over \mathbb{Z} .



$$R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Z}} = \left\{ (x; \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{u}) \right\}$$

Zinc in a nutshell
$$R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Z}} = \begin{cases} (x; w, u) & x \in \mathbb{Z}^m_{\leq B}, w \in \mathbb{Z}^k_{\leq B}, u \in \mathbb{Z}^{m+k+1}_{\leq B} \\ Az \circ Bz = Cz + u \circ \vec{n} \text{ over } \mathbb{Z}, z = (w, x, 1) \end{cases}$$

(2) Work over $\mathbb{Q}_{\leq B}$ instead of $\mathbb{Z}_{\leq B}$. Makes extraction simple.

Zip: PCS for polynomials over $\mathbb{Q}_{\leq B}$. Similar to Ligero/Brakedown.

Allows to compile a PIOP for $R_{\mathsf{R1CS\ell}, \mathbb{Q}}$ into a SNARK Π for $R_{\mathsf{R1CS\ell}, \mathbb{Q}}$

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Thanks

Collaborators wanted!

Research (fundamental or applications), engineering, use-cases, etc.



Paper



Implementation (WIP)



Technical talk at zkproof 6

Zinc in a nutshell

(1) Build a PIOP for $R_{R1CS\ell,\mathbb{Z}}$ (e.g. Spartan)

With soundness holding against P^* that use polys over $\mathbb{Z}_{\leq R}$

(2) Design a PCS for polynomials over $\mathbb{Z}_{\leq B}$

Compile into succinct argument for $R_{\text{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Z}}$

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Compile into succinct argument for $R_{R1CS\ell}$

Building (2). [CH2024] propose using the PCS over $\mathbb{Z}_{\leq B}$ of Block et al. It is not clear how to build efficient PCS's for integral polynomials. Why?

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It is not clear how to build efficient PCS's for integral polynomials. Why?

- When trying to extract the committed polynomial f, one has to solve a system of linear equations over $\mathbb Z$.
- The solution determines *f*.
- However, in general, the solution consists of rational numbers.

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Combining Π and Π_{look} we obtain a succinct argument for $R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Z}}$.

11

Based on Ligero/Brakedown with commitment on \mathbb{Q} , but runs modulo a prime. Incorporates a costless bit-size check to make sure elements have less than B bits. Commitment is over \mathbb{Q} . We use EA or RAA codes to keep the codeword entries small.

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
Commit to MLE(w), MLE(u) over \mathbb{Z}


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Random prime qExecute a SNARK over \mathbb{F}_q for the constraint $Az \circ Bz = Cz + u \circ \mu$ modulo q


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When opening MLE(w), MLE(u), reduce mod q.

 \overline{V}

(x)

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
.



(x)



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Commit to MLE(w), MLE(u) over \mathbb{Z} Random prime q

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 $Az \circ Bz = Cz + u \circ \mu \text{ modulo } q$


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PIOP over \mathbb{F}_q

V

(x)

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PIOP over \mathbb{F}_q + PCS over \mathbb{Z}

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Similar to Ligero/Brakedown But some parts run on $\mathbb Q$

(x)

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
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Zinc in a nutshell \mathbb{Q}^m

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


PIOP over \mathbb{F}_q + PCS over \mathbb{Q}

Sim Sim Chack

Zinc in a nutshell \mathbb{Q}^m

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Sim' Orts on But Others Old Also: It the



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Where \mathbb{Z}_B is the set of integers with bit-size less than B.



14

(1) Adapt Spartan PIOP (or SuperSpartan) for $R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Z},B}$

With soundness holding against P^* that use polys over \mathbb{Z}_R

(2) Design a PCS for polynomials over \mathbb{Z}_B

Compile into succinct argument for $R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Z},B}$



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$$\mathsf{RESEARCH}$$





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Argument for $R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Q},B}$



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This provides arguments for both $R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Q},B}$ and $R_{\mathsf{Look},\mathbb{Q},B}$.



18

The mod-PIOP technique



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


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P; w, u)






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
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$$V$$

Random prime q








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$$P \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Oracles to } \mathit{MLE}(w), \mathit{MLE}(u) \\ \hline \mathit{Random prime } q \end{array} \right. \quad V$$

$$(x; w, u) \quad \text{Execute a PIOP for the constraint} \quad (x)$$

$$Az \circ Bz = Cz + u \circ \mu \ \mathsf{modulo} \ q$$

For the latter, it suffices to use the usual version of (Super)Spartan.



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$$R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Z},B} = \left\{ (x; w, u) \middle| \begin{array}{l} x \in \mathbb{Z}_B^m, \ w \in \mathbb{Z}_B^k, \ u \in \mathbb{Z}_B^{m+k+1} \\ Az \circ Bz = Cz + u \circ \mu \ \text{ over } \mathbb{Z}, \ z = (w, x, 1) \end{array} \right\}$$

$$P \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Oracles to } MLE(w), MLE(u) \\ \hline \text{Random prime } q \end{array} \right.$$

$$(x; w, u) \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Execute a PIOP for the constraint} \\ Az \circ Bz = Cz + u \circ \mu \ \text{modulo } q \end{array} \right. \quad (x)$$


For the latter, it suffices to use the usual version of (Super)Spartan.


When MLE(w), MLE(u) are queried, V receives a value in \mathbb{Z} and reduces it mod q




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This PIOP is sound against P* that send oracles to MLE(w), MLE(u) with entries in \mathbb{Z}_B .

Execute a PIOP for the constraint

 $Az \circ Bz = Cz + u \circ \mu$ modulo q



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But the entries of z, u have at most B bits.



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We would like to use the mod-PIOP idea from Campanelli and Hall-Andersen. But reduction modulo a prime is not well-defined: w, u can contain rational entries. We use the concept of local subrings of \mathbb{Q} .





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Mult mod 2 ⁿ	Zinc
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 - · Something else.



23

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
 $GF(2^n)$, $\mathbb{Z}/2^n\mathbb{Z}$, Cyclotomic rings, Galois rings, any finite field, $\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$.

So: a SNARK for constraints over $\mathbb{Z}[X]$ or $\mathbb{Q}[X]$ has universal arithmetization properties

$$R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Z}[X]} = \left\{ (x; w, u, v) \middle| \begin{array}{l} x \in \mathbb{Z}[X]^m, \ w \in \mathbb{Z}[X]^k, \ u, v \in \mathbb{Z}[X]^{m+k+1} \\ Az \circ Bz = Cz + u \circ \overrightarrow{\mu} + v \cdot \overrightarrow{\eta} \text{ over } \mathbb{Z}[X], \quad z = (w, x, 1) \end{array} \right\}$$


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



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



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



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


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Reduction mod (X-a,q) is the same as replacing X by a and reducing mod q. This gets you to \mathbb{F}_q

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where \mathbb{F} is a prime field.

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
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
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- We hope to have a PoC implementation of Zinc+ in about 3 months.

WIP: More improvements


Avoid V sampling a prime. Sample just an integer




Similar to Ligero/Brakedown But some parts run on \mathbb{Q} Others on \mathbb{F}_q




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$$R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Z}}$$

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$$\mathsf{Prove with}$$

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Table 1

Polygon Zisk			
Using lookups	to	avoid	arithmetization
Check Binius	mult	use	case for the above
Tessel			
Invite people	to	colla	b in research and engineering





Anatomy of a FRI-based SNARK:




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Trace generation



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
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




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(Source: "State of Stwo" by Eli Ben-Sasson at SBC 2024)






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




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




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




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Where \mathbb{Z}_B is the set of integers with bit-size less than B.



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Adapt Spartan PIOP (or SuperSpartan) for $R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Z},B}$



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Prove it is sound against P^* that use polys over \mathbb{Z}_R



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Compile into succinct argument for $R_{\text{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Z},B}$



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With soundness holding against P^* that use polys over \mathbb{Z}_R

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Let's modify our naïve attempt so as to address these issues.

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Compile into succinct argument for $R_{R1CS\ell, \mathbb{Z}, B}$

(2) Design a PCS for polynomials over \mathbb{Z}_B

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[CH2024] compile mod-PIOPs with (2) into a succinct argument for $R_{\text{R1CS}\ell.\mathbb{Z}.B}$



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Compile into succinct argument for $R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Z},B}$

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It is not clear how to build efficient PCS's for integral polynomials. Why?

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- In a nutshell, when trying to extract the committed polynomial f, one has to solve a system of linear equations over $\mathbb Z$.
- The solution determines f.

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- However, in general, the solution consists of rational numbers.

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- In a nutshell, when trying to extract the committed polynomial f, one has to solve a system of linear equations over $\mathbb Z$.
- The solution determines f.
- · However, in general, the solution consists of rational numbers.
- I.e. extraction often requires inversion, but \mathbb{Z} is not closed under inversion.

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Design a PCS for polynomials over \mathbb{Z}_B

Compile into succinct argument for $R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Z},B}$

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Compile into succinct argument for $R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Z},B}$

We make the following key design choice:

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Compile into succinct argument for $R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Z},B}$

We make the following key design choice:

We work over \mathbb{Q}_B instead of \mathbb{Z}_B .

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PIOP for $R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Q},B}$

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Soundness holds against P^* that use polys over \mathbb{Q}_R

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Soundness holds against P^* that use polys over $\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbb{R}}$

Compile into succinct argument for $R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Q},B}$



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Note: Now $R_{R1CS\ell,\mathbb{Q},B}$ no longer captures arbitrary modular arithmetic.



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Because of this, we also design a lookup argument over \mathbb{Q}_{R} . I.e. an argument for



Designing a PCS over \mathbb{Z}_{R} is hard because \mathbb{Z} is not a field.

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Note: Now $R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Q},B}$ no longer captures arbitrary modular arithmetic.

Because of this, we also design a lookup argument over \mathbb{Q}_R . I.e. an argument for

$$R_{\mathsf{Look},\mathbb{Q},B} = \left\{ (t; \mathbf{a}) \middle| \begin{array}{l} t \in \mathbb{Q}_B^n, \ \mathbf{a} \in \mathbb{Q}_B^m, \\ \{\mathbf{a_i} \mid i \in [m]\} \subseteq \{t_i \mid i \in [n]\} \end{array} \right\}$$

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Set $t = [-2^B, 2^B] \cap \mathbb{Z}$.



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Then an argument for $R_{\mathsf{Look},\mathbb{Q},B}$ enforces a to contain entries from \mathbb{Z}_B .

Argument for $R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Q},B}$



$$R_{\mathsf{Look},\mathbb{Q},B} = \left\{ (t; \mathbf{a}) \middle| \begin{array}{l} t \in \mathbb{Q}_B^n, \ \mathbf{a} \in \mathbb{Q}_B^m, \\ \{\mathbf{a}_i \mid i \in [m]\} \subseteq \{t_i \mid i \in [n]\} \end{array} \right\}$$

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Argument for
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$$\begin{array}{c|c} \text{Argument} \\ \text{for } R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Q},B} \end{array} + \begin{array}{c|c} \text{Argument} \\ \text{for } R_{\mathsf{Look},\mathbb{Q},B} \end{array}$$



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In our work we are general and describe an argument for any relation over \mathbb{Q}_B that can be expressed algebraically.

This provides arguments for both $R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Q},B}$ and $R_{\mathsf{Look},\mathbb{Q},B}$.



42



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
$$P \bigcup_{(x; w, u)} \begin{array}{l} \mathsf{Oracles to } \mathit{MLE}(w), \mathit{MLE}(u) \\ \hline + \mathsf{Random prime } \mathit{q} \\ \hline (x; w, u) \end{array}$$





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For the latter, it suffices to use the usual version of (Super)Spartan.



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
When MLE(w), MLE(u) are queried, V receives a value in \mathbb{Z} and reduces it mod q




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This PIOP is sound against P* that send oracles to MLE(w), MLE(u) with entries in \mathbb{Z}_B .

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But the entries of z, u have at most B bits.



1



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We use the concept of local subrings of \mathbb{Q} .





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The mod-PIOP technique over the rationals

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
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(x; w, u)


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
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
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
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
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But entries in z, u have bit-size $\leq B$.

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(x; w, u)

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
Random prime *q*

If z, u have entries in $\mathbb{Z}_{(q)}$, execute a PIOP for $Az \circ Bz = Cz + u \circ \mu$ modulo q. Otherwise, abort.




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$$R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Q},B} = \left\{ (x; w, u) \middle| \begin{array}{l} x \in \mathbb{Z}_B^m, w \in \mathbb{Q}_B^k, u \in \mathbb{Q}_B^{m+k+1} \\ Az \circ Bz = Cz + u \circ \mu \text{ over } \mathbb{Q}, z = (w, x, 1) \end{array} \right\}$$



Soundness: Similarly as in mod-PIOPs over the integers (with some technical subtleties). If P* has large success probability, then some witness entry has large bit-size.



PIOP for $R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Q},B}$









Soundness holds against P^* that use polys over \mathbb{Q}_B



PIOP for $R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Q},B}$

Design a PCS for polynomials over \mathbb{Q}_{B}

Soundness holds against P^* that use polys over \mathbb{Q}_B



PIOP for $R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Q},B}$


Design a PCS for polynomials over \mathbb{Q}_B

Soundness holds against P^* that use polys over \mathbb{Q}_B




PIOP for $R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Q},B}$

Design a PCS for polynomials over \mathbb{Q}_{R}




Compile into succinct argument for $R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Q},B}$





Design a PCS for polynomials over \mathbb{Q}_B




Compile into succinct argument for $R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Q},B}$

Next, we design Zip, a PCS for polynomials over \mathbb{Q}_B .





Design a PCS for polynomials over \mathbb{Q}_R



Compile into succinct argument for $R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Q},B}$


Next, we design Zip, a PCS for polynomials over \mathbb{Q}_{B} .

Zip is based on the Brakedown PCS.





Design a PCS for polynomials over \mathbb{Q}_R



Compile into succinct argument for $R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Q},B}$

Next, we design Zip, a PCS for polynomials over \mathbb{Q}_{B} .


Zip is based on the Brakedown PCS.

Uses error correcting codes and hash functions.





Design a PCS for polynomials over \mathbb{Q}_B



Compile into succinct argument for $R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Q},B}$

Next, we design Zip, a PCS for polynomials over \mathbb{Q}_B .

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
Uses error correcting codes and hash functions.

This is the most involved part of our work.



PIOP for $R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Q},B}$

Design a PCS for polynomials over \mathbb{Q}_B



Compile into succinct argument for $R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Q},B}$

Next, we design Zip, a PCS for polynomials over \mathbb{Q}_B .

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
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Zip features both



PIOP for $R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Q},B}$

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
Zip features both

IOP of proximity to a linear code



PIOP for $R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Q},B}$

Design a PCS for polynomials over \mathbb{Q}_B



Compile into succinct argument for $R_{\mathsf{R1CS}\ell,\mathbb{Q},B}$

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Zip features both

- IOP of proximity to a linear code
- IOP of proximity to the integers





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Soundness

Guaranteed: P committed to

$$f \in \mathbb{Q}_{B'}[X_1, ..., X_{\mu}]$$



Soundness

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Zip guarantees P committed to multilinear $f \in \mathbb{Q}_{B'}[X_1, ..., X_{\mu}]$.



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To be used only for

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If P doesn't use $f \in \mathbb{Z}_B[X_1,...,X_u]$, completeness may fail.



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Analogous to IOP of proximity (IOPP) to a code:



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Analogous to IOP of proximity (IOPP) to a code:

An IOPP guarantees P committed to words close to codewords,

But completeness is only guaranteed if P actually used codewords

In our use cases, honest P always uses integral polys.



Soundness

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(We can extend Zip to enable completeness for $f \in \mathbb{Q}_B[X_1, ..., X_u]$.



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Zip is essentially Brakedown over \mathbb{Q} , executed modulo a random prime at times.



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The commitment happens over \mathbb{Q} .



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Hence, we use a linear code over $\mathbb Q$ (with integral generator matrix M_{Gen}).



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Key technical lemma: A random linear combination of rational numbers with large bit-size has large bit-size, e.w.n.p.

