

Gröbner basis Cryptanalysis of Anemoi

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08 May, 2025

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Introduction

Context

- Advanced cryptographic protocols, e.g. ZK-Proofs: need efficient **hash functions over large fields**.
- **Arithmetization-Oriented Primitives (AOP)**
- Algebraic representation: **algebraic attacks are the main threat**.

Notation

- $\mathbb{K}$: a finite field
- $R = \mathbb{K}[x_1, \dots, x_n]$: polynomial ring: the set of polynomials in n variables $x_1, \dots, x_n$ with coefficients in $\mathbb{K}$.
- $I \subset R$ is an ideal iff:
 - $0 \in I$
 - $\forall a, b \in I \implies a \pm b \in I$
 - $r \in R, a \in I \implies r \cdot a \in I$ (simplification)
- $\mathbf{x}$ denotes the set of variables $x_1, \dots, x_n$.

Gröbner basis background

Gröbner basis: Monomial ordering

Every monomial $m = \prod_{i=1}^n x_i^{\alpha_i} \in R$ can be identified with the corresponding vector of exponents $\alpha = (\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n)$.

Monomial ordering

A monomial ordering $\prec$ on $\mathbb{K}[x_1, \dots, x_n]$ is a relation $\prec$ on $\mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}^n$, or rather a relation on the set of monomials x^α where $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}^n$, satisfying the following conditions:

- $\prec$ is a total (or linear) order on $\mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}^n$
- if $\alpha \prec \beta$ and $\gamma \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}^n$, then $\alpha + \gamma \prec \beta + \gamma$
- $\prec$ is a well-ordering on $\mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}^n$, meaning that every non empty subset of $\mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}^n$ has a smallest element under the relation $\prec$.

Gröbner basis: DRL Monomial ordering

DRL Monomial ordering

Let $\alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}^n$. We say $\alpha >_{\text{DRL}} \beta$ if

$$|\alpha| = \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i > |\beta| = \sum_{i=1}^n \beta_i, \text{ or } |\alpha| = |\beta| \text{ and } \alpha >_{\text{RLEX}} \beta.$$

We say $x^\alpha >_{\text{DRL}} x^\beta$ if $\alpha >_{\text{DRL}} \beta$.

Gröbner basis: Weighted Monomial ordering

Weighted Monomial ordering

Given a weight vector $w = (w_1, \dots, w_n) \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^n$, where $w_1 \neq 0$. We say that w is associated with the monomial ordering $\prec$, defined by:

$$\prod_{i=1}^n x_i^{\alpha_i} \prec \prod_{i=1}^n x_i^{\beta_i} \iff \begin{cases} \sum_{i=1}^n w_i \alpha_i > \sum_{i=1}^n w_i \beta_i \\ \sum_{i=1}^n w_i \alpha_i = \sum_{i=1}^n w_i \beta_i, \alpha \prec_M \beta \end{cases}$$

where M is another monomial order like LEX, RLEX.

Gröbner basis

Gröbner basis

Let $I = \langle f_1, \dots, f_s \rangle$ be an ideal in $\mathbb{K}[x_1, \dots, x_n]$ and let $\prec$ be a valid monomial ordering. A finite subset $G = \{g_1, \dots, g_t\}$ of I different from $\{0\}$ is said to be a **Gröbner Basis** (or Standard Basis) w.r.t. $\prec$ if

$$\langle \text{LM}(g_1), \dots, \text{LM}(g_t) \rangle = \langle \text{LM}(I) \rangle.$$

Reduced Gröbner basis

Let G be a Gröbner basis for the ideal $I \subset \mathbb{K}[x_1, \dots, x_n]$ with respect to a monomial ordering $\prec$, if

- $\text{LC}(g) = 1$ for all $g \in G$
- for all $g \in G$, no monomial of g lies in $\langle \text{LT}(G \setminus \{g\}) \rangle$

G is said to be a **reduced Gröbner basis**.

Gröbner basis: one criterion for computation

S-polynomial

Let $f, g \in R$ be nonzero polynomials. The S-polynomials of f and g , denoted as $\mathcal{S}(f, g)$ is defined as:

$$\frac{\text{LCM}(\text{LM}(f), \text{LM}(g))}{\text{LT}(f)} f - \frac{\text{LCM}(\text{LM}(f), \text{LM}(g))}{\text{LT}(g)} g$$


Buchberger criterion

Let I be a polynomial ideal. Then a basis $G = \{g_1, \dots, g_t\}$ of I is a Gröbner basis of I if and only if for all pairs $i \neq j$, the remainder on division of $\mathcal{S}(g_i, g_j)$ by G (listed in some order) is zero.


GB attack methodology

Gröbner basis attack walkthrough

Primitive




Gröbner basis attack walkthrough




$$P = \begin{cases} p_1(x_1, \dots, x_n) \\ p_2(x_1, \dots, x_n) \\ p_3(x_1, \dots, x_n) \\ \vdots \\ p_m(x_1, \dots, x_n) \end{cases}$$

Gröbner basis attack walkthrough




- Choose a monomial ordering
- Compute a GB G of $\langle P \rangle$ with well-known algorithms, e.g.:
 - Buchberger's algorithm [Buc85]
 - F4 [Fau99]
 - F5 [Fau02]

Gröbner basis attack walkthrough



- Univariate polynomial finding step
- Two main techniques:
 - basis conversion (e.g. FGLM [FM17])
 - determinant computation

Gröbner basis attack walkthrough



- Root finding for computing the variety (the solutions to the original system)

Existing problems (at least some of them)

- Degrees of the equations
- Sparse polynomial representation of the primitive
- High complexity algorithms [CG20; CLO15]:
 - GB computation
 - univariate polynomial finding
- Loose theoretical bounds

Anemoi

General overview


- ZK-friendly permutation [Bou+23] proposed in CRYPTO '23.
- Defined over $\mathbb{K} = \mathbb{F}_q$ where q is prime (or $q = 2^n, n \geq 32$).
- Two parameters: $\ell \geq 1$ and $\alpha \in \{3, 5, 7, 11\}$.
- $\text{Anemoi} : \mathbb{K}^{2\ell} \rightarrow \mathbb{K}^{2\ell}$
- Each round is composed by a:
 - Linear Layer
 - Non-linear layer: called Flystel

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NOTE: we focused on $\mathbb{K} = \mathbb{F}_q$ where q is prime.

Non-linear layer: Flystel




$$Q_\gamma = \beta x^2 + \gamma \quad \text{and} \quad Q_\delta = \beta x^2 + \delta$$

where $E^{-1} = x^{\frac{1}{\alpha}}$, $\beta = g$, $\gamma = 0$, $\delta = g^{-1}$

Anemoi Hashing

Anemoi is mainly used within **sponge constructions**.



The permutation function $f = \text{Anemoi}_{q,\alpha}(\mathbf{x}_0, \mathbf{y}_0)$ operating on $\mathbb{K}^{r+c}$.

Anemoi cryptanalysis

Example with $\ell = 1$ and $\alpha = 3$

CICO problem

The main problem on which algebraic attacks are based on is the CICO (Constrained Input Constrained Output) problem.

CICO for Anemoi $\ell = 1$

Let $P : \mathbb{K}^2 \rightarrow \mathbb{K}^2$ be a permutation. The CICO problem consists in finding $(y_0, y_{N+1}) \in \mathbb{K}^2$ such that $\text{Anemoi}(0, y_0) = (0, y_{N+1})$.

Security Implications


Hash functions rely on 3 main properties:

- Pre-Image Resistance
- Second Pre-Image Resistance
- Collision Resistance



Finding the solutions to the system of polynomials means:

- Number of solutions $> 1 \implies$ breaking Collision resistance.
- Number of solutions $\geq 1 \implies$ breaking Pre-Image resistance.


Goals



Modelling phase: obtaining the equations




Modelling phase: obtaining the equations




$$b_{r+1} = \mathcal{L}^{(2)}(x_r, y_r) - s_{r+1} - y_{r+1}$$

Modelling phase: obtaining the equations



$$a_{r+1} = Q_\gamma(\mathcal{L}^{(2)}(x_r, y_r)) - s_{r+1}^\alpha - \mathcal{L}^{(1)}(x_r, y_r)$$

Modelling phase: obtaining the equations



$$f_{N+1} = \mathcal{L}^{(1)}(x_N, y_N)$$

New model for Anemoi : A_{CICO}


Definition (A_{CICO} model for $\ell \geq 1$)

An algebraic model of the Anemoi permutation $A_\pi : \mathbb{K}^{2\ell} \rightarrow \mathbb{K}^{2\ell}$ applied for N rounds, under the *CICO* constraints, is given by the system

$$A_{\text{CICO}} = \{\mathbf{a}_1, \dots, \mathbf{a}_N, \mathbf{b}_1, \dots, \mathbf{b}_N, \mathbf{f}_{N+1}\}$$

where $A_{\text{CICO}} \subset \mathbb{K}[\mathbf{y}_0, \dots, \mathbf{y}_N, \mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_N]$. The generated system contains $\ell(2N + 1)$ equations in $\ell(2N + 1)$ variables.

Goals



Gröbner basis computation

$$G_{\text{DRL}} = \begin{cases} g_{i,0} := y_{i,0} + Q(\mathbf{y}_1, \mathbf{s}_1) \\ g'_{i,j} := y_{i,j}^\alpha + Q(s_{i,j}, \mathbf{s}_{j+1}, \mathbf{y}_{j-1}, \mathbf{y}_j, \mathbf{y}_{j+1}) \\ g_{i,j} := s_{i,j}^\alpha + Q(\mathbf{y}_j, \mathbf{y}_{j+1}, \mathbf{s}_{j+1}) \\ g''_{i,j} := y_{i,j}s_{i,j} + Q(s_{i,j}, \mathbf{s}_{j+1}, \mathbf{y}_{j-1}, \mathbf{y}_j, \mathbf{y}_{j+1}) \end{cases}$$

$$G_{\text{W}_{\text{DRL}}} = \begin{cases} g_{i,0} := y_{i,0} + Q(\mathbf{y}_1, \mathbf{s}_1) \\ g'_{i,j} := s_{i,j}^{\alpha+1} + Q(s_{i,j}, \mathbf{s}_{j+1}, \mathbf{y}_{j-1}, \mathbf{y}_j, \mathbf{y}_{j+1}) \\ g_{i,j} := y_{i,j}^2 + Q(s_{i,j}^\alpha, y_{l-i-1,j}, \mathbf{y}_{j+1}, \mathbf{s}_{j+1}) \\ g''_{i,j} := y_{i,j}s_{i,j} + Q(s_{i,j}, \mathbf{s}_{j+1}, \mathbf{y}_{j-1}, \mathbf{y}_j, \mathbf{y}_{j+1}) \end{cases}$$

where $1 \leq i \leq \ell, 1 \leq j \leq N$.


Complexity and structure of the GB: proven by following the steps of the Buchberger's Algorithm.

Why a weighted monomial ordering?

```
4: s10^5 + 3*s11^5 + 3*y20^2 + 9*y21^2 + 3*y20 + y21 - y30 - s20 - 12
5: s10^5 + 33*s11^5 + 3*y20^2 + 10*y21^2 + 33*y20 + y21 - 30*y31 - 30*s21 + 10
16: -30*s11^5 - y21^2 - 30*y20 - y30 + 30*y31 - s20 + 30*s21 - 22
```


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
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$$2\text{wt}(y) \geq \alpha \text{wt}(s)$$

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16: -30*s11^5 - y21^2 30*y20 - y30 + 30*y31 - s20 + 30*s21 - 22
```



$$2\text{wt}(y) \geq \alpha \text{wt}(s)$$

```
4: y20^2 + 3*y21^2 + 30*s10^5 + s11^5 + y20 + 30*y21 - 30*y30 - 30*s20 - 4
5: y20^2 + 33*y21^2 + 30*s10^5 + 11*s11^5 + 11*y20 + 30*y21 - 10*y31 - 10*s21 + 33
18: -30*y21^2 - 10*s11^5 - 10*y20 - 30*y30 + 10*y31 - 30*s20 + 10*s21 - 37
```

Gröbner basis computation: experimental results

Small scale experiments with a 31-bit prime: 1481823929.

		$\alpha = 3$	$\alpha = 5$	$\alpha = 7$	$\alpha = 11$
$\ell = 1$	$T_{GB}[ms]$	2.16 (21)	2.33 (21)	2.12 (20)	1.94 (19)
	d_{solv}	9	30	42	66
$\ell = 2$	$T_{GB}[ms]$	4.57 (14)	4.39 (14)	3.83 (13)	4.02 (13)
	d_{solv}	9	30	42	66
$\ell = 3$	$T_{GB}[ms]$	11.0 (12)	8.79 (12)	8.74 (12)	8.49 (11)
	d_{solv}	9	30	42	66

Table: For $\ell = 1, 2, 3$, the G_{DRL} (if $\alpha = 3$) and G_{WDRL} (if $\alpha = 5, 7, 11$) computation time in millisecond and the solving degree d_{solv} . We present the GB results with respect to the number of rounds of Anemoi (in brackets), but we were able to compute the Gröbner basis for more than 100 rounds.

Gröbner basis computation complexity

DRL GB for $\alpha = 3$

$$\mathcal{O}\left(\frac{\text{poly}_1(\ell)N - \text{poly}_2(\ell)}{2}\right)$$


field operations where $\text{poly}_1(\ell) = \ell^2(24\ell^4 + 40\ell^3 + 32\ell^2 + 29\ell - 1)$ and $\text{poly}_2(\ell) = \ell^2(17\ell^4 + 4\ell^3 + 27\ell^2 + 15\ell + 1)$.

W_{DRL} GB for $\alpha = 5, 7, 11$

$$\mathcal{O}\left(\frac{\text{poly}_1(\ell)N + \text{poly}_2(\ell)}{2}\right)$$

field operations where $\text{poly}_1(\ell) = \ell^2(24\ell^3 + 6\ell^2 + 7\ell - 1)$ and $\text{poly}_2(\ell) = \ell^2(4\ell^4 - 6\ell^3 + 18\ell^2 + 11\ell - 1)$.

Goals



Univariate polynomial finding

Main methods:

- Basis conversion: e.g. SparseFGLM [FM17] ($\mathcal{O}(d_I(\mathcal{Z} + n_v \log(d_I)))$)
- Eigenvalue methods:
 - Determinant computation [Bar+24; LNZ17]: $\mathcal{O}(\ell \cdot d_I^\omega)$
 - **Wiedemann algorithm** [FM17; Wie86]: $\mathcal{O}(\ell d_I(\mathcal{Z} + \log(d_I)))$

Depend on:

- $\mathcal{Z}$: number of non-zero entries in the multiplication matrices
- d_I : quotient ring dimension

The quotient ring dimension

Conjectured in [KLR24; Bar+24].

Quotient ring dimension for Anemoi

Let N be the number of rounds of Anemoi for $\ell \geq 1$ and $\alpha = 3$ (resp. $\alpha = 3, 5, 7, 11$). The dimension of the quotient ring basis of the DRL Gröbner basis (resp. W_{DRL} Gröbner basis) w.r.t Anemoi(N, α, ℓ) is:

$$d_I = |B_{G_{DRL}}| = |B_{G_{W_{DRL}}}| := (\alpha + 2)^{N\ell}$$

Proof idea: the proven GB structure of Anemoi $\implies$ proving d_I .

Applying the Wiedemann algorithm: why?

Conjecture: Sparsity of the multiplication matrices

Sparseness of the multiplication matrices w.r.t the input variables computed as $\mathcal{Z}/d_I^2$:

$$\text{Sparsity}(T_i) \approx \begin{cases} 0.9e^{-1.148N}/\ell & \text{for } \alpha = 3 \\ 0.32e^{-1.06N}/\ell & \text{for } \alpha = 5 \end{cases}$$


Applying the Wiedemann algorithm: results

Security	128		256	
α	3	5	3	5
$\ell = 1$	111 (21)	143 (21)	196 (37)	253 (37)
	111 (21)	122 (<u>18</u>)	196 (37)	253 (37)
$\ell = 2$	171 (14)	212 (14)	269 (22)	335 (22)
	122 (<u>10</u>)	120 (<u>8</u>)	245 (<u>20</u>)	243 (<u>16</u>)
$\ell = 3$	230 (12)	283 (12)	326 (17)	401 (17)
	115 (<u>6</u>)	117 (<u>5</u>)	249 (<u>13</u>)	235 (<u>10</u>)

bits : security of full rounds instances

bits : security of reduced rounds instances

Goals



Basis conversion: is it useful for Anemoi?

- Common *modus operandi*: converting the GB from a graded monomial ordering to lexicographic
- In cryptanalysis, *Shape lemma is often assumed*.

Shape lemma

Let I be a zero-dimensional radical ideal such that the x_n coordinate of the points in $\mathbb{V}(I)$ are distinct. Let G be a reduced Gröbner basis for I relative to a LEX monomial order with x_n as the last variable. G consists of n polynomials

$$\{x_1 - g_1(x_n), x_2 - g_2(x_n), \dots, g_n(x_n)\}$$

where $\deg(g_i) < \deg(g_n)$ for each $1 \leq i < n$ and $\deg(g_n) = \dim_{\mathbb{K}}(\mathbb{K}[x_1, \dots, x_n]/I)$. We say, equivalently, that the ideal I has shape lemma or shape form.


Shape lemma for zero dimensional ideals

Theorem

Let $I \subset \mathbb{K}[x_1, \dots, x_n]$ be a zero-dimensional ideal and let G be its Gröbner basis (w.r.t a generic monomial ordering $\prec$) which contains elements f_i such that $\text{LM}(f_i) = x_i^{\alpha_i}$ for each $1 \leq i \leq n$. If I has no solutions at ∞ , then the ideal I has a Shape Form in the reduced LEX Gröbner basis.

Proof uses a recent result by Cox and D'Andrea [CD23].

Summary of the results



Thanks for your attention!

Questions?

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