

(inefficient Prover) ZAPs
from

Hard-to-Invert Functions

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30 SECOND SUMMARY

one-way functions are NOT needed for
a non-trivial notion of zero-knowledge proofs for NP

ONE MINUTE SUMMARY

1. new primitive below one-way functions (owf):


Hard-to-Invert Functions (HIF)

2. HIF $\Rightarrow$ ZAPs (2-message witness indistinguishable proofs)
for NP with subexponential time prover


(3. HIF + more complexity assumptions $\Rightarrow$ hardness in $NP \cap coNP$, non-uniform setting)

Hard-to-Invert Function?

Recall: One-Way Function



Hard-to-Invert Function (HIF)



can verify
" $f(x) = y$ "
(given proof)
(i.e. $\{ (x, f(x)) \} \in NP$)

$OWF \xRightarrow{\text{red X}} HIF \leftarrow \text{TFUP hardness}$

ZERO KNOWLEDGE



ZERO KNOWLEDGE



Completeness

$x \in L \implies \text{Verifier accepts (w.h.p.)}$

ZERO KNOWLEDGE



Completeness

$x \in L \implies$ Verifier accepts (w.h.p.)

soundness

$x \notin L \implies$ Verifier rejects (w.h.p.), even if prover cheats

ZERO KNOWLEDGE



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zero-knowledge

verifier only learns $x \in L$.

ZERO KNOWLEDGE



Completeness

$x \in L \implies$ Verifier accepts (w.h.p.)

soundness

$x \notin L \implies$ Verifier rejects (w.h.p.), even if prover cheats

zero-knowledge

verifier only learns $x \in L$.
($x \in L \implies$ interaction can be efficiently simulated.)

ZERO KNOWLEDGE



[Goldreich Micali Wigderson '86] $OWF \Rightarrow ZK$ for NP


ZERO KNOWLEDGE



[Goldreich Micali Wigderson '86] $OWF \Rightarrow ZK$ for NP

[Ostrovsky Wigderson '93] $\neg OWF \Rightarrow$ no ZK for hard-on-average L

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[Ong Vadhan '08] ZK for L $\iff$ L has instance dependent commitments

ZERO KNOWLEDGE





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[Ong Vadhan '08] ZK for L $\iff$ L has instance dependent commitments

[Hirahara Nanashima '24] if $P \neq NP$, then ZK for NP $\Rightarrow$ OWF

Non-Interactive ZERO KNOWLEDGE





Prover



Verifier

Non-Interactive ZERO KNOWLEDGE



Prover

Common "random" string
(CRS)


vs



Verifier

UNIFORM random string
(URS)

Non-Interactive ZERO KNOWLEDGE



Prover



Verifier


Common "random" string
(CRS)

vs

UNIFORM random string
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[Passhelat '05] $OWF \Rightarrow NIZK$ with CRS
for NP (AM)

Non-Interactive ZERO KNOWLEDGE



Prover



Verifier

Common "random" string
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
vs

UNIFORM random string
(URS)

[Pass shelat '05] $OWF \Rightarrow NIZK$ with CRS
for NP (AM)

[Feige Lapidot Shamir '99]
 $OWP \Rightarrow NIZK$ with URS
for NP (AM)

Non-Interactive ZERO KNOWLEDGE



Prover



Verifier

Common "random" string
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vs

UNIFORM random string
(URS)

[Pass shelat '05] **OWF** $\Rightarrow$ NIZK with CRS
for NP (AM)

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OPEN QUESTION:


OWF $\Rightarrow$ NIZK in URS model?

Partial progress: [Ghosal et al. '23] NIZK in ROM

this work: HIF $\Rightarrow$ ZAP (w/ inefficient prover)
(HIF < OWF) (ZAP < NIZK in URS)

ZAPs

[Dwork Naor '00]




ZAPs

[Dwork Naor '00]



Prover



Prover



Verifier

WITNESS INDISTINGUISHABILITY

[Feige Shamir '90]

for any witnesses w_1, w_2 for x :


$$\text{Prover}(w_1) \stackrel{\text{indistinguishable}}{\approx} \text{Verifier} \approx \text{Prover}(w_2) \stackrel{\text{indistinguishable}}{\approx} \text{Verifier}$$

ZAPs

[Dwork Naor '00]



Prover



Prover



Verifier

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
NOTE: trivial if witnesses unique or prover arbitrarily inefficient (find & send 'canonical' witness)

ZAPs

[Dwork Naor '00]



Prover



Prover



Verifier

WITNESS INDISTINGUISHABILITY

[Feige Shamir '90]


for any witnesses w_1, w_2 for x :

$$\text{Prover}(w_1) \stackrel{\text{indistinguishable}}{\approx} \text{Verifier} \approx \text{Prover}(w_2) \stackrel{\text{indistinguishable}}{\approx} \text{Verifier}$$

NOTE:

non-trivial if prover runs in 2^{n^ϵ} time ($\epsilon < 1$).

[Dwork Naor '00]



[Ball Dachman-Soled Kulkarni '20]
inefficient provers (for better assumptions)?

one-way permutation
[FLS '99]

(inefficient prover)

ZAPs
(for NP)


[BDK '20]

ONIZK
with URS
(for NP)

(trivial)

NIZK with URS
(for NP)


[This Work]



ONIZK?

"OFFLINE SIMULATION"



$\forall x \in L$



ONIZK?

"OFFLINE SIMULATION"

$\forall x \in L$



Technical Overview

how to build $\circ$ NIZK from HIF?


[Feige Lapidot Shamir '99] framework for NIZK

- ① NIZK for NP in "hidden bits" model
- ② hidden bits from URS + OWP

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


how to build $\circ$ NIZK from HIF?

[Feige Lapidot Shamir '99] framework for $\circ$ NIZK

- ① $\circ$ NIZK for NP in ^{relaxed} "hidden bits" model (no change) ✓
- ② ^{relaxed} hidden bits from URS + HIF ← main contribution


^{relaxed} hidden bits proof



Perfectly binding Commitment
* where committer
can be inefficient *


Relaxed Hidden Bits in URS model (informal)

"Verifiable Hardcore of Random String"



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


With high probability over r :

1. (total) perfect binding: $\exists$ unique b that verifier will accept (ω / π)

Relaxed Hidden Bits in URS model (informal)

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
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2. hiding: $\left(r \mid \text{Prover}(r) = (\pi, 0) \right) \approx \left(r \mid \text{Prover}(r) = (\pi, 1) \right)$

Relaxed Hidden Bits in URS model (informal)

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With high probability over r :

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non-relaxed version: can efficiently sample (r, π, b)

Recall: [FLS'99] hidden bits

tools: • one-way permutation: $f: \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$
• hardcore predicate for f : $\phi: \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}$

Recall: [FLS'99] hidden bits

tools:

- one-way permutation: $f: \{0,1\}^\lambda \xrightarrow{\sim} \{0,1\}^\lambda$
- hardcore predicate for f : $\phi: \{0,1\}^\lambda \rightarrow \{0,1\}$

Construction:

Prover

compute:

1. $x = f^{-1}(r)$
2. $b = \phi(x)$

$r \leftarrow U_\lambda$

Verifier

check $f(x) = r$
& $\phi(x) = b$

$\xrightarrow{x, b}$

Recall: [FLS'99] hidden bits

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
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(total) perfect binding: $x = f^{-1}(r)$ always exists and is unique (sim. $\phi(x) = b$)

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
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(total) perfect binding: $x = f^{-1}(r)$ always exists and is unique (sim. $\phi(x) = b$)

hiding: ϕ is hardcore predicate

Attempt from OWF (HIF same)

- tools:
- one-way ~~permutation~~ ^{function}: $f: \{0,1\}^\lambda \rightarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda$
 - hardcore predicate for f : $\phi: \{0,1\}^\lambda \rightarrow \{0,1\}$

Construction:

Prover


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(total) perfect binding: $x = f^{-1}(r)$ ~~always exists~~ and is ~~unique~~ (sim. $\phi(x) = b$) ☹️

hiding: ϕ is hardcore predicate ✓

given (H, r)
Prover

compute: 1. $x = (H \circ f)^{-1}(r)$
2. $b = \phi(x)$


send (x, b) to open

Verifier

check $H \circ f(x) = r$
& $\phi(x) = b$

Attempt 2: making total

H : t -wise independent hash



(total) perfect binding: $x \in (H \circ f)^{-1}(r)$ always exists and is ~~unique~~
hiding: ϕ is hardcore predicate ✓

given (H, r, h)
 Prover

compute: 1. $x \in (H \circ f)^{-1}(r) \cap h^{-1}(0)$
 2. $b = \phi(x)$


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Verifier

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Attempt 3: making unique?

H : t -wise independent hash
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
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Attempt 3: making unique?

H : t -wise independent hash
 h : t -wise independent hash



Problem:
 can't get unique x
 w.h.p.

(total) perfect binding: $x \in (H \circ f)^{-1}(r) \cap h^{-1}(0)$ always exists and is unique?
hiding: ϕ is hardcore predicate ✓

given (H, r, h)
 Prover

compute: 1. $S = (H \circ f)^{-1}(r) \cap h^{-1}(0)$
 2. $b = \phi(S)$


send (S, b) to open

Verifier

check $\forall x \in S,$
 $H \circ f(x) = r$
 $\& h(x) = 0,$
 $\& \phi(S) = b$

Attempt 4: use everything

H : t -wise independent hash
 h : t -wise independent hash



(total) perfect binding: $S = (H \circ f)^{-1}(r) \cap h^{-1}(0)$ always exists and is ~~unique~~ ^{poly-sized w.h.p.}
hiding: ϕ is hardcore predicate ✓

given (H, r, h)
 Prover

compute: 1. $S = (H \circ f)^{-1}(r) \cap h^{-1}(0)$
 2. $b = \phi(S)$


send (S, b) to open

Verifier

check $\forall x \in S,$
 $H \circ f(x) = r$
 $\& h(x) = 0,$
 $\& \phi(S) = b$

Attempt 4: use everything

H : t -wise independent hash
 h : t -wise independent hash



Problem:

can't check all of S sent!

$\phi(S) \neq \phi(S \setminus \{x\})$

(total) perfect binding: $S = (H \circ f)^{-1}(r) \cap h^{-1}(0)$ always exists and is unique poly-sized w.h.p.
hiding: ϕ is hardcore predicate ✓

given $(H_1, r_1, h_1) \dots (H_m, r_m, h_m)$ **Attempt 5: repeat & use statistics**

Prover

compute: for $i = 1 \dots m$:

1. $S_i = (H_i \circ f_i)^{-1}(r_i) \cap h^{-1}(0)$

2. $b_i = \phi(S_i)$

set $b = \text{MAJ}(b_1, \dots, b_m)$

send $(S_1, \dots, S_m, b)$

Verifier

check $\forall i, \forall x \in S_i$

$$H_i \circ f_i(x) = r_i$$

$$\& h_i(x) = 0,$$

$$\& \text{MAJ}(\phi(S_1) \dots \phi(S_m)) = b$$

$\& |S_1| \dots |S_m|$ distributed correctly

given $(H_1, r_1, h_1) \dots (H_m, r_m, h_m)$
 Prover

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

$\& \text{MAJ}(\phi(S_1) \dots \phi(S_m)) = b$

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Attempt 5: repeat & use statistics

[Akavia Goldreich Goldwasser Moshkovitz '06]:

Compare (accept if close):



given $(H_1, r_1, h_1) \dots (H_m, r_m, h_m)$
 Prover

compute: for $i = 1 \dots m$:
 1. $S_i = (H_i \circ f_i)^{-1}(r_i) \cap h^{-1}(0)$

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set $b = \text{MAJ}(b_1, \dots, b_m)$

send $(S_1, \dots, S_m, b)$

Verifier

check $\forall i, \forall x \in S_i$

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

$\& \text{MAJ}(\phi(S_1) \dots \phi(S_m)) = b$

$\& |S_1| \dots |S_m|$ distributed correctly

Attempt 5: repeat & use statistics

[Akavia Goldreich Goldwasser Moshkovitz '06]:

Compare (accept if close):



problem: where to get statistics about f ?

given $(H_1, r_1, h_1) \dots (H_m, r_m, h_m)$
 Prover

compute: for $i = 1 \dots m$:
 1. $S_i = (H_i \circ f_i)^{-1}(r_i) \cap h^{-1}(0)$

2. $b_i = \phi(S_i)$

set $b = \text{MAJ}(b_1, \dots, b_m)$

send $(S_1, \dots, S_m, b)$

Verifier

check $\forall i, \forall x \in S_i$

$H_i \circ f_i(x) = r_i$

$\& h_i(x) = 0,$



$\& \text{MAJ}(\phi(S_1) \dots \phi(S_m)) = b$

$\& |S_1| \dots |S_m|$ distributed correctly

Attempt 5: repeat & use statistics

[Akavia Goldreich Goldwasser Moshkovitz '06]:

Compare (accept if close):



problem: where to get statistics about f ? Prover (w/ proof) [Haitner Mahmoody Xiao '10]

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(Sketch: $① \Rightarrow ZAP \xrightarrow{+②}_{[BOV'03]} NIWI \xrightarrow{+③}_{[KZ'20]} NIWH \xrightarrow{+④}_{[GIKLS'23]} P \neq NP \cap coNP$)

OPEN QUESTIONS

- ① minimal assumptions for...
 - Ⓐ hard-to-invert functions?
 - Ⓑ ONIZK ?
 - Ⓒ inefficient prover ZAPs ?
- ② $\text{DWF} \Rightarrow \text{NIZK}$ in URS model?
- ③ explicit hardness in $\text{NP} \cap \text{coNP}$ without DWP ?

thanks!