Anamorphism Beyond One-To-One Messaging: PKE with Anamorphic Broadcast Mode

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Anamorphism

Two-View Principle

Anamorphic Art: Two Views on the Same Object



In anamorphic art, an object can be seen from many viewpoints, but the "complete" image only appears from a specific angle.

Two-View Principle

Anamorphic Art: Two Views on the Same Object



These images (*which I took at the National Gallery Singapore*) contain a proof of *anamorphism*: only from my specific position does the complete chair become visible.

Two-View Principle

Anamorphic Art: Two Views on the Same Object



Cryptography: Two Views on the "Same" Communication

- Real view: Actual interactions between insiders (holders of secret keys).
- Simulated view: Interactions are produced by a simulator.

Security: Real view \approx Simulated view (e.g., ZKP, MPC)

Anamorphic Cryptography [PPY22]

Anamorphic Ciphertext

View with normal_key

View with double_key

a regular message

an anamorphic message

Everything should look normal to a powerful adv. \mathcal{D} (dictator):

Anamorphic Cryptography [PPY22]

Anamorphic Ciphertext



Everything should look normal to a powerful adv. \mathcal{D} (dictator):

Ciphertext rule:

Anamorphic ciphertexts $\stackrel{\mathcal{D}}{\approx}$ normal ciphertexts, for an allowed encryption, with a specific public key.

• **Key rule:** D can request the secret key corresponding to any public key (unlike in *steganography*).

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Ciphertext rule:

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- Key rule: D can request the secret key corresponding to any public key (unlike in *steganography*).
- (New) Blocking rule: *D* can block any party from receiving communications (the fraction of blocked parties

The dictator enacts a law mandating weakened encryption or a built-in backdoor.

 \rightarrow A huge risk for **everyone**, including the dictator (e.g., Clipper chip, Dual_EC_DRBG).

Solution: Public debate, petitions, or technical demonstrations to oppose the approval of such laws.

The dictator permits standard encryption but remotely and massively controls all users:

- Require receivers to surrender their **secret keys** so all messages can be decrypted.
- Block any suspected users.

Our proposed **anamorphic model** provides a way to preserve users' privacy in this scenario.

PKE with Anamorphic Broadcast Mode

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Our Construction

Anonymity to Anamorphism: from Anonymous Multi-channel Broadcast (AnonMCBE)

Generic Approach

PKE + Associated Anonymous Multi-channel Broadcast

such that the ciphertexts are indistinguishable.

Then we can obtain PKE with Anamorphic Broadcast Mode.

How does it work?

- The sender sets up the AnonMCBE.
- Instead of sending a PKE ciphertext, they send a AnonMCBE's ciphertext.
- Anonymity + PKE ciphertexts \approx AnonMCBE ciphertexts

 \rightarrow Everything appears normal to the dictator.

- Double keys are decryption keys of AnonMCBE.
- Each anamorphic user decrypts to a message depending on the channel they belong to.

Generic Approach

PKE + Associated Anonymous Multi-channel Broadcast such that: the ciphertexts are indistinguishable then we can get PKE with Anamorphic Broadcast Mdoe.

Concrete Construction based on previous works:

- Multi-channel Broadcast [PPT12]: not anonymous.
- Multi-receiver Encryption [LPSS14]: 1 channel, ciphertext is of the same form as in PKE.
- Anonymous Broadcast [DPY20]: 1 channel, ciphertext is of the same form as in PKE.

Our Scheme: Anonymous Multi-channel Broadcast: many channels, ciphertext is of the same form as in PKE.

Short Integer Solution [Ajtai96] and Learning With Errors [Regev05] problems

• Params: $m, n, q \ge 0$, $A \leftarrow U(\mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n})$

k-LWE and Anonymous Broadcast

- Params: $m, n, q \ge 0, A \leftrightarrow U(\mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n})$
- Given k small hints $(\mathbf{x}_i)_{i \le k}$ s.t. $\mathbf{x}_i^t A = \mathbf{0} [q]$ (from [GPV08])

k-SIS [BF11] Find small $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}^m$ s.t.

- $\mathbf{x}^{t} A = \mathbf{0} [q]$
- $\mathbf{x} \notin \operatorname{Span}_{i \leq k}(\mathbf{x}_i)$

k-LWE [LPSS14] Distinguish $A\mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e}$ and $U(\operatorname{Span}_{i \leq k}(\mathbf{x}_i)^{\perp}) + \mathbf{e}'$ for $\mathbf{s} \leftrightarrow U(\mathbb{Z}_q^n)$ and small noises $\mathbf{e}, \mathbf{e}' \in \mathbb{Z}^m$ Anon-Broadcast [DPY20] Using $U(\operatorname{Span}_{i \leq k}(\mathbf{x}_i)^{\perp}) + \mathbf{e}'$

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Anonymous Broadcast Encryption from *k*-LWE in a Bounded Universe of *k* Users

- Twist on [LPSS14]: Using U(span_{i≤t}(x_i)[⊥]) + e for broadcasting (instead of tracing).
- Any user x_i can decrypt (while all others receive a random bit), and the ciphertext remains indistinguishable from standard PKE ciphertexts, under the *k*-LWE assumption.

Anonymous Multi-channel Broadcast Encryption

- 1-channel: Using y ↔ U(Span_{i≤t}(x_i (β, 0, ..., 0))[⊥]) + e to broadcast, then the decrypted result is modified, depending on βy₁ (all users in S still get the same result).
- Multi-channel: Partition the set into S₁,..., S_j, where each set S_i is associated with β_i → anyone in the same subset decrypts to the same bit (depending on β_iy₁).

Discussion and Open Questions

Anamorphic Crypto: Recent Active Directions

- Sender Anamorphism: The dictator can ask the sender to encrypt a specific message and provide proof of doing so (by giving him the randomness).
- Robustness; Anamorphic Extensions;
- Anamorphic-Resistance Encryption (ARE),
- Anamorphism in other primitives such as Signature, FHE.
- Public-key Anamorphism: No shared double keys.
- Generic constructions for any scheme? (\rightarrow next talk.)

Open questions

- Extend the one-to-many channel model along the above directions, in particular public-key anamorphism.
- Anamorphic broadcast mode for more schemes?
 - \rightarrow Bounded-Collusion Anonymous Broadcast Encryption.