

Quantum Pseudorandomness from a Single Haar Random State

Boyang Chen (Tsinghua University)


Andrea Coladangelo (University of Washington)

Or Sattath (Ben-Gurion University)







No unconditional cryptography in the common random string model




No unconditional cryptography in the common random string model





state model exists!!



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This model is called the common Haar random state model (abbreviated as the CHRS model).

Pseudorandom states

Definition(Adapted from [Ji-Liu-Song 17])

An *m*-qubit state family $|\phi_k\rangle$ is ℓ -pseudorandom state family (PRS) if:

- $|\phi_k\rangle$ can be efficiently prepared given $k \in \{0,1\}^n$
- For any adversary ${\mathcal A}$

$$\Pr_{k \sim \{0,1\}^n} \left[\mathcal{A}\left(|\phi_k\rangle^{\otimes \ell} \right) = 1 \right] - \Pr_{|\phi\rangle \leftarrow Haar} \left[\mathcal{A}\left(|\phi\rangle^{\otimes \ell} \right) = 1 \right] \le negl(n)$$

Pseudorandom states


Definition(Adapted from [Ji-Liu-Song 17])


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
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
$$\Pr_{k \sim \{0,1\}^n} \left[\mathcal{A}\left(|\phi_k\rangle^{\otimes \ell} \right) = 1 \right] - \Pr_{|\phi\rangle \leftarrow Haar} \left[\mathcal{A}\left(|\phi\rangle^{\otimes \ell} \right) = 1 \right] \le negl(n)$$

- As a special case, a 1PRS family is such that: a single copy of the state is computationally indistinguishable from a totally mixed state.
- Stretch: A 1-copy pseudorandom state family is nontrivial only if m > n.









Commitment from 1PRS

Theorem [Morimae-Yamakawa'22, Morimae-Nehoran-Yamakawa'24]

1PRS implies quantum bit commitment.

Pseudorandom states

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- $|\phi_k\rangle$ can be efficiently prepared given $k \in \{0,1\}^n$
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$$\Pr_{k \sim \{0,1\}^n} [\mathcal{A}(|\phi_k\rangle^{\otimes \ell})] = 1] - \Pr_{|\phi\rangle \leftarrow Haar} [\mathcal{A}(|\phi\rangle^{\otimes \ell})] = 1] \le \operatorname{negl}(n)$$

- As a special case, a 1PRS family is such that: a single copy of the state is computationally indistinguishable from a totally mixed state.
- Stretch: A 1-copy pseudorandom state family is nontrivial only if m > n.

Pseudorandom states in the CHRS model

Definition

- An *m*-qubit state family $|\phi_k\rangle$ is ℓ -pseudorandom state family (PRS) if:
- $|\phi_k\rangle$ can be efficiently prepared given $k \in \{0,1\}^n$ and $|\psi\rangle^{\otimes poly}$
- For any adversary ${\mathcal A}$

 $\Pr_{k \sim \{0,1\}^n} \left[\mathcal{A}\left(|\phi_k\rangle^{\otimes \ell}, |\psi\rangle^{\otimes poly} \right) = 1 \right] - \Pr_{|\phi\rangle \leftarrow Haar} \left[\mathcal{A}\left(|\phi\rangle^{\otimes \ell}, |\psi\rangle^{\otimes poly} \right) = 1 \right] \le \operatorname{negl}(n)$

- As a special case, a 1PRS family is such that: a single copy of the state is computationally indistinguishable from a totally mixed state.
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Cryptography from 1PRS

Main theorem (informal)

1PRS exist unconditionally in the CHRS model


As a corollary, quantum bit commitment exists unconditionally in the CHRS model.

Construction of PRS

Construction of PRS

Construction: Apply random Pauli on the first 0.45*n* qubits of the common random state $|\psi\rangle$: $|\phi_k\rangle \coloneqq X^a Z^b \otimes I|\psi\rangle$ where $k \in \{0,1\}^{0.9n}$, k = a||b $X^a \coloneqq \bigotimes_{i=1}^a X^{a_i}, Z^b \coloneqq \bigotimes_{i=1}^b Z^{b_i}$ $n - |\psi\rangle$

Construction of PRS



Proof sketch

Statistical 1-copy Security


• What does 1-copy security mean?



• $X^a Z^b |\psi\rangle$ is indistinguishable from a fresh Haar random state $|\phi\rangle$

Statistical 1-copy Security


• What does 1-copy security mean *in the CHRS model*?



• $X^a Z^b |\psi\rangle$ is indistinguishable from a fresh Haar random state $|\phi\rangle$ even given polynomially many copies of $|\psi\rangle$

Statistical 1-copy Security

 $\sigma = \mathbf{E}_{k,|\psi\rangle}[(X^a Z^b \otimes I)|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|(X^a Z^b \otimes I) \otimes |\psi\rangle\langle\psi|^{\otimes t}] \quad \boldsymbol{\rho} = \mathbf{E}[|\phi\rangle\langle\phi|] \otimes \mathbf{E}[|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|^{\otimes t}]$



- We show: Trace distance (quantum analog of TVD of distributions) between σ and ρ is $O(t^2/1.01^n)$
- Approach: Approximate σ and ρ with maximally entangled state

Approximating ρ


- t copies of an m-qubit Haar random state: $\mathbf{E}_{|\psi\rangle\leftarrow\mathrm{Haar}(2^n)}[|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|^{\otimes t}]$
- t copies of random maximally entangled state : $\mathbf{E}_{U \leftarrow \text{Haar}(2^{n/2})} [|\Phi_U\rangle \langle \Phi_U|^{\otimes t}]$ where $|\Phi_U\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^{n/2}}} \sum_{i=0}^{2^{n/2}-1} (U \otimes I) |ii\rangle$

Lemma [Harrow 24]:

$$\mathbf{E}_{|\psi\rangle\leftarrow\mathrm{Haar}(2^m)}[|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|^{\otimes t}]\approx_{O(t^2/2^{n/2})}\mathbf{E}_{U\leftarrow\mathrm{Haar}(2^{n/2})}[|\Phi_U\rangle\langle\Phi_U|^{\otimes t}]$$


Secure 1PRS without stretching

• Firstly, we show that random Pauli on first 0.5*n* qubits is secure (although not stretching)




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Reducing the key size

- Decompose common Haar random states according to the first qubit $|\psi\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle|\psi_0\rangle + |1\rangle|\psi_1\rangle)$
- Then, typically, $|\psi_0\rangle$ and $|\psi_1\rangle$ are close to two independent (n-1)-qubit Haar random states.

Reducing the key size


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- Then, typically, $|\psi_0\rangle$ and $|\psi_1\rangle$ are close to two independent (n-1)-qubit Haar random states.
- Key observation: If $X^a Z^b$ maps $|\psi_0\rangle$ and $|\psi_1\rangle$, $|\psi_0\rangle \pm |\psi_1\rangle$, $|\psi_0\rangle \pm i|\psi_1\rangle$ to the maximally mixed state (approximately on average), then it must also map $|\psi\rangle$ to the maximally mixed state.

CHRS model and quantum crypto primitives

What we know: PRS do not imply OWF in a black-box way [Kretschmer 21, KQST 23], PRS imply quantum cryptography [AQY21, MY 21]

What we don't know: how 1-copy PRS and multi-copy PRS are related

The CHRS model helps answer this question




Black-box separation of 1PRS and PRS

Theorem

Relative to the following oracle, 1PRS exists while PRS does not:

- A family of common Haar random state $\{|\psi_n
 angle\}$
- A **QPSPACE-complete** oracle




Generic attack on multi-copy PRS in the CHRS model

• Suppose $|\phi_k\rangle = Gen(k)|\psi\rangle$, consider the projector

 $\Lambda_k = \left(I \otimes Gen(k)^{\dagger} \right) SWAP \left(I \otimes Gen(k) \right)$

- $|\phi_k\rangle \otimes |\psi\rangle$ passes the test w.p. 1. A fresh random state $|\phi\rangle \otimes |\psi\rangle$ passes the test w.p. ~1/2. Thus $\Lambda_k^{\otimes 10n}$ provides an exponential gap between PRS and fresh Haar.
- Then use the quantum OR lemma $\Lambda_k^{\bigotimes 10n}$ for all k, we can distinguish PRS and Haar.



Concluding remarks

- Unlike classical settings, unconditional crypto exists in the presence of a common Haar random state.
- Follow-up work ([AGL24, BCN25, BMM+25, GZ25]): OWSG, classical communication commitment do not exist in the CHRS model, while EFID and one-way puzzles exist. The oracle can be lifted to a unitary oracle.
- Many other open questions.

