Faster ABE for Turing Machines from Circular Evasive LWE

<u>Valerio Cini</u> Hoeteck Wee





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 $(1^{\lambda}, \mathcal{F}) \rightarrow \boxed{\text{Setup}} \longrightarrow \text{msk}}$
 \downarrow
 mpk







[AgrawalKumariYamada24]

- $|ct| = O(T^2)$
- $|{\sf sk}| = O(|M|^2)$
- from Circular Evasive LWE [HLL23] + Tensor LWE [W22]

Our Results

- $|\mathsf{ct}| = O(T)$ and $\mathsf{Time}(\mathsf{Enc}) = O(T)$
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new encoding and techniques to switch $\ensuremath{\mathsf{b}}/\ensuremath{\mathsf{w}}$ them

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$$\mathbf{s}(\mathbf{A} - \mathbf{z} \otimes \mathbf{G}) = [\mathbf{s}(\mathbf{A}_1 - z_1\mathbf{G})| \dots |\mathbf{s}(\mathbf{A}_\ell - z_\ell\mathbf{G})]$$

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Main Idea: - dual encoding for (global) work tape - BGG⁺ encodings for (local) computation

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how to switch between the two types of encodings?

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$$\begin{split} \textbf{(C, C')} &= \textbf{(SB, SW + S'G)} & \textbf{B, W} \in \mathsf{mpk} \\ \textbf{K} \leftarrow \textbf{B}^{-1} \big(\textbf{A}_0 \textbf{G}^{-1} (\textbf{W}) - \textbf{W} \textbf{G}^{-1} (\textbf{A}_0') \, \big) \end{split}$$

 $\begin{array}{ll} \mbox{ciphertext} & (\textbf{C},\textbf{C}') = (\textbf{SB},\textbf{SW}+\textbf{S}'\textbf{G}) & \textbf{B},\textbf{W}\in \mbox{mpk} \\ & \textbf{K}\leftarrow \textbf{B}^{-1}\big(\,\textbf{A}_0\textbf{G}^{-1}(\textbf{W})-\textbf{W}\textbf{G}^{-1}(\textbf{A}_0')\,\big) \end{array}$

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$$\overbrace{z, \quad SA_0 - \operatorname{diag}(z) \cdot SG}^{\text{dual encoding of } z \text{ under } S, A_0} \longrightarrow \overbrace{S'A'_0 - \operatorname{diag}(z) \cdot S'G}^{\text{dual encoding of } z \text{ under } S', A'_0}$$

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 $|(\mathbf{C}, \mathbf{C}')| = O(|\mathbf{z}|) \longleftarrow$ linear in size of attribute / depend on \mathbf{S}, \mathbf{S}' $|\mathbf{K}| = O(1) \longleftarrow$ constant size / independent

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 $|ciphertext component| \longleftarrow linear in size of attribute$

 $|\text{key component}| \leftarrow \text{constant size}$

similar results hold for all other possible recodings 1) dual-to-dual 2) BGG⁺-to-dual 3) dual-to-BGG⁺

ABE for Iterated Computation with locality L, space S, and time T

$$f: \{0,1\}^L \longrightarrow \{0,1\}^L, \quad \text{read, write}: [T] \longrightarrow {S \choose L}, \quad L \ll S \leq T$$

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▶ $\mathbf{z}_t \in \{0,1\}^{S}$, t = 0, 1, ..., T, denotes the work tape at step t

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It captures Oblivious TM with 2^{L-1} states and alphabet $\{0, 1\}$

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Arbitrary TM with $O(\log T)$ overhead [PippengerFischer79]

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$$\underbrace{\mathbf{S}_0,\mathbf{S}_1,\ldots,\mathbf{S}_T}_{\boldsymbol{\mathcal{S}}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{\boldsymbol{\mathcal{S}}\times\boldsymbol{n}}$$

associated with ciphertext

associated with secret key

 \mathbf{A}_0

 $\in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$

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• attempt 1: all \mathbf{S}_t are the same, linear time but insecure

▶ final: each \mathbf{S}_t fresh random in U_t , with $|U_t| = O(L)$.

Warm-Up Construction

 $\tilde{\mathbf{C}}_{t-1} \coloneqq \mathbf{S}_{t-1} \mathbf{A}_0 - \mathsf{diag}(\mathbf{z}_{t-1}) \cdot \mathbf{S}_{t-1} \mathbf{G}$

$$\tilde{\mathbf{C}}_t \coloneqq \mathbf{S}_t \mathbf{A}_0 - \operatorname{diag}(\mathbf{z}_t) \cdot \mathbf{S}_t \mathbf{G}$$

$$\begin{array}{c|c} \hline \textbf{Warm-Up Construction} \\ \hline \textbf{Step } t \\ \hline \textbf{C}_{t-1} & \overbrace{\textbf{C}_{t-1}}^{\text{step } t} \textbf{C}_{t-1} = \textbf{S}_{t-1}\textbf{A}_0 - \text{diag}(\textbf{z}_{t-1}) \cdot \textbf{S}_{t-1}\textbf{G} \\ \hline \textbf{C}_{t-1}[\text{read}(t)] & \quad \textbf{C}_{t-1}[\overline{\text{write}(t)}] \end{array}$$

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$$\begin{array}{c|c} \hline \textbf{Warm-Up Construction} \\ \hline \textbf{S}_{\text{computation}} & \tilde{\textbf{C}}_{t-1} \coloneqq \textbf{S}_{t-1} \textbf{A}_0 - \text{diag}(\textbf{z}_{t-1}) \cdot \textbf{S}_{t-1}\textbf{G} \\ \hline \tilde{\textbf{C}}_{t-1}[\text{read}(t)] & \tilde{\textbf{C}}_{t-1}[\overline{\text{write}(t)}] \\ & \downarrow \text{dual-to-BGG}^+ \\ \textbf{s}_{t-1}'(\textbf{D} - \textbf{z}_{t-1}[\text{read}(t)] \otimes \textbf{G}) \end{array}$$

$$\tilde{\mathbf{C}}_t[\text{write}(t)] \qquad \qquad \tilde{\mathbf{C}}_t[\overline{\text{write}(t)}] \\ \overbrace{\mathbf{C}_t} \coloneqq \mathbf{S}_t \mathbf{A}_0 - \text{diag}(\mathbf{z}_t) \cdot \mathbf{S}_t \mathbf{G}$$

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Instead, we use fresh randomness for

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for some sets U_1, U_2, \ldots, U_T .

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 $U_t\coloneqq \mathsf{write}(t)\cup\mathsf{read}(t)$

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security under evasive LWE? Mhat about noise-growth?


Security

need to show that all the intermediate quantities computed during security under evasive LWE? decryption are jointly pseudorandom IWF What about noise-growth? techniques from [HseihLinLuo23] to handle unbounded depth computation need to use their circular-secure variant of evasive LWE

Security



 construction gets modified accordingly (need to add circular encryptions)

Conclusion

New Encoding and Recoding Techniques

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- ▶ New ABE for Turing Machines with better efficiency

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Thank you!