

Testing Side-Channel Security of Cryptographic Implementations against Future Microarchitectures

Chitchanok Chuengsatiansup and Marco Guarnieri

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Joint work with Gilles. Barthe, Marcel Böhme, Sunjay Cauligi,
Daniel Genkin, David Mateos Romero, Peter Schwabe, David Wu, and Yuval Yarom



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 - ▶ identify many security-critical optimization proposals 😞

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
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
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 - ▶ future microarchitectural optimizations


Our framework




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
Specify leakage models: LMSPEC




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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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-location (register/memory)
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1) generate initial state at random
2) change secret parts to get another state

Test for leakage: LMTEST



Case study

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- 18 microarchitecture optimization (*leakage* clause)

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 - ▶ **CT** constant time,

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- 18 microarchitecture optimization (**leakage** clause)
 - ▶ **CT** constant time, **SS** silent store,

Case study

- 18 microarchitecture optimization ([leakage](#) clause)
 - ▶ **CT** constant time, **SS** silent store, **RFC** register file compression,

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 - ▶ **CT** constant time, **SS** silent store, **RFC** register file compression, **CS** computation simplification, **OP** operand packing, **CR** computation reuse,

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salsa20																		
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 $\langle \text{STL} \rangle$ $\langle \text{RSB}_{\perp} \rangle$ $\langle \text{RSB}_o \rangle$



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poly1305	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦
sha512	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦
hmac	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦
ed25519	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦
x25519	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦
stream-xor	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦
cryptlib																				
aes-cbc	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦
sha512	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦
libnettle																				
aes-cbc	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦
salsa20	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦
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ed25519	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦
x25519	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦
stream-xor	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦
rust-crypto																				
salsa20	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦
poly1305	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦
sha512	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦
ed25519	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦
stream-xor	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦
libjade																				
salsa20	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦
poly1305	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦
sha512	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦
x25519	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦
stream-xor	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦

Example: leak from constant-time swap

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fe25519_cswap(fe25519_limb f[5], fe25519_limb g[5], bool b)
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    mask = (-(int64_t) b);

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
mask = 0 \rightarrow x = 0 \rightarrow xor 0 not changed
CS: xor is simplified

values not swapped \rightarrow memory not modified
SS: stores are suppressed

Summary


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
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- For more details, see <https://arxiv.org/pdf/2402.00641>

