

Hardware/Software Co-design for Hyperelliptic Curve Cryptography (HECC) on the 8051 µP

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Outline

- Introduction and Motivation
- Hyperelliptic Curve Cryptography (HECC)
- Case study: HECC on the 8051 μP
- Results
- Conclusions
- Improvements and Future work



Introduction

- (H)ECC vs. RSA:
 - (H)ECC offers shorter certificates, lower power consumption, more "security per bit"
- HECC: known since 1988 but only recently showed its potential
 - even shorter operands then for ECC
- Fast finite field arithmetic => efficient PKC implementations



Motivation

- Emerging new applications: wireless applications, sensor networks, RFIDs, ...
 - resource limited
 - low-cost, low-power
- PKC is sometimes necessary
 - sw-only solutions are too slow on embedded platforms
 - hardware acceleration is required for computationally intensive operations
 - HW/SW co-design is the only answer



Hyperelliptic Curves (1/2)

A hyperelliptic curve of genus *g* over a finite field *K*:

$$C: y^{2} + h(x)y = f(x)$$
 in $K[x, y]$,

where:

f and h are polynomials, $deg(h) \le g$, deg(f)=2g+1

f is monic

some more conditions should be satisfied



Hyperelliptic Curves (2/2)

Type II curves:

 $C: y^{2} + xy = x^{5} + f_{3}x^{3} + x^{2} + f_{0}$ in K[x, y], A divisor on C is a formal sum of points on C i.e. $D = \sum m_P P$ with a degree $deg(D) = \sum m_P$ Div_0 – divisors of order 0 The Jacobian of C is defined by $Jac(C) = Div_0/P$, where P is the set of all principal divisors (a divisor D is called principal if D = div(f) for some f) Jac(C) is an abelian group => DL system Usual representation D=[u,v], where u is monic of degree 2, deg(v) < deg(u)







Case study: HECC on the μP

- 3 different implementations
 - pure software implementations
 - C implementations
 - mixed C/assembly
 - hardware/software models
 - software routines enhanced with binary field operations performed in hardware
 - 2 options for the data-path



The platform





Hw/sw co-design for ECC/HECC



ATUS : SBOB5: SISTER

Implementations options

- Software Implementations
 - Pure C and C/assembly implementations
 - Compiled onto 8051 using Keil suite
 - Multiplication: comb-based
 - Inversion: Fermat
- 2 options for hardware/software implementations
 - A "multiplier-only" data-path
 - A "multiply-and-add" data-path



First hardware/software solution





Second solution: multiply-and-add data-path





Design environment - GEZEL

- Dalton 8051 ISS was used for simulation of software-only solution
- GEZEL for HW/SW co-design
 - used as a HW description language
 - used to co-simulate the 8051 with a 12 MHz hw module



Results - field operations

Operation	Perf. [# cl. cyc.]	Perf. [ms]@12MHz	XRAM [Bytes]	ROM [Bytes]
Addition (SW)	38 K	3.2	54	608
Multipl. (SW)	650 K	54.1	122	2065
Addition (HW)	28.2 K	2.3	53	934
Multipl. (HW)	28.2 K	2.3	53	934
Inversion (HW)	788.5 K	65.7	75	1835
ab+c (HW)	30.5 K	2.5	44	942



Results - Divisor mult.

Implemen.	FPGA [#LUTs]	Perf. [s]@12MHz	XRAM [Bytes]	ROM [Bytes]
C Inv. in SW	3300	191.7	820	11754
C+ASM Inv.in SW	3300	64.9	820	12284
C+HW Inv. in SW	3600	52	820	11754
C+HW Inv.in HW	3600	4.1518	927	12789
C+HW Inv.in HW modif.d.p.	3781	2.488	936	11524



Comparison with ECC

Implemen.	FPGA [#LUTs]	Perf. [s]@12MHz	XRAM [Bytes]	ROM [Bytes]
ECC: SW	3300	144.5	980	7597
HECC: SW	3300	149.8	1186	13926
ECC: C+HW (1 st)	3868	5.52	980	7597
HECC: C+HW (1 st)	3600	4.1518	927	12789
ECC: C+HW (2 nd)	4210	3.97	910	8739
HECC: C+HW (2 nd)	3781	2.488	936	11524



Results: Summary

- Critical for performance are data transfers
- Modified data-path is more beneficial for HECC
- HECC: faster + less extra hardware
- Co-processor usage: less than 1% in both cases => more speed-up in performance is possible



Conclusions

- HW/SW co-design is a new alternative for low-power and low footprint devices
- HECC can be efficiently implemented on a small 8-bit processor
- Addition of a small HW module results in a substantial speed-up
- Parallelism for group operations can be efficiently exploited

