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Good Is Not Good Enough

Deriving Optimal Distinguishers from Communication Theory

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Motivation

Given a side-channel context

simulations (SNR/leakage model)

measurements

knowledge of the attacker

- Questions raised by the community

What is the best distinguisher among all known ones?

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- Questions raised by the community

What is the best distinguisher among all known ones?

- Question we would like to answer

What is the best distinguisher among all **possible** ones?



Outlook

- Side-channel ↔ communication channel
- Optimal distinguisher
 - Known model
 - Known model on a proportional scale
 - Partially known model
- Empirical results
- What comes next!

SCA as a communication channel

$$\mathbf{X} = \varphi(f(\mathbf{T}, K^*)) + \mathbf{N}$$

leakage

input/output

secret key

noise

device-specific function


algorithmic-specific function

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


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
leakage input/output secret key noise

device-specific function algorithmic-specific function



SCA as a communication channel

- secret key is fixed but unknown
- communication theory: modeled as random
- practice: equal for all messages



Optimal distinguishing rule

- Minimize the probability of error

$$\mathbb{P}_e = \mathbb{P}\{\hat{K} \neq K^*\}$$

Theorem (Optimal distinguishing rule) *The optimal distinguishing rule is given by the maximum a posteriori probability (MAP) rule*

$$\mathcal{D}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{t}) = \arg \max_{k^*} \left(\mathbb{P}\{k^*\} \cdot p(\mathbf{x}|\mathbf{t}, k^*) \right) .$$

If the keys are assumed equiprobable, i.e. $\mathbb{P}\{k\} = 2^{-n}$, the equation reduces to the maximum likelihood distinguishing rule

$$\mathcal{D}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{t}) = \arg \max_{k^*} p(\mathbf{x}|\mathbf{t}, k^*) .$$

Proof given in the paper!

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Template attack
[Chari+2002]

Proof given in the paper!

Optimal attack when the model is known



knows

$$\mathbf{X} = \varphi(f(\mathbf{T}, K^*)) + \mathbf{N}$$

Proposition (Maximum likelihood) When f and φ are known to the attacker such that $\mathbf{Y}(K^*) = \varphi(f(\mathbf{T}, K^*))$, then the optimal decision becomes

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and for equiprobable keys this reduces to

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$$\mathcal{D}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{t}) = \arg \max_{k^*} p(\mathbf{x}|\mathbf{y}(k^*)).$$

Proof given in the paper!

Optimal Attack when the model is known

- Additive and i.i.d. noise

Proposition *When the leakage arises from $\mathbf{X} = \mathbf{Y}(K^*) + \mathbf{N}$, then*

$$p(\mathbf{x}|\mathbf{y}(k^*)) = p_{\mathbf{N}}(\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{y}(k^*)) = \prod_{i=1}^m p_{N_i}(x_i - y_i(k^*)) .$$

This expression depends only on the noise probability distribution $p_{\mathbf{N}}$.

Proof given in the paper!


- Most publications considered Gaussian noise
- Furthermore investigate uniform and Laplacian noise

Gaussian noise distribution

Theorem (Optimal expression for Gaussian noise) *When the noise is zero mean Gaussian, $N \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$, the optimal distinguishing rule is*

$$\mathcal{D}_{opt}^{M,G}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{t}) = \arg \max_{k^*} \langle \mathbf{x} | \mathbf{y}(k^*) \rangle - \frac{1}{2} \|\mathbf{y}(k^*)\|_2^2 .$$

Proof given in the paper!



Gaussian noise distribution


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
Proof given in the paper!

- For large number of measurements
 - the last term becomes key-independent but plays an important role otherwise
 - the optimal distinguisher approximates to the covariance and the correlation
- But not with the absolute value!
- The optimal attack is independent on σ

Uniform and Laplacian noise



uniform



Laplacian

Definition (Noise distributions) Let N be a zero-mean variable with variance σ^2 modeling the noise. Its distribution is:

- Uniform, $N \sim \mathcal{U}(0, \sigma^2)$ if $p_N(n) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{2\sigma\sqrt{3}} & \text{for } n \in [-\sqrt{3}\sigma, \sqrt{3}\sigma] , \\ 0 & \text{otherwise .} \end{cases}$
- Laplacian, $N \sim \mathcal{L}(0, \sigma^2)$ if $p_N(n) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}\sigma} e^{-\frac{|n|}{\sigma/\sqrt{2}}}$.

Uniform and Laplacian noise

Theorem (Optimal expression for uniform and Laplacian noises) *When f and φ are known such that $Y(k) = \varphi(f(K^*, T))$, and the leakage arises from $X = Y(K^*) + N$ with $N \sim \mathcal{U}(0, \sigma^2)$ or $N \sim \mathcal{L}(0, \sigma^2)$, then the optimal distinguishing rule becomes*

- *Uniform noise distribution: $\mathcal{D}_{opt}^{M,U}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{t}) = \arg \max_{k^*} -\|\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{y}(k^*)\|_{\infty}$,*
- *Laplace noise distribution: $\mathcal{D}_{opt}^{M,L}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{t}) = \arg \max_{k^*} -\|\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{y}(k^*)\|_1$.*

Proof given in the paper!

- Novel distinguishing rules
- Cannot be approximated by correlation or covariance

Mono-bit leakage model

- W.l.o.g. $Y(K^*) = \pm 1$
- Then $\|\mathbf{y}(k^*)\|_2^2$ is equal to the number of measurements

$$\mathcal{D}_{opt(1 \text{ bit})}^{M,G}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{t}) = \arg \max_{k^*} \langle \mathbf{x} | \mathbf{y}(k^*) \rangle = \arg \max_{k^*} \sum_{i|y_i(k^*)=1} x_i - \sum_{i|y_i(k^*)=-1} x_i$$

- Not equivalent to the difference-of-means test [Kocher+1999]

$$\mathcal{D}_{KJJ}^{M,G}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{t}) = \arg \max_{k^*} \overline{\mathbf{x}}_{+1} - \overline{\mathbf{x}}_{-1}$$

- Nor to the t-test improvement [Coron+2000]

Model known on a proportional scale



- Model only known on a proportional scale

$$X = aY(K^*) + b + N$$

where a and b are unknown and $a, b \in \mathbb{R}$

- One has to minimize $\|\mathbf{x} - a\mathbf{y}(k) - b\|_2$

Model known on a proportional scale



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where a and b are unknown and $a, b \in \mathbb{R}$

- One has to minimize $\|\mathbf{x} - a\mathbf{y}(k) - b\|_2$

Theorem (Correlation Power Analysis) *Where N is zero-mean Gaussian, the optimal distinguishing rule becomes*

$$\hat{k} = \arg \min_{k^*} \min_{a,b} \|\mathbf{x} - a\mathbf{y}(k^*) - b\|^2 ,$$

which is equivalent to maximizing the absolute value of the empirical Pearson's coefficient:

$$\hat{k} = \arg \max_{k^*} |\hat{\rho}(k^*)| = \frac{|\widehat{\text{Cov}}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}(k^*))|}{\sqrt{\widehat{\text{Var}}(\mathbf{x}) \widehat{\text{Var}}(\mathbf{y}(k^*))}} .$$

Proof given in the paper!

Model only partially known



knows

$$\mathbf{X} = \varphi(f(\mathbf{T}, k^*)) + \mathbf{N}$$


- Leakage arising from a weighted sum of bits

$$X = \sum_{j=1}^n \alpha_j [f(T, K^*)]_j + N$$

- Weights are unknown, *epistemic* noise is present

Model only partially known

- Assumption about the weights
 - Unknown
 - Normally distributed $\alpha_j \sim \mathcal{N}(1, \sigma_\alpha^2)$
 - Fixed over one experiments



Model only partially known

Theorem (Optimal expression when the model is partially unknown)

Let $\mathbf{Y}_\alpha(K^\star) = \sum_{j=1}^n \alpha_j [f(\mathbf{T}, K^\star)]_j$ and $\mathbf{Y}_j(K^\star) = [f(\mathbf{T}, K^\star)]_j$. When assuming that the weights are independently deviating normally from the Hamming weight model, i.e., $\forall j \in \llbracket 1, 8 \rrbracket, \alpha_j \sim \mathcal{N}(1, \sigma_\alpha^2)$, the optimal distinguishing rule is

$$\mathcal{D}_{opt}^{\alpha, G}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{t}) = \arg \max_{k^\star} (\gamma \langle \mathbf{x} | \mathbf{y}(k^\star) \rangle + \mathbf{1})^t \cdot (\gamma Z(k^\star) + I)^{-1} \cdot (\gamma \langle \mathbf{x} | \mathbf{y}(k^\star) \rangle + \mathbf{1}) \\ - \sigma_\alpha^2 \ln \det(\gamma Z(k) + I) ,$$

where $\gamma = \frac{\sigma_\alpha^2}{\sigma^2}$ is the epistemic to stochastic noise ratio (ESNR), $\langle \mathbf{x} | \mathbf{y} \rangle$ is the vector with elements $(\langle \mathbf{x} | \mathbf{y}(k^\star) \rangle)_j = \langle \mathbf{x} | \mathbf{y}_j(k) \rangle$, $Z(k^\star)$ is the $n \times n$ Gram matrix with entries $Z_{j, j'}(k^\star) = \langle \mathbf{y}_j(k^\star) | \mathbf{y}_{j'}(k^\star) \rangle$, $\mathbf{1}$ is the all-one vector, and I is the identity matrix.

Proof given in the paper!

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Proof given in the paper!

- In contrast to linear regression analysis the weights are not explicitly estimated

Empirical evaluation: known model

- Known model, only stochastic noise

$$X = \text{HW}[\text{Sbox}[T \oplus K^*]] + N \quad Y = \text{HW}[\text{Sbox}[T \oplus K^*]]$$

- Compared distinguisher

$$\mathcal{D}_{opt}^{M,G}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{t}) = \arg \max_{k^*} \langle \mathbf{x} | \mathbf{y}(k^*) \rangle - \frac{1}{2} \|\mathbf{y}(k^*)\|_2^2, \quad (\text{Euclidean norm})$$

$$\mathcal{D}_{opt-s}^{M,G}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{t}) = \arg \max_{k^*} \langle \mathbf{x} | \mathbf{y}(k^*) \rangle, \quad (\text{Scalar product})$$


$$\mathcal{D}_{opt}^{M,L}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{t}) = \arg \max_{k^*} -\|\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{y}(k^*)\|_1, \quad (\text{Manhattan norm})$$

$$\mathcal{D}_{opt}^{M,U}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{t}) = \arg \max_{k^*} -\|\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{y}(k^*)\|_\infty, \quad (\text{Uniform norm})$$


$$\mathcal{D}_{Cov}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{t}) = \arg \max_{k^*} |\langle \mathbf{x} - \bar{\mathbf{x}} | \mathbf{y}(k^*) \rangle|, \quad (\text{Covariance})$$

$$\mathcal{D}_{CPA}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{t}) = \arg \max_{k^*} \left| \frac{\langle \mathbf{x} - \bar{\mathbf{x}} | \mathbf{y}(k^*) \rangle}{\|\mathbf{x} - \bar{\mathbf{x}}\|_2 \cdot \|\mathbf{y}(k^*) - \bar{\mathbf{y}}(k^*)\|_2} \right|. \quad (\text{CPA})$$

Gaussian noise




Sigma = 1




Sigma = 6

Laplacian noise




Sigma = 1




Sigma = 6

Uniform noise



Sigma = 1



Sigma = 6

Gaussian noise: partially unknown model

- Stochastic scenario

$$Y_j = [\text{Sbox}[T \oplus K^*]]_j \text{ for } j = 1, \dots, 8$$

$$X = \sum_{j=1}^8 \alpha_j Y_j(K^*) + N$$


$$\alpha_j \sim \mathcal{N}(1, \sigma_\alpha^2)$$

- Optimal distinguisher compared with linear regression attack (LRA)


$$\mathcal{D}_{LRA}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{t}) = \arg \min_{k^*} \frac{\|\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{y}'(k^*) \cdot \hat{\boldsymbol{\alpha}}\|_2^2}{\|\mathbf{x} - \bar{\mathbf{x}}\|_2^2},$$

$$\mathbf{y}'(k) = (\mathbf{1}, \mathbf{y}_1(k), \mathbf{y}_2(k), \dots, \mathbf{y}_8(k))$$

Gaussian noise: partially unknown model




$$\sigma_\alpha = 2, \sigma = 1$$




$$\sigma_\alpha = 4, \sigma = 1$$

Gaussian noise: partially unknown model




$$\sigma_{\alpha} = 2, \sigma = 6$$



$$\sigma_{\alpha} = 4, \sigma = 6$$


Gaussian noise: partially unknown model

200 traces



$$\sigma_\alpha = 2, \sigma = 6$$

60 traces



$$\sigma_\alpha = 4, \sigma = 6$$

Conclusion

- Transformation: SCA problem to communication theory problem
- **Known leakage model**
 - Gaussian noise: optimal distinguisher close to CPA for low SNR
 - Apart from Gaussian noise: optimal distinguishers differ from any known distinguisher
- **One-bit models**: optimal distinguisher close to DoM
- **Proportional scale**: CPA is optimal
- **Partially unknown leakage model**: optimal distinguisher performs better than LRA in the given context

Future work

- Application to real measurements
 - Preliminary step to determine the underlying scenario
 - Quantify the gain in terms of numbers of traces required to break the key, in concrete setups (feasibility OK on DPA contest v4).
- First-order optimal distinguisher (FOOD) to higher-order optimal distinguisher (HOOD) - accepted at ASIACRYPT



Thank you!!

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Questions?

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