

# ElimLin Algorithm Revisited

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- 1 ElimLin Algorithm
- 2 Some Observations and Proofs about Elimlin
- 3 The Relation Between ElimLin and F4
- 4 Conclusion

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## Algebraic Cryptanalysis

- Solving multivariate polynomial representation of a given cipher.
- Initially recognized by Shannon back in 1949.
- Been used to attack various stream ciphers and less frequently block ciphers.
- Requires small number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
- The problem of solving multivariate polynomial systems of equations is NP hard and is referred to as MQ problem.

## Distinct approaches to solve the MQ problem

- Random systems: same number of equations as unknowns
  - No algorithm better than exhaustive search.
- Overdefined systems:
  - Gröbner basis (F4 and F5), XL and MutantXL.
- Sparse systems:
  - XSL, SAT solvers, Raddum-Semaev algorithm and [ElimLin](#).

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**Goals:** What can we learn from the theory behind ElimLin?  
Is it better than the other heuristic techniques or  
is it worse?  
Do we always need sophisticated techniques  
such as Gröbner basis?

## ElimLin Algorithm

- Stands for **E**liminate **L**inear
- Also known as “inter-reduction” in all major algebra systems.
- Devised as a single tool by Courtois to attack DES (2006).
- An algorithm for solving multivariate polynomial systems.
- The degree of the system is maintained during all the steps.
- Finds some (**NOT ALL**) hidden linear equations in the system.
- An extremely simple algorithm, but hard to analyze.
- Almost nothing has been done regarding the theory behind it.
- Might be sufficient for large number of samples.

## ElimLin (a very simple algorithm)

### Repeat

- *Gaussian Elimination*: All the linear equations in the linear span of initial equations are found.
- *Substitution*: Variables are iteratively eliminated in the whole system based on linear equations until there is no linear equation left.

**Until** no new linear equation is obtained in the linear span of the system.



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## Why does ElimLin generate new linear equations?

- Linearization is done first.
- Gaussian elimination does not capture the relation between the monomials.
- After the substitution, new monomials may appear.
- Depending on the substitution, the system we obtain is different.
- Intuitively, depending on the substitution, the result of ElimLin might be different.
- Gröbner basis algorithms: ordering as a prominent factor

Do distinct substitutions and Gaussian eliminations or any bijective affine variable change modify the ElimLin result?

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NO!

See the paper for the proof.

## Characterizing the ElimLin Output

- 1: Input : A set  $\mathcal{S}^0$  of polynomial equations in  $R_d$ .
- 2: Output : A system of linear equations  $\mathcal{S}_L$ .
- 3: Set  $\bar{\mathcal{S}}_L := \emptyset$ .
- 4: **repeat**
- 5:    $\bar{\mathcal{S}}_L \leftarrow \text{Span}(\mathcal{S}^0 \cup (R_{d-1} \times \bar{\mathcal{S}}_L)) \cap R_1$
- 6: **until**  $\bar{\mathcal{S}}_L$  unchanged
- 7: Output  $\mathcal{S}_L$ : a basis of  $\bar{\mathcal{S}}_L$ .

where

$$R_d = \text{Span}(\text{monomials of degree } \leq d) / \text{Ideal}(x_1^2 - x_1, x_2^2 - x_2, \dots, x_n^2 - x_n)$$

## Does ElimLin generate all the hidden linear equations? NO!

An example, demonstrating such an evidence:

- $\ell(x)g(x) + 1 = 0$  over  $\text{GF}(2)$ , where  $\ell(x)$  is a polynomial of degree one and  $g(x)$  is a polynomial of degree at most  $d - 1$ .
- ElimLin on this single equation trivially fails.
- Multiply both sides of the equation by  $\ell(x) + 1$ .
- We obtain:  $\ell(x) = 1$ .

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ElimLin can be extended! (The extension is degree 2-bounded Gröbner basis)



How can we extract more linear equations from the structure of the cipher?

Using more samples: **NOT** independent!

- Multiple instances of the same system with different input/output pairs. Does it help?
- The instances only share the key variables.
- With more samples: the number of equations increases faster than the number of variables.
- We expect the system to collapse when we have enough number of samples.

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How many samples? (still an open problem)

## Some Lightweight Block Ciphers

Later, we attack a few lightweight block ciphers:

- LBlock: a new lightweight Feistel-based block cipher, proposed at ACNS 2011, operates on 64-bit blocks, uses a key of 80 bits and has 32 rounds.
- MIBS: a lightweight Feistel-based block cipher, proposed at CANS 2009, operates on 64-bit blocks, uses a key of 64 or 80 bits and has 32 rounds.
- CTC2: a toy SPN-based block cipher devised by Courtois to evaluate the security of ciphers with respect to algebraic attacks, variable block and key sizes.

**Table:** Attacking 8-round LBlock with 5 pairs and 32 LSB key bits guessed.

| $l$       | $n$        | $m_0$        | $AvS$     | $T$          | $n_L$    | $n_c$       |
|-----------|------------|--------------|-----------|--------------|----------|-------------|
| 1         | 7440       | 22730        | 3         | 16793        | 6376     | 6376        |
| 2         | 1064       | 22730        | 8         | 26386        | 214      | 6590        |
| 3         | 850        | 22730        | 10        | 30368        | 151      | 6741        |
| 4         | 699        | 22730        | 15        | 33097        | 91       | 6832        |
| 5         | 608        | 22730        | 23        | 37005        | 55       | 6887        |
| 6         | 553        | 22730        | 32        | 39058        | 35       | 6922        |
| 7         | 518        | 22730        | 35        | 37629        | 16       | 6938        |
| 8         | 502        | 22730        | 34        | 35748        | 1        | 6939        |
| 9         | 501        | 22730        | 35        | 35709        | 1        | 6940        |
| 10        | 500        | 22730        | 34        | 35509        | 1        | 6941        |
| <b>11</b> | <b>499</b> | <b>22730</b> | <b>34</b> | <b>34649</b> | <b>0</b> | <b>6941</b> |

**Table:** Attacking 8-round LBlock with 6 pairs and 32 LSB key bits guessed.

| $l$      | $n$        | $m_0$        | $AvS$     | $T$          | $n_L$    | $n_c$       |
|----------|------------|--------------|-----------|--------------|----------|-------------|
| 1        | 8784       | 27758        | 3         | 19929        | 7528     | 7528        |
| 2        | 1256       | 27758        | 7         | 31563        | 257      | 7785        |
| 3        | 999        | 27758        | 10        | 36607        | 189      | 7974        |
| 4        | 810        | 27758        | 17        | 41351        | 123      | 8097        |
| 5        | 687        | 27758        | 26        | 48066        | 83       | 8180        |
| 6        | 604        | 27758        | 34        | 46540        | 41       | 8221        |
| 7        | 563        | 27758        | 36        | 42910        | 15       | 8236        |
| <b>8</b> | <b>548</b> | <b>27758</b> | <b>37</b> | <b>41469</b> | <b>8</b> | <b>8244</b> |
| 9        | 540        | 27758        | 32        | 39312        | 24       | 8268        |
| 10       | 516        | 27758        | 16        | 29409        | 126      | 8394        |
| 11       | 390        | 27758        | 19        | 23370        | 108      | 8502        |
| 12       | 282        | 27758        | 20        | 14889        | 87       | 8589        |
| 13       | 195        | 27758        | 15        | 9157         | 122      | 8711        |
| 14       | 73         | 27758        | 4         | 1454         | 71       | 8782        |
| 15       | 2          | 27758        | 0         | 3            | 2        | 8784        |

## Is ElimLin a powerful algorithm?

- ElimLin is a polynomial time algorithm  $O(n_0^5)$  in the initial number of variables.
- Can we show that with polynomial number of samples ElimLin succeeds?
  - Both yes/no answers are of great interest.
  - Yes: already a breakthrough in cryptography.
  - No: for instance, AES can never be broken by algebraic attacks at degree 2.

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Lack of theory, need a very efficient implementation of ElimLin and in general, the Gröbner basis algorithms.

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## Gröbner Basis Algorithms

- Gröbner basis and SAT solving techniques: the most successful methods to solve polynomial systems.
- Both have their own restrictions.
- Gröbner basis approach often needs a large amount of memory.
- Faster than other methods for overdefined dense systems and when the system is over  $\text{GF}(q)$ , where  $q > 2$ .
- Sometimes faster for small systems over  $\text{GF}(2)$ .

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Do we always need sophisticated methods such as Gröbner basis algorithms?

## F4 under PolyBoRi Framework

- PolyBoRi: the most efficient implementation of F4 algorithm (free compared to Magma).
- A C++ library with a Python interface.
- Uses zero-suppressed binary decision diagrams (ZDDs) to store polynomials efficiently in memory.
- It also makes the Gröbner basis computation faster.
- We used polybori-0.8.0 for our experiments.

**Table:** Algebraic attack complexities on reduced-round LBlock using ElimLin and PolyBoRi.

| $N_r$ | #key | $g$ | Running Time<br>(in hours) | Data | Attack<br>notes | CPU     | RAM  |
|-------|------|-----|----------------------------|------|-----------------|---------|------|
| 8     | 80   | 32  | 0.252                      | 6 KP | ElimLin         | 2.8 Ghz | 4 GB |
| 8     | 80   | 32  | crashed!                   | 6 KP | PolyBoRi        | 2.8 Ghz | 4 GB |

$N_r$  : Number of rounds

$g$ : Number of guessed LSB of the key

KP: Known plaintext

**Table:** Algebraic attack complexities on reduced-round MIBS using ElimLin and PolyBoRi.

| $N_r$ | #key | $g$ | Running Time<br>(in hours) | Data  | Attack notes |
|-------|------|-----|----------------------------|-------|--------------|
| 4     | 80   | 20  | 0.137                      | 32 KP | ElimLin      |
| 4     | 80   | 20  | crashed!                   | 32 KP | PolyBoRi     |
| 5     | 64   | 16  | 0.395                      | 6 KP  | MiniSAT 2.0  |
| 5     | 64   | 16  | crashed!                   | 6 KP  | PolyBoRi     |
| 3     | 64   | 0   | 0.006                      | 2 KP  | ElimLin      |
| 3     | 64   | 0   | 0.002                      | 2 KP  | PolyBoRi     |

$N_r$  : the number of rounds

$g$ : the number of guessed LSB of the key

KP: known plaintext

## Going to the higher degrees

- Sometimes, it is enough to stay at degree 2.
- ElimLin solves the system at degree 2.
- Gröbner basis algorithms often break the systems at higher degrees.
- ElimLin is a part of Gröbner basis computations for a specific ordering.
- Since memory is limited, maybe we should not go to higher degrees.
- We used an efficient implementation of the ElimLin algorithm (might not be efficient enough).

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- We shed some light on to how ElimLin works.
- We presented a unique characterization of the set of linear equations in ElimLin in terms of a fixed point.
- Variable ordering or any affine bijective variable change does not modify the result of ElimLin.
- Much more research needs to be done regarding ElimLin:
  - Have a better understanding of how the algorithm works.
  - How the number of linear equations evolves in each iteration?
  - Is polynomial number of samples enough for ElimLin to work?
  - Does ElimLin always succeed with infinite number of samples?
  - At what degree, a system is solvable by ElimLin?
  - Finding a more efficient implementation of the algorithm.



# Questions?