CryptoDB
Security Proofs for an Efficient Password-Based Key Exchange
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Abstract: | Password-based key exchange schemes are designed to provide entities communicating over a public network, and sharing a (short) password only, with a session key (e.g, the key is used for data integrity and/or confidentiality). The focus of the present paper is on the analysis of very efficient schemes that have been proposed to the IEEE P1363 Standard working group on password-based authenticated key-exchange methods, but for which actual security was an open problem. We analyze the AuthA key exchange scheme and give a complete proof of its security. Our analysis shows that the AuthA protocol and its multiple modes of operation are provably secure under the computational Diffie-Hellman intractability assumption, in both the random-oracle and the ideal-cipher models. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2002-11715, title={Security Proofs for an Efficient Password-Based Key Exchange}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={cryptographic protocols / key exchange, dictionary attack}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/192}, note={ David.Pointcheval@ens.fr 12348 received 19 Dec 2002, last revised 23 Oct 2003}, author={Emmanuel Bresson and Olivier Chevassut and David Pointcheval}, year=2002 }