CryptoDB
Revisit Of McCullagh--Barreto Two-Party ID-Based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols
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Abstract: | The recently proposed two-party ID-based authenticated key agreement protocols (with and without escrow) and its variant resistant to key-compromise impersonation by McCullagh & Barreto are revisited. The protocol carries a proof of security in the Bellare & Rogaway (1993) model. In this paper, it is demonstrated that the protocols and its variant are not secure if the adversary is allowed to send a Reveal query to reveal non-partner players who had accepted the same session key. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2004-12307, title={Revisit Of McCullagh--Barreto Two-Party ID-Based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={cryptographic protocols /}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/343}, note={ k.choo@qut.edu.au 12760 received 1 Dec 2004, last revised 7 Dec 2004}, author={Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo}, year=2004 }