CryptoDB
A Block Cipher based PRNG Secure Against Side-Channel Key Recovery
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Abstract: | We study the security of a block cipher-based pseudorandom number generator (PRNG), both in the black box world and in the physical world, separately. We first show that the construction is a secure PRNG in the black box world, relying on standard computational assumptions. Then, we demonstrate its security against a Bayesian side-channel key recovery adversary. As a main result, we show that our construction guarantees that the success rate of the adversary does not increase with the number of physical bservations, but in a limited and controlled way. Besides, we observe that, under common assumptions on side-channel attack strategies, increasing the security parameter (typically the block cipher key size) by a polynomial factor involves an increase of a side-channel attack complexity by an exponential factor, as usually expected for secure cryptographic primitives. Therefore, we believe this work provides a first interesting example of the way the algorithmic design of a cryptographic scheme influences its side-channel resistance. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2007-13636, title={A Block Cipher based PRNG Secure Against Side-Channel Key Recovery}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={implementation / physically observable cryptography, side-channel attacks, provable security, block ciphers, information theory}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/356}, note={ fstandae@uclouvain.be 13764 received 8 Sep 2007, last revised 8 Sep 2007}, author={Christophe Petit and François-Xavier Standaert and Olivier Pereira and Tal G. Malkin and Moti Yung}, year=2007 }