CryptoDB
A Meet-in-the-Middle Collision Attack Against the New FORK-256
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| Abstract: | We show that a $2^{112.9}$ collision attack exists against the FORK-256 Hash Function. The attack is surprisingly simple compared to existing published FORK-256 cryptanalysis work, yet is the best known result against the new, tweaked version of the hash. The attack is based on "splitting" the message schedule and compression function into two halves in a meet-in-the-middle attack. This in turn reduces the space of possible hash function results, which leads to significantly faster collision search. The attack strategy is also applicable to the original version of FORK-256 published in FSE 2006. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2007-13653,
title={A Meet-in-the-Middle Collision Attack Against the New FORK-256},
booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
keywords={secret-key cryptography / FORK-256, Hash Function Cryptanalysis, Meet-in-the-middle},
url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/373},
note={INDOCRYPT 2007 m.saarinen@rhul.ac.uk 13781 received 16 Sep 2007, last revised 25 Sep 2007},
author={Markku-Juhani Olavi Saarinen},
year=2007
}