CryptoDB
Collision Attack on NaSHA-384/512
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Abstract: | In this paper, we present a collision attack on the hash function NaSHA for the output sizes 384-bit and 512-bit. This attack is based on the the weakness in the generate course of the state words and the fact that the quasigroup operation used in the compression function is only determined by partial state words. Its complexity is about $2^{128}$ (much lower than the complexity of the corresponding birthday attack) and its probability is more than $(1- \frac{2}{{2^{64} - 1}})^2$ ($\gg \frac{1}{2}$). |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2009-18253, title={Collision Attack on NaSHA-384/512}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/026}, note={ lizhimin1981@gmail.com 14269 received 11 Jan 2009, last revised 25 Jan 2009}, author={Zhimin Li and Daofeng Li}, year=2009 }